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
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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

THE

ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE



THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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PREFACE

THE present edition of the Ethics was planned on a more ambitious scale twelve years ago, and most of it was written before 1890. At that time I was unaware that Mr Bywater was so soon to give us a revised text, and that Mr Stewart was about to publish his "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics." When these facts came to my knowledge, I laid my own work aside, as I could not suppose it would any longer be required. But, when the publishers informed me that they intended to bring out an edition of a less elaborate kind, and asked me to undertake it, I felt that it might be worth while to bring the work I had already done into more moderate compass, especially as I was conscious that my method of interpretation was a somewhat novel one, and might possess a certain interest for students of Aristotle. I had come to the conclusion that most of the difficulties that have been raised about the Ethics were due to the fact that, though the dialectical character of many passages had long been admitted, commentators had never thoroughly recognised that the treatise was dialectical throughout. They had tried to find in it the scientific and metaphysical basis of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy, and when they discovered instead that the foundations of the doctrine here set forth were of the most shifting character, taken as they are at one time from the opinions of ordinary people, at another from

popular Platonism, they have been ready to accuse Aristotle of inconsistency, or to doubt the authenticity of the treatise in its present form. There are indications in the writings of Diels and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff referred to in the Introduction that a different view is gaining ground in Germany, and this edition is a humble contribution to its advancement.

From the nature of the case, the text I have given is a somewhat eclectic affair, and is not intended as a contribution to Aristotelian criticism. It would doubtless have been more convenient for the student if I had simply reprinted Professor Bywater's text as it stands, but such a proceeding would hardly have been justifiable. I have therefore taken as a basis my own revision of Bekker's text, made with the help of Susemihl's edition ten years ago. As was to be expected, it presents some points of resemblance to Professor Bywater's text, though I have been less decided in preferring K^b to L^b where these MSS. differ. I had published a few of my notes on the text in the *Classical Review* before the publication of Professor Bywater's edition, and had hit upon some of the corrections he has introduced, a fact which he has most generously acknowledged. It is, however, in matters of punctuation that I owe most to Professor Bywater. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the improved punctuation he has given us is as good as an exegetical commentary, based as it is on an unrivalled knowledge of Aristotle's use of language. It will be understood that I have not hesitated to adopt many of Mr Bywater's readings, including a considerable number that he has not received into the text himself. The text of the Eudemian extracts which, for reasons given in the Introduction, I have printed at the bottom of the page, is mainly Susemihl's. I regret that I have not been able to make more use of the notes which Dr Henry Jackson is now contributing to the *Journal of Philology*, though I have been able to incorporate a few of

his suggestions, and especially the admirable conjecture by which he has restored to us a new fragment of Eunikos (p. 375).

It is inevitable that, in a commentary like the present, most of the illustrations should be old, though I think I may claim to have added some new ones. I have, of course, made constant use of Bonitz's Index, and that indeed is the source of the greater part of my quotations. My own contribution to the illustration of the Ethics lies chiefly in the direction of tracing the originals of many passages in Plato and Isokrates. This was closely connected with my general method of interpretation, and I may fairly claim that some of the material has been collected for the first time; but no one can be more conscious than I am how much still remains to be done in this field.

I owe much to conversations with my friends, especially Mr J. A. Smith and Mr Joachim, on difficult points, and it has not always been easy for me to distinguish what is mine and what is theirs. Dr Latta gave me the quotation from Leibniz which illustrates 1166 a, 20-22. The Index is mainly the work of Miss E. M. Samson.

J. B.

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INTRODUCTION

I.

§ 1. AMONG the writings that have come down to us as Aristotle's, there are three that bear the title "Ethics." This makes it necessary to state at the outset the critical assumptions on which the present essay in interpretation is based, and which, so far as it is successful, it tends to confirm. Every interpretation implies some critical hypothesis, and our acceptance or rejection of that hypothesis must in turn depend mainly on its adequacy as a basis for interpretation.

§ 2. We may fairly take it for granted that the so-called *Magna Moralia* is a Peripatetic hand-book written after Aristotle's time; for all competent judges are now agreed upon this. Still, as it shows no trace of Stoic influence or of opposition to Stoic views, it cannot well be later than the third century B.C., and is therefore evidence of the school tradition at a time when there was still a school with a living tradition¹. The other two treatises present a more difficult problem. They both profess to be Aristotle's; but the first of them is called after Nikomachos, his natural son, the other after one of his most illustrious scholars, Eudemos of Rhodes. It is true that these titles first occur in a quotation from the Platonist Atticus, who lived in the time of the Antonines, but they are certainly much older. Cicero knew the *Nikomachean Ethics* by its present title; for he is inclined to think Nikomachos was actually its author. Aspasios, the earliest of the Aristotelian commentators, has already to face the question whether the discussion of Pleasure in Book VII is the work of Aristotle or Eudemos². We may be sure, then, that these titles go back to Alexandrian times at least, and that they were found in the edition of Andronikos; but there

is no authoritative tradition as to their meaning. We can hardly accept the statement that the present work is that of Nikomachos; for, according to the biographical tradition, which is founded on contemporary documents, he died while still a lad³. He would be too young, then, to write the Ethics, though he may have been old enough to edit his father's lectures under the guidance of Theophrastos. On the other hand, we cannot adopt the view of the later Greek commentators that the treatises were dedicated to Nikomachos and Eudemos respectively. This would imply that Aristotle himself prepared his lectures for publication, which is contrary to everything that can reasonably be inferred from the books themselves and others like them. Following the analogy of the Theophrastean and Eudemean Physics and Metaphysics, most modern scholars agree in regarding the Nikomachean Ethics as substantially the work of Aristotle himself, and in assigning the Eudemean to Eudemos; but the meaning of this conclusion differs widely according as the critic holds that the three central books are rightly placed in the one treatise or in the other. For the most serious difficulty is just this, that, according to our tradition, Books V—VII of the Nikomachean Ethics are identical with Books IV—VI of the Eudemean.

¹ Zeller's Aristotle, Eng. Trans. vol. ii, p. 497.

² Cicero de Finibus, v, 5, 12. Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristotelis, sed non video quare non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Aspasios, p. 151, 21 (Heylbut) ἐπεὶ ἔν γε τοῖς Νικομαχείοις, ἐνθα διειληπται καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς Ἀριστοτέλης σαφῶς εἰρηκεν αὐτὴν μὴ ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἀλλὰ παρακολουθεῖν "ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀκμαίοις τὴν ὥραν." σημεῖον δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τοῦτ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλ' Εὐδήμου τὸ ἐν τῷ <δεκάτῳ> λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς οὐδέπω περὶ αὐτῆς διειλεγμένου· πλὴν εἴτε Εὐδήμου ταῦτά ἐστιν εἴτε Ἀριστοτέλους, ἐνδόξως εἴρηται. For the other references, see Zeller, vol. i, p. 97, n. 1.

³ He died in battle as a *μειρακίσκος* according to the biographers. Cf. the will of Theophrastos in D. L. v, 51. We must remember that the wills of Aristotle and Theophrastos were preserved in the school as charters of foundation. A Greek philosophical school was a corporation like a college, and had to keep its titles.

§ 3. From the nature of the case, most arguments on this subject are apt to involve a *petitio principii*. If we suppose

that these three books are in any sense the work of Aristotle, or even a fair reproduction of his thought, it becomes very hard to maintain that there is such a thing as a distinctively "Eudemian" doctrine; for the undoubtedly Eudemian books only differ from their Nikomachean counterparts in matters of detail and emphasis. On the other hand, if we hold that the three books are the original and independent work of Eudemos, we have to admit that we know nothing of Aristotle's views on some of the most important subjects, and that we have therefore no means of telling whether Eudemos gives us a faithful account of them or not. Of course it would be a different matter if, as some critics hold, any real inconsistency could be detected between the teaching of the doubtful books and the remainder of either treatise. I have tried to interpret them on the assumption that there is none, with what success the commentary must show. It would also alter the case if it could be shown that the central books contain expressions and thoughts not to be found in the undoubtedly Nikomachean books but easily paralleled from the undoubtedly Eudemian. But this argument loses all force when it is shown that these suspicious phrases and ideas can be matched from other works of which the Aristotelian origin has never been called in question, and that some of them even go back to Plato. This I believe I have shown in all important cases.

The assumption made in this edition, then, is that the disputed books are really Aristotle's, an assumption which may be provisionally commended by two general considerations. The interpretation of Book V is notoriously difficult owing to the use made in it of mathematical formulas which are not always clear, and which seem to give the writer almost as much trouble as they have given to his editors. Now Mathematics was just the one province of human knowledge in which Aristotle did not show himself a master, while Eudemos was one of the foremost mathematicians of an age in which that science made more progress than it ever did again till the seventeenth century. We can understand that Aristotle felt bound by the Platonic tradition to treat

Justice mathematically, but we can hardly understand Eudemos of Rhodes discussing so simple a matter as proportion in a way which, whatever we may think of it, has certainly produced an astonishing divergence in the interpretations of the most competent editors. The other point is this. The difficulties of Books VI and VII arise, as we shall see, from the presence in them of a dialectical element and a neglect of formal symmetry far more characteristic of the master than the scholar. If we look at the way in which Eudemos has reproduced the substance of Books VIII—IX, we shall find it very hard to believe that he would not have given us a more neatly formulated account of the "intellectual virtues," and a less puzzling discussion of the relations between thought and feeling. There is a higher art in Aristotle's apparent confusion, and the spirit of the Platonic dialogue with its tentative arguments and provisional conclusions still lives in his dialectic procedure. He is seeking the truth along with his hearers and not expounding a ready-made system. We do not expect this from Eudemos, whose chief interest would lie in giving a faithful reproduction of his master's thought, and who would not feel in the same way the need of leading his audience step by step from the Academic standpoint to his own; but we do expect a more dogmatic and perspicuous exposition.

§ 4. Now, if this is the true account of the relation of Eudemos to Aristotle, it follows at once that we have in the Eudemian Ethics the most authoritative commentary on the *Nikomachean*. I have assumed that Eudemos gives us the thought of Aristotle, as he understood it, as faithfully as he can, though it is plain enough that he has added a good deal from other Aristotelian sources in order to bring out more clearly what he took to be the meaning, and even that he has here and there given a turn of his own to what Aristotle had said. The burden of proof certainly lies with those who maintain anything else; for it is clear that this is what Theophrastos and Eudemos did in the case of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. They followed the main lines, passing

lightly over those parts where Aristotle was full and clear, but formulating more precisely and discussing more minutely those subjects he had left with a less finished treatment. This statement, which is made on good authority of Theophrastos¹, is true also of the Eudemean Physics, as we can see from the numerous quotations in Simplicius². The Ethics of Theophrastos is unfortunately lost; but the few fragments we possess confirm the general impression so far as they go³. It is significant that one of these fragments is distinctly an amplification of a sentence in one of the disputed books⁴.

In view of all this, I have thought it right to print the relevant passages of Eudemos under the text to which they refer, and I have always hesitated to adopt an interpretation different from his. We must remember that he was in all probability there when the lectures were given, and that he would talk over all the difficulties with the master. We really cannot expect to know what Aristotle meant much better than he did, and we should always make the most of first-hand evidence. The superficial paraphrases of Byzantine commentators are quoted to-day as if those Graeculi had any authority in the matter; but the Eudemean Ethics, which takes us back to the Peripatos itself, has been too much neglected.

¹ Boethius Hermen. ii, 12, 9 In omnibus de quibus ipse disputat post magistrum leviter ea tangit quae ab Aristotele dicta antea cognovit, alias vero diligentius res non ab Aristotele tractatas consequitur. Priscianus Lydus, 33, 6 (Bywater) ἐκθέμενος τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους...ἐπιδιαρθροῖ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ ἐπαπορεῖ τινα.

² Simplicius has preserved a significant fragment of a correspondence between Eudemos and Theophrastos with regard to the text of the Physics (Zeller, vol. i, p. 136). Further, Simplicius, who had the Eudemean Physics before him, says in one place (p. 411, 37 Diels) μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Εὐδήμος ὁ γνησιώτατος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων. There can indeed be no doubt that he reproduced the teaching of Aristotle's Physics much more faithfully than Theophrastos. It is surely arbitrary to assume that he did anything else than this in the case of the Ethics, though no doubt his strong theological interest has coloured his account of the "Contemplative Life."

³ On the Ethics of Theophrastos, see G. Heylbut in the Archiv, vol. i, p. 194 sqq. and the notes on 1100 b, 29. 1123 a, 19. 1144 b, 33. 1145 a, 6. 1153 b, 19. 1154 b, 13.

⁴ Cf. 1154 b, 13 (from the "Eudemean" discussion of pleasure) ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχεύουσα with Theophrastos quoted by Aspasios, p. 156, 17 (Heylbut) ἐξελαύνει ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τε ἐναντία, ὅσον κ.τ.λ....καὶ ἡ τυχεύουσα, τοῦτέστιν κ.τ.λ....

II.

§ 5. All this is of course inconsistent with the widely-spread view that the Aristotelian corpus has come down to us in a more or less unauthentic form. Some recent scholars have gone great lengths in the assumption of "dislocations" and "duplicate passages," so far indeed that if they were right we could hardly say we possessed the works of Aristotle at all in any natural sense of the words. In its crudest form, this theory has been used to justify wholesale transpositions of sentences, paragraphs, and chapters to any place where, in the editor's opinion, they would be more appropriate. But it is very hard to see how the process of shuffling which this implies could actually have occurred¹. Even the story of the cellar at Skepsis does not suggest that the works of Aristotle were picked up in little bits like an Egyptian papyrus at the present day and pieced together as well as might be. And the external evidence that the works of Aristotle were known substantially in their present form from the time of Theophrastos to that of Andronikos is overwhelming. The rise of Stoicism would be inconceivable unless we might assume that the more important works of Aristotle were easily accessible. In this extreme form, then, the theory may be dismissed². But, in the form given to it by Professor Cook Wilson after Torstrik³, the theory of "duplicate passages" requires more serious consideration. According to this, the Aristotelian matter with which the early editors had to deal was regarded as sacred, and their chief aim was to prevent the loss of any of it. So several different versions of the same discussion were combined into a single treatise just as a "harmony of the gospels" might be. The possibility of this is undeniable and the facts upon which the theory is based are certain. It is the case that, in certain parts of the work, Aristotle appears to discuss the same subject several times over, and that these discussions are frequently inconsistent and apparently quite independent of each other. But I have tried to show that this fact admits of another explanation. The

Ethics is, and from the nature of the case must be, a dialectical and not a demonstrative work, and it is, as we shall see, entirely in accordance with Aristotle's own view of the method which is appropriate in such a case to give as many solutions of the difficulties which arise as can be given, without any regard to the real philosophical validity of those solutions. If it can be shown that these apparent duplicates are really successive applications of the different dialectical *τόποι* appropriate to the subject, the critical problem does not arise. Aristotle is not committed to all or any of the solutions he gives any more than Plato is committed to the successive definitions of knowledge given in the *Theaitetos*. Nor can we even assume that the true solution is necessarily given at all. It often is given; but it was contrary to Aristotle's own principles to base the exposition of *Politics* on his metaphysical system.

¹ I do not mean to deny that there are traces of editing, and clumsy editing too, in the *Ethics*. In particular, many of the summaries and transitions break the argument in a way that can hardly be attributed to Aristotle himself, and which we do not observe in his more finished works. But this does not detract seriously from the integrity of the text. We may ascribe these connecting tags to *Nikomachos* if we please.

² It is really impossible to resist the arguments adduced by Zeller (*Aristotle*, Chapter III.) in favour of the view that the works of Aristotle as we have them were known and used all through the period from his death down to the recension of *Andronikos*. The statement that the successors of *Theophrastos* were ignorant of the physical and metaphysical treatises is simply untrue, as is proved by the whole history of philosophy in the third century B.C.

³ *Aristotelian Studies*, 1 (Oxford, Clarendon Press).

§ 6. The plausibility of all these theories is enhanced by certain undeniable peculiarities of style, and these must be explained at once if we are to judge the work fairly. It is clear to begin with that we have not before us a book intended for publication in the ordinary sense of the word. Primarily it is the manuscript of a course of lectures intended for the lecturer's own use, and also doubtless for consultation by members of the school. In any case the writings of *Theophrastos* and *Eudemos* had, so far as we can see, exactly the same character, and no account of that character

which applies only to the Aristotelian corpus can be accepted. What we have to explain is not the form in which Aristotle's works have come down to us, but the nature of the Peripatetic *ἀκρόασις*. "Now," as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff puts it¹, "there has been no lack of people who have tried to force upon Aristotle the pedantry of a well-paragraphed lecture note-book that sends the audience to sleep. We must allow, indeed, that as an oral teacher he had the vice of recapitulations and of declarations that now one subject has been exhausted and it is the turn of the next. But that is just the public speaker's vice, and if we take the akroamatic writings as spoken discourses, they lose much of what certainly annoys the reader. It is clear, however, that Aristotle was eloquent only with the pen, or he would not have written out all the indifferent stuff as well." The point of view here indicated appears to me the right one, and we may be glad that Aristotle found it necessary to write down what he was going to say word for word, and that his pupils, as was natural, caught the trick from him.

¹ Aristoteles und Athen, vol. i, p. 66, n. 37.

§ 7. But there is a further peculiarity in the style of such works as the *Ethics* which is of great importance for their right understanding, and which has been most distinctly brought out by Diels¹. He has called attention to the curious fact that "we read on through long tracts of his ordinary dry prose, and are suddenly surprised by a charming oasis. It is observable too that in those more literary and popular passages we usually find a Platonic element, a reference to Platonic 'divisions' and Platonic dialogues. In this respect the *Ethics* holds a middle place between the purely scientific writings and the wholly popular such as the *Rhetoric*." How natural this is we shall see when we come to consider Aristotle's method in the *Ethics*; here it will be sufficient to quote the explanation given by Diels himself. He says:—

"I can think of no other ground for this alternation, to speak for the present only of the *Nikomachean Ethics*, than

a paedagogic one. Aristotle saw before him at the lecture on Ethics of which this treatise is the reflexion, hearers of riper years (1095 a, 1), whose minute familiarity with the Platonic dialogues he could count upon unconditionally, just as the audience at his course on Rhetoric must have had a number of model speeches, especially those of Isokrates, in their heads. So he gave them first the skeleton of his doctrine, and then tried to clothe it with flesh and blood by explanations in a more popular style and by instructive digressions, to bring it nearer to the understanding of his scholars by attaching it to what was familiar and exoteric. This certainly introduces some unevenness into the terminology and treatment, which has often had a confusing effect and has led some to assume a discrepancy of doctrine where there is really nothing but an accommodation of the expression to his Platonically schooled public."

Diels goes on to show the truth of this by a most skilful analysis of the opening of Book I, of which I have made free use in my notes. If I have succeeded in showing that the rest of the Ethics lends itself just as easily to the same treatment, the substantial unity and integrity of the work will become much more credible.

¹ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i, pp. 494 sqq.

III.

§ 8. Besides the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, there are several ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics. Only two of these are of real value, the commentary of Aspasios (2nd century A.D.) and the relevant parts of the *Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις* of Alexander of Aphrodisias. These two works contain genuine Peripatetic tradition and are often of service in interpreting the treatise. They also throw very considerable light upon the text by preserving readings older than those of our MSS. The commentaries of Michael (11th century A.D.) and Eustratios (12th century A.D.) with the 14th century Paraphrase now attributed to Heliodoros of

Prusa are of the usual Byzantine type and add little or nothing to our knowledge¹.

¹ The commentaries on the Ethics have been edited by Heylbut for the Royal Prussian Academy (Berlin, 1889). For Alexander's *Ἀποραι καὶ λύσεις* see the edition of Ivo Bruns in the *Supplementum Aristotelicum* vol. ii.

§ 9. The modern commentaries on the Ethics of earlier date than the present century may be divided into two classes, those that throw light upon the argument and those that illustrate the language. Of the former class, the most valuable is the commentary of Giphanius, while the edition of Zell is a most useful summary of the latter. Michelet's edition (Berlin 1829) contains many good things, though his method of interpretation is somewhat arbitrary. Sir Alexander Grant's commentary was the first attempt to explain Aristotle's real meaning in accordance with the methods of historical criticism. However much we may differ from it in detail, it is a work of permanent value. Ramsauer's edition is difficult to work with and hardly marks an advance. Professor Stewart's "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics" is a work of great learning and provides a store of matter from which all subsequent writers on the subject will continue to draw. Dr Henry Jackson has given us an edition of Book V, and there is an admirable little edition of Book X by Monsieur G. Rodier (Paris, Delagrave, 1897). Fritzsche's editions of the Eudemian Ethics and of Books VIII and IX of the Nikomachean Ethics contain much interesting matter, and the tracts of Rassow and Susemihl may always be consulted with profit.

IV.

§ 10. With the Ethics we enter upon that part of Aristotle's system which has to do with Man, "the philosophy of things human," as he once calls it¹ in the popular phraseology of his time. From the nature of the case, the philosophy of Man as studied by men must be a practical and not a theoretical science; for that is the true division of the sciences and is rightly put in the forefront by Eudemos². It is true, as Zeller has pointed out³, that this particular

classification is nowhere expressly made by Aristotle himself, but that is only because it was a Platonic "division"⁴ and might therefore be assumed. It is the only one recognised by the early Peripatetics and it is certainly implied by very many passages in Aristotle. Thought has only two forms; it is always either (1) theoretical or (2) practical and productive, and the difference between these is that the former has to do with things which are either immoveable or have their source of motion in themselves, while the latter deals with such things as require an external cause to set them in motion, things which have their efficient or motive cause in something else, that is to say in human will or skill⁵. We must not be misled by the minor distinction between practical and productive. Now and then it becomes desirable for dialectical purposes to mark the difference between those sciences which have some action as their end and those which produce some external product, and then the latter are more properly called arts than sciences. But this distinction is referred by Aristotle himself to "extraneous discussions,"⁶ and he seldom or never makes serious use of it. As a general rule the terms "practical science," "productive science" and "art" are used quite indiscriminately.

¹ 1181 b, 15.

² EE. 1214 a, 10 quoted on p. 7.

³ Eng. Trans. vol. i, p. 181 sqq.

⁴ Cf. Polit. 258 e *Ταύτη τοίνυν συμπάσας ἐπιστήμης διαίρει, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν προσειπῶν, τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικὴν.*

⁵ We find *θεωρητικὸς νοῦς* opposed to *πρακτικὸς* (De An. 407 a, 25. 415 a, 11. 432 b, 27. 435 a, 15), and so Met. 1026 a, 25 *πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ (1) πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ (2) θεωρητικὴ*. Cf. also Met. 1025 b, 18 *ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνει οὕσα περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος (περὶ γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐστὶν οὐσίαν ἐν ᾗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ), ὁῖον ὅτι οὔτε πρακτικὴ ἐστὶν οὔτε ποιητικὴ, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις.*

⁶ Cf. 1140 a, 3. It is characteristic that the appearance of a threefold division is commonest in the Topics. Cf. 145 a, 15 *θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὴ καὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται (ἢ ἐπιστήμη)*; 157 a, 16 *τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μὲν θεωρητικαὶ αἱ δὲ πρακτικαὶ αἱ δὲ ποιητικαὶ*. But the true doctrine is given in EN 1139 b, 1 *αὕτη γὰρ (sc. ἡ ἐνεκά του διάνοια) καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχει.*

§ 11. A practical science or art, then, such as that of the statesman¹ is essentially a source of change in something else,

the efficient cause of motion in something which has no motive cause in itself. Some things are wholly immoveable, and these are the objects of First Philosophy and Mathematics; other things, though moveable, have their source of motion and rest in themselves¹. A tree grows of itself, a house is brought into being by the art of the housebuilder. Those things which have their motive cause in themselves are the sphere of Nature; Art or Practical Science has to do with things which have to be moved from outside. It is true, as we shall see, that in some cases the same result may be produced by Nature and by Art. Health, for instance, may be the result of the natural growth of the body, or it may be artificially produced by the doctor. There are other things, again, that can only be produced by art and do not come into existence by nature at all². Any classification based solely on the nature of the objects would, therefore, be endlessly complicated. We must hold fast to the simple distinction based on the fundamental difference between theoretical and practical or productive intelligence.

¹ Plato had referred the science of the king or statesman to the cognitive class (Polit. 259 c); Aristotle, on the contrary, never tires of insisting on its practical character. This is a fundamental distinction, and is well brought out by Eudemos. Cf. EE. 1216 b, 3 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτερος φησὶ εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἐπεζητεῖ τί ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐπολεῖ γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως· ἐπιστήμης γὰρ φησὶ εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβάλειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμεν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι, διόπερ ἐζητεῖ τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἄλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμῃς· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρήσιμους αὐτὰς ἡμῖν)· τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἰατρικῆς, εὐνομία δὲ ἥ τι τοιοῦθ' ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς. καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἕκαστον τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμωτάτον τί ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρείοι, οὐδὲ τί ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.

² Met. 1026 a, 13 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἓνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὅλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.... ὥστε τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογικὴ.

² Cf. 1140 a, 18. Part. An. 640 a, 28 *ἐνια γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου γίνεται ταῦτὰ τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης*. Met. 1034 a, 9 *ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίνεται καὶ τέχνη καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ' οὐ, οἷον οἰκία, κ.τ.λ.*

§ 12. Each of these kinds of science has its own good or end, something that makes it worth knowing; but this will be different in each case. The end of theoretical science cannot be to make any change in its object; for that object is either incapable of change altogether or at least of all change from an external source. In theoretical science we are, therefore, simply in the position of spectators, and this is the original signification of the word *θεωρία*. The end or good of such science lies in conformity to reality, and this conformity is truth. When we have reached this, we have reached the completion (τέλος) of the science, and there is nothing beyond it for us to attain¹.

If, however, the object of a science is something which has not its source of motion in itself, our relation to it at once becomes different. If the efficient cause is in ourselves, it becomes possible for us to realise the object of our science, and this realisation becomes the "end" or completion of the science. The object of it is no longer "what is" (τὸ ὄν), but the *γένεσις* of "what is to be" (τὸ ἐσόμενον); we are no longer spectators but actors². Popular language already uses the word *δύναμις* for such a science³, and this is quite correct; for the definition of *δύναμις* is just *ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ*⁴.

¹ Met. 993 b, 20 *θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια, πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον*. ib. 1051 b, 3 *ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἶόμενος διηρησθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκείσθαι, ἐφύεσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα*.

² An. Post. 100 a, 9 *ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης*. Part. An. 640 a, 3 *ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὄν, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐσόμενον*.

³ Plato, Polit. 304 d *ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δύναμις*. Isokr. Panath. § 30 *τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις διαφερόντων*. So Ar. Met. 1046 b, 2 *διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβολητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾧ ἄλλο*.

⁴ Met. 1020 a, 4 *ὥστε ὁ κύριος ὅρος τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβολητικῇ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾧ ἄλλο*. De Cael. 301 b, 18 *φύσις μὲν ἐστίν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχουσα κινήσεως ἀρχή, δύναμις δ' ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾧ ἄλλο*. The addition ἢ ᾧ ἄλλο is intended to provide for such cases as the physician healing himself.

V.

§ 13. We see that there are many practical and productive sciences or arts, just as there are many things that are good for Man; but we see also that the ends of some of those arts are subordinate to those of others. Plato had already divided arts into those that "make" and those that "use," those that make the tools and those that make the thing itself. The art of weaving uses the art of shuttle-making, and therefore the shuttle-maker must take his instructions as to the proper form of shuttles from the weaver, just as the weaver in turn takes his instructions as to cloth from the tailor. In the same way, to take an illustration which was in Aristotle's mind when he wrote the first chapter of the "Ethics," the maker of bridles must take his instructions from the horseman who uses them¹. This relation of the higher to the lower arts is otherwise expressed by saying that the former are "architectonic" with regard to the lower, a term also of Platonic origin².

Now, for reasons which will be explained presently, there must be some one good which is in a pre-eminent sense the Good for Man, and to which all other goods are subservient, and it is the art of producing this we are to study now. Clearly, if we wish to know what this art is, we must ask what is the art that "uses" all the other arts, the most "architectonic" of the practical sciences, the science that has the plan of human life as the master-builder has the plan of the house. This point too has been settled by Plato; for he has shown that the two sciences which are most apt to claim the chief place, namely Rhetoric and Strategy, are both subordinate to Politics³. This, then, is the art or science we must study if we wish to produce the Good for Man⁴.

¹ Plato, *Krat.* 390 c (of the *kerkis*) *τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος εἰ τὸ προσήκον εἶδος ἐν ὅποιον ξύλῳ κείται; ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος, ὁ ὑφάντης;* The *χρησομένη τέχνη* is said *ἐπιστατεῖν τῇ ποιούσῃ*. In *Polit.* 281 d the distinction is expressed as one between *αἰτίαι* and *συναίτιοι τέχναι*. We read there *ὅσαι μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργούσαις ὄργανα παρασκευάζουσιν, ταύτας μὲν συναίτιους, τὰς δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀπεργαζομένας αἰτίας*. The

example of *χαλινοποιική* in EN. 1094 a, 11 is a clear allusion to Rep. 601 c (where a third art, the imitative, is added) *Ζωγράφος, φάμεν, ἥντας τε γράφει καὶ χαλινόν; Ναί. Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπατεῖ οἷας δεῖ τὰς ἡντίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ γραφεύς; ἢ οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας, ὃ τε χαλκεύς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκείνος, ὅσπερ τούτοις ἐπιστάται χρῆσθαι, μόνος ὁ ἱππικός; Ἀληθές-τατα. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ πάντα οὕτω φήσομεν ἔχειν; Πῶς; Περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην; Ναί.*

² The term *ἀρχιτεκτονικός* is derived from Plato Polit. 259 c καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργάτης ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἀρχων. He furnishes γνώσις and not χειρουργία. On the other hand he is not merely κρητικός but ἐπιτακτικός. So in Ar. Phys. 194 a, 36 we have δύο δὴ αἱ ἀρχουσαι τῆς θλῆς καὶ αἱ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι, ἣ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς.

³ The problem of Plato's "Statesman" is to distinguish by the use of dialectics the true King or Statesman from the countless claimants of the title. After the kingly art has been distinguished from the other arts of tending live animals in herds, we have still to distinguish it from the other arts within the state, both those which produce the things themselves (αἱ αἰτίαι) and those which produce the tools for making them (αἱ συναίτιοι). After enumerating seven classes of arts which produce inanimate possessions, we come to the animate. We pass in review slaves, hirelings, heralds, secretaries and priests, till at last we have left only τὰ τίμια καὶ συγγενῇ, namely στρατηγία, δικαστική and the highest kind of ῥητορεία (Polit. 303 e, cf. EN. 1094 b, 3).

Now, if we take any art, we find that there is a higher art which prescribes whether we are to learn it or not (Polit. 304 b, cf. EN. 1094 b, 1), and the other arts must yield precedence to this. So Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, must yield precedence to the art which decides whether persuasion or force is to be used, and Strategy, the art of war, must yield to the art which determines whether we are to be at war or at peace. That Aristotle had all this in mind when he wrote the first chapter of the Ethics is plain, not only from its general tenour, but from coincidences of language such as πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις (1094 a, 12 n.), the use of *ἕναμις* (§ 12, n. 3), the phrase αἱ τιμώταται τῶν δυνάμεων and the like. The argument was familiar in the Platonic school and is found also in the Euthydemus (189—191). —

⁴ The interpretation of the first chapter of the Ethics here implied is, so far as I know, a new one. It is generally supposed that the passage deals with ends in general and not simply with the distinction between the ends of theoretical and practical science and the proof that the end of the most architectonic of the practical sciences will be the good for Man. The external evidence for the interpretation I have adopted consists of (1) the obvious fact that Aristotle is simply reproducing the familiar argument of Plato given above, n. 3, (2) the brief syllogistic summary of the argument in the Politics, 1282 b, 14, quoted on p. 7, (3) the tradition of the school as represented by MM. 1182 a, 32 sqq., quoted on p. 6.

§ 14. A modern writer who wished to draw a distinction between Ethics and Politics would probably rest his case on the view that the good of the individual is something different

Such an idea, however, is wholly foreign to Aristotle's way of thinking. No one knew better than he did that a happiness which is not the happiness of individual souls is nothing at all. The state as such has no good that can be secured at the expense of the individuals who compose it. What Aristotle did hold was that, if we wish to find the Good for Man, we must seek it in a community of some sort; for man is by nature a being who finds his good only in a community, and can only find it completely in the most "full-grown" or complete community, that is, in the city-state. Lesser communities like the family and the village are enough for the needs of bare life; but Man's nature requires more than this for its full development, and it is the state alone that can secure for him the good life¹.

On the other hand, it is true that the organisation of the state involves a restriction of happiness in the fullest sense to certain of its members. The state exists for the sake of the comparatively few rare souls that are able to lead the highest life, and it is undeniable that the rest are to some extent sacrificed to these. But in reply to this Aristotle would say that in a well-ordered state all the citizens have such happiness as they are capable of, and we cannot ask for more. Even slavery, which Aristotle regarded as necessary and natural, he at least attempted to justify on the ground that it is best for the slave himself to be the "living tool" which enables his master to lead the good life. Were it not that some men are "slaves by nature," slavery would be unjustifiable altogether².

¹ Pol. 1252 b, 28 (after a description of the *oikía* and the *κώμη*) ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἥ δὴ πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὰ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἥ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φάμεν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας (cf. below § 27).

² Aristotle therefore condemns the indiscriminate treatment of prisoners of war as slaves (Pol. 1255 a, 24); τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πρᾶθῆναι ληθθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον.

§ 17. There is another mistaken view of the identification of Ethics and Politics which we have to guard against. We feel that somehow the ideal of a community is not always the same as that of the individuals who compose it. It may occasionally be higher, as most Greeks would have said was the case at Sparta; usually it is a good deal lower. Now Aristotle was keenly alive to this fact and the problems to which it gives rise. To the Greeks such questions were apt to present themselves in a personal form—a peculiarity which saved them from much confused thinking—and Aristotle therefore asks himself “Is the good man the same as the good citizen?” The answer which he gives to this is quite clear. The good man and the good citizen are not the same except in the case of the man who is leading the highest life in the ideal state¹. Here we certainly have no lowering of the moral ideal to suit the middling practice of the ordinary state; for we may make our ideal state as ideal as we please. The only thing we must insist on is that, except in a community of some kind, man can never be complete, can never be all that he has it in him to be.

¹ Cf. EN. 1130 b, 26 sqq. with the notes, and the full discussion in Pol. 1276 b, 16 sqq. Newman's *Politics*, vol. i, pp. 234 sqq.

§ 18. Aristotle, then, was quite aware of the fact that the ideal was nowhere realised, and he knew that, as things were, there was a discrepancy between individual and social morality. But he did not separate Ethics and Politics because he did not despair yet of the Greek city-state. No one who reads these lectures can doubt that they were delivered as a serious contribution to the realisation of the ideal state as Aristotle conceived it. There is a hopeful tone in all he says which shows he really thought the thing could be done if only people would go about it in the right way. He is no idle speculator, but a man in all earnestness making practical proposals which he has hopes of getting adopted. We feel the contrast between this and the far less sanguine view that was natural to Plato's deeper nature. The fact is that Aristotle, with all his intellectual greatness, was a child to his

- master in the understanding of human life. On the other hand, it may be noted that his strong sense of reality prevented him from ignoring altogether, as Plato was sometimes apt to do, the relative worth of the various imperfect ideals realised by the Hellenic states as he found them, and this enabled him to become the founder of Politics in the modern sense of the word.

§ 19. It is only another consequence of the personal way in which such problems presented themselves to the Greek mind that the question of how to save the city-state took the shape "How can we best train a lawgiver?" The whole course of Greek history illustrates the importance of personality. The laws of most states had been framed by legislators whose names were known, and where none was known a mythical one was soon invented. This was the only form in which a Greek could imagine a reformation, and we need not wonder if Aristotle thought he might be able to train a new Solon. The discovery of the long-lost "Constitution of the Athenians" has proved that the historical works of Aristotle were composed with the same idea. They were no mere collections of facts on which a generalisation of purely scientific importance might be based, but also political pamphlets intended to commend certain definite views to practical statesmen. As it has been well put by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Aristotle wished to train a generation that should be enabled, by insight into the nature and end of the state and into the forms it assumes, to have a practical effect in the right sense among the thousandfold different conditions which the Hellenic states presented....To this task he addressed his efforts, and he thought not a little of his performance!"

The strange thing is, as has often been pointed out, that Aristotle, himself a man without a city and closely connected with the Macedonian court, should never have suspected that the days of the city-state were numbered, and that the Diadochoi were creating a new political unity, the Empire, which was not indeed to reach its full developement on Greek

soil, but was to act as the most powerful of the influences that led an Italian city-state to become the capital of the world.

¹ Aristoteles und Athen, vol. ii, p. 361.

VI.

§ 20. The question of method is always vital to Aristotle, and he seems to have found his hearers very deficient in a due sense of its importance. He complains in one place that people dislike any method of exposition they are not accustomed to, and mean by intelligible no more than familiar. It is just the same as with the ancient laws, which are often childish, but have been sanctified by long custom. Thus it is that some will not listen to a lecture unless it is put into mathematical form, while others demand examples and illustrations, and others again require the evidence of some poet. One class want everything put with minute exactitude; others are annoyed by precision, either because they are incapable of connected thought, or because they think it is mean and petty. There is something about it, in philosophy as well as in business, that repels them. What is wanted to remedy all this is Culture. We cannot be always looking for the method of knowledge and for knowledge itself at the same time. Neither is easy to find. It is clearly necessary, then, that we should have some preliminary training in these matters, so that we may know where we are entitled to demand mathematical precision and where anything of the sort would be entirely out of place¹.

¹ Met. 995 a, 3 αὶ δ' ἀκρόσεις κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη συμβαίνουσιν· ὥς γὰρ εἰώθαμεν οὕτως ἀξιοῦμεν λέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν ἀγνωστότερα καὶ ξενικώτερα. τὸ γὰρ σύνθετος γνωριμώτερον, ἥλικον δ' ἰσχὺν ἔχει τὸ σύνθετος οἱ νόμοι δηλοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μείζον ἰσχὺν τοῦ γινώσκου περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἔθος. οἱ μὲν οὖν, ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικῶς λέγῃται, οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τῶν λεγόντων, οἱ δ' ἐὰν μὴ παραδειγματικῶς, οἱ δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιοῦσιν ἐπάγεσθαι ποιητὴν. καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνελρεῖν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν. ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι τισι δοκεῖ. διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδευθῆναι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὥς ἀτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης· ἔστι δ' οὐδέτερον ῥᾶδιον λαβεῖν. τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητέον, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην.

§ 21. We see that Aristotle calls this preliminary training *παιδεία*. This word in the fourth century B.C. was very commonly contrasted with *τέχνη*, to express the idea of culture as opposed to professional knowledge or skill. It was the proudest boast of Isokrates that he, alone among the teachers of his time, kept this end steadily in view; for to him it seemed that Plato and Aristotle taught a mere specialism, and that of no very exalted kind. In the Protagoras of Plato the young Hippokrates actually blushes at the suggestion that he is going to take lessons with any other view than to get that unprofessional culture which alone becomes a gentleman. It is clear, however, that Aristotle means something far more definite than this. With him the man of culture is above all things the arbiter of method. He is the judge of how much precision is fairly to be expected in any inquiry (EN. 1094 b, 23), and in the Metaphysics we are told that it shows want of culture not to know what can be demonstrated and what can not¹.

The clearest account of the matter, however, is to be found in a remarkable passage at the beginning of the treatise on the Parts of Animals. There we read that there are two ways of possessing any science whether it be humble or exalted, one of which may be called knowledge of the subject and the other a sort of culture. It shows culture to be able to form a right judgment instinctively as to where the speaker's exposition of a subject is methodically correct and where it is amiss. This is general culture, the power of judging all scientific method correctly. But there is another kind of culture which has to do with some definite part of knowledge only. In Natural History as in other branches of study there is a culture of this kind which enables us to approve or condemn the form of the exposition quite apart from the question of the truth or falsehood of the matter².

We have to do, then, with two distinct kinds of culture, general and special, and we must ask what precisely each of these is. Now, there is a passage in the Metaphysics where want of culture is identified with ignorance of "Analytics³."

This seems to be the key. Giphanius said long ago "Vocat ille *παιδείαν* habitum quendam recte iudicandi de rebus omnibus quod docet doctrina Analytica; contra *ἀπαιδευσία* contrarius ab illo habitus dicitur, hoc est ignoratio doctrinae Analyticae." This is quite correct; for "general culture" is evidently what we call Aristotelian Logic, a knowledge of which is, therefore, essential to a right understanding of the Ethics.

But, in addition to this, Aristotle demands a special kind of culture from the student of Politics, just as he demanded a special culture from the student of Natural History. In the Politics we are told that, just as a doctor must render his account to doctors, so must all others be judged by their peers. But by a doctor we mean not only the practitioner, but also the architectonic doctor and thirdly the man of culture; for, we are told, there are people of that class in nearly all the arts. We must allow the right of judgment to men of culture as fully as to men of knowledge⁴.

The kind of culture referred to here is clearly not Aristotelian Logic. The "architectonic" doctor is the great physiologist or pathologist, to whom the practitioner is related as the builder is to the architect, and the man of culture must be the man who has an intelligent, but non-professional, knowledge of medicine, enough, let us say, to know a quack when he sees one. Just so in Politics. The architectonic politician is, as we have seen already, the lawgiver, the "practical politician" corresponds to the medical practitioner, and the man of culture to the citizen who, without necessarily taking an active part in political life, can form an intelligent judgment on political questions, and who knows what sort of treatment is applicable to so complex a thing as human society. Just as the man of medical culture will see at once through the quack's nostrum, even though he may be unable to justify his rejection of it on scientific grounds, so the man of whom we are speaking will at once distrust any talk upon such subjects which seems to suggest that good citizens can be made by theoretical instruction in the duties of citizenship, and any attempt to regulate the

state on the basis of rigid and abstract formulas like the axioms of the mathematicians.

¹ Met. 1006 a, 6 ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο (the principle of contradiction) ἀποδεικνύει τινὲς δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ.

² Part. An. 639 a, 1 Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινότεραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἐξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδεῖαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἔστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. τοιοῦτον γὰρ δὴ τίνα καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἴομεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικὸν τίνα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τις ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μέρων. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινὰς ὑπάρχειν ὅρους τοιούτους, πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέχεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τάληθές, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως.

³ Met. 1005 b, 3 δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν.

⁴ Pol. 1282 a, 1 ὥσπερ οὖν ἱατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἱατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἱατρὸς δ' ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἡττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν.

VII.

§ 22. The first lesson we have to learn from our man of culture is that every science must have a starting-point (*ἀρχή*). Geometry, for instance, starts from certain definitions and axioms which define the nature of space, and we must have a similar starting-point for Politics.

From what has been said as to the nature of practical science, however, it follows that the starting-point of Politics will be a definition, not of something that is, but of something that is to be. It will not resemble the definitions from which deductive geometry starts, but rather the enunciation of a problem in geometrical construction, what in the older Greek geometry was called a *ὑπόθεσις*¹. Now the method by which we solve a problem of this kind is analysis, that is to say, we assume that the construction is made, and then ask what are the conditions of its being made until we come to something that is in our power, just as in a theoretical analysis we go on until we come to something we know to be true.

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle gives us an example of a theoretical analysis. Figures are resolved by making actual the divisions into other figures which are there potentially. If they were already actually divided the proof would be plain; as it is, we must make a construction which is always in the long run some form of division. For instance, why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? It is because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If the line parallel to the side were already drawn, the truth would be plain at first sight. Again, why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? It is because, if you have three lines, the two segments of the base and the perpendicular raised on the centre, and if you know the previous proposition, the thing is clear at first sight².

The theoretical sciences cannot prove their starting-points or first principles. In the long run these must simply be perceived, and it is equally true that the practical sciences cannot deliberate about the end which forms their starting-point. The reason is that analysis, whether it takes the form of demonstration or deliberation, has to do only with the series of middle terms which appear in the theoretical sciences as causes, in the practical sciences as means. For instance, if we have to "demonstrate" an eclipse of the moon, we do so by finding the middle term *ἀντίφραξις γῆς*, and when we have found this, we know the cause of the eclipse³. In the same way, if we have to deliberate about health, we do so by seeking for middle terms or "means" till we come to one that it is in our power to produce⁴. And, on this side too, we are dependent on a simple "perception" or "intuition." If we are analysing a rectilinear figure, we simply "perceive" that triangles are the ultimate figures into which we can analyse it, a perception which is really identical with that of the axiom that two straight lines cannot inclose a space⁵. So too in practice. An act is always a particular act, and no particular can ever be reached by a process of reasoning. We simply "see" that this particular act which is within our power is a case of the general rule which we have found by deliberation. The whole process of analytic deliberation has

to do only with the middle terms which are intermediate between the definition of the end to be attained and the particular act, which is also an object of simple intuition. We start from an "immediate proposition" (*ἄμεσος πρότασις*), that is, a proposition which does not admit of any middle term between its subject and its predicate⁶, and we end with a particular act, which in turn cannot be connected with the rule under which it falls by a middle term. At each end of the scale we are dependent on immediate perception.

¹ The precise signification of *ὑπόθεσις* is *ὃ ὑποτίθεται τις*, that which one sets before oneself as a thing to be done or proved; for the meaning of *ὑποτίθεμαι* is not very different from that of *προτίθεμαι*. The *ὑπόθεσις* is properly the Q.E.D. or Q.E.F. of a geometrical problem. It is a conclusion assumed for purposes of analysis to be true, or an end assumed for purposes of deliberation to be realised. The method and terminology are alike Platonic, though in the Sixth Book of the Republic Plato insists that knowledge in the highest sense cannot be of this character, but must deduce everything from the Form of the Good. The analytic method proceeds *ἐξ ὑποθέσεων οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ* (510 b); the true method would not regard these *ὑποθέσεις* as *ἀρχαί*. It is evidence of the Academic origin of the theory that we have in [Plato] Def. 415 b *ὑπόθεσις ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος*. See Jowett and Campbell's Republic, vol. ii, pp. 333 sqq.

Met. 1051 a, 21 *εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεῖα· διαρροῦντες γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ' ἦν διηρημένα, φανερά ἂν ἦν· νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὁρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὁρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευρὰν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον. διὰ τί ἡ ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὁρθὴ καθόλου; διότι ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἡ τε βᾶσις δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὁρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκείνῳ εἰδότε.*

² An. Post. 93 a, 30 *ἐκλείψις ἐφ' οὗ τὸ Α, σελήνη ἐφ' οὗ Γ, ἀντίφραξις γῆς ἐφ' οὗ Β. ib. 85 b, 23 ἀποδείξεις μὲν ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί. Met. 1041 a, 10 ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί αἰεὶ οὕτως, διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῃ τινὶ ὑπάρχει. An. Post. (loc. cit.) ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι οἰόμεθα ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, αἰτίαι δὲ τέτταρες, ... πᾶσαι αὗται διὰ τοῦ μέσου δεικνύνται.*

⁴ See EE. 1227 b, 28 sqq. quoted on pp. 323 sq. Cf. Met. 1032 b, 15 *τῶν δὲ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἡ μὲν νόσις καλεῖται (the deliberative analysis), ἡ δὲ ποίησις, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἶδους (the ὑπόθεσις consisting of a formal cause or definition) νόσις, ἡ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως (the ἐσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει) ποίησις. λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ ὕγιανέϊ, δεῖ ὁμαλυνθῆναι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμαλυνθῆναι; τοδί. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται εἰ θερμανθήσεται. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστι; τοδί. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοδί δυνάμει· τοῦτο δ' ἦδη ἐπ' αὐτῷ.*

⁵ Cf. EN. 1142 a, 28 n. This passage, which has caused some difficulty, is well elucidated by Görland, *Aristoteles und die Mathematik*, pp. 79 sqq. The mathematical *ἐσχατον*, into which all rectilinear figures could be resolved, was the triangle. Cf. Met. 1054 a, 3 *καὶ εἰ σχήματα εὐθύγραμμα (sc. τὰ ὄντα ἦν), σχημάτων ἂν ἦν ἀριθμός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ τρίγωνον. De An. 414 b, 21 οὕτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς... παραπλησίως δ' ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν*

σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχὴν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπὶ τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, ὅσον ἐν τετραγώνῳ τρίγωνον κ.τ.λ.

⁶ An. Post. 72 a, 7 ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἀποδείξεως πρότασις ἀμεσος, ἀμεσος δὲ ἥς μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλη προτέρα. 72 b, 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φάμεν ὅτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον...τὰ ἀμεσα...ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ib. 76 a, 19 φανερόν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὰς ἐκάστου ἰδίας ἀρχὰς ἀποδείξει. ib. 90 b, 24 ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὁρισμοί, ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἐσονται ἀποδείξεις δέδεικται πρότερον. ib. 93 b, 21 ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἑτερόν τι τὸ αἰτιον, τῶν δ' οὐκ ἐστίν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν τί ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀμεσα καὶ ἀρχαὶ εἰσιν, ἃ καὶ εἶναι καὶ τί ἐστίν ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερόν ποιῆσαι.

§ 23. How, then, do we know these "first principles," these ultimate definitions from which every science must start? The answer given by Aristotle in the Ethics (1098 b, 3) is that some are apprehended by means of induction (*ἐπαγωγῇ*), some by perception (*αἰσθήσει*), and some by "habituation" (*ἐθισμῶ τινι*). It is by perception or intuition that the first principles of mathematics, for instance, are apprehended. The definition of a triangle is reached simply by looking at a triangle. No one can prove to us that a figure with three angles will also have three sides; we must simply see that for ourselves. If we cannot imagine a triangle, no one can help us to do so. When, however, we have once got the definition, we can go on to demonstrate mediate propositions about triangles to any extent by finding middle terms which lead to new conclusions. This process is analysis; but without the definition of the triangle as a starting-point we should have nothing to analyse.

In most cases, however, the subject is more complex, and a single act of intuition does not suffice to make the definition clear to us. In such cases we must be made to see the truth of the immediate proposition by being called upon to recognise it in a number of instances adduced for the purpose. It is this process which Aristotle calls *ἐπαγωγή*, a word which literally signifies the citation of witnesses in a court of law. It is not a method of proof; for the propositions which we arrive at by its help are not capable of proof in the proper sense of the word. It is simply a way of making us see for ourselves what we cannot know in any other way. If we have not the "sense" to see the truth of an immediate proposition

for ourselves, no number of instances will make us sure of it, and this is what Aristotle means when he says *νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν*, and identifies *νοῦς* with *αἴσθησις*, which is the most general term for immediate perception whether sensuous or intellectual¹.

But there are still more complicated cases, and these include, for reasons we shall see presently, the greater part of human affairs, which require something more than this inductive process, the chief sphere of which is the study of nature. The operations of nature are always in the same direction, whereas human action is always the result of a capacity of opposites, and therefore implies a choice between alternatives. Now, if we are to see for ourselves the first principle of which all human action ought to be the application, we must be habituated in such a way as always to choose the right alternative of the two which are possible in every act. If we were habituated in such a way as always to choose the wrong alternative, we should arrive at some sort of a first principle too, but it would be a false one; while if we were to choose now the one and now the other, our "moral sense" would be blunted and confused. And this explains why we must attend to the unproved statements and beliefs of experienced and elderly people (1143 b, 11). Their experience has given them an eye for such things and they see aright. But we must remember also that it is the "eye" and not the experience that really secures the truth of these statements. The first principles of the science of human conduct are as incapable of demonstration as those of any other science. They too must in the long run be "perceived" immediately, and if we cannot see them for ourselves, no one can make us see them.

¹ This is the *ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις* of Speusippos, *ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας* (Sext. Math. vii, 145). Cf. EN. 1042 a, 27, where it is contrasted with *ἡ τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθησις* and compared with the perception of the "common sensibles," i.e. those *αἰσθητά* which are not the object of any special sense.

VIII.

§ 24. Assuming, then, that the necessary habituation has been secured, how are we to get at the starting-point of our science in a form that admits of deliberative analysis? In other words, how are we to find the definition of the Good for Man? The answer is that we must adopt the method of Dialectic. The word *διαλεκτική* properly means nothing more than the art of dialogue or discussion—it signifies the theoretical formulation of the practice of Sokrates. Little as we know with certainty of the teaching of the historical Sokrates, we do know very accurately the method which he adopted. It was to make people see the truth by talking to them, to elicit by means of question and answer that knowledge which they possessed without being clearly conscious of it, the truth which was in them already in the sense that they could be made to see it as soon as it was put before them in a clear and distinct way. Plato developed this method and, by the help of the theory of Reminiscence, made Dialectic the science of the Forms or “Ideas.” In his hands it became the only instrument of all philosophical thinking, the ideal of a completed science. To this Aristotle could not agree. A dialectic proof was to him no proof at all; for it had no middle term¹. It could not be the right instrument for arriving at mediate propositions; for we can only be said to know these in the true sense of the word when we know them as the conclusions of a syllogism. This was Aristotle’s own contribution to Logic, and he is never weary of showing us that the syllogism is the only adequate form for the mediate truths of science. But it remains as true for him as it was for Plato that the dialectic method is the only way of arriving at immediate propositions, propositions which can have no middle term between their subject and their predicate, and we have seen that it is from such propositions that all science must start.

¹ The fault of the dialectic method as employed by Plato is just that it represents mediate truth in a form which is only right for immediate. Cf. An. Pr.

46 a, 31 ὅτι δ' ἡ διὰ τῶν γενῶν διαίρεσις (as in Plato's Sophist and Statesman) μικρόν τι μόριον ἔστι τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου, ῥᾶδιον ἰδεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις ὡς ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ δεῖξαι αἰτεῖται, συλλογίζεται δ' αἰετὶ τῶν ἀνωθεν... ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ὅταν δέη τι συλλογίσασθαι ὑπάρχειν, δεῖ τὸ μέσον, δι' οὗ γίνεταί ὁ συλλογισμός, καὶ ἥττον αἰετὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ καθόλου τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἄκρων. ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις τούναντιον βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ καθόλου λαμβάνει μέσον.

§ 25. Dialectic is the subject of that part of the Organon called the Topics, and it is there that we shall find the theoretical justification of the method employed in the Ethics. The object of the science, we are told, is to enable us to draw conclusions from received beliefs on any subject that may be proposed. The dialectic syllogism differs from the demonstrative syllogism in having for its premisses, not scientific truths but received beliefs. These beliefs are those either of the majority or of the wise. It is useful to cultivate this science, first as an intellectual exercise, secondly as a preparation for discussions with those who do not accept our premisses, and it has a place even in sciences that admit of philosophic treatment. If we are able to raise all the difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily distinguish truth from error. But above all it is of use for the discovery of the first principles or starting-points of the different sciences, since it is impossible for any science to give an account of its own starting-point. That can only be discussed in the light of received beliefs on the subject. This, then, is the proper function of dialectic, which is a method of examination and affords a path to the first principles of all the sciences¹.

We begin, then, by "taking" (λαμβάνειν)² premisses from the beliefs of the many and the wise to serve as premisses (ἐνδοξοὶ προτάσεις)³. But our attitude towards these beliefs is by no means uncritical. We start from them, indeed, but we at once go on to raise all the difficulties which they suggest. As a general rule, we find that they are contradictory, and when we find such a contradiction between received beliefs, we have what is called an ἀπορία (literally "no thoroughfare"). Our thought is, as it were, fettered and we are obliged to look for some means of freeing it from its

chains. The technical name for a pair of contradictory *ἐνδοξα* is *πρόβλημα* and the solution of it is called the *λύσις*¹.

Our belief in the possibility of solving the contradictions between *ἐνδοξα* depends upon the conviction that neither the mass of men from ancient times down to the present nor the great thinkers of mankind are likely to be altogether wrong². We usually find that if we develop their beliefs by criticism, if we make them "take a step further" (*μεταβαίνειν*), they come into agreement readily enough. "It is of advantage," we read in the *Metaphysics*, "to advance step by step to what is more known," that is, more known "by nature." "It is thus that all learning takes place, by an advance from what is less known by nature to what is more so. This is our real task, to turn what is more known to us into what is more known by nature, just as in action it is to turn what is good for us into what is good universally. What is first known to a given person is often very feebly known; but for all that it is from things known to oneself, however inadequately, that we must try to apprehend universal knowledge, shifting our ground and advancing step by step, as has been said, through these very things³."

The task of the dialectician, then, is to draw on the opposing parties to a consciousness of their real meaning, and thus to make them see their fundamental agreement. It is to lead them on, to use a phrase which has strangely been called "Eudemian," but which is really Platonic, from what is "true but not clear" to what is "true and clear⁴." This he does by assailing these beliefs (*ἐπιχειρεῖν*) from a number of positions or points of vantage (*τόποι*), which are applicable to every kind of subject, the positions of "the more and less," "the essential and the accidental," and so forth, which the skilled dialectician is always ready to occupy. They are in fact a number of ways in which the beliefs under discussion can be qualified so that the contradiction, which only arises from their being stated without qualification, will disappear.

It is sometimes said that the method just described amounts to taking our first principles on trust; but this criticism leaves out of account the other side of the doctrine,

namely that the *ἀρχή* is really apprehended immediately. To this extent we must always remember that Aristotle is a convinced "intuitionalist" in the true sense of that much abused word. Just as we must simply see by "looking at it" that a figure with three sides will have three angles, so in the long run we must simply "see" the truth of our definition of the Good for Man. But that is no reason for refusing the help of any method that will put us in a position to see more easily what is too complex a thing to be grasped at once like the axioms of geometry. Our belief in the truth of this definition rests on no other ground than our conviction of these axioms, and if any one chooses to deny it, we can have nothing further to say to him. We cannot prove it to him; he can only be converted, as Eudemos says, by the experience of advancing years or by being put under restraint. (EE. 1214 b, 28 sqq.)

¹ Top. 101 a, 25 *ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰπεῖν πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμος ἢ πραγματεία. ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτῶν καταφανές ἐστι· μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ῥῶον περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν δυνήσομεθα. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν καθηριζομένην δόξαν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς, μεταβιβάζοντες (cf. π. 6) ὅτι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνονται λέγειν ἡμῖν. πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω διαπορῆσαι ῥῶον ἐν ἐκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τὰληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἐκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν, ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθείσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀπάντων εἰσὶ, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστίν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὕσα πρὸς τὰς ἀπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.*

² The use of *λαμβάνειν* as a technical term of dialectics is Platonic, and is derived from the current phrase *λόγον λαμβάνειν παρὰ τινος*. So we have *λαβεῖν προτάσεις παρὰ τῶν ἐρωτωμένων* (Top. 154 a, 25), *λαβεῖν ὑποθέσεις* (An. Pr. 24 a, 24), *λαβεῖν ἀρχάς* (Top. 153 a, 9). Cf. also *λήψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου* (An. Pr. 24 b, 11), *λήψις τῶν ὄρων* (ib. 61 a, 28). The *ἐρωτῶν αἰτεῖται παρὰ τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου*, the *ἀποκρινόμενος ἀποδίδωσι τῷ ἐρωτῶντι*, and the *ἐρωτῶν* in turn *λαμβάνει, δέχεται, ἀποδέχεται*.

³ Cf. EN. 1098 b, 27. Top. 100 b, 21 *ἐνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τοῖσις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις*. The mark of an *ἐνδοξος πρότασις* is the verb *δοκεῖ*, "is believed," "is thought," which must always be carefully distinguished from *φαίνεται*, "seems," "appears." Cf. Bonitz Ind. 203 a, 27 "inde *δοκεῖ*, *δοκοῦντα* usurpatur de iis opinionibus quae communi hominum sensu comprobantur, τὰ δοκοῦντα (syn. τὰ ἐνδοξα, τὰ φαινόμενα)."

* For ἀπορία cf. EN. 1146 a, 22 sqq. and the notes. A πρόβλημα (προβάλλω) only differs from a πρότασις (προτείνω) in form (τῷ τρόπῳ), cf. Top. 101 b, 29. The best commentary on the term λύσις is δέδεται ἡ διάνοια (EN. loc. cit.).

† This conviction of Aristotle's is most strongly expressed in such passages as EN. 1153 b, 32 where all creatures are said to have θεῖον τι in them. This comes from Plato, Laws 950 b θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὐστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς κ.τ.λ.

‡ Met. 1029 b, 3 πρὸς ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον. ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἥττον γνωριμῶν φύσει εἰς τὰ γνωρίμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστω ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστω ἀγαθῷ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνωρίμα αὐτῷ γνωρίμα. τὰ δ' ἐκάστοις γνωρίμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλὰ κίς ἡμέρα ἐστὶ γνωρίμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος. ἀλλ' ὁμως ἐκ τῶν φανῶν μὲν γνωστῶν, αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας ὥσπερ εἰρηται διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν. For μεταβαίνειν, μεταβιβάζειν cf. EN. 1097 a, 24 n., EE. 1216 b, 30 (quoted ad loc.), Top. 101 a, 33 (quoted in n. 1).

§ For ἀληθές μὲν οὐδὲν δὲ σαφές cf. EN. 1138 b, 26 n. The formula is technical in Plato's dialectical dialogues. Cf. e.g. Polit. 275 a τὸ μὲν λεχθὲν ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν... σαφές ἐρρήθη, 281 c ἡ λέγομεν μὲν ἄν τι ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν σαφές γε;

§ 26. Once we have got our definition, however, the procedure becomes quite different. Our analysis of it, though it is deliberative and not demonstrative, will proceed through middle terms and can only be expressed adequately in the form of a series of practical syllogisms. But here again the "man of culture" has an important warning for us. There cannot be more in the conclusion than there is in the premisses. We can make deductions from the axioms with absolute precision, because these axioms are eternal and necessary and even the mediate truths which we derive from them are quite free from matter. But the premisses of practical science are not of this kind. They are statements, not of immutable truth, but simply of what holds good "for the most part," and our conclusions will therefore have the same approximate character. It shows total lack of culture to ask for mathematical accuracy¹ in the discussion of human affairs. That is only to be looked for in sciences which deal with simple and primary truths².

It formed no part of Aristotle's programme to justify this distinction in a course on practical science, but it is really based on metaphysical grounds. We must carefully distinguish two classes of facts which may be the objects of science. First we have those that are of necessity and always,

such as the truths of mathematics. Then there are the things that happen "for the most part" or as a general rule. Thirdly, as this implies exceptions to the rule, there are those things that follow no rule, and are said to happen by "chance." These cannot be the objects of science³.

In the Topics, the fact that reason rules over temper and desire is given as an instance of a thing that is true for the most part, and in the Prior Analytics, the fact that men grow gray⁴. The first is an *ἡθικὴ πρότασις*, the second a *φυσικὴ πρότασις*. Most investigations, we are told, have to do with facts of this kind, and this is especially true of the practical sciences. Rhetoric, for instance, deals with actions (*τὰ πρακτά*), and these all have this character. None of them are necessary, and "things which happen for the most part and admit of being otherwise must be inferred from premisses of a like nature⁵." This is just the other side of the proposition with which we started above. Again we are told in another passage of the Prior Analytics that "problems as to what is for the most part must be answered from premisses that are true for the most part. The conclusion of each is similar to its starting-point⁶."

From all this it follows that the starting-point of Politics cannot be anything more than a general truth; we cannot hope to find a universal and necessary axiom such as those from which the geometer starts. And it will be absolutely impossible to lay down universal rules of action. Every act is a particular act and for that reason cannot be brought under a universal rule. As in medicine and navigation, we must always take into account the particular circumstances of the case, and these cannot be formulated or predicted⁷.

³ The words which express the presence or absence of this precision are all metaphors taken from the arts, and this is the primary application of the adjective *ἀκριβής*, though we can only guess what a *κρίβος* was. The opposite of *ἀκριβώς* is *τύψ*, a word which expresses the outline of a solid as *ὑπογραφή* or *περιγραφή* expresses the outline of a plane. As Muretus says, "quod in picturis *ὑπογραφή*, in statuariorum similiumque artificum operibus *τύπος*." The adverb *παχυλῶς* is used of the thick, rough lines of a sketch in contrast with the fine outline of the *τελεία ἀπεργασία*. Cf. Plato, *Polit.* 294 c, 295 a, where *πως οὕτως* *παχύτερον* is opposed to *ἀκριβῶς* and the verb *λεπτουργεῖν*.

² The conditions of ἀκρίβεια are thus given in An. Post. 87 a, 31 ἀκριβεστέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα (1) ἢ τοῦ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ (2) ἢ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ὅσον ἀριθμητικῆ ἀρμονικῆς, καὶ (3) ἢ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως, ὅσον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητικῆ. The "abstraction" (ἀφαίρεσις) of arithmetic is that of "position" (θέσις). Met. 982 a, 26 ἀκριβεστέρα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἶσιν· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβεστέρας τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λαμβανομένων, ὅσον ἀριθμητικῆ γεωμετρίας. Met. 1078 a, 9 καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπλουστέρων, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει τάκριβες.

³ Met. 1065 a, 4 ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ αἰεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τούτων ἐστίν. ib. 1026 b, 3 πρώτων περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεκτέον ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρία.

⁴ Top. 129 a, 10 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, καθάπερ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἴδιον πρὸς ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν τῷ μὲν προστάττει τὸ δ' ὑπηρετεῖ· οὕτε γὰρ τὸ λογιστικὸν πάντοτε προστάττει, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ προστάττεται, οὕτε τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν αἰεὶ προστάττει, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστάττει ποτὲ, ὅταν ἡ μοχθηρὰ ἢ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. (Note here the dialectical use of Plato's psychology.) An. Pr. 32 b, 4 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων πάλιν λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ δύο λέγεται τρόποις, ἓνα μὲν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαι καὶ διαλείπειν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσον τὸ πολιουθῆναι ἀνθρώπου ἢ τὸ αἰξάνεσθαι ἢ φθίνειν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ πεφυκὸς ὑπάρχειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ συνεχὲς μὲν ἔχει τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου, ὄντος μέντοι ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐστίν. ἄλλον δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον, ὃ καὶ οὕτως καὶ μὴ οὕτως δυνατόν, ὅσον τὸ βαδίζειν ζῶον ἢ τὸ βαδίζοντος γενέσθαι σεισμόν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὕτως πέφυκεν ἢ ἐναντίως... ἐπιστήμη δὲ καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν μὲν ἀορίστων οὐκ ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι τὸ μέσον. τῶν δὲ πεφυκότων ἐστὶ, καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ σκέψεις γίνονται περὶ τῶν οὕτως ἐνδεχομένων· ἐκείνων δ' ἐγγωρεῖ μὲν γενέσθαι συλλογισμὸν, οὐ μὴν εἰσθῆ γέ ζητεῖσθαι.

⁵ Rhet. 1357 a, 22 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ εἶσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράττουσι βουλευόμενοι καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα τούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων), τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἐτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

⁶ An. Pr. 43 b, 33 τῶν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προβλημάτων καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προτάσεων, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τινῶν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐκάστου τὸ συμπέρασμα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.

⁷ Professor Stewart quotes Hippokrates περὶ ἀρχαίης λατρικῆς § 9, a passage of which we seem to have more than one echo in the Ethics. Καὶ ἐλ μὲν ἦν ἀπλῶς, ὡς περὶ ὕφης γέγεται, ὅσα μὲν ἦν ἰσχυρότερα ἐβλαπτεν, ὅσα δ' ἦν ἀσθενέστερα ὠφέλει τε καὶ ἐτρεφε τὸν κάμνοντα καὶ τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, εὐπετές ἂν ἦν τὸ πρήγμα· πολλὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀσφαλῆος ἂν εἶδει περιλαμβάνοντας ἀγειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσθενέστατον. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἐμάρτημα, οὐδὲ ἥσσον λυμαινεται τὸν ἀνθρώπου, ἢν ἐλάσσονα καὶ ἐνδεέστερα τῶν ἱκανῶν προσφέρηται· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ λιμοῦ μέρος δύναται ἰσχυρῶς ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ γινώσκει καὶ ἀσθενέα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀποκτείνειν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κακὰ, ἐτεροῦ μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ πληρωσίως, οὐχ ἥσσον δὲ ἅμα δεινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ κενώσιος· δι' ὧν πολλὸν ποικιλώτερά τε καὶ διὰ πλεονός ἀκριβὴς ἐστὶ. δεῖ γὰρ μέτρον τινὸς στοχάσασθαι. μέτρον δὲ, οὐδὲ σταθμὸν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἄλλον, πρὸς ὃ ἀναφέρων εἰσὴ τὸ ἄκριβές, οὐκ ἂν εὐροίης ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἰσθησιν· διὸ ἔργον οὕτως καταμαθεῖν ἀκριβέως, ὥστε σμικρὰ ἀμαρτάνειν ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα· κἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτον τὸν ἱητρὸν ἰσχυρῶς

ἐπαινέομι τὸν σμικρὰ ἁμαρτάνοντα· τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς ὀλιγάκις ἔστι κατιδεῖν· ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοὶ γε τῶν λητρῶν ταῦτά μοι δοκέουσι τοῖσι κακοῖσι κυβερνήτησι πᾶσχειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν ἐν γαλήνῃ κυβερνῶντες ἁμαρτάνωσιν, οὐ καταφανέες εἰσὶν· ὅταν δὲ αὐτοὺς κατάσχη χειμῶν τε μέγας καὶ ἄνεμος ἐξώστης, φανερώς ἤδη πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι δι' ἀγνωσίην καὶ ἁμαρτίην δῆλοι εἰσιν ἀπολέσαντες τὴν ναῦν.

IX.

§ 27. We have assumed that man has an "end," and it is desirable to say something at this stage about the conception of the Final Cause which is the ruling conception of our study. It is in accordance with the whole character of this treatise that Aristotle does not include in it any account of his teleological views, but it is necessary for us to refer to them briefly in order that their true bearing may be understood.

The existence of an "end," or more exactly a "completion" (τέλος)¹, is due to the fact that nature and man have not only a source of motion in themselves, but also a source of rest². No animal or plant grows indefinitely; there is a point at which each is "complete" or full-grown. Still more will it be the case that for the human soul there is a point at which it has nothing further to attain, and this will be the perfection or completion or "end" of man.

To Aristotle's mind the existence of such a point is proved by the fact that otherwise we should be face to face with that most irrational of things an infinite progression³. It is one of his fundamental doctrines that the infinite exists potentially but not actually. We can always get a finite as large as we please, and that gives rise in our minds to the fiction of an actual infinite; but this is quite inconsistent with the idea of the "complete" (τέλειον), which is defined as that outside of which there is nothing (οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω), that which requires nothing more to make its form complete⁴. The actual infinite if it existed would destroy the possibility of human action by destroying the Good or Final Cause. "We cannot desire to walk for the sake of health and to be healthy for the sake of happiness, and that again for the sake

of something else and so on *ad infinitum*..... Those who set up an infinite do not see that they are destroying the Good. Surely no one would ever set about doing anything if he were never to reach any final result. There would be no sense in such action; for all men of sense act for the sake of something, and that something is a limit; for the end is a limit²." In other words, we should never desire anything at all, unless there were something which we desire for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. However long the chain may be, it must have its last link firmly attached somewhere.

¹ The Greek word τέλος has quite different associations from the English "end." We may see from its use in common speech (τέλος εχειν, λαβεῖν, ἐπιθεῖναι) that it implies the idea of completion. We must always think of it as the τελείωσις of an εἶδος.

² Phys. 192 b, 13 τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἐν ἐαυτῷ κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως. Met. 1013 a, 29 ἔτι (αἰτιον) ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡμετέρας. Gen. An. 776 a, 35 ὥσπερ ἐστηκὸς ἤδη διὰ τὸ τέλος ἔχειν τὸ ἐμβρυνον.

³ Cf. 1094 a, 20 πρῶσι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον, a phrase which is regularly opposed to ἵσταται, στήσεται. This is derived from the "quasi-impersonal" use described in Riddell's Digest § 97. Cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 28 b οὐδὲν δεῖν μὴ ἐν ἑμὶ στή, "there is no fear of my being the last." So An. Post. 82 b, 11 ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνω ἵσταται ὁδός, καὶ ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω στήσεται. An. Pr. 43 a, 36 ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνω πορευομένοις ἵσταται ποτε, πάλιν ἐροῦμεν. An. Post. 72 b, 11 εἰ τε ἵσταται καὶ εἰσὶν ἀρχαί. Gen. Corr. 332 b, 12 δεῖ μὲν γὰρ στήναι καὶ μὴ εἰς ἀπειρον τοῦτο λέναι. Met. 1000 b, 28 καὶ εἰ ἵσταται καὶ εἰ βαδίζει εἰς ἀπειρον.

⁴ Met. 1021 b, 21 ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας ἀρετῆς μὴδὲν ἐλλείπη μύριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους. 1055 a, 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε μέγιστον ἐν ἐκάστῳ γίγνεται τέλειον· μέγιστόν τε γὰρ οὐ μὴ ἴστω ὑπερβολή, καὶ τέλειον οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω λαβεῖν τι δυνατόν. Phys. 207 a, 9 ἀπειρον μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεὶ τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἔξω· οὐ δὲ μὴδὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον...τέλειον δ' οὐδὲν μὴ ἔχον τέλος. For a fuller account of τελείωσις, see Introductory Note to Book 11, p. 70, n. 10.

⁵ Met. 994 a, 1 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τις καὶ οὐκ ἀπειρα τὰ αἰτία τῶν ὄντων...ὁῦλον... οὐδὲ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα εἰς ἀπειρον οἶόν τ' ἵέναι, βάδισιν μὲν ὑγιείας ἕνεκεν, ταύτην δ' εὐδαιμονίας, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ἄλλου, καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἄλλου ἕνεκεν εἶναι. ib. 994 b, 9 ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα τέλος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ μὴ ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ πᾶλλα κείνουν· ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτόν τι ἔσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἀπειρον· εἰ δὲ μὴδὲν τοιοῦτου, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' οἱ τὸ ἀπειρον ποιῶντες λαμβάνουσιν ἐξαιρούντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, καίτοι οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειεν οὐδὲν πράττειν μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρασ ἤξειν. οὐδ' ἂν εἴη νοῦς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς· ἕνεκα γάρ τινος αἰεὶ πράττει ὃ γε σοῦν ἔχων· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ πέρασ· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρασ ἐστίν.

X.

§ 28. There is nothing, however, in the conception of the Final Cause to justify us in saying that there is only one end of all existence, a universal good to which all others lead up. On the contrary, we seem rather to see that there are very many different forms, each of which has its own completion, a stage at which it is full-grown. A plant is complete when it flowers, an animal when it has reached the full stature of its kind, and we do not see that in this they are contributing to the completion of any universal form. There appear to be as many final causes as there are forms capable of completion, and if this is so, we can hardly agree with Plato who held that the Good for Man could not be studied apart from the good for all creatures and of the world as a whole. It follows at once from Aristotle's teleology that the good of each form must be studied by itself.

It must, however, be admitted that this is not exactly the ground on which Plato's universal good is rejected in the Ethics. We have instead a number of subtle arguments based on the doctrine of the "Categories" and a few remarks which look like appeals to the prejudices of "common sense." The latter we can understand at once; for it is in accordance with the method of the Ethics to go for premisses to the beliefs of the many. But what are we to make of the arguments drawn from the priority of one category to the others and the impossibility of anything being a common predicate in all the figures of predication? Are we to say that Aristotle for once has violated the rules of his own method and argued directly from his own scientific premisses, and then not even from those that really determined his views?

To understand this point, it is necessary to be quite clear as to what these "categories" are, a subject upon which much new light has recently been thrown. There are various names for the categories, but the most correct and technical is *σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας*, "figures of predication." The most obvious way of interpreting this term is to look at it in

the light of the analogous phrase *σχήματα τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ* or "figures of inference." Now what the figures of the syllogism really give us is the different relations in which two terms can stand to a third or "middle" term, and it would therefore seem natural that the figures of predication should give us the various relations that can exist between a subject and a predicate. The analogy is not quite perfect, however; for we should rather expect in that case to find the categories or "predicaments" identical with the "predicables," namely genus, species, property and accident, whereas they are really such things as quality, quantity and relation. This little discrepancy, we may note at once, is suggestive of a non-Aristotelian origin for the doctrine.

The whole theory, as Apelt has shown¹, is intended to solve the difficulties about predication which had caused so much trouble to "the more recent of the ancients," as Aristotle calls them. They were disturbed by the thought that a thing might turn out to be both a one and a many, and resorted to various devices to avoid this. Some, like Lykophron, abolished the "is" (the copula), some altered the form of speech and said *ἄνθρωπος λελεύκωται*, to avoid having to admit the proposition *ἄνθρωπός ἐστι λευκός*, which seems to violate the principle of contradiction. Man is man and white is white, and we must not say that man is white². Now all these difficulties arise from a confusion between what we may call the substantial, the qualitative, the quantitative judgment and the rest. When we say that Koriskos is musical, we are not making the same kind of judgment as we make when we say that Koriskos is in the Lykeion or that Koriskos is sitting. We can quite well ask what Koriskos *is*, what he *is* like, how tall he *is*, and what he *is* doing, without implying that he "is" anything else than Koriskos. In this sense, then, Koriskos is a "one and a many," and the difficulties about predication disappear as soon as we recognise that it has many forms.

All these difficulties, however, were very ancient history indeed by Aristotle's time, and we can hardly suppose that he invented a theory of categories in order to meet them,

especially as that theory is something of an excrescence alongside of his own characteristic theory of the predicables. Not only so, but by the time Plato wrote the *Philebos*, this particular spectre had been finally laid to rest. This is what Plato himself said about it :—

So.—To say that the many is one and the one many sounds a strange statement, and it is easy to raise objections against anyone who lays down either of these propositions.

Protarchos.—Do you mean when anyone says that I Protarchos, who am one by nature, am again quite a number of “me’s” and opposite to one another, and puts me down as tall and small and heavy and light and countless other things?

So.—What you mention, Protarchos, are only the vulgar marvels of the one and the many, and practically everyone is agreed now-a-days that it is better not to meddle with them. They are childish and easy and stand in the way of all reasonable argument³.

Now, if once we realise the full meaning of this, we shall have no hesitation in admitting with Rose and Gercke⁴ that the table of the categories is not Aristotle’s at all, but simply part of his heritage from the Academy, and we shall have no difficulty in accepting the positive statement that Xenokrates reduced the categories to two only, Substance and Relation⁵. If that is so, we shall see that, in accordance with his method, Aristotle was bound to argue against the Platonic view from some position admitted by the Academy, and that it is this which has prevented him from doing what would doubtless have been more interesting to us, namely, from contrasting his own view of teleology with that of Plato.

Now that we can look at them in this light, the arguments themselves are not nearly so captious and unreal as they might appear at first sight. Aristotle is pointing out a real inconsistency in the Academic position, namely that the theory of the “one and many” is quite inconsistent with the doctrine of “forms,” at least in its original shape.

All these arguments depend upon the fundamental position that the categories cannot be reduced either to one another or to any common genus⁶. It may be possible with Xenokrates to reduce all but Substance to the single category of Relation, it may be possible to class them all as accidents of

substance; but there is no common measure of a substance and of a relation or accident. Now the Platonic forms are substances, if they are anything, and cannot have any application beyond the first of the categories. A thing which could be predicated in all the categories can for that very reason have no substantial existence; it can form no true genus. But the Form of the Good professes to be just such a common predicate; we say that a thing is good in any category we please, and therefore good is no true universal. In particular it is impossible that the same universal should be predicated of two things, one of which is posterior to the other; for species are never prior or posterior to one another. Now all the other categories are clearly posterior to substance and they cannot therefore be coordinate species of the same genus. This is an *argumentum ad hominem*, certainly, but it goes to the root of the difference between Plato and Aristotle.

¹ O. Apelt, Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, pp. 201 sqq.

² Phys. 185 b, 29 ἐθоруβούντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ ἅμα γένηται αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀφείλον, ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελευκκῶται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μὴ ποτε τὸ ἔστι προσάπτοντες πολλά εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἐν, ὡς μοναχῶς λεγόμενον τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος. The phrase μοναχῶς λεγόμενον (opp. πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον) is exactly equivalent to ἐν μᾶ κατηγορίᾳ κατηγορούμενον. The doctrine in question was maintained by Antisthenes and the schools of Megara and Eretria.

³ Phileb. 14 c ΣΩ. ...ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλά εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλά θανααστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τοῦτων ὀποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ. ΠΡΩ. "Ἀρ' οὖν λέγεις ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἓνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία; ΣΩ. Σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θανααστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβάνοντων γίνεσθαι. Plato first published the solution of the problem in Soph. 251 a, sqq., where see Apelt's note. The "category" of πρὸς τι gets rid of this particular difficulty.

⁴ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iv, p. 424.

⁵ Simplicius in Cat., Schol. Br. 47 b, 26 οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσι.

⁶ Phys. 200 b, 34 κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦτων οὐδὲν ἐστὶ λαβεῖν, ὡς φασί, δ' οὔτε τόδε οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐδέν. Met. 1024 b, 10 ἕτερα δὲ τῷ γένει λέγεται...καὶ ὅσα καθ' ἕτερον σχῆμα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ ποῖόν τι, τὰ δ' ὡς διήρηται πρότερον οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναλύεται οὐτ' εἰς ἀλλήλα οὐτ' εἰς ἓν τι. ib. 1070 a, 33 ἀπορήσει γὰρ ἂν τις πρότερον ἕτεραί ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον εἰ ταῦτά πάντων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρὸς τι καὶ ἡ οὐσία. τί οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδὲν ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν στοιχεῖον ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας.

BOOK I.

HAPPINESS.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. To find the definition which is to be the starting-point of our science we must discuss the beliefs of the many and the opinions of the wise (Introd. § 25). Now all are agreed that the Good for Man is Happiness, but there is a great divergence between the many and the wise as to what happiness really means. We must therefore discuss their views, whether these are merely implied in the lives they lead, or formulated as theories of the good. This discussion will show us what sides of the truth each has laid hold of, and the definition of happiness will then emerge.

We need not hesitate to translate the word *εὐδαιμονία* by the English "happiness," but we must be careful not to ascribe to Aristotle any theory of "Eudaemonism." If we do, we make the mistake of supposing him to be setting up Happiness as the end of life in opposition to some other theory of that end. Now his whole point is that there is no other. Plato and his followers are quite at one with Sardanapallos as to this, and the only question is what we are to understand by it. In popular Greek *εὐδαιμονία* meant having a good *δαίμων*, and *δαίμων* means fortune or luck. Generally speaking, then, it meant an abundance of worldly goods, and this sense is given in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* along with others which seem to come from the Academy¹. For the Greek philosophers had long been trying to deepen

¹ *Rhet.* 1360 b, 14 *ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία* (1) *εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς*, ἢ (2) *αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς*, ἢ (3) *ὁ βίος ὁ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ᾗδιτος*, ἢ (4) *εὐθηρία κτη-*

μάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμειος φυλακτικῆς καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων. These definitions bear the stamp of the Academy. The first is a definition

the significance of the old term. Herakleitos had said "Man's character is his δαίμων," and Demokritos declared that "Happiness lieth not in flocks and herds: the soul is the dwelling-place of the δαίμων." This was of course the view of Plato too, and the final step in the ennoblement of the word was taken by Xenokrates. To him the soul itself was a δαίμων, and the term εὐδαιμονία thus acquired a new shade of meaning².

§ 2. If we look at the lives men lead, we see that they may be reduced to three. First there is the life of pleasure or enjoyment, then there is the life of action, which aims at honour or fame, and there is the life of the spectator, the artistic, scientific or religious life. The first two are easily disposed of, and so is the view which the seeker of honour may readily be made to adopt, that goodness is the real object of his life. A man may be good and never do anything with his goodness; he might as well be asleep or be a vegetable. We are getting nearer the truth, but we have not reached it yet. We are not now in a position to discuss the life of artistic and scientific contemplation, the life of the onlooker, and besides it can hardly be called a popular one; but we shall have to show later on that its aim is not mere amusement. All these views of life, then, are partial; but our definition must do justice to them all. Popular opinion cannot be altogether wide of the mark.

§ 3. Turning next to the opinions of the wise, we are met at once by the Platonic theory of the Good. This we are forced to reject, because it is based upon the impossible idea of a universal good. (Introd. § 28.) But, when we pass on from this, we find that Plato has expressed several views about Happiness which lend themselves to the purposes of our dialectic. For instance, in the Philebos, he has made it quite clear that Happiness must be complete, self-sufficient and more worth having than anything else. It must be something which is desired for itself

by τότε μετὰ τοῦδε (cf. 1146 a, 27 n.). The second is to be explained from [Plato] Def. 412 b αὐτάρκεια τελειότης κτήσεως ἀγαθῶν (cf. Plato, Philebos 20 c sqq. and the definitions of Speusippos and Xenokrates in note 3). The third is possibly that of Eudoxos, while the fourth alludes to the ὑπηρετικὴ δύναμις of Xenokrates (see note 3).

² Herakleitos fr. 121 ἡθὸς ἀνθρώπου δαίμων. Demokritos fr. 10, 11 (Natorp) εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ' ἐν χρυσῷ· ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος. Ar. Top. 112 a, 36 εὐδαιμονία, οὐδ' ἂν ὁ δαίμων ᾗ σπουδαῖος, καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης φησὶν εὐδαιμονία εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαῖον· ταύτην γὰρ ἐκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα.

and never as a means to something else. We cannot ask the question why we desire to be happy, and if that is so, Happiness cannot be identified with any partial form of life, but only with the good life as a whole.

But what is the good life? Here again the views of Plato help us. In the Republic he has shown that the good life and consequently the happiness of anything is identical with the good performance of its own proper task or function. Accordingly if we wish to find in what a good human life consists we must ask what is the proper function of man. Now man is an animal, a living creature, so his function will be life. But life merely as such cannot be his proper function; for a plant lives as well as a man. Nor can it be merely sentient and appetitive life; for every animal shares in that. The only kind of life which is peculiar to man is the life of rational activity, that is the life which knows the ground (*λόγος*) of its activities and can give an account of them (*λόγον ἔχει*).

The Good for Man, then, is to perform this function well, but what do we mean by "well"? We can only mean that the function is performed in such a manner as to exhibit the form of goodness proper to it. To be happy we must, then, be in such a condition that we can perform our proper function well.

§ 4. So far, we are in substantial agreement with the Academy. Speusippos defined Happiness as "the complete or perfect condition of beings in a natural state," and Xenokrates says it is the "possession of our proper goodness along with the power that ministers to it". These definitions are, however, inadequate. If we ask Speusippos whether the good life is best defined as a

² The Academic definition of *εὐδαιμονία* as an *ἔξις* first appears in Plato Phileb. 11 d ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἔξω ψυχῆς καὶ διαθέσεων ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνα παρέχειν. The definitions of Speusippos and Xenokrates are preserved by Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II, 21 p. 500 (Potter) Σπεύσιππος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἔξω εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν, ἣ ἔξω ἀγαθῶν· ἥς δὴ καταστάσεως ἅπαντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους δεξιῶν ἔχειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀσχλησίας· εἶεν δ' ἂν αἱ ἀρεταὶ

τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργαστικά. ib. 22 Ξενοκράτης...τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτῆσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῇ δυνάμεως· εἰτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς δ' ὑφ' ᾧ τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡς δὲ ἐξ ᾧ ὡς μερῶν τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις, ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ (surely ὡς δ' ᾧ οὐκ ἄνευ as Zeller reads) τὰ σωματικά καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. We cannot understand the dialectic by which Aristotle reaches his own definition without keeping all this clearly before us.

condition or as the activity arising from that condition, he must allow that a life is strictly speaking an activity rather than the condition which gives rise to it. And, if we ask Xenokrates whether he means by Happiness the mere "possession" of goodness or rather its exercise and use, he must certainly admit that he really means the latter.

§ 5. After this discussion, the following definition will appear self-evident. In the first place, Happiness is "an activity of the soul," that is, as we have seen, of that part of the soul which "knows what it is doing" (λόγον ἔχει). But not every such activity is related to the function of man, but only good activities. For the purpose of our analysis it will be clearer to express this formally as the differentia, and say "an activity according to goodness." And, if there are more forms of goodness than one, we must say "according to the best and most complete form of goodness." We must add further, since an activity is always something complete, that it must be "in a complete life," meaning by that a life which has developed to its full stature, which has reached the form appointed for it by nature. The body is complete when it has reached the limit which nature fixes for the growth of its species, and the rational soul too is full-grown at a certain stage of its development. But we must not imagine that when it has reached this completion, its life comes to an end; that was the mistake made by Solon, who confused the "end" of life in the sense of its full developement with the "end" of life in the sense of death. It would be truer to say that life is only beginning when the "end" in the former sense is reached; for now it is a complete or full-grown activity, or, to put the thing in a way which Aristotle is fond of in other connexions, though he does not refer to it here, we are dealing with an activity and therefore we can use the present and the perfect tenses at the same time of the same thing⁴. Seeing is such an activity, and we can say "he sees" and "he has seen" and they may both be true. In like manner, Aristotle might have said, we can say of the man who is active according to goodness both εἰ ζῇ and εἰ βεβίωκε, for the goodness of his life is fully present in every moment of it. And, in spite of Solon, we may say also εἰ βιώσεται, for such activities have an element of permanence in

⁴ On this way of expressing the complete presence in any given moment of an ἐνέργεια, cf. 1174 a, 13 sqq. and the notes.

them, and are not wholly at the mercy of fortune. But we must not push this to an extreme; for an old age like that of Priam or King Lear is possible in a world not wholly independent of chance. The world is such that "on the whole" Happiness once achieved is permanent; but there are exceptions to this just as there are monstrosities and portents in nature.

§ 6. We see, then, that we must allow to a certain extent for chance, and this is precisely what we should expect from the account given above⁵ of the subject-matter of Politics. But that is no reason for identifying happiness with good luck or embodying "external goods" in our definition of it as Xenokrates does. It is, of course, quite clear that Happiness, like everything else in this world, is dependent on certain material conditions, but that is no reason for including those conditions in its definition. It is true that a tragedy, however fine it may be, cannot be produced at all without a chorus and costumes and scenery; but these things are no part of the tragedy itself; they are the province of the choregos and not of the poet. We must admit, then, that Happiness is dependent on something which is not in our power at all, while on the other hand we must refuse to admit that these external conditions are any part of the happiness itself. In this respect the relation of Happiness to external goods is quite different from its relation to pleasure. Pleasure is not something external, but something in the soul itself, and therefore belongs to Happiness not accidentally but essentially. This indeed is the justification of the one-sided popular view that happiness is pleasure, just as the view of men of action that it is honour is fully satisfied by the doctrine that it is an activity according to goodness. For honour implies goodness in the honoured, or the belief in it by those who honour, and is only a secondary end.

We see, then, that the definition we have given meets all the requirements we can fairly make of it, and it can have no other proof than this.

⁵ Introd. § 26.

πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν, πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἱατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι 4
 10 δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν—καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν χαλινοποικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἵππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσὶν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἐτέρας—ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάν-
 15 των ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς 5
 εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεῖσων ἐπιστημῶν.

II. Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τᾶλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον 20 αἰρούμεθα—πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι

ἐνεκα ναυπηγίας; So πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις is from Polit. 304 e στρατηγικὴ καὶ πᾶσα ἡ πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις. Eudemos (loc. cit.) adds that the purely theoretical problems arising from practical science are to be treated also so far as they are relevant. This is Aristotle's practice too.

§ 4. ὅσαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. This sentence is an anacolouthon; for ὅσαι δὲ is resumed after an intricate parenthesis by ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ as if ἐν ὅσαις had preceded. This form of anacolouthon is very characteristic of the akroamatic style. In the parenthesis itself, as Professor Bywater points out (Contr. p. 22), κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον introduces the apodosis to καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. We might substitute ὥσπερ... οὕτως to bring out the sense.

τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. πρακτικῶν ἐπιστημῶν or τεχνῶν.

δύναμιν, practically equivalent to τέχνην or πρακτικὴν ἐπιστήμην as in Plato, Polit. loc. cit. Cf. Intro. § 12.

ἄλλαι...ἐτέρας. The pronouns are alternated for variety. Cf. 1158 a, 28. 1166 b, 7.

τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν Intro. § 13. The term is assumed to be familiar from Plato.

§ 5. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ. In the case of the sciences just mentioned (ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεῖσων ἐπιστημῶν) the end is some ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. But the principle just stated will apply also in cases where the end is the ἐνέργεια itself. So, at the beginning of the Metaphysics it is shown that σοφία is ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ with regard to all sciences, and its end is simply an ἐνέργεια. In the Ethics, too, we shall find that the end of σοφία is 'better' than that of any practical science.

II. § 1. τῶν πρακτῶν. By τὰ πρακτά Aristotle means the objects of πρᾶξις, the things we do, just as by τὰ αἰσθητά he means the things we perceive by the senses. For another sense of πρακτός, cf. below 1096 b, 34.

πρόεισι, impersonal. 'There will be a process *ad infinitum*.' Cf. 1097 b, 13. The phrases εἰς ἀπειρον ἵεναι, προῖεναι, πορεύεσθαι, βαδίζειν are opposed to ἵστασθαι, στήναι. Cf. 1142 a, 29n. For the argument, cf. Intro. § 27.

κενήν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὀρεξίν,—δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰ γα-
 2 θὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γυνῶσις
 αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν
 3 ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω,
 πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνοσ 25
 4 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης
 5 καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται·

1094 a, 22. EE. 1214 b, 6 ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν,...πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις, ὡς τό γε μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρὸς τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημείων ἐστίν.

κενήν, 'ineffectual,' like the λόγῃ κενή of Thuc. ii, 49. So often κενὰ εὐχαί, κενὰ ἐλπίδες and the adverbial διὰ κενῆς.

ματαίαν, 'in vain.' A thing is μάτην, *frustra*, which does not attain its proper end. So μάτην γὰρ ὑπόδημα...οὐ μὴ ἐστὶν ὑπόδεσις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν (De Caelo 271 a, 32). We use the word μάτην when a thing which has a final cause does not attain it. Phys. 197 b, 22 σημείων δὲ τὸ 'μάτην,' ὅτι λέγεται ὅταν μὴ γένηται τῷ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐκείνο οὐ ἕνεκα...ὡς τοῦτο ὃν τὸ 'μάτην,' τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ὅταν μὴ περαίνῃ ἐκείνο οὐ ἕνεκα ἐπεφύκει.

τάγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, 'the good and indeed the best.'

§ 2. ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is one of Aristotle's literary passages and is reminiscent of Plato and Isokrates. Cf. Intro. § 7. Such passages are often introduced by the conversational ἄρ' οὖν, cf. 1163 a, 16. 1166 b, 3. 1171 b, 29. The subjects discussed in this section are, as Diels says, such as we should treat in a preface; but with Aristotle they "form a resting-point after the first fatiguing ascent."

καθάπερ τοξόται κ.τ.λ. This simile is found both in Plato and Isokrates. Cf. Rep. 519 c σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ

βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἓνα οὐ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Ep. ad Iasonis liberos § 10 τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον ζητοῦντες καὶ φιλοσοφῶντες, ὥσπερ σκοποῦ κειμένου στοχάσεσθε τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεύξεσθε τοῦ συμφέροντος. It recurs several times in the Ethics. Cf. 1097 a, 3. 1109 b, 26. 1138 b, 22 n.

τοῦ δέοντος, 'the right thing,' what is wanted in given circumstances, not 'our duty' which would rather be τοῦ προσήκοντος. So when Demosthenes urged the Athenians τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν he did not mean they were to 'do their duty,' but that they were to take the steps required by the situation.

§ 3. τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν. A Platonic phrase, cf. Rep. 414 a ὡς ἐν τύπῳ μὴ δὲ ἀκριβείας εἰρήσθαι, 559 a ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς, Laws 718 c οὐ πάνυ ῥᾶδιον ἐν ἐνὶ περιλαβόντα εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ οἷόν τινα τύπῳ. For the terminology of this passage cf. Intro. § 26 with the notes.

§ 4. δόξειε δ' ἂν, 'it will be admitted,' the usual phrase in a dialectical λῆψις. By κυριωτάτης Ar. means 'most authoritative' as the context shows. Cf. also Pol. 1282 b, 14 quoted on p. 7.

1094^b τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ 6
 ποίας ἐκάστους μαρτάνειν καὶ μέχρη τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει·
 ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην
 οὕσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν· χρωμένης 7
 δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ
 5 νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης
 τέλος περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰνθρώ-
 πινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν 8
 γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ
 σφῆζειν· ἀγαπητόν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ
 10 θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων 9
 ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὐσα·

§ 6. τίνας γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Politics is most 'authoritative,' for it regulates what sciences, theoretical or practical, are to exist in the state, what each class of citizens (ἐκάστους) are to learn and up to what point (or up to what age). Ar. is referring to such regulations as those laid down by Plato, Rep. 539 d, sqq. Diels notes χρῶν as a literary touch.

ὁρῶμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is from Plato, Polit. 303 e, sqq. Cf. Introd. § 13.

§ 7. χρωμένης δὲ κ.τ.λ. Politics 'makes use of' the practical sciences, such as strategy and rhetoric; it does not 'make use of' the theoretical sciences, though it regulates them, cf. 1145 a, 6. I believe with Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 23) that πρακτικαῖς is a gloss from Aspasios, but I think it gives the true sense. Politics does not 'use' mathematics or astronomy.

§ 8. εἰ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This is not an apology for 'confusing ethics and politics,' but rather for appearing to separate them (Introd. § 14). The science of the Good is the same whether for one, few, or many, but it is called Politics *a priori*. To secure the good of one is 'better than no-

thing' (ἀγαπητόν), but it is not the full realisation of the end of our science.

ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν, 'for a people,' such as the Macedonians, or for free Hellenic 'states.' The word ἔθνος is regularly used of peoples who had not developed so far as the city-state.

§ 9. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος κ.τ.λ. 'This' (viz. to secure and preserve the good for man) 'is what our branch of science aims at.' Here we have a clear reference back to the beginning, Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος...ἀγαθοῦ τίνος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ, and a confirmation of the view that that passage refers to the ends of sciences alone, and not to ends in general.

ἐφίεται...οὐσα. As Zell points out, the meaning really is 'Now the science which aims at this is Politics.' The Greek idiom allows of the leading idea being expressed by the participle (so regularly with τυγχάνω etc.).

πολιτικὴ τις. The τις is added merely because popular usage confined the word to 'practical politics' and ignored the 'architectonic' art of the lawgiver (cf. 1141 b, 28). We must not translate 'a species of Politics'; for it is the whole of Politics.

III. Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς 2 λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, 15 πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμον μόνον 3 εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰ γαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες 4 ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν

III. § 1. Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. "This discussion of scientific ἀκρίβεια distinguishes itself from the gray uniformity of Aristotle's style by its choice phrases and words (πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, παχυλῶς, χρεῶν, πιθανολογεῖν)" Diels in Archiv 1, 495.

κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην, 'so far as the subject-matter allows.' Pol. 1256 a, 8 λέγω δὲ ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, ὅσον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποῦ δὲ χαλκόν. Met. 1029 a, 3 λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην, ὅσον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφήν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἰδέας, τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων, τὸν ἀνδριάντα, τὸ σύνολον. This is not only an Aristotelian technicality, but a Platonic image and therefore in place here. Cf. Phileb. 54 b φημί δὲ γενέσθαι μὲν ἐνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν κ.τ.λ. Tim. 69 a δτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ νῦν οἷα τέκουσιν ἡμῖν παρὰ κεῖται... ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἐπιλοιοῦν λόγον δεῖ συνυφανθῆναι (where note the shifting of the metaphor). Aristotle substitutes ὑποκείσθαι for the Platonic παρακείσθαι (cf. also 1104 a, 29 n.) because ἡ ὕλη ὑπόκειται τῷ εἶδει is a more important aspect of the thing to him than ἡ ὕλη παρὰ κεῖται τῷ δημιουργῷ. The metaphor is kept up by ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις below. We do not expect the same finish in wood as in marble. It is worth noting that there is no properly attested instance in earlier literature of ὅλη meaning any

other material than wood. That quoted in Liddell and Scott from Sophokles is illusory. The word ὅλη there belongs to Plutarch.

§ 2. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not mean to say that τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια are in themselves liable to variation and fluctuation,—that point is discussed below 1134 b, 18 sqq.—but that they give rise to variation and fluctuation in men's judgments. For the meaning of ἔχει, cf. ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχειν, ἀπορίαν ἔχειν and the like.

ὥστε δοκεῖν, 'that they are believed' by some of the sophists. For the history of the contrast between νόμος and φύσις, see my article in the International Journal of Ethics for April, 1897.

§ 3. καὶ τὰ γαθὰ, i.e. the recognised good things of life, described later on (1129 b, 3) as τὰ ἀπλῶς μὲν ἀγαθὰ, τιμὴ δ' οὐκ ἀεί. For a characteristic Greek list cf. Plato, Rep. 491 c κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει. See too Meno 87 c ἐγγεία, φαιμέν, καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ, ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα.

διὰ πλοῦτον... δι' ἀνδρείαν. For the first Diels compares Xen. Kyr. 1, 6, 44 πολλοὶ τὸν πολέμειον πλοῦτον κατακτησάμενοι διὰ τούτων ἀπώλοντο. Difficulties have been felt about the inclusion of ἀνδρεία among goods that may be bad. But the point is what the popular view is, and certainly it

20 οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ
 τύπῳ τάληθες ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
 καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεῶν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγο-
 μένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰ κριβές
 25 ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος

1094 b, 22. EE. 1216 b, 35 διαφέρουσι δ' οἱ λόγοι περὶ
 ἐκάστην μέθοδον, οἳ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ μὴ φιλοσόφως.
 διόπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν περιέρχον εἶναι τὴν τοι-
 αύτην θεωρίαν δι' ἧς οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διὰ
 τί· φιλόσοφον γάρ τὸ τοιοῦτον περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον. δεῖται μέντοι
 τοῦτο πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφου
 εἶναι τὸ μὴθὲν εἰκῇ λέγειν ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγου, πολλάκις λανθάνουσι
 λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς. τοῦτο δὲ
 ποιοῦσιν ὅτε μὲν δι' ἄγνοίαν, ὅτε δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν, ὑφ' ὧν ἀλίσκεσθαι
 συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν
 μὴτ' ἐχόντων μῆτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἢ πρακτικὴν.

admits this. Diels points out that the reference is to Plato's *Meno* 87 e sqq. After enumerating the ἀγαθὰ, he says (88 a) ταῦτά δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίστε καὶ βλάπτειν, ... οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ φρόνησις ἢ ἀνδρεία, ἀλλ' οἷον θάρρος τι κ.τ.λ.

§ 4. περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων. For the phrase cf. 1095 a, 3. 1143 b, 10. According to the doctrine of the *Analytics* there are three things in every proof: (1) περὶ ὃ δείκνυσι, (2) ὃ δείκνυσι, (3) ἐξ ὧν δείκνυσι (*An. Post.* 75 a, 39 sqq.). The περὶ ὃ (1) is the ὑποκείμενον γένος or the ὑποκειμένη ὄλη, that about which something is proved. In the present case this is τὰ πρακτὰ or τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια. The ἐξ ὧν (3) are the ἀξιώματα, the principles from which we argue. In the present case, as neither (1) nor (3) is universal or necessary, it follows that (2) ὃ δείκνυσι, i.e. the conclusion, τὸ συμπέρασμα, cannot be so either. Tr. 'on such a subject and with such premisses.'

περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Phys. 196 b, 10 ὁρῶμεν τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως γινόμενα τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, φανερόν ἐστι οὐδενὸν τούτων αἰτία ἢ τύχη λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. If chance were the cause, there could be no science of them; ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ αἰεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (*Met.* 1065 a, 4). Nature and Man are the two causes which act ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ and stand between Necessity and Chance. Cf. *Intro.* § 26.

τοιαῦτα, sc. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. The conclusion (συμπέρασμα) must have the same character as the premisses (τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος).

ἀποδέχεσθαι. Correlative to ἀποδοῦναι. We pass from the lecturer to the student.

πεπαιδευμένου γάρ κ.τ.λ. On Aristotle's conception of παιδεία, see *Intro.* § 21.

καθ' ἕκαστον γένος. The clear distinction of γένη is the mark of παιδεία.

φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ
τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις
5 ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἂν γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων
ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, 1095^a
ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.

Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος·
ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ
6 τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς
ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν 5
7 οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν
ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ
διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιού-
τοις ἀνόνητος ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν·
τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι 10

πύσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστι περὶ ἕκαστον
πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τοὺς τ' οἰκεῖους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλοτριους.

παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.
This is taken from Plato, Theait. 162 e ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἥρτων οὐν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ἢ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετεῖν, ἀξιος οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκότι περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους. On the other hand we have no right to ask more than τὸ πιθανόν from the rhetorician. Rhet. 1355 b, 10 sqq. (ῥητορικῆς ἔργον) τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον.

ἀποδείξεις. The ἐνθύμημα or rhetorical syllogism from εἰκότα or σημεία is sometimes called ῥητορικὴ ἀπόδειξις (Rhet. 1355 a, 6), but that is only καθ' ὁμοιότητα, 'by analogy.'

§ 5. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα κ.τ.λ. The qualification καθ' ἕκαστον does double duty. Fully expressed the meaning is καθ' ἕκαστον κρίνει καλῶς ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδευμένος. For the

brachylogy cf. Kühner § 597 f, and for the distinction between general and special παιδεία, Introd. § 21.

ἀπλῶς. The word ἀπλῶς, *simpliciter*, means without any πρόσθεσις or qualification. The πρόσθεσις which is dropped here is καθ' ἕκαστον. For the τόπος of πρόσθεσις and ἀφαίρεσις, cf. 1140 a 28 n. It is a favourite form of ἐπαγωγή.

Διὸ κ.τ.λ. This is because he has not the special παιδεία required as a preliminary training. The logical παιδεία is more within his reach.

ἐκ τούτων...περὶ τούτων. Cf. 1094 b, 20 n.

§ 6. τὸ τέλος, sc. τῆς πολιτικῆς, which is a practical science. Cf. 1103 b, 27.

§ 7. καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν. As we shall see in Book VII, the ἀκρατής is the morally weak man who εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος.

κατὰ λόγον, 'by rule,' 'uniformly,' 'consistently.' In 1169 a, 5 τὸ κατὰ

πολυφελές ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν 8
ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφρο-
μιάσθω ταῦτα.

IV. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ
15 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν
πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν
ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολο- 2
γεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες

1095 a, 14. EE. 1217 a, 18 πεπροοιμασμένων δὲ τούτων,
λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ σαφῶς
λεγομένων, ζητοῦντες ἐπὶ τὸ σαφῶς <προϋόντες> εὑρεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἡ
εὐδαιμονία. ὁμολογεῖται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν
ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχ' ἂν εἴη
καὶ βελτίονος ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία, οἷον θεοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ
ἄλλων ζῶων, ὅσα χεῖρω τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν κοινωνεῖ
ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ'
ἰχθὺς οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθέν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει
μετέχει θείου τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινα τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν
βέλτιον ζῇ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον
ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν
ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτὰ τὰ δ' οὐ πρακτά. τοῦτο δὲ λέγομεν οὕτως, διότι ἓνα
τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν μετέχει κινήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (? πράξεων)·
καὶ ταῦτ' ἴσως ἄριστα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἓνα δὲ πρακτὰ μὲν, ἀλλὰ
πρακτὰ κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν (καὶ
γὰρ ὧν ἕνεκα πράττομεν καὶ ἃ τούτων ἕνεκα μετέχει πράξεως, οἷον καὶ
τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον τίθεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὰ τούτων
πραττόμενα χάριν, τὰ θ' ὑγιεινὰ καὶ τὰ χρηματιστικά), ὁῦλον ὅτι καὶ
τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν ἄριστον θετέον.

λόγον ζῆν is opposed to τὸ κατὰ πάθος.
Cf. Plato, Laws 689 d ὁ...κατὰ λόγον
ζῶν. Tim. 89 d ἡ τις...μάλιστα' ἂν
κατὰ λόγον ζῷη. What is meant is
that the appetitions must be consis-
tently directed so that they may be
counted on; they must not be παρά-
λογοι or such as to defy calculation.
The phrase does not mean 'according
to reason,' cf. 1100 a, 23 n.

IV. § 1. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλα-

βόντες κ.τ.λ. This shows clearly
how we are to understand 1094 a,
1 sqq. As we saw, πολιτικὴ is both a
γνῶσις and a προαίρεσις.

§ 2. τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν κ.τ.λ.
See Introductory Note. We now
find a nominal agreement but a very
real disagreement between the beliefs
of the many and those of the wise.
This ἀπορία must be solved by the
dialectic method. The fact that

λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπο-
 λαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τί 20
 ἐστὶν ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς
 3 ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον
 ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο—πολλάκις δὲ
 καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ
 πλοῦτον—συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ 25
 ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἐνιοὶ δ' ὄντο παρὰ τὰ

a, 22—26. EE. 1214 b, 7 θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν,
 ἥτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν.

a, 26. EE. 1217 b, 2 φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾧ ὑπάρχει τό τε πρῶτον εἶναι
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι.
 ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοτέρω τῇ ιδέᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. λέγω δὲ ἀμφοτέρω
 τό τε πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτίον ἀγαθοῖς τῇ παρουσίᾳ

'most people' regard εὐδαιμονία as the Good for man raises a presumption that it is the ἀρχή we are seeking for. Introd. § 25.

οἱ χαρίεντες. This is the urbane equivalent of οἱ σοφοί, the name which is given to them below. The reference is mainly to the Platonists, who had already adopted the name εὐδαιμονία for man's highest good. See Introductory Note, § 1.

τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν. In the Politics Aristotle more and more tends to substitute this phrase for the name εὐδαιμονία which he had borrowed from the Academy. It emphasises the view that a good life is an ἐνέργεια.

τὸ εὖ πράττειν. In [Plato] Alcib. I, 116 b the ambiguity of this phrase is similarly turned to account. "Ὅστις καλῶς πράττει οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει;—Ναί.—Οἱ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσι;—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; We must remember that Aristotle is here giving the views of others and is not answerable for the fallacy. He himself gives a very complete proof below 1098 a,

7 sqq. Cf. also the definition of εὐδαιμονία as εὐπραγία μετ' ἀρετῆς (Introductory Note, n. 1).

οἱ πολλοί, here opposed to οἱ σοφοί. But cf. 1095 b, 16 n.

§ 3. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is not answered till a, 26 ἐνιοὶ δ' ὄντο.

νοσήσας κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Rep. 583 c ἄρα οὐ μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους;...ὥς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡδίων τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς ἐλελήθει πρὶν κάμνειν ἡδιστον ὄν.

συνειδότες...θαυμάζουσιν. We gather from EE. 1214 b, 7 (θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἥτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν) what these regard as happiness. For ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς, 'over their heads,' cf. Gen. An. 723 a, 22 λαν ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τὸ λεγόμενον, Isokr. Paneg. § 11 ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἔχουσι.

ἐνιοὶ δ' ὄντο, sc. the Platonists. The imperfect tense is used because Aristotle is speaking from personal recollection of the school. So ἡπόρει a, 32. He sums up the Platonic view

πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις
 πᾶσιν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν 4
 τὰς δόξας ματαιώτερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα
 30 ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω 5

τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι. μάλιστα τε γὰρ τὰγαθὸν λέγεσθαι κατ' ἐκείνης
 ἀληθῶς (κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητα τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνης εἶναι),
 καὶ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ μετεχομένου ἀναιρεῖσθαι
 καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ιδέας, ἃ λέγεται τῷ μετέχειν ἐκείνης, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον
 τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον. ὥστ' εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 τὴν ιδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ χωριστὴν εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ιδέας.

1095 a, 28. EE. 1214 b, 28 πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκο-
 πεῖν, ὅσας ἔχουσιν τινες περὶ αὐτῆς, περιέρχον (πολλὰ γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ
 τοῖς παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ παραφρονούσι, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὐθεὶς
 νοῦν ἔχων διαπορήσειεν· δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἡλικίας ἐν
 ἣ μεταβαλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κολάσεως ἱατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς· κόλασις γὰρ
 ἢ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐστίν), ὁμοίως δὲ ταύταις οὐδὲ
 τὰς τῶν πολλῶν (cf. 1095 b, 19 sq.) ἐπισκεπτέον (εἰκὴ γὰρ λέγουσι
 σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ εὐδαιμονίας· ἀτοπον γὰρ
 προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγον μὴδὲν δεομένοις ἀλλὰ πάθους). ἐπεὶ δ'
 εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἐκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκείαι, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ περὶ
 βίου τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσὶν. ταύτας οὖν καλῶς
 ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων ἐλεχοὶ τῶν
 ἐναντιουμένων αὐτοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσὶν. (Cf. Top. 104 b,
 1—105 a, 9.)

thus: 'Over and above the many good things we know there is another Good which is good in itself and the cause of the goodness of all the good things we know.'

καθ' αὐτό. One of the marks of τὸ καθόλου, An. Post. 73 b, 26 sqq.

ὃ καὶ...ἀγαθὰ. This implies κατὰ παντός, the other mark of τὸ καθόλου.

§ 4. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We need not discuss mere θέσεις of the wise (cf. 1096 a, 2 n.), nor contradictions of τὰ δοκούντα by ὁ τυχών (cf. Top. 104 b, 23).

τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας, 'the most prevalent' (lit. 'those that come

to the surface'), the common meaning of the word. Cf. προύχοντες, b, 18.

ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον, 'or are thought plausible.' The phrase λόγον ἔχειν regularly means 'to have something to say for themselves,' or 'to admit of something being said for them' and is exactly equivalent to εὐλογον εἶναι. It can have no other meaning here.

§ 5. μὴ λανθανέτω δὲ κ.τ.λ. A note justifying the dialectical method which is here used. This is not a case for syllogistic reasoning from the ἀρχή, but for dialectical search after the ἀρχή.

δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὐ γὰρ καὶ [ὁ] Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐξήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. 1095^b ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμε- 5 7 νον ἱκανῶς· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρ-

οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι, sc. οἱ ἀπο-
δεικτικοί.

οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, sc. οἱ διαλεκτικοί.

εὐ γὰρ καὶ [ὁ] Πλάτων κ.τ.λ. The imperfect tense shows that Aristotle is still speaking from personal recollection of the Academy. He means that, before commencing any inquiry, Plato used to ask whether, in the given case, they were in a position to descend from the ἀρχή by διαίρεσις, or whether it was first necessary to ascend to it by συναγωγή. I prefer to omit ὁ with L^b; the article is generally added when Plato in his writings is meant.

ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. This is not to be found in the published works of Plato, but the simile is clearly taken from the δίαυλος. Are we in such a position that we have only κάμψαι διαβλου θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν (Aisch. Ag. 345), or have we first to run the first κῶλον? The πέρας is not the winning-post, but the καμπή.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γάρ. This reading (K^b) is preferable to ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν (L^b). It makes what follows an explanation of the comparison, while μὲν οὖν would set it aside.

ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων. This cannot mean 'from the knowable,' as Muretus and others have thought. In Greek γνώριμος is the opposite of ἀγνωστ and means 'known.'

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς, sc. γνώριμα λέγεται. This is the true Aristotelian

distinction between reasoning *a priori* and *a posteriori*. The ἀρχή is the logical *prius* of all legislation and action, but current moral judgments and existing institutions are 'more known to us.' Cf. Top. 141 b, 5 ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν γνωριμώτερον τὸ πρότερον τοῦ ὑστέρου, οἷον στιγμὴ γραμμῆς καὶ γραμμὴ ἐπιπέδου καὶ ἐπιπέδον στερεοῦ ... ἡμῖν δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἐνίοτε συμβαίνει· μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ στερεὸν ὑπὸ τὴν αἰσθησιν πίπτει.

§ 6. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The man who has been trained in good habits has the ἀρχή implicitly, and it can be made explicit by a dialectical process. For ἡχθαι cf. ἀγωγή 1179 b, 31.

ἡθεσιν, the reading of L^b, seems preferable to ἔθεσιν K^b. We have not settled yet that ἦθος comes from ἔθος.

§ 7. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The word ἀρχή is used in its regular sense, for which see Introd. § 22. Since the starting-point or first principle of Politics is 'the that,' i.e. the fact that the definition of Happiness is whatever we may find it to be, and since any one who has been well brought up either has that definition or can easily get it by a dialectical process, the one thing needful for the intending student is a good up-bringing. He need not know anything of First Philosophy or Physics; for in Politics we treat the definition of Happiness as ultimate

κούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι, ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἑσιόδου—

- 10 οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἔσθλός δ' αὖ κακείνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοήῃ μήτ' ἄλλον ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

V. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
15 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκάσιν ἐκ τῶν βίων
ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· 2
διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν—τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι

1095 b, 14. EE. 1215 a, 26 διηρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν
μὲν <οὐδ' > ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εἡμερίας, ἀλλ' ὥς τῶν
ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς
καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ τὰς βαναύσους (λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν
τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἐδραίας καὶ
μισθαρνικάς, χρηματιστικὰς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ὦν<ας> [ἀγοράς] καὶ πράσεις
καπηλικὰς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων, τριῶν ὄντων

(cf. *Intro.* § 23). Aristotle uses τὸ ὅτι ('the that') as opposed to τὸ διότι ('the why'—*διότι* is the indirect form of *διὰ τί*;) especially of the definitions which form the οἰκείαι ἀρχαί of any science, which assert existence but are not capable of demonstration by that science.

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ. sc. ὁ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἡγμένους καλῶς.

λάβοι ἂν. For λαβεῖν used to express the result of the dialectical process, the λήψις of a πρότασις, see *Intro.* § 25.

μηδέτερον, sc. τὸ ἔχειν ἢ τὸ λαβεῖν ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. If a man neither sees that the Good for Man is what we shall find it to be, nor can be made to see it dialectically, we can have nothing more to say to him. He is, as it were, morally colour-blind.

τοῦ Ἑσιόδου. Ἔργα 291 sqq.

V. § 1. Ἡμεῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. The dialectical examination of the *ἐνδοξα* now begins. First we discuss the beliefs of the many.

ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν, 1095 a, 30.

οὐκ ἀλόγως, 'as might be expected' of οἱ πολλοί. The phrase is equivalent to εὐλόγως or εἰκότως.

εἰκάσιν ἐκ τῶν βίων, 'appear from their lives,' 'to judge by their lives.'

§ 2. οἱ μὲν πολλοί, resumed by οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοί (b, 19) and opposed by οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες (b, 22).

διὸ καί, 'which is just why.' It can be the only reason, though of course they do not formulate it as a theory of life.

τρεῖς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This classification of the 'three lives' was current at the time; for we find it both in Plato and Isocrates. Cf. *Rep.* 581 c *Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον,*

μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός
3 καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός—οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀν-
δραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, 20

τῶν καὶ πρότερον ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὁρῶμεν καὶ βίους ὄντας, οὓς οἱ ἐπ' ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἅπαντες, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολυστικόν. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος βούλεται περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁ δὲ πολιτικός περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς καλὰς (αὗται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὁ δ' ἀπολυστικός περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς σωματικάς. διόπερ ἕτερος ἕτερον τὸν εὐδαίμονα προσαγορεύει, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, Οὔθεις, εἶπεν, ὧν σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἂν τίς σοι φανείη. τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος, ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν

φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδές... Οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ θέλοις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους... ἀνερωτᾶν τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἡδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; They are then referred to as ὁ χρηματιστικός, ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλόσοφος. Isokr. Antid. § 217 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡδονῆς ἢ κέρδους ἢ τιμῆς ἕνεκα φημὶ πάντας πάντα πράττειν. Iamblichos (V. Pyth. § 58) says of Pythagoras εἰκέναι γὰρ εἶπεν τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάροδον τῷ ἐπὶ τὰς πανηγύρεις ἀπαντῶντι ὁμίλῳ· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖσε παντοδαποὶ φοιτῶντες ἀνθρώποι ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλου χρεῖαν ἀφικνεῖται, ὁ μὲν χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ κέρδους χάριν ἀπεμπολῆσαι τὸν φόρτον ἐπειγόμενος· ὁ δὲ δόξης ἕνεκα ἐπιδεικνόμενος ἥκει τὴν ῥώμην τοῦ σώματος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τρίτον εἶδος καὶ τὸ γελευθεριώτατον, συναλιζόμενον τόπων θέας ἕνεκα καὶ δημιουργημάτων καλῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργων καὶ λόγων· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῷ βίῳ παντοδαποὺς ἀνθρώπους ταῖς σπουδαῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐκωστρούζεσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ τροφῆς αἰρεῖ πῆθος, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἕμερος φιλονικίαι τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν· εἰλικρι-

νέστατον δὲ εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνθρώπου τρόπον τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν τῶν καλλίστων θεωρίαν, ὃν καὶ προσονομάζειν φιλοσόφον. This passage well brings out the metaphor underlying the phrase θεωρητικὸς βίος, 'the life of the spectator.' We know from Cicero (Tusc. v, 3) that the story was told also by Herakleides, and it is not easy to resist the impression that its source is some published work of Aristotle's such as the Προτρεπτικός, on which see Bywater in Journal of Philology, II, 55 and Diels in the Archiv I, 477. This impression is much strengthened when we read in Ar. frag. 58 (from the Προτρεπτικός of Iamblichos) καὶ τὰ Διονύσια δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐχ ὡς ληψόμενοι τι παρὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ προσθέντες (the reading is correct, cf. Plato Euthyphro 3d, and it is not necessary to read προσδόντες with Diels).

§ 3. βοσκημάτων βίον. From Plato, Rep. 586 a, βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες. Cf. also EE. (loc. cit. p. 21) on Apis.

περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλις· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις
εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ 7
5 τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρημα- 8
τιστῆς βία ὅστις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλούτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητού-

τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινὰ διαπο-
ροῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἅττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκ' ἂν τις ἔλοιτο γενέσθαι
μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, Τοῦ, φάναι, θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ
τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἕνεκα τὴν
αἴρεσιν ᾤετο τιμίαν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον μακαρίζοντες
ἢ Σμινδουρίδην τὸν Συβαρίτην (Hdt. vi, 127) ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν
ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται
τάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· ἕτεροι δὲ τινες οὗτ' ἂν φρόνησιν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε

παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ
φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀντιλέ-
γειν, καθάπερ ἐφ' Ἀντισθένης, ἢ ὅτι
πάντα κινεῖται καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι
ἐν τῷ ὄν, καθάπερ Μελισσὸς φησιν.
De Caelo, 306 a, 12 εἰκόσι τοῖς τὰς
θέσεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διαφυλάττονσι.

ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις. There can be
no doubt that in Aristotle's time
ἐγκύκλιος was a word applied to things
that were a matter of 'routine,' that
belonged to the 'trivial round.' Iso-
krates (De Pace § 87) says that during
the war ἐν ᾗν τοῦτο τῶν ἐγκυκλίων
ταφὰς ποιεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν.
Aristotle himself speaks of ἐγκύκλια
διακονήματα (Pol. 1255 b, 25) and
ἐγκύκλιοι διακοναί (ib. 1263 a, 21).
Cf. also the ἐγκύκλιοι λητουργαί.
With the present use of the word we
may compare De Caelo 279 a, 30 ἐν
τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι. The
meaning will therefore be 'in every-
day discussions or writings,' and will
not be very different from that of
ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, on which see 1102 a,
26 n.

§ 7. ὑπὲρ οὗ. Like Demosthenes,
Aristotle uses ὑπὲρ to avoid the repeti-
tion of περὶ (cf. Sandys on Phil. i, § 1).
We find it so used five times in the
Ethics, viz. here and 1096 b, 30.

1112 a, 20. 1155 b, 16. 1172 a, 26.
According to Eucken, this usage is
commonest in the Topics, Rhetoric
and Ethics, which means that it is an
elegance belonging to Aristotle's more
popular style (Introd. § 7). There is,
therefore, no occasion to doubt the
genuineness of passages where it oc-
curs.

ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις, in the Tenth Book.
The K^b reading ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις may
be based on the notion (strangely re-
vived by Ramsauer) that the discussion
of the Platonic theory which follows
is a discussion of the θεωρητικὸς βίος.
Aristotle can dismiss this Life without
vitiating his argument; for we have
to do just now only with the beliefs of
the many.

§ 8. βία ὅστις ἐστίν. I owe this
emendation to Mr James Watt of
Balliol College, Oxford. The MSS.
have βλαῖς τίς ἐστιν, but we may read
ΒΙΑΙΟΣΤΙΣΕΣΤΙΝ as we please. It
has long been seen that the meaning
must be that the money-maker is not
a free agent, and so his opinion does
not count. But can a χρηματιστής, or
even a χρηματιστῆς βίος, be called
βλαῖος in this sense? Elsewhere the
word is only used of φορὰ, κίνησις and
the like; and, though we can say βία

μενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπάται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω. 10

VI. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς

τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἔλονται μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. αἰροῦνται γοῦν οὐ μόνον ἔνιοι δόξης χάριν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μέλλοντες εὐδοκίμησειν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστι πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἄπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.

ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστι πάντες ἐπὶ τρεῖς βίους φέρουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολυστικόν.

φέρεται and βία κινεῖται, we can hardly say βία ζῆ. The conjecture is confirmed by a reading of the Vetus Versio, *pecuniosus autem quis violenter est*. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 8.

καταβέβληνται. Cf. Plato Soph. 232 d δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν. The metaphor, as Gomperz has pointed out, is that of scattering seed. So Herod. i, 122 φάτιν καταβάλλειν, *similem spargere, disseminare*. So the καταβεβλημένοι μαθήσεις of Pol. 1337 b, 21 are the popular subjects of instruction. Of course πρὸς means 'against.' Though the thing is clear, yet diatribes against them like the Προτρεπτικὸς are widely circulated.

VI. § 1. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου, sc. ἀγαθόν. It has not yet been mentioned by this name, but the two marks of τὸ καθόλου are given above, 1095 a, 27 n. We should now go on to the beliefs of the wise; but first we must apply our dialectic to showing that Plato was wrong in speaking of a universal good. Introd. § 28.

καίπερ προσάντους κ.τ.λ. The word προσάντης literally means 'up hill.' This apology is thoroughly Platonic in tone and even in style. Cf. Rep. 595 b Πητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καίτοι φίλια γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδῶς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.

εἰσαγαγεῖν, 'have imported.' The word is commonly used of introducing novelties, and suggests something arbitrary. Cf. De Caelo 271 b, 11 τοῦλάχιστον εἰσαγαγών, 'by importing the notion of a least magnitude into mathematics.'

δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως, 'it will surely be admitted' even by those who think it ungraceful of me to attack Plato. That Aristotle was sensitive to this charge appears from frag. 10, thus quoted by Proclus, καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκραγὼς μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τοῦτῳ συμπαθεῖν κἄν τις αὐτὸν αἰσθῇ διὰ φιλονικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας, another Platonic touch. Cf. Theait. 164 a εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθεν λόγον. So 1104 a, 10 πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.

15 ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους
ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλοις ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλή-
θειαν.

Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ιδέας ἐν 2
οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν
ιδέαν κατεσκευάζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
20 καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ

1096 a, 17. EE. 1218 a, 1 ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ
ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν. εἴη γὰρ
ἂν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον· πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστόν διὰ
τὸ ἀναιρουμένον τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον

καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν. Aristotle here as elsewhere partly identifies himself with the Platonic school. Cf. Met. 990 b, 8 ἔτι καθ' οὗς τρόπους δεικνυμεν ὅτι ἐστὶ τὰ εἶδη, κατ' οὐθένα φαίνεται τούτων... ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα τούτων εἶδη γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ. 997 b, 3 ὥς μὲν ὄν λέγομεν τὰ εἶδη αἰτιά τε καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι καθ' αὐτάς. Note that ἀναιρεῖν is used of cancelling a will.

ὅσιον προτιμᾶν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rep. 595 c ἀλλ' οὐ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ, and, for ὅσιον, 368 b δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κατηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν, 607 d ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθές οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. So in Met. 1073 b, 16 φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.

§ 2. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες κ.τ.λ. This word has the same associations as εἰσαγαγεῖν above. Cf. Top. 159 b, 30 οἱ κομίσαντες ἀλλοτρίας δόξας, Met. 990 b, 2 ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν (said of the ιδέαι).

ἐποιοῦν. This word also suggests something arbitrarily 'set up.' Cf. Met. 995 b, 16 οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰ εἶδη. So κατεσκευάζον below. For the tense see note on φοντο 1095 a, 26.

ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. In a numerical series we have priority and posteriority. For instance 1 is prior

to 2 because if there is 2 there must be 1, but not *vice versa*. For this sense of πρότερον cf. Cat. 14 a, 34 where the second kind of priority is given as τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν, ὅλον τὸ ἐν τῶν δύο πρότερον· δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθύς τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ἐνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ ἀκολουθήσεις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν. If there were a 'form' of number, it would be prior to the first number of the series. Which is absurd. Met. 999 a, 6 ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὅλον τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ὅλον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δυάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, 'in the category of οὐσία.' For the doctrine of the Categories see Introd. § 28. They too form a series the terms of which are 'not convertible according to sequence of being.' If there is quality there must be substance, but not *vice versa*. Substance is the *prius* of them all; but, if there were a common 'form' of which they all partook, it would be prior to Substance. Which is absurd.

τὸ... καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία, 'the essential, i.e. substance.' τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ

οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι—παραφινάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος—ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.

- 3 Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ 25 ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δηλὸν ὥς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἔν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.

πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον.

α, 24. EE. 1217 b, 25 πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ὄν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διήρηται, σημαίνει τὸ μὲν τί ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ποῖον, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ πότε, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ κινεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν πτώσεών ἐστι τούτων, ἐν οὐσίᾳ μὲν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεός, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε ὁ καιρὸς, τὸ δὲ διδάσκον καὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον περὶ κίνησιν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἐν τί ἐστι περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

is what a thing is 'in (or rather 'by') itself,' as opposed to its accidents (συμβεβηκότα). Met. 1065 b, 2 οὐδὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς πρότερον τῶν καθ' αὐτό.

πρότερον τῇ φύσει. For the posteriority of the other categories to the τί ἐστί, cf. Met. 1028 a, 13 τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγόμενου τοῦ ὄντος φανερόν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὄν τὸ τί ἐστί...τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητας εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ποιότητας, τὰ δὲ πάθη κ.τ.λ...τὸ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ (Cat. ποιότης) ἢ τὸ κατῆμερον (Cat. κείσθαι) οὐκ ἄνευ τούτου λέγεται.

τοῦ πρὸς τι. Met. 1088 a, 23 τὸ πρὸς τι πάντων ἥκιστα φύσις τις ἢ οὐσία τῶν κατηγοριῶν.

παραφινάδι—a biological metaphor. Cf. Rhet. 1356 a, 25 συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητο-

ρικὴν οἷον παραφινὲς τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι.

τοῦ ὄντος, i.e. τοῦ τί ἐστί. The word is used in its narrower sense, not in that which it has in the next sentence.

§ 3. ἰσαχῶς...τῷ ὄντι; "in as many senses as the word 'is'." Τὸ ὄν is here used in a wider sense as the substantive corresponding to the copula ἐστί. In this sense it includes all the categories, which therefore are sometimes called γένη τοῦ ὄντος.

ἐν τῷ τί. The regular term is ἐν τῷ τί ἐστί, cf. supra 19.

τὸ μέτριον...καιρὸς...δίαίτα. The medical sense of these words is chiefly in Aristotle's mind. Cf. Top. 107 a, 8. There does not seem to be any satisfactory parallel for δίαίτα in the sense of τόπος ἐν ᾧ εὖ διάγουμεν (Schol.).

30 Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ 4
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ
πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ
μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν
τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική.

35 Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν 5
1096^b αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἥ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος,
οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἡ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν 6

1096 a, 30. EE. 1217 b, 34 οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ
ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μῖς
ἐστι θεωρῆσαι, οἷον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα ἑτερον καιρὸν
θεωρεῖ καὶ ἑτέρα ἑτερον μέτριον, οἷον περὶ τροφήν μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ
τὸ μέτριον θεωρεῖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς
πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέραν πράξεις, ὥστε σχολῇ
αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μῖς.

a, 35. EE. 1218 a, 10 ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτὸ τι ἀγαθόν. τὸ
οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη
πλὴν ὅτι αἰδίδιον καὶ χωριστόν; ἀλλ' οὐθὲν μᾶλλον λευκὸν τὸ πολλὰς
ἡμέρας λευκὸν τοῦ μίαν ἡμέραν· ὥστ' οὐδὲ <τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν
τῷ αἰδίδιον εἶναι· οὐδὲ> δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταῦτο τῇ ιδέᾳ· πᾶσι γὰρ
ὑπάρχει τὸ κοινόν.

b, 5. EE. 1218 a, 15 ἀνάπαλιν δὲ καὶ δεικτέον ἢ ὡς νῦν δεικ-
νύουσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀνομολογουμένων ἔχειν

§ 4. καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κ.τ.λ.
Eudemus (loc. cit.) calls these τὰ
ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα.

οἷον καιροῦ. Καιρὸς is ἀγαθὸν ἐν
χρόνῳ. For its use in strategy cf.
Thucydides and Demosthenes *passim*,
and for its use in medicine cf. Hippo-
krates Aph. I 'Ο βίος βραχύς ἢ δὲ
τέχνη μακρὴ· ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς, ἢ δὲ
πεῖρα σφαλερὴ, ἢ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπὴ.
τοῦ μετρίου, i.e. τοῦ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ
ἀγαθοῦ.

ἐν πόνοις. Cf. 1138 b, 28 n.

§ 5. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.
We have had three arguments to show
that the good is not καθόλου, we now

have two to show that it is not
χωριστόν.

τί ποτε καὶ is impatient. 'What-
ever they can mean by adding the
prefix αὐτο- to things.' Cf. Met.
1040 b, 32 ποιοῦσιν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ
εἶδει (sc. οὐσίας) τοῖς φαρτοῖς—ταύτας
γὰρ ἴσμεν—αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ αὐτό-
ἵππον, προστιθέντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ
ῥῆμα τὸ αὐτό.

οὐδ' ἡ ἀγαθόν, sc. διοίσει τὸ ἀγαθόν
καὶ τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν. Mr Bury proposes
to read οὐδὲ <τάγαθόν> ἢ ἀγαθόν,
but the brachylogy is quite Aristo-
telian.

οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ
 7 λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. πιθανώτερον δ' 5
 εἰόκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἐν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος
 ἐπακολουθήσαι δοκεῖ.

τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ ὁμολογούμενα εἶναι ἀγαθὰ δεικνύουσιν, ἐξ
 ἀριθμῶν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἀγαθόν· τάξεις γὰρ καὶ ἀριθμοί,
 ὡς τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν
 αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. δεῖ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, ὅσον ὑγιείας ἰσχύος
 σωφροσύνης, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις μᾶλλον τὸ καλόν. πάντα γὰρ
 τάδε τάξεις καὶ ἡρεμία· εἰ ἄρα, ἐκείνα μᾶλλον· ἐκείνοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει
 ταῦτα μᾶλλον. παράβολος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἐφίενται λέγουσι φανε-
 ρῶς, ἀλλὰ λίαν ἀπλῶς τοῦτο φασί, καὶ ὀρεξίν εἶναι πῶς ἂν τις
 ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷς ζωὴ μὴ ὑπάρχει· δεῖ δὲ περὶ τούτου πραγματευθῆναι,
 καὶ μὴ ἀξιοῦν μὴτὲν ἀλόγως, ἃ καὶ μετὰ λόγον πιστεῦσαι οὐ ῥᾶδιον.
 τό τε φάναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι ἐνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές·
 ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται, ὁφθαλμὸς ὄψεως, σῶμα ὑγιείας,
 οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου.

§ 7. πιθανώτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eudemos (loc. cit.) is fuller on this, but we do not know enough about it to be quite sure of the interpretation. Speusippus is criticised (1) for trying to prove things to be good because they are numbers instead of showing that number is good because admittedly good things are or imply number; (2) for saying that the One is the good because all numbers aim at unity. At the same time, Aristotle says that, strange as this theory may be, it is more plausible to say the One is the Good than to say the Good is one. But there must also be some reference to the theory of Speusippus that the good is not eternal. Cf. Met. 1072 b, 30 ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι. So ib. 1091 a, 33 we are told that some thought them ὑστερογενῆ and said that προελθοῦσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως

καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφάνεσθαι. His superior plausibility consists, then, in this, that, instead of starting from one universal eternal good and deducing all other goods from it, he makes the One the good to which all things tend and places it not in the beginning, but in the end. A universal good seems more conceivable as a yet unrealised ideal than as a first cause.

ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ. Met. 986 a, 22 τὰς ἀρχὰς δέκα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγομένας—

- | | |
|----------------|---------------|
| 1. πέρας | καὶ ἄπειρον. |
| 2. περιττόν | „ ἄρτιον. |
| 3. ἐν | „ πλῆθος. |
| 4. δεξιόν | „ ἀριστέρον. |
| 5. ἄρρεν | „ θῆλυ. |
| 6. ἡρεμοῦν | „ κινούμενον. |
| 7. εὐθύ | „ καμπύλον. |
| 8. φῶς | „ σκότος. |
| 9. ἀγαθόν | „ κακόν. |
| 10. τετράγωνον | „ ἑτερόμηκες. |

Ἄλλα περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ 8
 λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ
 10 παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν
 εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ
 τούτων ἢ φυλακτικὰ πῶς ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα
 λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' 9
 ἂν τὰ γαθὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.
 15 χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα
 εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἂν ; 10
 ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὄραν καὶ
 ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί ; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώ-
 κομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἂν. ἢ οὐδ'
 20 ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας ; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.
 εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰ γαθοῦ λόγον ἐν 11
 ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν
 χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ
 φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτη

§ 8. τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν κ.τ.λ., 'We can descry a possible objection to our arguments on the ground that Plato's words do not apply to *every* good.' For ὑποφαίνεσθαι cf. Plato, Soph. 245 e τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα.

καθ' ἐν εἶδος, 'are so called because they are the same in species.' Aristotle opposes τὰ καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα to τὰ πρὸς ἐν which include τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ and τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ. See further b, 27 n. In Rhet. 1362 a, 27 we find among received definitions of the good καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων... καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ.

§ 10. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The argument is put in the form of a dilemma, the two horns of which are introduced by ἢ (b, 17 and b, 19). Things good *per se* either include something more than the Form of Good or they do not. If they do not, what is the use of the Form? If they

do, in what does their specific identity consist?

μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. 'The species (of things good *per se*) will be purposeless,' seeing that there are no good things of which it is the εἶδος. It will be a species to which nothing belongs, a form of which nothing partakes, a type which is nowhere realised. This is one horn of the dilemma.

§ 11. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. The other horn. If these too (i.e. ὅσα μονούμενα διώκεται) are good *per se* and καθ' ἐν εἶδος λεγόμενα (b, 10), the definition of good must be the same in all of them, or they will not be a real species at all. Snow and white lead are both called white καθ' ἐν εἶδος, and therefore the definition of whiteness (χρῶμα διακριτικὸν ὅψεως Top. 119a, 30) is the same in both. Is this true of the Good?

τιμῆς...φρονήσεως...ἡδονῆς. These are the ends of the 'three lives.' Of

ἡ ἀγαθά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν 25
 ἰδέαν.

- 12 Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ
 τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρα γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς
 ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὥς γὰρ
 ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.
 13 ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ 30
 αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

1096 b, 30. EE. 1217 b, 16 ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ διασκοπεῖν περὶ
 ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἑτέρας τε διατριβῆς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ λογικωτέρας ἐξ

course φρόνησις is used in its wide Platonic sense to include 'wisdom' of all kinds.

ταύτη ἡ ἀγαθά. These are the emphatic words. The definitions of snow and white lead are different too, but not ταύτη ἡ λευκά, in so far as they are regarded as belonging to the species of white things.

κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. Note the proposition. Cf. § 12 and the notes.

§ 12. πῶς δὴ λέγεται; sc. ἀγαθά. If they are not καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα, in what sense are they all called by one name?

τοῖς...ὁμωνύμοις. ὁμώνυμα are defined as ὡν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἑτερος. Cf. 1129 a, 30. The usage of the term, however, fluctuates somewhat. Here 'chance ὁμώνυμα,' where there is absolutely nothing in common but an accidental identity of name, are distinguished from certain other ὁμώνυμα, for which see next note.

τῷ ἀφ' ἐνός...πρὸς ἐν. This is the class called παρῶνυμα in Cat. 1 a, 12, a name which merely implies modification of the name by some inflexion or suffix (πτῶσις). They form an intermediate class between ὁμώνυμα and συνώνυμα, the latter of which are also called καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα. For example, τὸ ὀγιμένον means 'the healthy' in the sense (1) of what produces and pre-

serves health (πρὸς ἐν), e.g. healthy exercise, (2) of what is a sign of health (ἀφ' ἐνός), e.g. a healthy complexion, (3) of what is capable (δεκτικόν) of health, e.g. a healthy man. Cf. Met. 1003 a, 33. So in Met. 1060 b, 37, we speak of an ἱατρικὸς λόγος (ἀφ' ἐνός) and an ἱατρικὸν μαχαίριον (πρὸς ἐν). As Professor Stewart well says: "A knife and a lecture may both be called 'surgical.' They are both called 'surgical,' not as an ox and a horse are both called 'animals' (συνωνύμως), nor yet as a key and the collar-bone are both called κλέις (ὁμωνύμως)."

κατ' ἀναλογίαν. This is Aristotle's own view. Things predicated in different categories can only be the same κατ' ἀναλογίαν, that is their sameness can be represented as a proportion. This meaning of ἀναλογία is illustrated by the example ὄψις : σῶμα :: νοῦς : ψυχή. This illustration would at once appeal to Aristotle's audience, as it comes from Plato Rep. vi. To take another illustration from the matter immediately in hand, we may say καιρός : χρόνος :: τὸ μέτριον : ποσότης.

§ 13. ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. Cf. 1096 a, 4 n.

ἄλλης...φιλοσοφίας, sc. τῆς πρώτης. As Ramsauer points out, we have hints of such a treatment in Met. 1078 a, 31 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον· τὸ μὲν

περὶ τῆς ιδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἓν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ' αὐτό, δηλὸν ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι 35 ζητεῖται. τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν 1097^a αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτενξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν 15 οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμας διαφωνεῖν· 5 πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνώσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτου τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ 16 τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν,

ἀνάγκης (οἱ γὰρ ἅμα ἀναιρετικοὶ τε καὶ κοινοὶ λόγοι κατ' οὐδεμίαν εἰσὶν ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην). εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ιδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὁπουοῦν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς. ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

1096 b, 32. EE. 1217 b, 23 ἔπειτ' εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα εἰσὶν αἱ ιδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέα, μὴ ποτ' οὐδὲ χρήσιμος πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις.

γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. 996 a, 27 ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν, οὐδ' εἶναι τι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. But we have no full discussion.

ἓν τι τὸ κοινῇ κ.τ.λ. So Bekker with L^b. Bywater compares EE. 1218 a, 7 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν. See too Top. 179 a, 8 φανερόν οὖν ὅτι οὐ δοτέον τὸδε τι εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ποιὸν ἢ πρὸς τι ἢ ποσόν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι σημαίνειν. K^b has καὶ for τὸ.

αὐτό τι καθ' αὐτό. For the order Bywater compares EE. 1218 a, 10 αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν and Met. 1045 a, 16 αὐτό τι ζῶον.

§ 14. οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα κ.τ.λ. Plato often substitutes the type to

which things approximate for the form in which they partake. The meaning is not really different. Cf. Rep. 505 e, 519 c, 501 b.

§ 15. ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n.

τὸ ἐνδεὲς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1337 a, 1 πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλείπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν. This is only the other side of ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι.

§ 16. ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων. The regular Platonic instances. The τέκτων makes the *kerkis* for the ὑφάντης (Krat. 388 c sqq.), and Plato himself had said that he looks to the εἶδος of the *kerkis*, without bringing in the αὐτοαγαθόν, just as the ὑφάντης looks to the εἶδος of the *ιμάτιον*.

ἢ πῶς ἱατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν¹⁰ αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἱατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

VII. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν,¹⁵ τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἱατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἱατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῃ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν²⁰ ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω,² ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφίκεται· τοῦτο³ δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὴ πλείω φαί-²⁵

τεθεαμένος, the Platonic word.
οὕτως, sc. καθόλου.

μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε. This is said not of the doctor's art but of its application. Cf. Met. 981 a, 14 μᾶλλον ἐπιτηγχνόοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἔχοντων... a, 17 αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἱατρεύων, πλὴν ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτη ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι.

VII. § 1. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν κ.τ.λ. Having disposed of the universal good, we may now consider the beliefs of the wise (i.e. Plato) about the good, restricting it to the single πράξις, τέχνη or προαιρέσις of πολιτικῇ. ἐκάστης, sc. τέχνης. This particularises the question. Even if we reject the universal good, the Platonists will still give answers about the ends of a particular art, of which we may make use.

οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ. Cf. Top. 146 b, 10 οὐ χάριν τᾶλλα.

§ 2. μεταβαίνων, 'shifting its ground.' The verb μεταβιβάζειν is technically used of the dialectic process. Cf. Top. 101 a, 33 μεταβιβάζοντες ὅτι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν. So EE. 1216 b, 30 μεταβιβαζόμενοι συνομολογήσουσι (Introd. § 25). Adopting the Platonic personification of the λόγος, we can say ὁ λόγος μεταβαίνει in the same sense. The meaning, then, is that, if the Platonists are 'moved on' or forced by criticism to take a fresh step, that is, to limit the good which we are seeking to that of some one art, their account of it comes into agreement with that from which we ourselves started.

διασαφῆσαι. This refers to another formula of dialectics, for which see 1138 b, 26 ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθέν δὲ σαφές and the note.

§ 3. ἐπεὶ δὴ. So Hel. reads for the ἐπεὶ δὲ of the MSS. Professor Bywater, regarding μεταβαίνων...πειρατέον as

νεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον
 πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι
 πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ
 μὲν ἔστιν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,
 30 εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν 4
 τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο
 αἰρετὸν τῶν <καὶ> καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν, καὶ
 ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε
 δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ· 5
 1097^b ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο,
 τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα
 μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν,
 5 διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμο-
 νίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο.
 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ 6
 γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐταρκές
 λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ

“intrusive” (Contr. p. 24), thinks the reading δὴ an “attempt to disguise a structural flaw in the text.”

αὐλοὺς. The soundness of this reading has been suspected, but, it now appears, without reason. Professor Bywater points out that in Plato Rep. 601 d the αὐλός is taken as a typical instance of the ὄργανον.

τέλειόν τι. The account of the good now given comes from Plato's Philebos (see Appendix G τέλειον, ἱκανόν, αἰρετόν in Bury's edition). We are still discussing τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκούντα. Cf. Phileb. 20 c Τὴν τάγαθου μοῖραν πρό-
 τερον ἀνάγκη τέλειον ἢ μὴ τέλειον εἶναι;
 —Πάντων δὴπον τελεώτατον.

§ 4. καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ, i.e. without the πρόσθεσις implied by the πτώσις of the comparative degree. For the τόπος of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον here employed cf. Top. 115 b, 3 πάλιν εἰ τι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὑπάρχει.

§ 5. τιμὴν...ἡδονήν...νοῦν, again the ends of the ‘three lives.’

§ 6. αὐταρκές, cf. Phileb. 20 c τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τάγαθόν;—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων. ib. 20 c δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τάγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἐτι προσδεῖσθαι.

οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, sc. ἀρκούν, understood from αὐταρκές. Aristotle is explaining the sense in which he takes the αὐτο- of αὐταρκές.

βίον μονώτην. The word μονώτης is peculiar to Aristotle (cf. 1099 b, 4, 1157 b, 21, 1169 b, 16, 1170 a, 5). It seems to be based on the analogy of ἰδιώτης. Cf. Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας 144 καὶ ἐξ ἰδιωτικοῦ ὀνόματος γίγνεται (sc. χάρις), ὡς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης “ὅσῳ γάρ,” φησί, “μονώτης εἰμὶ, φιλομυθότερος γέγονα”· καὶ ἐκ πεποιημένου, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ “ὅσῳ γὰρ αὐτίτης καὶ μονώτης εἰμὶ, φιλομυθότερος γέγονα.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ μονώτης ἰδιωτικωτέρου ἔθους

γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ 10
 7 πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ
 ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς <τῶν
 γονέων> καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς
 ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθὺς ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ
 δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ 15
 8 μηδεὶν ἔνδεα· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἴομεθα εἶναι·
 8 ἐτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην—συναριθ-
 μουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον,

ἥδη ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ αὐτίτης πεποιημένον ἐκ
 τοῦ αὐτός. Cf. Poet. 1458 a, 21 sqq.

φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. Cf.
 Pol. 1253 a, 2 ὃ ἄνθρωπος φύσει
 πολιτικὸν ζῶν ἐστι. I have given
 the reading of L^b: for it seems most
 likely that the K^b reading πολιτικὸν
 ὁ ἄνθρωπος has been accommodated
 to the Politics.

§ 7. τούτων, sc. τῶν φίλων κ.τ.λ.

ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς. This is not con-
 sistent with 10, even if γονεῖς can
 stand for προγόνους. Rassow's γονεῖς
 τῶν γονέων (Forsch. p. 111) is a highly
 probable conjecture.

εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Cf. 1094 a,
 20 n.

εἰσαυθὺς, sc. in the discussion of
 φίλοις, 1170 b, 20 sqq.

τὸ δ' αὐταρκες κ.τ.λ. By αὐταρκες
 we do not mean τὸ αὐτῷ ἀρκοῦν but
 τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρκοῦν 'what suffices by
 itself.' The αὐτό is explained by
 μονούμενον. Most mss. (not K^b) have
 ἄριστον καὶ αἰρετὸν or αἰρετὸν καὶ ἄριστον,
 which points to the true explanation.

§ 8. ἐτι...αἰρετωτάτην. Cf. Phileb.
 10 d πᾶν τὸ γινώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ
 ἰσχύεται βουλόμενον εἶλεν κ.τ.λ.

μὴ συναριθμουμένην, 'not included
 in the enumeration' (of good things),
 'not as one good thing among others.'
 It must include all particular good
 things, and therefore cannot be put
 on the same line with or made co-

ordinate with them (σύστοιχον τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς Hel.). So in the
 Philebos Plato had shown that neither
 φρόνησις nor ἡδονή could be the good
 because φρόνησις + ἡδονή is better
 than either alone. Cf. 1172 b, 28 n.
 The best commentary is Rhet. 1363 b,
 18 ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλεῖω (sc. ἀγαθὰ) τοῦ
 ἐνός καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου
 τοῦ ἐνός ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μείζον ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γὰρ, τὸ δ' ἐνυπάρχον
 ὑπερέχεται. It is only if all other
 goods are contained in it (ἐνυπάρχει),
 that we can be sure no πρόσθεσις is
 possible. If ὑγίεια συναριθμεῖται τῇ
 εὐδαιμονίᾳ, then εὐδαιμονία + ὑγίεια
 will 'exceed' εὐδαιμονία alone. Cf.
 also Top. 117 a, 16 ἐτι τὰ πλεῖω ἀγαθὰ
 τῶν ἐλαττόνων (αἰρετώτερα), ἢ ἀπλῶς,
 ἢ ὅταν τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἐτέροις ὑπάρχη,
 τὰ ἐλάττω ἐν τοῖς πλεόσιν, to which
 Alexander (p. 247 Wallies) notes as an
 exception ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εὐδαιμονία μετὰ
 τῶν ἀρετῶν αἰρετωτέρα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας
 μόνης, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ περιέχονται
 καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί...οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται τοῖς
 περιέχουσιν τινα τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ'
 αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν
 ἐρρήθη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν οὐ συγκρίνεται· διὸ
 δεῖ προσδιορίζεσθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖτοις εἶναι
 τὰ πλεῖω καὶ περιέχοντα ἀγαθὰ αἰρετώ-
 τερα τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ περιεχομένων,
 ἐν τοῖς συναριθμείσθαι πεφυκόσι.
 This προσδιορισμός is made in Rhet.
 loc. cit.

20 ἀγαθὼν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεί. τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται
καὶ αὐταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.

Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμο- 9
λογούμενον τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν
ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ' εἰ ληφθεῖ τὸ ἔργον 10
25 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ
παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν
τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ
ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος 11
μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ'
30 οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἡ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ
χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται
τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις
ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ 12
ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ
1098^a ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν.

1097 b, 24. EE. 1219 a, 5 ὥστε καὶ ψυχῆς (sc. ἡ βελτίστη
ἕξις ἀρετῇ)· ἐστὶ γάρ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς. καὶ τῆς βελτίονος δὴ ἕξεως ἔστω
βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον· καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ
τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἐχέτω, καὶ τέλος ἐκάστου τὸ
ἔργον.

τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος. Here
again the leading statement is ex-
pressed by the participle (cf. 1094 b,
11 n.). 'Happiness, then, is complete
and self-sufficient, and is the end of
action.'

§ 9. τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον
λέγειν. 'To identify Happiness and
the Best.' The addition of the article
to both terms shows that it is in-
different which is subject and which
is predicate.

ἐναργέστερον...ἔτι. Cf. ἀληθὲς μὲν,
οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές 1138 b, 26 n.

§ 10. ληφθεῖς. Cf. Introd. § 25.
We are still 'taking' ἐνδοξοὶ προτάσεις
from 'the wise.'

τὸ ἔργον. The following ἐνδοξον
comes from Plato, Rep. 352 d, sqq.,

where the ἔργον of anything is defined
as ὃ ἂν ἡ μόνῃ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἡ ἀρίστα.

ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is an ἐπα-
γωγή. Its conclusion is 'If Man
has an ἔργον, his good will depend
on that ἔργον.'

§ 11. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. An-
other ἐπαγωγή. We see that (1) every
class of men has an ἔργον, (2) that
every part of man has an ἔργον. It
is therefore εὐλογον that Man as such
should have an ἔργον.

§ 12. ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. The
'proper' function of man cannot be
something 'common' to him and to
vegetables.

τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν.
The life of nutrition and growth, the
presence of which differentiates the

ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ
 13 καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. λείπεται δὲ πρακτικὴ τις
 τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος [τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ
 δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοοῦμενον.] διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης 5
 τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγε-

1098 a, 5. EE. 1219 a, 9 φανερόν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον
 τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἑξέως· τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τέλος
 τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐ ἕνεκα τᾶλλα πάντα. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τὸ
 ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἑξέως καὶ τῆς διαθέσεως, ὁδὸν· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔργον
 λέγεται διχῶς. τῶν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν,
 οἷον οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ἰατρικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλ'
 οὐχ ὑγίανσις, τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὄψεως ὄρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς
 ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη, ὡν ἔργον ἡ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν
 βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἑξέως.

animate from the inanimate, life at its
 lowest. Cf. De An. 413 b, 7 θρεπτικὸν
 δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς
 οἷ καὶ τὰ φύμενα μετέχει. See the
 whole passage.

αἰσθητικὴ τις, the 'sentient life,'
 which differentiates animals and plants.
 Cf. De An. 413 b, 1 τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην (sc. τὸ θρεπτικόν)
 ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῳῷ, τὸ δὲ ζῶν διὰ τὴν
 αἰσθησιν πρώτως. The sentient life
 cannot be the ἔργον of man. The
 sentient life here includes the life of
 mere appetite (ἀρεκτικὴ ζωή).

§ 13. πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον
 ἔχοντος. The active life of the
 rational part. Τὸ λόγον ἔχον is that
 part of the soul which 'can give an
 account of itself' and is therefore
 capable of πράξις (including θεωρία)
 directed to an end. Observe that,
 though λόγον ἔχον may be translated
 'rational,' λόγος does not mean 'reason'
 here any more than in ordinary Greek.

τούτου δὲ... διανοοῦμενον. This re-
 mark interrupts the argument and
 destroys the grammar. The language

too is late. The adjective ἐπιπειθής
 can hardly have been used by Aris-
 totle. The interpolation refers to the
 distinction made at the end of Book I,
 and is quite irrelevant here.

διττῶς... λεγομένης. It may be
 either a ἑξίς or an ἐνέργεια (in the
 language of the Academy a χρῆσις).
 The distinction between the two is
 the same as that laid down in the
 De An. 414 a, 4 sqq. See especially
 417 a, 21 sqq. where the distinction
 is illustrated by the contrast of τὸ
 ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην and τὸ θεωρεῖν.

κυριώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reason
 is that the ἔργον is the end of the ἑξίς
 and therefore better. Where there is
 an ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν that is
 better than the ἐνέργεια (1094 a, 5);
 but, when the end is the ἐνέργεια it-
 self, it is the final cause, and the ἑξίς
 is only a δύναμις in relation to it.
 Now the δύναμις is referable to the
 ἐνέργεια (1170 a, 16 sqq.) as that
 which determines it and makes it
 what it is (τὸ κύριον). Cf. Met.
 1050 b, 6—34.

σθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον 1
ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει
τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου
10 κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης
τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ
μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως,—ἀνθρώ-
που δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζώην τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν

1098 a, 7. EE. 1219 a, 18 τούτων δὲ τούτων τὸν τρόπον διω-
ρισμένων, λέγομεν ὅτι ταῦτὸ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως. οἷον σκυτοτομικῆς καὶ σκυτεύσεως ὑπόδημα· εἰ δὴ
(1. δέ) τίς ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ σκυτικῆς καὶ σπουδαίου σκυτέως, τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ
σπουδαῖον ὑπόδημα, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

a, 12. EE. 1219 a, 23 ἔτι ἔστω ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν,
τοῦ δὲ χρῆσις καὶ ἐγρήγορις· ὁ γὰρ ὕπνος ἀργία τις καὶ ἡσυχία
(1099 a, 2). ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη ἐν καὶ ταῦτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς

§ 14. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. The defini-
tion of Happiness now emerges from
the dialectic process.

κατὰ λόγον. This follows from
its being ἐνέργεια τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.
The activity of that part of the soul
which 'has a ground' for its activity,
will be explicable from that ground,
and therefore 'according to rule.'

ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου. The phrase λόγον
ἔχειν may mean 'to be able to give an
account of oneself,' but it may also
mean 'to admit of an account being
given,' 'to be explicable.' If the
λόγον ἔχον is only so in the latter
sense, κατὰ λόγον may be too strong
an expression; but, even in that case,
a λόγος or 'ground' is implied, though
it may not be explicit.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ...τῷ γένει, 'generically
the same.' Aristotle is meeting the
objection that to pass from the function
of an individual of a given class (τοῦδε)
to that of a good individual of the
class (τοῦδε σπουδαίου), from the ἔργον
of Man to the ἔργον of the good
man, is a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος.
Eudemos takes the Socratic example

of the shoemaker. If σκυτοτομικῆ
(the ξίς) and σκυτεύσις (the ἐνέργεια)
have an ἀρετὴ, then (the ἔργον of the
shoemaker being a shoe) the ἔργον
of a good shoemaker will be a good
shoe.

καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ κ.τ.λ. These words
mark the ἐπαγωγή, like καὶ ὅλως
1097 b, 26. The only difference is
that καὶ ἀπλῶς lays stress upon the
elimination (ἀφαίρεσις) of the particular
instances, while καὶ ὅλως lays stress on
the inclusion of all other particulars.

προστιθεμένης κ.τ.λ., 'the excess
in goodness (of the good individual
over the individual simply) being
added to the function.' We must
make the same πρόσθεσις in both
cases. If we say 'good shoemaker,'
we must say 'good shoe.' Here
ὑπεροχή is used in its usual mathe-
matical sense of 'excess' or 'differ-
ence.' Cf. Index s.v.

ἀνθρώπου δέ...εἰ δ' οὕτω. Pro-
fessor Bywater (Contr. p. 24) thinks
this is clearly a duplicate of what
precedes. I confess that I hardly like
to put a limit to the capacity of Aris-

καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ
 15 καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται 15
 —εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται
 κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ
 16 τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ
 ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα
 μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

20

καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔργον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωὴ σπουδαία. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἐστὶ
 τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων
 (ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄριστα
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν, * * * αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἕξις ἡ ἐνέργεια), ἐπεὶ βέλτιον ἡ ἐνέργεια
 τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτίστης ἕξεως ἡ βελτίστη ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ'
 ἀρετὴ βελτίστη ἕξις, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶναι.
 ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον. ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς
 ἀγαθῆς ἐνέργεια.

a, 18. EE. 1219 a, 35 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλειον τι,
 καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελεία καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μόριον), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία
 ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.

little for long and complicated protases even when they involve repetitions and grammatical awkwardnesses. He never seems to be sure that he has said all he meant to say and constantly 'tries back.' Cf. Zell's note.

μετὰ λόγον. Like κατὰ λόγον (1095 a, 10 n.), this phrase belongs to ordinary Greek speech, where it means almost the same thing. It implies, however, that the agent is conscious of the rule he follows, that he acts not merely 'by rule' but 'with a rule,' and we shall see later (1144 b, 25 sqq.) that Aristotle insists on this distinction. For the phrase itself cf. Plato, Protag. 324 b where μετὰ λόγου κολάζειν is opposed to ἀλογιστως τιμωρεῖται to express punishment deliberately inflicted for a certain purpose clearly realised.

§ 16. ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ, 'in a complete

life.' The authoritative commentary on this is EE. 1219 b, 5 τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μῆθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν ('any')... ἄλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμον, οὐ γὰρ ὅλον. (The parenthesis about Solon has obscured the meaning of this, cf. p. 48.) Cf. also 1101 a, 13 ἐν πολλῷ τινι καὶ τελείῳ (sc. χρόνῳ), ib. 16 μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον, 1177 b, 25 λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τελείου. It certainly refers, then, to duration, and the later Peripatetic way of putting it (cf. MM. 1185 a, 5 τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ, Stob. Ecl. ii, p. 132, Wachsmuth τέλειον δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ὅσον ὥρισεν ἡμῖν <τὸ> πλεῖστον ὁ θεός) is not really wrong. For, if we bear in mind that nature as a rule (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) fulfils her ends, it will not seem amiss to describe a 'complete' life-time, one in

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰγαθὸν ταύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως 17
 ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἴθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ' ἂν
 παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα
 τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετῆς ἢ συνεργὸς
 25 ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις·
 παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλείπον. μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν 1
 προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν
 ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ
 ἐπὶ τοσούτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων 1
 30 καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι·

which the end of human life is attained, as the average life-time of man. If the *θρεπτική καὶ αὔξητική ζωή* were the truly human life, a *βλος τέλειος* would be one in which we had time to grow nearly six feet.

§ 17. Περιγεγράφθω μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Gen. An. 743 b, 20 ἅπαντα δὲ ταῖς περιγραφαῖς διορίζεται πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μαλακότητας καὶ τὰς σκληρότητας, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἂν ὑπὸ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργούμενα· καὶ γὰρ οἱ γράφειν ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῶον. ὑποτυπῶσαι.....ἀναγράψαι. The first word is a metaphor from sculpture, the second from painting. Introd. § 26.

προαγαγεῖν, 'to carry out,' 'advance.' Cf. Met. 985 b, 23 οἱ καλοῦμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν μαθημάτων ἀψάμενοι πρῶτον ταῦτα προήγαγον. Soph. El. 183 b, 28 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχάς (τῶν τεχνῶν) εὐρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκίμουντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἶον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηὐξήκασιν. Poet. 1449 a, 13 κατὰ μικρὸν ηὐξήθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγγίνετο φανερόν αὐτῆς. ib. 1448 b, 23 κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων.

In fact προαγαγεῖν is the transitive verb corresponding to ἐπιδοῦναι.

διαρθρῶσαι, i. q. διακριβῶσαι.

τὰ...τῇ περιγραφῇ, 'what is well outlined.' For the dative with καλῶς ἔχειν, cf. Kühner-Gerth § 419.

παντὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. El. 183 b, 17 τῶν γὰρ εὐρισκομένων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ' ἐτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον· τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἰσθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὃν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι. ταύτης δ' εὐρημένης ῥῶν τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναῖξιν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστὶν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πᾶσας τέχνας.

§ 18. μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Rasso brackets from here to the end of the chapter. But see Introd. § 6.

§ 19. τὴν ὀρθήν, sc. *γωνίαν*. The verb ἐπιζητεῖν seems to be ambiguously used here. With ὁ τέκτων it means *desiderat*, with ὁ γεωμέτρης, *considerat*.

θεατῆς γὰρ τάληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω
 20 γίνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν
 ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ 1098^b
 21 περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ'
 αἶ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἶ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἶ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινι,
 22 καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἥ πεφύ-
 23 κασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην 5

1098 a, 33. EE. 1218 b, 17 ὀρισάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τᾶλλα
 δεικνύουσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. οἷον
 ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοδί, ἀνάγκη τόδε εἶναι τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτήν·
 τὸ δ' ὑγιεινὸν ὑγείας αἴτιον ὡς κινήσαν, καὶ τότε τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἔτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθεις ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ
 ὑγίεια, ἂν μὴ σοφιστῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ ἱατρός (οὗτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις
 λόγοις σοφίζονται), ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν.

θεατῆς γὰρ τάληθοῦς, from Plato, *Rep.* 475 c τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας... φιλο-
 θεάμονας.

ὅπως μὴ κ.τ.λ., from Plato, *Theait.*
 177 b περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ
 πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶ-
 μεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, πλείω δεῖ ἐπιρρέοντα
 καταχῶσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον,
 and *Laws* 807 c πάρεργον γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ
 τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων διακώλυμα γίνεσθαι.
 Cf. Agathon fr. 11 Nauck—

τὸ μὲν πάρεργον ἔργον ὡς ποιούμεθα,
 τὸ δ' ἔργον ὡς πάρεργον ἐκπονούμεθα.

§ 20. τὴν αἰτίαν, i.e. τὸ διότι
 (1095 b, 7). We should not ask to
 have the definition of Happiness,
 which is the ἀρχή of Politics, deduced
 from anything higher. We must only
 expect to have τὸ ὅτι, the fact that it
 is so, exhibited to us (δειχθῆναι here
 opp. to ἀποδειχθῆναι) dialectically.

τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. Cf.
 1095 b, 6 ἀρχή γὰρ τὸ ὅτι. We
 cannot demonstrate the definition of
 εὐδαιμονία, we cannot show *why* the
 Good for Man is what it is. All we
 can do is to make clear *what* it is by
 a dialectical treatment of the beliefs

of those who have been trained in
 good habits.

§ 21. ἐπαγωγῇ, 'by induction.'
 See *Introd.* § 23. The ἀρχαί of
 physical science are apprehended by
 induction.

αἰσθήσει, 'by intuition.' See *Int-*
rod. § 23. The ἀρχαί of mathematics
 are apprehended by intuition.

ἐθισμῷ τινι, 'by habituation.' The
 ἀρχή of Politics must be apprehended
 by habituation. The citizen whose
 character has been formed by habitual
 obedience to the laws of his state is
 the man who can apprehend it. Ἐθισ-
 μός, then, is a sort of practical ἐπα-
 γωγή.

§ 22. μετιέναι, 'to go in the track
 of,' 'in quest of,' 'to investigate,' a
 Platonic metaphor taken from hunt-
 ing, cf. *Theait.* 187 c πάλιν ὥσπερ
 ἔχρος μετελθεῖν, *Polit.* 263 b καθάπερ
 ἰχνεύοντες μέτιμεν. So *indagare*, *in-*
vestigare. Hence the noun μέθοδος
 1094 a, 1 n.

§ 23. μεγάλην γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. *De*
Caelo 271 b, 8 τὸ μικρὸν παραβῆναι
 τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφισταμένους γίγνεται

γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμισυ τοῦ παντός εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

VIII. Σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμ-
10 περάσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων
περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα,
τῷ δὲ ψευδεὶ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές. νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν 2

1098 b, 11. EE. 1216 b, 26 πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων
ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι
τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι
συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας,
ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκείον τι πρὸς
τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύει πῶς περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν
ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προϋῶσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς,
μεταλαμβάνουσιν αἰεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγ-
κεχυμένως..... 1217 a, 10 καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς κρίνειν τὸν
τῆς αἰτίας λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διὰ τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως, ὅτι
προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον
τοῖς φαινομένοις (νῦν δ' ὅπου ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν, ἀναγκάζονται
πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου
δεδεῖχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθές μὲν ἔστιν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν
δι' ἣν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθές δεῖξαι· δῆλον
δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

b, 12. EE. 1218 b, 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ,
καὶ τούτων αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.

πόρρω μυριοπλάσιον...τούτου δ' αἴτιον
ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει,
διόπερ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρόν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ
γίνεται παμμέγεθες.

VIII. § 1. περὶ αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς
ἀρχῆς, i.e. the definition of the Good
for Man. The next step in the dia-
lectical process is to show that the
definition will explain all the λεγόμενα.

ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος κ.τ.λ. The
συμπέρασμα is the conclusion (i.e.
the definition of εὐδαιμονία), the ἐξ ὧν
ὁ λόγος are the premisses. We have

reached our ἀρχή by inductive syl-
logism. There is no inconsistency
between this and the statement that
we must not ask for the διότι. The
inductive syllogism συλλογίζεται τὸ
ὅτι not τὸ διότι. Its premisses are not
αἰτία τοῦ συμπεράσματος.

τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, 'the data.' Here
τὰ λεγόμενα, current moral judgments,
are the data we have to deal with.

§ 2. νενεμημένων...τριχῇ. Plato,
Laws 743 e ὄντων γὰρ τριῶν τῶν ἀπάν-
των περὶ ἅ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σπουδάζει,

ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ
 ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ
 μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς 15
 ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ
 γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὔσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ
 3 τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγον-
 ται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγα-
 4 θῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτὸς. συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ 20
 εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία
 5 τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα
 6 τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησιν ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δο-
 κεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· 25

b, 18. EE. 1219 a, 40 ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς
 λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τό τε γὰρ εὖ
 πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὡν ἕκαστον χρησί-
 ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πράξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ
 χρηστικὴ ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλκεὺς ποιεῖ χαλινόν, χρῆται δ' ὁ
 ἵππικός). Cf. *Introd.* § 13.

b, 23. EE. 1214 a, 30 τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως
 καὶ καλῶς εἶναι ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἰρετωτάτοις.
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγιστον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθόν, οἱ δὲ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνιοι περὶ τοῦ
 μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισβητοῦσι, συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον
 θατέρου μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὔσαν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν
 φρόνησιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετὴν, οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρων
 τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δ' ἐκ
 ὁνοῦν, τοῖς δ' ἐν ἐνί τινι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως.

τελευταῖον καὶ τρίτον ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χρη-
 μάτων ὀρθῶς σπουδαζομένη σπουδή,
 σώματος δὲ πέρι μέση, πρώτη δὲ ἡ τῆς
 ψυχῆς. A similar division is implied
 in *Euthyd.* 279 b and *Phileb.* 48 e.

κυριώτατα. Cf. 1098 a, 6 n.

καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο, 'our definition
 will be right.'

§ 4. τὸ εὖ ζῆν κ.τ.λ., 'the belief
 that the happy man lives well and

fares well,' which was referred to
 above 1095 a, 19.

§ 5. τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα, 'the *deside-
 rata*.'

§ 6. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ κ.τ.λ.
 Here again the reference is mainly to
 the *Philebos*. ἔτεροι δὲ κ.τ.λ. This
 refers to Xenokrates who included
 ὑπηρετικὴ δύναμις in his definition (cf.
Introductory Note, n. 3).

ἔτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι 7 καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἔν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. 30 τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνφδός ἐστιν 8 ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἢ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει 9 δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνέργειᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται 1099^a μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγκότη, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον τε. πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' 5 οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι—τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν—οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν ἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ 10 μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ

1098 b, 31. EE. 1215 a, 20 ἔσται δὲ φανερά τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων καὶ διαπορουμένων, ἂν καλῶς ὀρισθῇ τί χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποιῶν τινα μόνον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καθάπερ τινὲς ᾤκησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἢ δεῖ μὲν καὶ ποιῶν τινα ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι ποιᾶς τινάς.

1099 a, 3. EE. 1219 b, 9 καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ.

εὐετηρίαν. Aristotle affects pastoral and agricultural words in this connexion. For εὐετηρία (from εὖ and ἔτος) cf. 1155 a, 8. So εὐημερία 1099 b, 7 and εὐθενεῖν 1100 a, 7.

§ 7. πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοί...ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι. Introd. § 25.

§ 8. συνφδός. Cf. συνάδει 1098 b, 20. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 25.

§ 9. διαφέρει δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. This is where Aristotle parts company with Speusippos who defined εὐδαιμονία as ἔξις τελεία and Xenokrates who defined it as κτήσις τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς (Introductory Note, n. 3). His advance

on the Academy consisted in the substitution of ἐνέργεια for ἔξις, or what comes to the same thing, χρήσις for κτήσις. Cf. 1120 a, 8. 1129 b, 31.

πράξει γάρ, sc. ὃ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργῶν.

§ 10. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, 'Pleasure belongs to the class of psychical states.' The point is as follows. All pleasure is a state of the soul, whether it arises from things external or from the activities of the soul itself. But pleasure, being a state of the soul, is more closely bound up with the activities of the

- λέγεται φιλοτιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα
 δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ 10
 11 φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς
 μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ'
 εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται
 δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδέαι καὶ
 12 καθ' αὐτάς. οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν 15
 ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
 πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένους γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς
 καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ
 χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα
 ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 20
 13 εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτάς ἂν εἴεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδέαι.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων
 ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει
 14 δ' ὡς εἵπομεν. ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ

a, 24-30. EE. *in*it. 'Ο μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ
 γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητώου,

soul which feels it, than with anything external. The life of the good man is therefore pleasant 'in itself' (*καθ' αὐτόν*), not accidentally (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*). Goodness is pleasant to him because he is a man, whereas horses are not pleasant to the *φιλίππος* *quia* man, but *ἡ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ φιλίππῳ εἶναι*.

φιλοτιοῦτος, 'φιλο-so-and-so.' This generic name for all compounds beginning with *φιλο-* occurs below 1118b, 22. 1125 b, 14. It has been restored by Vahlen in *Rhet.* 1363 b, 1.

οἷον...καὶ ὅλως, an *ἐπαγωγή*. Cf. 1098 a, 10 n.

§ 11. **τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται**. Cf. 1166 b, 19 *στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινων, τὸ δὲ ἡδέται*. See the whole chapter. As the pleasures are *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* they may be in conflict, οὐ

γὰρ πάνυ συνδιάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (1157 a, 35).

τοιαῦτα, sc. *ἡδέα*.

τοιαῦται, sc. *φύσει ἡδέαι*.

§ 12. **περιάπτου**. Camerarius quotes the Peripatetic Kritolaos (ap. Philon. 2, 492) *καταγοητεύουσιν ὀφθαλμοὺς αἱ ἀμορφοὶ καὶ εἰδεχθεῖς ἐταίραι περιάπτους καὶ νόθῳ κόσμῳ, χηρεῖα γνησίου*. The idea here is surely rather that of a *postiche* than that of an amulet (for which sense cf. 1100 b, 29 n.).

πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένους. This completes the proof of the essential pleasantness of good activities. Not only (1) does the good man take pleasure in them, but (2) he is not good unless he does so.

§ 13. **ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** They fulfil the requirements not only of τὸ ἡδὺ, but also of τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ καλόν, and each of these in the highest degree.

25 εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπί-
γραμμα—

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας
30 δέ, ἡ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

Φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, 15
καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἡ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ καλὰ
πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται,

διελὼν οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ
τὸ ἡδύ, ποιήσας

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
πάντων ἥδιστον δ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον
ἁπάντων οὕσα ἥδιστον ἐστίν.

§ 14. κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπί-
γραμμα. Eudemos makes this the be-
ginning of his Ethics with good literary
effect. The γνώμη is also found in
Theognis, 225, where, however, the
pentameter runs πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνύ-
τατον, τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ, τὸ τυχεῖν. Sopho-
kles in his Kreousa (fr. 326) worked
it up in his own way—

Κάλλιστόν ἐστι τοῦνδικον πεφυκέναι,
λῶστον δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἄνοσον· ἥδιστον δ'
ὅτῳ

πάρεστι λῆψις ὧν ἐρᾷ καθ' ἡμέραν.
The authority of Aristotle is sufficient
to prove that it was really inscribed
on Leto's temple at Delos in the same
way as the γνώμαι of the 'Seven Wise
Men' were set up at Delphoi. Cf.
Preger, Inscr. Metr. p. 165.

§ 15. Φαίνεται... προσδεομένη. We
now turn to the question of 'external
goods.' In spite of its being an
ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, the good life evidently
stands in need of something over and
above τὰ ψυχικά. The word προσ-
δεομένη is appropriate because external
goods cannot be said to inhere (ὑπάρ-

χειν) essentially (καθ' αὐτά) in the good
life as pleasure does. Contrast 1099 a,
15 οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς.

καθάπερ εἵπομεν. No such state-
ment has been explicitly made, but we
have seen (1098 b, 26) that some τῶν
ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν,
and that they are not likely to be
wholly wrong. We are still testing
our definition by τὰ λεγόμενα.

ἀχορήγητον ὄντα, just as a tragedy
cannot be produced unless its cost is
defrayed by a χορηγός, though all he
can do is really external to it and in
no way affects its excellence as a
tragedy (Poet. 1453 b, 7 τὸ διὰ τῆς
ὀψews ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεό-
μενόν ἐστι). The metaphor is a fa-
vourite one with Aristotle. Cf. 1101 a,
15. 1177 a, 30. 1178 a, 24. 1179 a,
11. Pol. 1288 b, 32 ἀχορήγητον τῶν
ἀναγκαίων, 1295 a, 28 φύσεως δεῖται
καὶ χορηγίας τυχερᾶς. In the κοινῇ it
was no longer felt as a metaphor.
Polybius uses χορηγία for material of
war, what Thucydides and Demo-
sthenes call παρασκευή.

καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς 1099^b
 16 δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον
 εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ
 τὴν ιδέα παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος,
 ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἥττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ 5
 17 ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες θετῶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεύ-
 σθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάπτουσιν
 ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν.

1099 b, 7. EE. 1214 a, 24 πολλοὶ γὰρ ταὐτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν
 εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. b, 11 μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ
 διορίσασθαι μήτε προπετῶς μήτε ῥαθύμως, ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ
 ζῆν εὔ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν.
 οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν, ὡς τ' ἄνευ οὐχ οἷον τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν·
 ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς
 καὶ ὡς ἄνευ οὐ δυνατόν ζῆν καλῶς (ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν οὐκ
 ἴδια τῆς ὑγιείας οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν
 ἔξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οἷον ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν ἢ ἐργηγορεῖν ἢ
 κινήσεως μετέχειν οὐθεν ἂν ὑπάρξειεν ἡμῖν οὐτ' ἀγαθόν οὔτε κακόν,
 τὰ δ' ἴδια μᾶλλον περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν· ἃ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ
 ὁμοίως οἰκείον πρὸς εὐεξίαν τοῖς εἰρημένους κρεωφαγία καὶ τῶν περι-
 πάτων οἱ μετὰ δειπνον). ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἷτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως
 περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὡς ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ
 οἷον τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσι.

πολλά μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first
 class of external goods consist of the
 instruments (ὄργανα) of happiness.

§ 16. ἐνίων δὲ κ.τ.λ. The second
 class of external goods are the neces-
 sary conditions (ὡς οὐκ ἄνευ) of happi-
 ness. The same division occurs below
 1099 b, 27.

τητῶμενοι. A tragic word occurring
 nowhere else in Aristotle. The use
 of such words in passages like this is
 characteristic of his style. So we have
 it in Plato's Laws 810 b τητῶμενα
 ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας.

ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον. Another
 poetical touch. Cf. 1100 b, 28 θλίβει
 καὶ λυμᾶνεται τὸ μακάριον.

οἷον εὐγενείας κ.τ.λ. Cf. the list of

what are called, in a popular sense,
 μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας in Rhet. 1360 b,
 18 εὐγένεια, πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία,
 πλοῦτος, εὐτεκνία, εὐγηρία, κάλλος,
 ἰσχύς, μέγεθος, δύναμις ἀγωνιστική,
 δόξα, τιμή, εὐτυχία, ἀρετή. It is from
 such lists we may best gather the
 Hellenic ideal of life.

μονώτης. Cf. 1097 b, 9 n. Here
 it is contrasted with πολυφιλία etc. in
 the Rhetoric (see last note). Aristotle
 has a strong sense of the pain of the
 μονώτης βίος. Cf. 1169 b, 16 sq.

§ 17. εὐημερίας. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n.
 The word became hackneyed in the
 κοινή.

τὴν εὐτυχίαν. The proper word
 in connexion with external goods,

IX. "Οθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθισ-
 10 τὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θέλαν μοῖραν ἢ
 καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι 2
 θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεός-
 δοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον.
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, 3
 15 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν

1099 b, 9. EE. 1214 a, 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν
 καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχά-
 νοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιάν
 διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὐσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας,
 ἢ διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ'
 ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι,
 χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδέναν τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν
 δὲ θάτερον, ἥτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
 ἐπιπνοίᾳ δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην... ὅτι
 μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία διὰ τούτων ἀπάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἄδηλον (ἀπασαι γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πίπτουσιν εἰς
 ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἀπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ
 ἐπιστήμης ἂν τις συναγάγοι πράξεις).

Cf. Rhet. 1362 a, 5 ὅπως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ' οἷς
 ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος.

ἔτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν. These words
 depend very loosely on ὅθεν, but that
 is no reason for expunging them. The
 meaning is 'while others identify it
 with goodness.' The remark is rele-
 vant as giving the two extreme views.
 And it is necessary to connect the
 argument with the next section.

IX. § 1. "Οθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. 'It is
 just this (viz. the fact that some
 identify Happiness with εὐτυχία, others
 with ἀρετή) which gives rise to the
 difficulty.'

πότερον...ἀσκητόν. These are the
 views of those who identify Happiness
 with goodness. Cf. EE. loc. cit.

ἢ...παραγίνεται. These are the

views of those who identify it with
 εὐτυχία. Cf. EE. loc. cit. For
 the two views cf. Archilochos fr. 15
 Πάντα τύχη καὶ μοῖρα, Περικλέης, ἀνδρὶ
 διδῶσιν, and fr. 16 Πάντα πόρος ταίχαι
 θνητοῖς μελέτη τε βροτεῖη.

§ 2. εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle
 admits the *prima facie* plausibility of
 the naive religious view that εὐδαιμονία
 is good fortune sent by dispensations
 of divine providence. Θεία μοῖρα is
 the religious equivalent of τύχη, and
 is commonly so used by Plato.

§ 3. ἄλλης...σκέψεως, sc. τῆς θεολο-
 γικῆς. "Haec magis sunt declinantis
 quam pollicentis. Ubi enim ad dei
 deorumque vel naturam vel volun-
 tatem perventum est, Aristotelem
 constat plerumque ἐπέχειν." Ram-
 sauer.

καί τινα μάθῃσιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων
 εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι
 4 φαίνεται καὶ θεῖον τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύ-
 κοινον· δυνατόν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις
 5 πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν
 οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν 20
 οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν οὕτω
 6 πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν,
 καὶ μάλιστα <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ
 7 κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς

b, 18. EE. 1215 a, 8 ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ
 λανθάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς ἃ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων
 ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν, εἴ τῳ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώ-
 τερον εἰπεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην ἂν τῶν
 ἐπιεικῶν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ
 καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δι' ἐπιμελείας
 ἢ κτήσις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν
 ποῖον τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν,
 θειότερον δὲ τῷ κείσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζουσι
 ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

§ 4. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ κ.τ.λ. 'But, at the same time, it must be—.' This is not an argument, but a reservation. Aristotle wishes to guard against a common and easy perversion of the religious view. We may call Happiness *θείον* and the like; but we must regard it as in the reach of all, not as confined to the favourites of heaven, a Polykrates or Croesus, as Stewart well says.

τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις. Nature aims at the best, but is sometimes forced by Matter to remain at a lower stage of perfection. This Aristotle calls *πῆρωσις*. Cf. Zeller (Eng. Trans.) vol. I, p. 466.

§ 5. εὐλογον. Aristotle simply opposes one plausibility to another

in accordance with the dialectical character of the passage.

§ 5. εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν κ.τ.λ. The higher we ascend in the scale of causes, the more evidence do we find of teleology. The four chief causes are Chance, Nature, Mind (Man) and Necessity (1112 a, 31). The works of Nature are as good as they can be (cf. Phys. 260 b, 22 τὸ δὲ βέλτιον δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν, ἂν ἢ δυνατόν). Much more will this be true of the works of Man.

§ 6. <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην, sc. αἰτίαν, i.e. διάνοιαν, Intelligence or Man.

πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. This is a simple appeal to cultivated feeling. The word is Platonic.

25 δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ποιά τις, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· 8
τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ 30 πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικούς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως 9 οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον 1100^a λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷον τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνερ-
γείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· 10 οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικός τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ 5 εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλὰ γὰρ 11 μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθενοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περι-
πεσεῖν ἐπὶ γῆρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου

1100 a, 1. EE. 1219 b, 5 καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μήθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν), ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθεν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὄλον.

§ 7. καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, 'as a consequence of the definition,' as well as dialectically. Note how the style changes at once from the literary to the scientific. Introd. § 7.

ποιά τις, i.e. κατ' ἀρετὴν, which I take to be a gloss.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, sc. τῶν ἐκτός.

τὰ μὲν...ὀργανικῶς. A scientific description of the two classes of goods described in a literary way above, 1099 b, 1 sqq. They are (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖα (1) as ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, (2) as ὄργανα.

§ 8. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ. 1094 a, 27 sqq. αὕτη δὲ κ.τ.λ. As an ἐπιστήμη, Politics must know the best way of attaining its own end. We may therefore draw inferences from the actual

practice of lawgivers. As they try to make the citizens good, it is evident that they think it possible to produce Happiness thus.

ποιούς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς, 'of a certain quality, i.e. good.'

§ 9. εἰκότως οὖν κ.τ.λ. Some additions of a dialectical character loosely appended.

τοιαύτης, sc. πρακτικῆς τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος.

§ 10. ἀρετῆς τελείας, goodness fully developed in a complete life.

§ 11. πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The question of τύχη brings us back naturally to that of the βίος τέλειος.

εὐθενοῦντα. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n. Theophrastos, Hist. Plant. 2, 5, 7 (of trees) τότε γὰρ εὐθενεῖ μάλιστα.

μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτή-
σαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

X. Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμο- 10
2 νιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεῶν τέλος ὄραν; εἰ δὲ
δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἄρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν
ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς
3 λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ
λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μὴδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, 15
ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον
ὥς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει
μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ
τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ
αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ 20
4 ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ

X. § 1. Πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. The best way of bringing out the relation of *τύχη* and external goods to the good life is by discussing Solon's dictum. We shall find that the true solution of it is that, though we must have a *τελειος βίος*, we are only bound to accept Solon's view in its extreme form if we identify *εὐδαιμονία* with *εὐτυχία*.

οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, 'not even any one else,' though he may not meet with *Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι*.

κατὰ Σόλωνα. Hdt. i, 32 σκοπεῖν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν καὶ ἀποθνήσκει. The dictum was a commonplace of the Age of the Seven Wise Men, and passed into Athenian tragedy, like so many other *γνώμαι*. Soph. Trach. 1 calls it *λόγος... ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανείς*.

§ 2. ἄτοπον. The word marks the dialectical character of the argument. It is the opposite of *εὐλογον*. Popular opinion would at once reject the idea that a man is happy after he has died.

§ 3. τηνικαῦτα, 'then and not till then.' Usually *τηνικαῦτα ἤδη or τότε*

δὴ, *tum demum*.

ἔχει... ἀμφισβήτησιν, 'admits of dispute.' Cf. Index s.v. *ἔχειν*.

δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There is no question here as to the departed being aware of what goes on in this world. On the contrary, the point is that what happens after a man's death may affect our estimate of his life in just the same way as what happens in his lifetime without his being aware of it. Neither makes any difference to the man himself, but the popular belief is (*δοκεῖ*) that it must affect our estimate of it. We cannot call that life a success which leads to failure, even though the man himself may never know of his failure, or may die in time to escape it. So with the fortunes of children. Even now we say 'what would his poor father think, if he were alive?'

εἴπερ καί, 'just as much and just as little.' If Happiness consists in external goods, a man may very well lose it without being aware of his loss δι' ἀποδημίαν ἴσως ἢ διὰ χρόνιον καὶ σφοδρὰν ἀσχολίαν πρὸς ἕτερα (Eustratios).

καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι
 γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μετα-
 βολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν
 25 ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐν-
 αντίας· ὁ δὲ δὴλον ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς
 παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν
 εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων
 πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος, ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον 5
 30 συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον 6
 ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθεῖ καὶ τὸ
 νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ 7
 τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὥς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι
 πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων μὴ
 35 ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι
 1100^b τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τὸ
 μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐ-

§ 4. κατὰ λόγον, 'accordingly,'
 'consistently with his life.' The editors
 as a rule see that 'according to
 reason' will not do here, but it has
 not always been seen that this use
 of the phrase determines its meaning
 in such passages as 1095 a, 10. The
 original sense of the phrase is 'in
 proportion' and hence it is used of
 anything that, being 'according to
 rule,' can be calculated upon and is
 uniform or consistent. The opposite
 of τὸ κατὰ λόγον is τὸ παράλογον, that
 which violates all rules of probability
 and is therefore incalculable. Cf.
 Plato, Polit. 283 c ἵνα κατὰ λόγον
 ἐπαινώμεν κ.τ.λ. Rep. 500 c κόσμῳ...
 πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα.

τοῖς ἀποστήμασι, the different de-
 grees in which the descendants are
 'removed' from their ancestor.

ἄτοπον. Cf. 1100 a, 13 n. This
 sentence shows clearly that there is
 no question of the dead man being
 aware of what takes place. If he
 were, there would be no absurdity in

his being at one time happy, at
 another wretched. What is absurd
 is that our estimate of the success or
 failure of his life as a whole should be
 indefinitely subject to revision.

§ 5. συνικνεῖσθαι. The use of this
 word is, of course, flatly inconsistent
 with the view that the dead man οὐκ
 αἰσθάνεται. The inconsistency, how-
 ever, is not Aristotle's. We may
 learn from Rohde's 'Psyche' how
 very inconsistent and illogical popular
 views on this subject were. Cf.
 e.g. Isokr. Aigin. § 42 εἰ τίς ἐστιν
 αἰσθησις τοῖς τεθνεώσι τῶν ἐνθάδε
 γιγνομένων.

§ 6. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον κ.τ.λ. The
 λύσις of the first ἀπορία, viz. πότερον
 οὐδένα εὐδαιμονιστέον ἔως ἂν ζῇ;
 (1100 a, 31...1101 a, 21).

τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, sc. the ἀπορία
 raised in § 3. Cf. § 4 ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ
 ταῦτα παρέχει.

§ 7. ἀληθεύσεται, passive. Cf.
 Bonitz, Index s.v. ἀληθεύω.

τὸ ὑπάρχον, 'the fact.'

μετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς
 8 αὐτοὺς; ὁ δὲ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθούμεν ταῖς τύχαις,
 τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, 5
 "χαμαιλέοντά" τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες "καὶ
 9 σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον." ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν
 οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ
 προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἵπομεν,
 κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ 10
 10 δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν
 διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπί-
 νων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν·
 μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·
 τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ τὸ μάλι- 15
 στα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταξῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους·
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην.
 11 ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου
 τοιοῦτος· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἡ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει
 τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ 20
 πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ "τετράγωνος
 12 ἄνευ ψόγου." πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφε-
 ρόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχη-
 μάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ὁ δὲ ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ

§ 8. χαμαιλέοντα κ.τ.λ., changing colour with the changing ground of external circumstances. The words χαμαιλέοντα καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον seem to come from some poet.

§ 10. τῷ λόγῳ, viz. that activities according to goodness and not fortune determine happiness. The difficulty just discussed (τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν) confirms this; for it has arisen διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπεκλιθεῖν. Now fortune does not abide; goodness does.

καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Cf. 1140 b, 28.

αἱ τιμιώταται, sc. αἱ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, as we shall learn later on.

συνεχέστατα. Cf. 1177 a, 21.

§ 11. τὸ ζητούμενον, sc. ἡ βεβαιότης.

τοιοῦτος, sc. εὐδαίμων.

πάντων. Masculine. The reservation is made because τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.

καὶ θεωρήσει. All through this passage, Aristotle has the θεωρητικὸς βίος distinctly in view.

ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς κ.τ.λ., from Simonides. The passage is quoted and discussed in Plato, Protag. 339 b.

"Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθῶς γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν

χερσὶν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ
 τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τε-
 τυγμένον.

25 ῥοπήν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν
 εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει—καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπι-
 κοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία
 γίνεται—ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται
 τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς
 30 ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν,
 ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας,
 μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.
 εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, 13
 οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ
 35 πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς
 1101^a ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως
 φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν,
 καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ
 χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων
 5 σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν
 οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαιμόν, οὐ μὴν μακαρίος γε, ἂν
 Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ
 εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥα-
 10 δίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων
 καὶ πολλῶν, ἕκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν

§ 12. **λύπας τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** A fragment of Theophrastus preserved by Plutarch seems to belong to this discussion. Cf. V. Per. c. 38 ὁ γοῦν Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς διαπορήσας εἰ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ἥθη καὶ κινούμενα τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πάθεσιν ἐξίσταται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἰστόρηκεν ὅτι νουῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπούμενῳ τινὶ τῶν φίλων δειξεῖ περιπατῶν ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχήλῳ περιηρημένον, ὡς σφόδρα κακῶς ἔχων ὅποτε καὶ ταύτην ὑπομένει τὴν ἀβελτερίαν. Cf. Usener, *Analecta Theophrastea*, p. 23 and 1153 b, 19 n.
μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν. The ἀνάλγητος (1115 b, 26) is the man of stupid insensibility, insensibility to pain being

regarded as the mark of a coarse nature. He is closely akin to the ἀναίσθητος (1104 a, 24 n.), but the insensibility of the latter is intellectual rather than moral. Kleon bids the Athenians not to show themselves ἀναλγητότεροι than the Mitylenean (Thuc. iii, 40), and Demosthenes (D. Cor. 35) quotes Aischines as speaking of the ἀναλγησία of the Theban power. See also 1126 a, 3 n.

§ 13. **οὐδέποτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** His ἐνεργεῖαι will never be of the kind called αἱ ἐναντία supra 1100 b, 11, and it is these alone which can make a man positively ἄθλιος.

εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ
τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.
15 τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν
ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον 15
μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον
καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ
τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν ἐστίν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ
16 τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως; εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν
τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους 20
δ' ἀνθρώπους. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.

XI. Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων
τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφίλον φαίνεται καὶ
2 ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων δια-
φορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνου- 25
μένων τῶν δ' ἥττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ
ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν
3 ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχη-
μάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ
δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως 30

§ 15. ἢ προσθετέον κ.τ.λ. Rasso-
w thought this a later Peripatetic ad-
dition, inconsistent with the rest of
Aristotle's criticism, though in har-
mony with the view of MM 1185 a, 5
that a τέλειος βίος is ὅσον ἄνθρωπος
βιοῖ. If we make this addition, it
seems we might as well accept Solon's
dictum at once, as Eudemos appears
to do (1219 b, 6). But the difficulty
disappears if we keep what is said
about Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι clearly in view.
These are first mentioned (1100 a,
5 sqq.) before the discussion of Solon's
dictum has begun, and that discussion
itself is limited to the question whether
we may or may not call any *other*
man—other than the man who meets
with Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι—happy so long
as he lives. We must, then, make
this particular reservation whatever

conclusion we come to on the main
question.

κατὰ λόγον. Cf. 1100 a, 23 n.

§ 16. μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους, an-
other reservation. Happiness is an
ἐνέργεια and therefore complete at
any moment or in the whole (1174 a,
13 sqq.), but τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ
συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.

XI. § 1. τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων
κ.τ.λ. The λύσις of the second ἀπορία,
viz. πότερον συμβάλλονται αἱ τῶν ἀπο-
γόνων τύχαι; (1101 a, 22...b, 9).

συμβάλλεσθαι, sc. πρὸς τὸ εὐδαι-
μονεῖν ἢ μὴ.

§ 3. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. A complex pro-
tasis, the two members of which are
καθάπερ...ἀπαντας διαφέρει...πράτ-
τεσθαι. The apodosis begins at συλ-
λογιστέον δὴ. The answer to this
question is made to depend upon

ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ 4
 τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα
 καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι,
 συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως 5
 35 τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινω-
 1101^b νοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γοῦν ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖ-
 ται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοῦναντίον, ἀφανρόν
 τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν
 γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
 5 μὴδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι 6
 μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φί-
 λων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα
 ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο
 τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

10 XII. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς
 εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστίν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν

1101 b, 10. EE. 1219 b, 11 ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινέ-
 ται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τᾶλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μόρια
 εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον.

what is laid down above 1100 b,
 23—25.

§ 4. ἕκαστον, accusative with συμ-
 βαίνειν.

προϋπάρχειν, 'to be assumed' ἔξω
 τοῦ δράματος (Poet. 1460 a, 29 sqq.).
 To take place 'behind the scenes' or
 'before the curtain rises.' The
 murder of Laios, for instance, does
 not affect us as it would do if it
 formed part of the action. The
 regular word for 'action' in this sense
 is πράττεσθαι.

§ 5. συλλογιστέον. 'We must
 estimate' or 'allow for this differ-
 ence too.' The word is not used
 in its technical sense. L^b and the
 Vetus Versio (*ita*) read ταύτῃ for
 ταύτην, which would mean 'we must
 allow for the difference in this way
 too.'

τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι, sc. συλλογιστέον.
 'We must allow for the fact that
 a difficulty is felt.' Lambinus con-
 jectured τόδε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι, Rasso-
 w τόδε δεῖ ἀπορεῖσθαι. But the difficulty
 has been already alluded to above
 1100 a, 11.

γοῦν. This seems to be implied by
 the γάρ of K^b and the οὖν of L^b.

ἐκ τούτων, sc. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ἀφανρόν. Professor Bywater (Contr.
 p. 26) points out that this is a poetic
 word and suggests ἀμανρόν, 'obscure,'
 cf. De An. 403 a, 19.

ἢ ἐκείνοις, sc. ἡ κεκμηκόσιν.

εἰ δὲ μή, sc. διικνεῖται. This shows
 clearly that the question is not mainly
 one of the dead man's own feelings,
 but only of our estimate of his life.

XII. § 1. ἐπισκεψώμεθα κ.τ.λ.
 Happiness is not a mere δόναμις. Is

1 τιμίῳ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνεται
 δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποίῳ τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν
 ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν
 ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ 15
 ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστον τῷ ποίῳ τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγα-
 3 θόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς
 θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερό-
 μενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' 20
 4 ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν. εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιού-
 των, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν
 τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς
 μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειο-
 τάτους [μακαρίζομεν]. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς 25
 γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὥς

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον· ὁ δ' ἔπαινος
 <τοῦ> τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου· ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

it ἐπαινετὸν or τίμιον, i.e. has it a relative or an absolute value?

τιμίῳ, 'precious.' Cf. MM. 1183 b, 20 sqq. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια, τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὸ δὲ τίμιον λέγω τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, ὅσον ψυχῇ, νοῦς, τὸ ἀρχαιότερον... τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά ὅσον ἀρετά... τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις ὅσον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἰσχύς κάλλος· τοῖσι γὰρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἰς ἀνδρῶν χρησασθαι καὶ ὁ φαῦλος κακῶς, διὰ δυνάμει τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦνται ἀγαθὰ. If this is correct, the δυνάμεις here are identical with τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. Cf. also Topics 126 b, 4 καὶ εἰ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ τιμίον ἢ ἀρετῶν εἰς δυνάμειν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ ποιητικὸν (cf. 1096 b, 11) ἐθηκεν.

§ 2. τῷ ποίῳ τι εἶναι κ.τ.λ., 'in virtue of some quality and relation.'

§ 3. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων, 'from the praises of the gods.' Here we see περὶ c. acc., used as in 1098 b,

14 περὶ ψυχῇ and 1101 a, 28 περὶ αὐτόν, develop into a regular genitive equivalent, just like the Latin *de*. Though barely noticed in the grammars, this construction is quite common in Plato, being used chiefly to avoid a cumulation of genitives. For other examples see Index s.v. *περὶ*.

γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται, sc. οἱ θεοί. 'It strikes us as absurd that the gods should be referred to our standard' (personal construction). The goodness of the gods is independent of their relation to us, and so praise of them based on a reference (*ἀναφορά*) to human needs and desires is absurd.

§ 4. τῶν τοιούτων, sc. τῶν πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντων, the 'relative.'

[μακαρίζομεν], suspected by Susemihl and bracketed by Bywater.

τῶν ἀγαθῶν, sc. τὰ θεϊκὰ μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν.

θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος 5
καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ
ἐπαινέισθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐσαν μηνύειν ᾧτο ὅτι κρείττον ἐστι
30 τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς
ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος 6
τῆς ἀρετῆς, πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης, τὰ δ'
ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν
ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν 7
35 τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
1102^a εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων.
ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ 8
χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ
καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.
5 XIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις
κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα
γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα 2
πεπονησθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ

1101 b, 31. EE. 1219 b, 8 ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ
ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων.

§ 5. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος κ.τ.λ.
'And Eudoxos is thought to have
pleaded ably the claims of pleasure to
the prize of highest excellence.' On
Eudoxos see 1172 b, 9 n. This refer-
ence probably indicates the real motive
of the paragraph.

§ 6. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος κ.τ.λ.
Rhet. 1367 b, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων
ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ
κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι
πράττοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν... ἔστι δ'
ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος
ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικ-
νύναι ὡς τοιαῦται· τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν
ἔργων ἐστὶ... διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πρᾶ-
ξαντας· τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἐξέως
εἰσιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπρα-
γότα, εἰ πιστεῦομεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. EE.
1219 b, 14.

§ 8. ἀρχή, sc. πράξεως, for it is τὸ
οὐ ἔνεκα, the Final Cause of human
activity.

τίθεμεν. *Hoc loco clausulam im-*
ponere debebant libro primo, Susemihl.

XIII. § 1. τελείαν. Cf. 1100 a,
4 n.

περὶ ἀρετῆς. The first step in the
analysis will be to deliberate about
the production of goodness. See In-
troductory Note to Book II. The
first point to note is the distinction
between the two kinds of goodness.

§ 2. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. A con-
firmation of our view from the practice
of the masters of our science. If
πολιτική is a science, the true πολι-
τικός must know how to secure its
end. Cf. 1099 b, 29 n.

3 τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς 10
 Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινας ἑτέροι
 4 τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις
 αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γίνουτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 5 προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον
 ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαι- 15
 6 μονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν
 τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ
 7 ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι
 δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πῶς τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν
 ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύουσιν καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον 20
 ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἱατρικῆς· τῶν δ'

1102 a, 18. EE. 1219 b, 26 μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρητέον·
 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνην
 ἀρετὴν ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγου μετέχοντα,
 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχιν λόγου ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ
 ἐπιτάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέναι. εἰ δέ τί
 ἐστὶν ἑτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μόνιον. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν
 οὐτ' εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐτ' εἰ ἀμερῆς, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις διαφόρους

§ 3. τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαι-
 μονίων νομοθέτας. In his Laws, Plato
 had already introduced a Spartan and
 a Cretan to discuss legislation with an
 Athenian. Spartan and Cretan insti-
 tutions alone seemed to be deliberately
 designed with reference to an end, and
 therefore seemed to be alone scientific.
 Plato and Aristotle were both aware
 that the end they strove to realise was
 but a partial one and that they were
 therefore onesided. But that did not
 alter the fact that they alone set an
 end consciously before them.

§ 4. ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, sc. ὅπως τοὺς
 πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσει.

ἡ ζήτησις, sc. ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

τὴν...προαίρεσιν. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n.
 Here προαίρεσις is almost equivalent
 to πρόθεσις.

§ 7. εἰδέναι πῶς, sc. ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς
 ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα (infra 24).

τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύουσιν. Sug-
 gested by Plato, Charm. 156 b ἀλλ'
 ὥσπερ ἴσως ᾔδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν ἱατρῶν, ἐπειδὴν τις προσέλθῃ
 τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσι πού
 ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν
 τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον
 εἶη αἶμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν εἰ
 μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν εὖ ἔχειν,
 καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὀλεσθαι ἂν ποτε
 θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἀνευ ὅλου
 τοῦ σώματος, πολλὴν ἀνοιαν εἶναι· ἐκ
 δὲ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίτας ἐπὶ πᾶν
 τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ
 μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσι θεραπεύειν.

καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα, sc. δεῖ εἰδέναι
 πῶς. Ramsauer's insertion of the
 article is generally accepted, see Byw.
 Contr. p. 26. The phrase comes from
 the passage of the Charmides quoted
 above.

ιατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, 8 θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ 25 ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς 9 ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πό- 10 τερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη καὶ πᾶν τὸ 30 μεριστόν, ἡ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκῶτα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει

καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιαχώριστον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

οἱ χαρίεντες, i.e. οἱ σοφοί (cf. 1095 a, 18), scientific physicians as opposed to mere practitioners.

τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν, i.e. the 'theory' of the body, or physiology, as opposed to practical therapeutics.

§ 9. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις, 'in extraneous discourses.' The only question that can arise is 'extraneous to what?' The different views which have been maintained are conveniently summarised in Susemihl-Hicks, *Politics* p. 561. There can be no doubt, I think, that Diels has given the right answer, and that the meaning is 'extraneous to the Aristotelian school.' I believe, further, that this is in almost all cases merely another way of saying 'in the writings of the Academic school.' That is certainly the meaning here.

τὸ μὲν ἄλογον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle himself did not believe in 'parts of the soul' at all: Plato did, but this is not his division, for it is practically certain that it was first formulated in this way by Xenokrates. There is a part of the soul which 'knows what it

is doing' and a part that does not. Cf. 1098 a, 3 n.

§ 10. τῷ λόγῳ δύο, 'verbally two.' This phrase is often opposed to ἀριθμῷ ἐν (cf. 1131 b, 16 n.). Cf. *Phys.* 262 a, 21 τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀρχῆς μέσου τελευτῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἀμφοῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἐν, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ δύο. 263 b, 12 τὸ σημείον μὲν οὐκ ἀμφοῖν κοινόν, καὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου, καὶ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐ ταυτόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τελευτῆς, τοῦ δ' ἀρχῆς. *Gen. Corr.* 320 b, 12 βέλτιον τοίνυν ποιεῖν πᾶσιν ἀχώριστον τὴν ὕλην ὥς οὖσαν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μὴ μίαν.

ἀχώριστα. Cf. *De An.* 413 b, 14 καὶ εἰ μέρος, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ. 429 a, 10 περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς... εἶτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἶτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον. 432 a, 19 πότερον ἐν τι μέρει αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ὃν ἢ μεγέθει ἡ λόγῳ.

πεφυκῶτα, i.e. φύσει. The distinction, then, is between the dialectical and the physical account of the soul. Cf. below 1147 a, 24 n. for λογικῶς καὶ φυσικῶς.

1 πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυ-
 τικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν
 τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφομένοις
 θεῖη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ 1102^b
 2 ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης
 μὲν οὖν κοινὴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ
 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ
 ἢ δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἦκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' 5

1102 a, 32. EE. 1219 b, 36 ἀφήρηται δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ
 μέρος ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ φυτικόν. ἀνθρωπίνης γὰρ ψυχῆς τὰ εἰρημένα
 μόρια ἴδια· διὸ οὐδ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ αἱ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ αὔξητικοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἢ ἄνθρωπος, λογισμὸν ἐνείναι καὶ ἀρχὴν
 καὶ πρᾶξιν· ἄρχει δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ
 παθημάτων, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ εὐεξία
 σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόριον ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ
 ἢ τέλος.

b, 5. EE. 1219 b, 16 καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δ' ἐνίστε δῆλον ἐκ
 τούτων, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐθὲν βελτίους οἱ σπονδαῖοι τῶν φαύλων τὸν
 ἡμισυν τοῦ βίου· ὅμοιοι γὰρ καθεύδοντες πάντες. αἷτιον δ' ὅτι ἀργία
 ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνέργεια. διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μόριον ἐστὶ
 ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἢ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς ὅλης
 ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ
 τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ. ὅσον
 δὲ τοῦ μὴ (πῃ Casaubon) κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσιν, καὶ αἱ φαντασῖαι
 βελτίους αἱ τῶν σπονδαίων, εἰ μὴ διὰ νόσον ἢ πῆρωσιν.

πρὸς τὸ παρόν. For our purposes
 the λογικὴ πρότασις furnished by the
 theories of the Academy will be suffi-
 cient. It is not necessary to base
 πολιτικὴ on φυσική.

§ 11. κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ. Cf.
 supra 1097 b, 33 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν
 κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς,
 ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις. The argu-
 ment is that the sort of soul we find
 in all organisms kept up by nutrition
 (including plants), and in the embryos
 (of animals) where there is nothing

besides, we may reasonably assume
 to exist also in developed animals,
 though in them there is something
 besides.

εὐλογώτερον. Cf. 1100 a, 13 n. The
 word shows that this is purely a λογικὴ
 σκέψις.

§ 12. ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. Cf. De Somno
 454 b, 32 τὸ ἐργον τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ
 θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον
 ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ
 αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον, ὥς οὐδὲν προσ-
 δεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

ὑπνόν—ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἡμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς
 εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία 13
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὑπνός τῆς ψυχῆς ἣ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη
 —πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ δικνοῦνται τινες τῶν κινήσεων,
 10 καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπικεικῶν ἢ τῶν
 τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλης, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν 14
 ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἅμοιρον πέφυκεν.
 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, με- 15
 τέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς
 15 τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινούμεν—ὁρθῶς
 γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ—φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς
 καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ
 ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυ-
 μένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινήσαι
 20 τοῦναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς

ὅθεν φασὶν κ.τ.λ. This is probably a free quotation from some comic poet.

§ 13. πλὴν εἴ πῃ, to be taken closely with ἥκιστα διάδηλοι above. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 26) reads πλὴν εἰ μὴ with Aspasios and M^b. In EE. 1219 b, 24 (p. 59) we have ὅσον δὲ τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσιν, καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι βελτίους αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων. Here μὴ gives no sense, and Casaubon was surely right in reading πῃ. But, if so, πῃ must surely be right here too. It should be noted also that the reading of M^b may be simply an instance of the tendency of scribes to substitute the vulgar πλὴν εἰ μὴ for the more correct πλὴν εἰ.

τινὲς τῶν κινήσεων, i.e. the 'motions' of the senses ('impressions'). Cf. Περὶ ἐνυπνίων 462 a, 29 τὸ φάντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν ᾗ, ἢ καθεύδει, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐνύπνιον.

ἐπικεικῶν...τυχόντων. Attic 'litotes' for ἀγαθῶν and κακῶν. For ἐπικεικῆς cf. 1137 a, 35 n. For the difference

between the dreams of good and bad men, see Probl. 957 a, 25.

§ 15. φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς. Aristotle in his Platonic passages uses φύσις with the genitive in a somewhat vague sense. Often it seems merely periphrastic. See Ind. Ar. 838 a, 8 sqq. Here it is equivalent to μόριον or δύναμις.

τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς. The meaning of these terms is fully discussed in Book VII. Both the 'continent' and the 'incontinent' man have a right λόγος or rule of action, though the one follows it and the other does not. The fault of the ἀκρατῆς does not lie in the λόγον ἔχον, there must therefore be something else.

ἐν αὐτοῖς, i.e. in the ἐγκρατῆς as well as in the ἀκρατῆς. The ἐγκρατῆς does not follow his λόγος or rule without a struggle. It is in this that he differs from the σώφρων whose desires are in complete harmony with his principles. See infra § 17.

ἀντιτείνει, a Platonic word. Cf. Phaidr. 254 a.

16 οὕτως· ἐπὶ τάναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντι-
 17 βαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 25 φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς—ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώ-
 18 φρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει 30 πῶς, ἢ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φάμεν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πῶς ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε
 19 καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, 1103^a

ἐπὶ τάναντία κ.τ.λ., sc. τῷ λόγῳ. The argument is the same as that by which Plato proves that θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are distinct.

§ 17. πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν κ.τ.λ. As the fact of ἀκρασία showed it to be ἄλογον, so the fact of ἐγκράτεια shows that it μετέχει πῇ λόγου. We have now proved the existence of a higher part of τὸ ἄλογον, which is simply the ὀρεκτικόν of Aristotle's own system.

τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου, i.e. the irrational part of the man who has the ἀρετή of the irrational part, i.e. the σώφρων who has the ἀρετή of ἐπιθυμία and the ἀνδρεῖος who has the ἀρετή of θυμός. See below 1117 b, 24. The fact that the irrational part may not only 'obey' the rational, but may even be 'in harmony with' it, shows that it μετέχει λόγου.

πάντα...ὁμοφωνεῖ, 'it is in complete harmony with—'

§ 18. καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν. This is a hint for those who know the De Anima. The force of ὅλως is to include θυμός and βούλησις as well as ἐπιθυμία.

οὕτω δὴ τοῦ πατρὸς κ.τ.λ. Theon of Smyrna, p. 72, 21 (Hiller) sqq., quotes an interesting Peripatetic enumeration of the various senses of λόγος which mentions *inter alia* ὁ τῶν τιμώντων καὶ τιμωμένων, καθ' ὃν φαμεν λόγον τινὸς ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν. This is clearly the sense referred to here. The ὀρεκτικόν may be called λόγον ἔχον inasmuch as it λόγον ἔχει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, 'pays heed to the λόγος of the λόγον ἔχον.'

οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, 'not in the mathematical sense,' in which λόγον ἔχειν means to be 'rational' in the sense of commensurable. For the idiom cf. Riddell, Digest § 25. We must not 'understand' any definite word to 'govern' τῶν μαθηματικῶν.

§ 19. εἰ δὲ χρὴ κ.τ.λ. The insufficiency of the twofold division is now brought out from the other side. If, to save the unity of τὸ ἄλογον, we say that τὸ ὀρεκτικόν belongs to τὸ λόγον ἔχον, then that in turn will split up into two 'parts.'

itself and a part of the soul which can not. This distinction has been adopted by Xenokrates, the present head of the Academy, and will therefore make a good starting-point².

We must, however, note at once that the part of the soul which is strictly speaking "irrational," the part which has to do with nutrition and growth, cannot be the seat of the goodness or badness of man as such. And yet there is a case where a part which we must call irrational does affect human conduct. If we consider what happens in the case of the man who does what he knows to be wrong, we are forced to admit that the judgment (*λόγος*) which he forms is right, and therefore that the rational part of his soul is in just the same state as if he resisted the temptation. His weakness must accordingly be attributed to the irrational part. On the other hand, if we look at the case of the man who does not yield to the temptation, we see that this part of the soul cannot be wholly irrational either, seeing that it is capable of understanding and obeying a judgment.

Perhaps, then, it will be thought better to call this part of the soul "rational," and there can be no objection to that, provided we remember the cases of moral weakness and moral strength, and do not confuse it with the rational part in the strict sense of the word. We must say in that case that the rational part has two parts, one rational in the strict sense, and the other in the sense that it is able to understand and follow a rule given it from without. We have, then, by means of dialectic, discovered the existence of a part of the soul which we may call either the higher part of the irrational soul or the lower part of the rational, as we please.

This discussion is an admirable example of what Aristotle means by the dialectic method. All he wishes to bring out is the existence of what in his own psychology is called the "sentient and appetitive soul,"³ and it might seem to us that a reference to

² Heinze, Xenokrates p. 140 sqq., makes it extremely probable that the division was due to Xenokrates himself.

³ See R.P. 336 and Zeller, Aristotle, II, pp. 21 sqq., for the relevant references. Aristotle's own psychological division crosses that of the Academy chiefly in this respect, that, while he assigns Desire, Temper and Wish alike

to the appetitive soul, the Academy had to refer the latter to the "rational," and thus to separate it in an arbitrary way from the other forms of Appetition. Aristotle's advance upon the earlier theory was his recognition of the appetitive character of goodness as well as of badness. Here, however, he does not care to insist. So long as we recognise the existence of this

the *De Anima* would have been more satisfactory than an attempt to twist the doctrines of Xenokrates into a new form. But Aristotle does not wish to assume a knowledge of his own system in the course on Politics, and he therefore tries as best he may to make the popular psychology of the Academy the basis of his argument. The way in which he does this is most ingenious, though to our minds much less convincing than a brief exposition of his own psychological views would have been. The use which he makes of the Platonic term *μετέχειν* and the way in which he takes advantage of the different senses of the phrase *λόγον ἔχειν* are particularly instructive.

§ 2. These two parts of the soul will each have its proper form of goodness, and this distinction will correspond to that drawn in ordinary speech between goodness of character and goodness of intellect. For the present it is with the latter, the goodness of the sentient and appetitive soul, that we have to do.

The recognition of a form of goodness which was not in the strict sense of the word intellectual and reflective had already been forced upon Plato as a result of his criticism of the Socratic paradox that "Goodness is knowledge." In his earlier dialogues⁴ Plato had taken the various recognised forms of goodness one by one and had discussed the question whether they were knowledge or not. The result of all these dialogues is practically the same. The recognised forms of goodness are not knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word; for as soon as we draw all the conclusions which follow from the assumption that they are, we find ourselves unable to hold fast the distinctions between them. Any single form of goodness, if regarded as knowledge, turns out to be knowledge of the good, and therefore identical with goodness as a whole.

Now it is evident that this view will prevent us from giving the name of goodness to almost everything that commonly goes by that name. By working out to its logical result the doctrine that goodness is knowledge we have really proved at the same

appetitive soul, and distinguish it clearly from the principle of nutrition and growth on the one hand and from the thinking soul on the other hand, we may call it "rational" or "irrational" or what we please. Nor does he insist upon its identity with

the "sentient" soul, though that also, as we shall see, is of fundamental importance for the psychological groundwork of his Ethics.

⁴ See especially the *Laches*, *Charmides* and *Protagoras*.

time the existence of another kind of goodness which is not knowledge. In the *Phaedo*⁶ this distinction between two kinds of goodness appears already, though there "popular goodness" is rated very low, and the only true goodness is still wisdom or "philosophic goodness." But if we follow the course of Plato's ethical thought we find that the reality and worth of this secondary form of goodness is more and more fully recognised. The "first education" in the *Republic* aims solely at the training of character (*ἦθος*), and the whole of the *Laws* is practically directed to the same end.

§ 3. The distinction between goodness of character and goodness of intellect does not correspond, then, to that between knowledge and conduct, which the traditional rendering "moral and intellectual virtues" is apt to suggest to us. As a matter of fact, Aristotle held that conduct depended upon intellectual goodness just as much as knowledge did, while on the other hand he admitted the existence of a kind of art and a kind of knowledge which were not strictly speaking intellectual, but depended on something more closely resembling character⁷. There is conduct which is intellectual and art which is not.

Though it is beside Aristotle's purpose in the *Ethics* to insist upon the point, we know that the soul with which we are now concerned is not only appetitive, but also sensitive, and we shall therefore expect to find an analogy between the developement of goodness from appetite and the developement of knowledge from sense. It is worth while to point out in what this consists.

The object of sensation⁷, though it is always individual, "a this" (*τὸδε τι*), necessarily implies a universal element. What we perceive is not strictly speaking the "this" which is the object of sensation, but always "a such" (*τοιοῦνδε τι*). We perceive Kallias, indeed, but our perception is of certain things which "mean" Kallias, that is of a man having certain qualities which enable us to identify him as Kallias. The whole content of our perception

⁶ *Phaedo* 68 d sqq.

⁷ Cf. *Rhet.* 1354 a, 7 where we are told that many orators succeed *διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ λέξεως*. The chief example is, of course, the medical *ἐμπειρος*.

⁷ On all this see Zeller, vol. II, pp. 58 sqq. It seems necessary to draw attention to the fact that *τὸδε τι* means "a this." The Greek for "this somewhat" would be *τὸ τι τὸδε*.

is therefore universal in character, and the function of sense-perception is just the discrimination of those universal qualities.

In the case of creatures endowed with memory, these sense-perceptions remain in imagination (*φαντασία*), and a number of such memories make up an experience (*ἐμπειρία*). For instance, we say that a man has experience when he has an idea that this or that was good for Kallias when he had this or that disease, and for Sokrates, and so on for other individuals. Aristotle rates experience very high indeed for practical purposes, and he is never tired of citing its value in the practice of medicine. Practice has to do entirely with particulars and is therefore the peculiar province of experience. medic.

But nevertheless experience does not reach the level of Art or Science. These do not arise till the universal implicit in experience is made explicit, till we pass from "This was good for Kallias and Sokrates and so-and-so when they were too hot" to "This is good for the human body in a fever."

The development of goodness is precisely parallel to this. The object of appetite is individual like that of sense, but it too implies a universal. For, though we desire or wish for a particular thing, we really desire it because it is "a such." For instance, we desire this food or that honour, but only because they are pleasant or beautiful, and these are universals. These are the qualities which appear in imagination (*φαντασία*) and so move appetite. }

Now the retention in memory of a number of such images of the pleasant or beautiful produces an *ἦθος*, that is a tendency to desire or wish for similar things as pleasant or beautiful, and this is precisely parallel to experience. And it is of the utmost value in practice; for it is with particulars that practice has to do. } Incl.

At the same time, this is not human goodness in the full sense any more than experience is science or art. We do not reach the stage of intellect till the implicit universal has been made explicit, till we pass from "This, that and the other thing is pleasant or beautiful" to "This kind of feeling or action is good for the human soul."

§ 4 Closely connected with the question of the two kinds of goodness was the question "Can goodness be taught?" or does it come by nature or the grace of heaven, as was believed in early times? Clearly, if goodness is knowledge, it can be taught: but }

the criticism of Plato's earlier dialogues⁸ is largely directed to showing that there are no teachers of goodness in the ordinary sense of that word. In Aristotle we find the solution of the problem taken for granted. It is impossible to teach goodness of character; that can only be acquired by habituation. But goodness of intellect can be taught, with this reservation, however, that the intellectual capacity is presupposed, and that a good character has already been formed. You cannot make any one good by teaching; but, if a man has the gift, his goodness of character may be raised into an intellectual form and become the practical wisdom of the lawgiver.

Aristotle does not even tell us in the *Ethics* what habituation is, and we have to turn to *Eudemos* for a definition of it⁹. The main point about it is that habituation must be in acts of the same quality as the acts which issue from the character when formed. It is this which makes it necessary for us after all to discuss the nature of goodness; for it is only if we know what goodness is that we shall be able to stamp the actions of those for whom we are legislating with the right quality. Before, however, we go on to discuss the definition of goodness, it may be well to sketch briefly the ideas which underlie Aristotle's doctrine of habituation as we may gather them from the *Physics* and elsewhere.

The sentient soul has the natural capacity of being moved by the imagination of pleasure and pain. These imaginations are constantly being presented to it; for every act of sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain, and the images of these feelings are stored up in memory. But the capacity of the soul to feel pleasure and pain is a rational capacity which may become active in two opposite ways. The capacity of taking pleasure in a good act is also the capacity of taking pleasure in a bad act. The capacity will therefore remain dormant unless there is something to determine it in the one direction or the other. This something is to be found in appetite, which converts the mere capacity of pleasure and pain into a desire to have the pleasure and avoid the pain.

But the soul is not in a perfectly neutral state as regards the pleasures and pains which it feels. Its life is a process, and it has

⁸ On this point see especially the *Gorgias* and *Meno*. ⁹ Cf. 1103a, 17 n.

its source of motion and rest in itself. Now every continuous process implies an end to which it is directed, and the qualitative changes in the soul which we call feelings are only the incomplete processes which mark its growth. They are all really directed to the soul's completion, to its attaining the true nature or true form of the human soul. Hence the need of guidance from one who knows this form, and can decide in the light of it which of two alternative possibilities of feeling to actualise.

§ 5. We have asked how goodness is to be produced and we have seen that it is produced by habituation, and by habituation in the same acts which result from goodness when it has been produced. We must, then, ask what goodness is, and first of all we must find its genus.

If Aristotle had been basing his account of goodness on his own philosophical system, there would have been no difficulty about this. We have seen that goodness is a "completion" (τελείωσις) of a thing which is by nature capable of such a completion, and we know that such completions are called *ἔξεις* or conditions, a word taken from medicine and gymnastics. The acquisition of such a *ἔξις* is no mere motion (κίνησις) or alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) like the feelings which are its matter; it is a "form," and displays all the characteristics of forms. But the fact is that we must go to the Physics for Aristotle's moral philosophy; here we only arrive at the knowledge that the genus of goodness is *ἔξις* by a dialectical argument from the "division" of the category of quality. Here is another instance where the doctrine of the categories is assumed as familiar to Aristotle's hearers. (Cf. *Introd.* § 28.)

The differentia of goodness, the "Mean," is more scientifically arrived at, doubtless because both the doctrine itself and the metaphysical groundwork on which it rests were quite familiar in the Academy from the days of Plato's *Philebos* onwards at least. Quality is a category that admits of quantitative determination or degree, "the more and less" as the Academy called it: it is continuous and therefore infinitely divisible, at least potentially. Now, feelings and acts, which are the matter of goodness, being qualitative motions, are continuous, and the degree of feeling which is right for a given person in given circumstances may therefore be quantitatively expressed. This is all that is meant by the doctrine of the mean; for the Greek word *μεσότης* does

not mean only or even primarily the arithmetical mean: it is the oldest word for a proportion of any kind and however determined. We must admit that a feeling like fear is capable of such determination; for we must fear either more or less or equally. And the same is true of an act like giving away money; for we must give away either more or less or an equal sum. But to say that Aristotle makes only a quantitative distinction between goodness and badness is to miss the whole point. Aristotle has expressly refused to identify goodness either with the feeling or the outward act. It is the permanent condition of soul, and conditions of soul do not differ quantitatively, nor are they motions. They do not come into being or cease to be by motion or alteration, though they are and are not in virtue of an alteration in something else, that is, in the soul¹⁰.

¹⁰ The locus classicus on this subject is Phys. 245 b, 3 sqq. "Ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον ἅπαν ἀλλοιοῦται ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ ἐν μόνοις ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀλλοίωσις ὅσα καθ' αὐτὰ λέγεται πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων μάλιστα ἂν τις ὑπολάβῃ ἐν τε τοῖς σχήμασι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μορφαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἔξεσι καὶ ταῖς τούτων λήψεσι καὶ ἀποβολαῖς ἀλλοίωσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἐν οὐδετέροις δ' ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σχηματιζόμενον καὶ ῥυθμιζόμενον ὅταν ἐπιτελεσθῇ (i.e. τελειωθῇ, τέλος λάβῃ), οὐ λέγεται ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἔστιν, ὡς τὸν ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸν ἢ τὴν πυραμίδα κηρὸν ἢ τὴν κλῖνην ξύλον, ἀλλὰ παρωνυμιάζοντες τὸ μὲν χαλκοῦν, τὸ δὲ κήρινον, τὸ δὲ ξύλινον. τὸ δὲ πεπονηδὸς (sc. ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν) καὶ ἡλλοιωμένον προσαγορεύομεν (sc. ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἔστιν)· ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ θερμὸν καὶ σκληρὸν τὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν καὶ τὸν κηρὸν. καὶ οὐ μόνον οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν, ὁμωνύμως τῷ πάθει προσαγορεύοντες τὴν ὕλην. ὥστ' εἰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν μορφήν οὐ λέγεται τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν ᾧ (i.e. the ὕλη) ἔστι τὸ σχῆμα, κατὰ δὲ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἀλλοιώσεις λέγεται, φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴεν αἰγινέσεις αὐταὶ ἀλλοιώσεις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀποπον ἂν δόξειεν,

ἡλλοιωσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον τῶν γεγεννημένων· ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως ἕκαστον ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τινός, ὡς τῆς ὕλης πικνουμένης ἢ μαρνουμένης ἢ θερμαινόμενης ἢ ψυχομένης, οὐ μὲντοι τὰ γινόμενά γε ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐδ' ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν ἀλλοίωσις ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἱ ἔξεις οὐθ' αἱ τοῦ σώματος οὐθ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλοιώσεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρεταὶ αἱ δὲ κακίαι τῶν ἔξεων· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ἡ ἀρετὴ οὔτε ἡ κακία ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελειώσις τις (ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετὴν, τότε λέγεται τελεῖαι ἕκαστον· τότε γὰρ μάλιστα ἔστι τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ κύκλος τελείος, ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται κύκλος καὶ ὅταν βελτιστός), ἡ δὲ κακία φθορὰ τούτου καὶ ἕκστασις. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς οἰκίας τελείωμα λέγεται ἀλλοίωσιν (ἀποπον γὰρ εἰ ὁ θριγκὸς καὶ ὁ κέραμος ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ εἰ θριγκουμένη καὶ κεραμουμένη ἀλλοιοῦται ἀλλὰ μὴ τελειοῦται ἡ οἰκία), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων ἢ λαμβανόντων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ τελειώσεις αἱ δ' ἕκστασεις εἰσίν, ὥστ' οὐκ ἀλλοιώνται. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαμεν ἀπάσας εἶναι τὰς ἀρεταὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ὑγίαιαν καὶ εὐερίαν, ἐν κράσει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεμεν, ἢ αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτὰ τῶν

§ 6. It is important to remember that the theory of goodness as a "mean" or ratio between opposites is only one case among others of a principle which served to explain all the difficulties which earlier thinkers had felt about becoming, the difficulties which Plato had expressed in the *Phaedo*, and which he finally settled in the *Philebos* by his doctrine of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*. Matter to Aristotle is that which is potentially, and it comes to be actually under the influence of that which is already actual. This is just because it is a *στέρησις*, and only attains its own *ἔξις* when it reaches its proper form or *τέλος*. By its very nature it is that which is capable of receiving opposites; it is the substratum in which opposites inhere. Such a substratum we must assume because it is impossible that the one opposite can become or approximate to the other. Cold iron may become hot iron, but cold can never become heat. Now the form which is the cause of all becoming is always a ratio (*λόγος*) or mean (*μεσότης*) between the two opposites, it is a definite "interval" as musicians call it, a fixed proportion in which the opposites neutralise one another and give rise to a new product. If Aristotle had only known the theories of modern chemistry, they would have seemed to him a most perfect exemplification of the principle; for what the modern chemist calls atomic weights are just of this nature, and a chemical formula like H_2O is the most typical instance of

ἐντὸς ἢ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας. ἐκάστη γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰ οἰκεία πάθη εὖ ἢ κακῶς διατίθῃσι τὸ ἔχον· οἰκεία δ' ὑφ' ὧν γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ πρὸς τι οὔτε αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις, οὔτε αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδ' ὅλως μεταβολὴ οὐδεμία, φανερόν ὅτι οὐθ' αἱ ἔξεις οὐθ' αἱ τῶν ἔξεων ἀποβολαὶ καὶ λήψεις ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως αὐτὰς καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν ἀνάγκη, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν μορφήν, ὡς θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν ἢ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν, ἢ ἐν οἷς τυγχάνουσιν ὄντας πρώτοις. περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκάστη λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑφ' ὧν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι πέφυκε τὸ ἔχον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὡς δεῖ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικόν ἢ ἐναντίως (i.e. μὴ ὡς

δεῖ) ἀπαθές. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔξεων· ἅπασαι γὰρ καὶ αὐταὶ τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ τελειώσεις, αἱ δὲ κακίαι ἐκστάσεις· ἐτι ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ εὖ διατίθῃσι πρὸς τὰ οἰκεία πάθη, ἡ δὲ κακία κακῶς. ὥστ' οὐδ' αὐταὶ ἐσονται ἀλλοιώσεις· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποβολαὶ καὶ αἱ λήψεις αὐτῶν. γίνεσθαι δ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους. ἀλλοιοῦται δ' ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικὰς ἐπεὶ δ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἐγγιγνομένης καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνεται (περὶ ταύτας γὰρ εἰσιν), αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ λύπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, φανερόν ὅτι ἀλλοιουμένου τινὸς ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀποβάλλειν καὶ λαμβάνειν. ὥστ' ἡ μὲν γένεσις αὐτῶν μετ' ἀλλοιώσεως, αὐταὶ δ' οὐκ εἰσιν ἀλλοιώσεις.

what he calls a λόγος or μεσότης. Unfortunately he did not know this remarkable confirmation of the theory he had inherited from Plato, and we can only quote examples which seem less striking because biology has not yet been reduced to organic chemistry.

Health had been regarded since the times of the Pythagoreans as a sort of ἀρμονία ("tuning" or "pitch," not "harmony") of the opposites warm and cold, dry and moist, in the human body. The formula or ratio of this proportion exists in the soul of the doctor, and its presence there is the efficient cause of health in the human body as well as its formal and final cause. It is exactly in the same way that the lawgiver has in his soul the formula or λόγος of goodness, and it is the efficient cause of goodness in others.

Again, in discussing the fact of growth, Aristotle is met by some old difficulties which were raised for the first time, so far as we know, by Empedokles and Anaxagoras. As the latter put it "How can flesh arise from what is not flesh, or bone from what is not bone?"¹¹ How, in fact, do the opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry, become organic tissues (ὁμοιομερῆ)? Aristotle says "If flesh arises from both of them but is neither of them, nor yet a compound in which both are preserved, what remains but that the product of them should be matter? The destruction of one opposite either produces the other opposite or matter. Surely then, since there are degrees of heat and cold, when the one is in actuality it will be potentially the other; but when it is not completely actual, but cold as compared to heat, and hot as compared to cold, since things that are mixed destroy one another's excesses, then neither will the matter nor either of the opposites be completely actual, but something intermediate. In so far as it is potentially more hot than cold or the opposite, in that ratio it will be three times as hot potentially as cold, or twice, or whatever the ratio may be.....That which is actually hot is potentially cold, and what is actually cold is potentially hot, so that if they are not equal they change into one another—and so with the other opposites—the elements first change in this way, and after these flesh and bones and the like, the hot becoming cold and the cold hot, when they have reached the mean (τὸ μέσον)."¹²

¹¹ Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 286, sqq.

¹² I have selected this passage from many others which might have been

It is in this sense, then, that goodness is a mean; it is the form which is the true nature of the human soul when fully developed. To say that Aristotle makes the distinction between goodness and badness a quantitative one is like saying that music is merely mathematics, or that the distinction between the different compounds of an acid and a base is only one of degree.

quoted as being, perhaps, specially instructive; but the main thing to remember is that "the Mean" is no isolated ethical doctrine, but the regular Platonic and Aristotelian way of explaining the Formal Cause. The misleading view of it as a mere *mediotissimus ibis* is due to the unfortunate isolation in which Aristotle's ethical doctrines are commonly studied; and this in turn is due to the peculiarities of Aristotle's own method. The passage is as follows:—

Gen. Corr. 334 b, 2 sqq. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ποιοῦσι μίαν αὐτῶν ὕλην ἔχει τῷ ἀπορίαν πῶς ἔσται τι ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οἷον ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ ἢ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ σὰρξ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν καὶ μηδέντερον ἐκείνων, μηδ' αὖ σύνθεσις σφισμένη, τί λείπεται πλὴν ὕλην εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνων; ἡ γὰρ θατέρου φθορά ἢ θάτερον ποιεῖ ἢ τὴν ὕλην. ἀρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ὅταν μὲν ἀπλῶς ἢ θάτερον ἐντελεχέει, δυνάμει θάτερον ἔσται· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς, ἀλλ' ὥς μὲν θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ὥς δὲ ψυχρόν θερμὸν (διὰ τὸ μὴ γινόμενα φθεῖρειν τὰς ὑπεροχὰς ἀλλή-

λων), τότε οὐθ' ἡ ὕλη ἔσται οὔτε ἐκείνων τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκάτερον ἐντελεχέει ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν ἢ τούναντιον, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον διπλασίως θερμὸν δυνάμει ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ τριπλασίως, ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον. ἔσται δὲ μὴ-θέντων τᾶλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ἐκείνων δυνάμει πως ὄντων, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον· καὶ ἔστιν οὕτω μὲν μίξις, ἐκείνως δὲ ὅλη τὸ γινόμενον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τάναντία κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις διορισμόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα θερμὸν δυνάμει ψυχρόν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ψυχρόν δυνάμει θερμὸν, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ ἰσάζῃ, μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων) καὶ πρώτων οὕτω τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὴ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὀστά καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γιγνομένου ψυχροῦ, τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέτερον—τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον—ὁμοίως δὴ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιοῦσι σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τᾶλλα.

B

Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς
 15 δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει
 καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ
 χρόνου· ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα
 ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεγκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.

1103 a, 17. EE. 1220 a, 39 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
 ὄνομα σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ'
 ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πως οὕτως ἦδη [τὸ]
 ἐνεργητικόν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνύχοις οὐχ ὀρώμεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις
 ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ), διὸ ἔστω τὸ
 ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον < τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν > δυνα-
 μένου δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.

I. § 1. Διττῆς...τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, as shown above 1103 a, 3 sqq. We take up the question of how goodness is produced without asking what it is; for this is a practical investigation. We shall, nevertheless, be forced to ask what it is later on.

τὸ πλεῖον. This is a necessary reservation; for we shall see that besides teaching goodness of intellect implies (1) cleverness, which comes by nature, and (2) goodness of character, which comes by habit. Cf. 1144 a, 20 sqq.

ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους. Aristotle simply assumes the solution of this old problem (cf. Introductory Note) to which Plato finally came. Cf. Laws 729 e

πάν ἦθος διὰ ἔθος. We have to go to Eudemos (loc. cit.) for a definition of habit. That is habituated which "from being often moved in a certain way under guidance which is not innate, is now active in that way."

περιγίνεται, 'is gained,' 'is the result of.' Contrast φέσει ἐγγίνεται, παραγίνεται below, which imply no previous process.

παρεγκλίνον. This is the reading of K^b and Hel. There seems to be no instance of *παρεκκλίνον*, the usual reading, in the present sense, while *παρεγκλίνω* is used transitively in Athenaeus 701 b and the scholiast on Ar. Knights 956, where it refers as here to a change in *προσῳδία*. The

2 Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, 20 οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ρίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως

a, 20. Met. 1046 a, 36 ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἵνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἴσονται ἀλογοὶ αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῃ ἢ τῇ ἄλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δ' ἀλογοὶ μία ἐνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὃ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν οὐχ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν, ἔστι δ' ὡς τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος μᾶλλον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἶναι δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰς τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτό, τοῦ δὲ πρόπον τινα κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορᾷ δηλοῖ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἡ γὰρ στέρησις ἡ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δ' ἀποφορὰ χατέρου. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυχτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὃ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω. λόγος γάρ ἐστιν ἄμφω μὲν, οὐχ ὁμοίως δέ, καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἡ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχήν· ὥστ' ἄμφω ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς κινήσει πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συνάψασα. διὸ τὰ κατὰ λόγον δυνατόν τοῖς ἀνευ λόγου δυνατόις ποιεῖ τὰναντία· μᾶ γὰρ ἀρχῇ περιέχεται, τῷ λόγῳ. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῇ μὲν τοῦ εὖ δυνάμει ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν δύναμις, ταύτη δ' ἐκείνη οὐκ αἰεὶ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα καὶ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ μόνον ποιοῦντα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν.

intransitive use, though not found elsewhere, presents no difficulty. Observe the etymological theory implied by the use of παρά (ἦθος παρά τὸ ἔθος). The Greeks did not think of words as 'derived' from other words, but as deflexions or declensions (πτώσεις, ἐγκλίσεις, παραγωγαί) from a normal form. Cf. Plato, Crat. 400 b ἂν μὲν καὶ συμκρόν τις παρακλήνῃ, 410 a

συμκρόν τι παρακλίνοντες, 398 d συμκρόν παρηγγμένον. So παρώνυμος cf. 1096 b, 27 n.

§ 2. Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον κ.τ.λ. That ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ comes ἐθισμῷ is assumed, but Aristotle digresses a little to show the inconsistency of this with the view that it comes φύσει.

οὐθὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first argument is that τὰ φύσει are not affected

ἀν ἐθισθείη. οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ 3
25 ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις
δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς 4
δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ

1103 a, 26. Met. 1047 b, 31 ἀπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἶον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δ' ἔθει οἶον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἶον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προεργήσας εἶχειν ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν τί δυνατόν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον δύναται

by habituation, goodness is, therefore goodness does not come by nature. This really depends on the distinction between *ἄλλοι οἱ δυνάμεις* and *δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγον*, for which see Met. loc. cit. Every *λόγος* expresses both the thing and its negation (the first essentially and the second accidentally), and therefore every *δύναμις* of the *λόγον ἔχον*, the part of the soul that can give an account of itself, is also a *δύναμις* of its opposite. But where there is no *λόγος* the *δύναμις* can only become actual in one way.

§ 3. *πεφυκόσι...δέξασθαι*, i.e. *φύσει δεκτικοῖς οὖσιν αὐτῶν*.

τελειουμένοις. Though stated almost parenthetically, this is meant as a hint to those hearers who are acquainted with Aristotle's system. Cf. Met. 1021 b, 20 καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τελειώσις τις· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μὴδὲν ἐλλείπη μῦριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους. Nature has not only its ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in itself, but also its ἀρχὴ στάσεως (Introd. § 27). The process of growth stops when the form is fully embodied in the matter. The *ὑποκείμενον* is then said to be complete (*τέλειον εἶναι*, *τέλος ἔχειν*) or to have attained its true nature (*ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν* 1152 b, 13 n.). It is for this

reason that the *γένεσις* of ἀρετὴ is not an ἀλλοίωσις—the *εἶδος* is not capable of alteration—but takes place ἀλλοιουμένου τινός, in this case by alteration of the soul. Cf. Phys. 246 a, 10 Introductory Note n. 10.

§ 4. *ἔτι ὅσα κ.τ.λ.* In things that come by nature, the capacity precedes the act, in things that come by habit the act precedes the capacity. For the full explanation of this we must refer once more to the Metaphysics (loc. cit.). Capacities are either congenital (*συγγενεῖς*) or acquired, whether by habit or teaching. The reason why, in the case of the latter, the act precedes the capacity is just that they are *μετὰ λόγον δυνάμεις*, and accordingly of opposites. They will not, therefore, become active as soon as they are brought into contact with the appropriate object. They cannot act in two opposite ways at once, so they will not act at all till something else determines in which way they are to be active. As we are dealing with the *δυνάμεις* of τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, this something will be some form of *ὄρεξις*, or at least something which has an appetitive element in it (*προαιρεσις*).

ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. Cf. Met. (loc. cit.), but we see from Met. 1049 b, 10 and De An. 415 a, 16 that πρότερον

ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκούσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι 30 ἔσχομεν). τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα 1103^b σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρεῖοι.

5 Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθεταὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ

καεῖν καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν μετὰ λόγον, τὰ δ' ἄλογα καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἄλογοι, κακείνας μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐμψύχῳ εἶναι ταύτας δ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνάμεις ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὥς δύνανται τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν πλησιάζωσι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκείνας δ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη. αὗται μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαι μία ἐνὸς ποιητικῆς, ἐκείναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἅμα ποιήσει τὰναντία· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον· λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν. ὁποτέρου γὰρ ἂν ὀρέγηται κυρίως, τοῦτο ποιήσει, ὅταν ὥς δύναιται ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πλησιάζῃ τῷ παθητικῷ. ὥστε τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται, οὐ τ' ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὥς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὡδὶ ἔχοντος [ποιεῖν]. εἰ δὲ μή, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται. τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἔξω κωλύοντος προσδιορίζεσθαι οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ· τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὥς ἔστι δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἔστι δ' οὐ πάντως ἀλλ' ἐχόντων πως, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἔξω κωλύοντα· ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσόντων ἔνια. διὸ οὐδ' εἰ ἅμα βούληται ἢ ἐπιθυμῇ ποιεῖν δύο ἢ τὰναντία, οὐ ποιήσει· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦ ἅμα ποιεῖν ἢ δύναμις, ἐπεὶ ὧν ἔστιν οὕτως ποιήσει.

here is only χρόνῳ πρότερον. In another sense πρότερον εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις (sc. τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι) κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, 'in the case of the arts as well,' e.g. ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλέειν (Met. loc. cit.). This is the point in which teaching and habituation resemble one another.

οὕτω δὴ is the apodosis to ὥσπερ

καὶ above. "The clause of comparison ὥσπερ κτέ. does duty twice over." Bywater, Contr. p. 27, referring to Riddell, Dig. § 209.

§ 5. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This is not a third argument to show that goodness does not come φύσει, but a reinforcement of the original statement that it comes ἐθισμῷ. For the appeal to the practice of νομοθεταί, cf. 1099 b, 29. 1102 a, 7.

5 μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ
αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία
πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.

Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα 6
ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ
κιθαρίζειν καὶ [οἱ] ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί.
10 ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ
τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς
κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάζοντος, 7
ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι
15 τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδι-
κοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖ-
σθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν
γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀρ-
20 γίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεισθαι, οἱ δὲ
ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ
ἔξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποίας ἀποδιδόναι· 8

§ 6. Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. This is summed up 1105 a, 14 by the words *οἱ ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αἰσθεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινόμενων*. There is no real difference of meaning between *ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν* and *διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν*, and the same idea is expressed below (1104 a, 28) by *ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν*. Aristotle might have said that the *ποιητικὰ ἀρετῆς* and the *φθαρτικὰ ἀρετῆς* were the same.

καὶ [οἱ] ἀγαθοὶ κ.τ.λ. I have bracketed *οἱ* as suggested by Professor Bywater. Tr. 'people become—.'

§ 7. τοῦ διδάζοντος. We are still speaking of *τέχναι*.

ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ, 'in short,' a Platonic phrase, apparently only here in Aristotle. Cf. Sandys on Dem. 3, 18. 'Like dispositions arise from like activities.' The attribute has to be understood with both members of the phrase, as often, cf. 1094 b, 28 n.

§ 8. ποίας ἀποδιδόναι, i.e. ἀποδεικνύου. This use of the verb is derived from that which we see in 1103 a, 27. 'We must qualify our activities.' For the use of terms here cf. Met. 1020 b, 17, where the two meanings of quality are given as (1) *διαφορὰ οὐσίας*, and (2) *διαφορὰ κινήσεως*. The latter meaning is thus explained: *τὰ δὲ πάθη τῶν κινουμένων ἢ κινούμενα καὶ τῶν κινήσεων διαφοραί· ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος τι· διαφορὰς γὰρ δηλοῦσι τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καθ' ἃς ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσι καλῶς ἢ φαύλως τὰ ἐν κινήσει ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὠδὶ δυνάμενον κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἐνεργεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ὠδὶ καὶ ἐναντίως μοχθηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποῖον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμφύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν. The meaning, then, is that we must 'give our activities a certain quality.' It is*

κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

25

II. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παρούσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὐταὶ γὰρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ 30 τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πρᾶττει κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείμεθω [ῥηθῇ-

1103 b, 26. EE. 1216 b, 20 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμωτάτον τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδὲ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ἔξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.

important to notice the introduction of this category.

II. § 1. Ἐπεὶ οὖν κ.τ.λ. The genuineness of this passage has been suspected, and it is certainly true that (1) it says over again much that has been said already, and (2) that it anticipates much—especially the doctrine of the Mean—that will find its proper place later on. It is also true (3) that § 8 is continuous not with this but the preceding passage, and (4) that this passage is not referred to in the recapitulation 1105 a, 13. But these are all characteristics of the akroamatic style. It is to be noted also that there is a great difference between the discussion of the Mean here and later on. Here it is explained dialectically by a mere analogy; later on it is discussed φυνσιῶς. Now this is a very characteristic procedure, as we shall see.

πραγματεία, ἡ περὶ τὰ ῥηθῇ πραγματεία, ἦν δίκαιον ἐστὶ προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν (Rhet. 1356 a, 26). In this sense of a 'branch' of philosophy the

word is a synonym of μέθοδος. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n.

οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκα. Contrast Phys. 194 b, 17 ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν ἡ πραγματεία. The statement that a theoretical study of goodness would be of no use will not seem too strong if we remember that in a practical science the product is 'better' than the activity. From this it follows that such a study would not completely attain its end.

§ 2. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. The least misleading translation is 'according to the right rule.' The phrase comes from the Academy (see next note), and was too familiar to need explanation.

κοινόν, 'is common ground,' i.e. common to us and other schools, especially the Academy. That this is the meaning appears clearly from 1144 b, 21 sqq. For the meaning given to κοινός cf. κοινὰ γνώμαι, δόξαι, κοινὰ ὀνόματα, 'received beliefs,' 'accepted names.'

ὑποκείμεθω. Cf. 1129 a, 11 ὡς ἐν

σεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς].

- 1104^a Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν 3
πρακτέων λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι,
ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἵπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι
ἀπαιτητέοι, τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν
5 ἐστήκους ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ 4
καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ
ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὐθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν
οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς αἰετὸς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς
τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς
10 κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος 5
λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι 6
τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρε-
σθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις

τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. 'Let it be assumed as the basis of our discussion.' Hel. and some inferior MSS. read *ὑπερκείσθω*, but no parallel to this expression can be found in Aristotle. The words which follow in brackets are justly suspected by Professor Bywater. They imply the identification of the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* with *φρόνησις*, which in this bald form is post-Aristotelian. See, however, 1144 b, 27 n.

§ 3. περὶ τῶν πρακτέων. περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν Bekk. Sus. Byw. with Hel. I have reverted to the reading of all the best MSS. Aristotle is not here speaking of the difficulty of practical science in general, but of the difficulty of laying down rules as to how we should 'qualify our activities.'

τύπῳ... ἀκριβῶς... κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Cf. 1094 b, 11 sqq. The comparison goes down to τὰ ὑγιεινά, which are here substituted for the products of the arts in the former passage. This is because an example of τὰ ποιητικά is wanted, and ὑγιεινόν has for one of its meanings ὑγιείας ποιητικόν (cf. 1096 b, 27 n.).

§ 4. περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. General rules of conduct are hard to give: a system of casuistry is still less capable of exactness.

ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, 'it comes under no professional tradition,' as medical treatment, for instance, does. Cp. Probl. 885 b, 27 of ἱατροὶ παραγγέλλουσι, Rhet. ad Alex. 1421 b, 4 παραγγέλματα πολιτικά, δικανικά. For πίπτει cf. ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον πίπτει (Top. 102 a, 37).

It is curious to note that, in the hands of the Church, casuistry became just such a professional tradition.

ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Mr Stewart is doubtless right in supposing that Aristotle had in mind the passage of Hippokrates quoted in the Introduction, § 26.

§ 5. πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. A Platonic touch. Cf. 1096 a, 14 n.

§ 6. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'things like goodness.' There is no need to seek a definite reference for the pronoun. Aristotle is here employing the dialectical method of *σκέψις ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων*.

δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Isokr. Dem. § 34 τὸ γὰρ ἀφανές ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ

χρησθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὀρῶμεν·
 τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα 15
 φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία
 πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ
 7 σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σφύζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ
 ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.
 ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπο- 20
 μένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὁ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πά-
 σης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλα-
 στος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός
 τις. φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς 25
 ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σφύ-
 8 ζεται. ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ
 φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· 30

1104 a, 27. EE. 1220 a, 22 ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἢ βελτίστην
 διάθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίνεσθαι, καὶ πράττεσθαι ἄριστα περὶ
 ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου ἀρετῆς, οἷον πόνοι τε ἄριστοι καὶ τροφή ἀφ'

ταχίστην ἔχει τὴν διάγνωσιν. The
 parenthetical clause introduces the
 reason for what follows (i.e. the
 choice of health and strength as
 instances) according to the common
 idiom. The dialectical method here
 employed consists in finding the things
 that are 'productive and destructive'
 of goodness by finding what is pro-
 ductive and destructive of things simi-
 lar. This is quite without prejudice to
 the more 'physical' account of the
 matter later on.

§ 7. ἀναίσθητός τις. Here and in
 some other places (1107 b, 8. 1108 b,
 11. 1109 a, 4. 1119 a, 7) Aristotle
 uses this word, though with some
 hesitation, in the special sense of
 'insensible' to pleasure. In this sense
 it is contrasted with ἀνάληγτος, of

which it is more commonly a synonym.
 Cf. 1114 a, 10 n.

φθείρεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For the reading
 see Bywater, Contr. p. 27. The par-
 ticle δὴ is here inferential. Tr. 'then.'

§§ 8—9. ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.
 "Ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα
 καὶ ἐνεργεῖ (1105 a, 16). This section
 is continuous with c. i, §§ 6—8, cf.
 c. ii, § 1 n. Note that ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
 is substituted for διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν with
 no difference of meaning, γίνεσθαι
 being treated as the passive of ποιεῖν.
 Bekker has καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις, but the
 article is omitted in K^b and obscures
 the sense. The γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις
 on the one hand are opposed to the
 φθοραὶ on the other.

καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, sc. αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
 ἐξωσ, i.e. ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτ' αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρὸς. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ 1104^b καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

III. Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξων τὴν ἐπυγινόμενῃ ἡδονῇ ἢ λύπῃ τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος

ὡς γίνεται εὐεξία, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας ποιοῦσιν ἄριστα· ἐπὶ πᾶσαν διάθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γέγενεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πῶς προσφερομένων, ὥσπερ ὑγίεια ὑπὸ τροφῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ ὥρας. ταῦτα δὲ δῆλα ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ τοιαύτη διάθεσις ἐστὶν ἣ γίνεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχῆν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ' ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πῶς μὲν γίνεται, πῶς δὲ φθίρεται, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑφ' ὧν καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθίρεται, πρὸς ἃ βέλτιστα διατίθωνται.

1104 b, 4. EE. 1220 a, 34 σημείον δ' ὅτι περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρά καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἱατρεῖαι οὖσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσίν.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν... ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται, 'will be *in pari materia*.' This way of expressing the ὅλη is Platonic. Cf. Polit. 288 d ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦσιν, Phileb. 59 d τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεως κ.τ.λ.... εἰ τις φαλὴ καθαπερὲ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι παρακείσθαι (cf. 1094 b, 12 n.), καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι. "Bricks are made *out of* clay, while a potter works *in* clay" (Bury in loc.). Among the senses of ἐν given in Phys. 210 a, 14 sqq. we find *inter alia* ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ. Here the particular meaning of ἐν ᾧ is ἐν ᾧ ἡ κίνησις, which may be space, quantity or quality. Cf. Phys. 227 b, 25 καὶ ἐν τινι τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι, ὅλον ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ἐν πάθει. The ἐνέργειαι here described are (fully-

developed) κινήσεις ἐν τῷ ποιῷ (ἀλλοιώσεις) and in particular, κινήσεις ἐν πάθει. For πάθος is the ὅλη alike of the γένεσις and φθορά of goodness and also the ἐν ᾧ of good activities. Note that ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς is replaced in the summary by περὶ ταῦτα, and that Eudemos says πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις (i. q. ἐνέργεια) αὐτῆς.

III. § 1. Σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. "Ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας" (1105 a, 13).

σημεῖον...ποιεῖσθαι. It is in accordance with the practical character of this discussion that the theory of the relation of goodness to feeling should apparently be introduced only to justify a practical rule for diagnosing ἔξεις by their symptoms. For σημείον ποιεῖσθαι, 'to take as a

τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σῶφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρείος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν 10
2 καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ·
3 ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἰ αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ 15
4 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μνηύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολλάσεις γινόμε-

symptom,' cf. Isokr. Nikokles § 28 τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν εὐ μέγιστον σημεῖον ποιούμεθα.

ἡ μὴ λυπούμενός γε. The reason for this reservation appears from the discussion of Courage below. Cf. esp. 1117 b, 15.

περὶ ἡδονὰς. For the preposition cf. περὶ ταῦτα 1105 a, 16.

διὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Eight arguments in favour of the position advanced. The important argument is the fourth (§ 5). The first three lead up to this, while the remaining four are supplementary and illustrative of it.

§ 2. ἡχθαί. Cf. 1095 b, 4 and ἀγωγή in 1179 b, 31.

ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν. The article and the present tense show that Plato in his writings is meant. The idea is found already in Rep. 401 e ὁρθῶς δὴ διαυχεράινων... καὶ χαίρων, but Aristotle is no doubt alluding to Laws, 653 a Α λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρῶτην αἰσθήσιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι· φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους, εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο· τίλειος δ' οὖν ἐστ' ἀνθρώπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθὰ. ταυδεῖαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετὴν, ἡδονὴν δὲ καὶ ὀρίαν καὶ λύπην καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὁρθῶς ἐν

ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνυνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, ὁρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν· αὐτῆς θ' ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ὁρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμῶν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδεῖαν προσαγορεύων κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν ὁρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις. So Ar. Pol. 1340 a, 15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν (συμβέβηκε) περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὁρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν.

§ 3. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supplementary proofs that ἀρετὴ is περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη. That ἀρετὴ has to do with πράξεις is clear from the account of it given above (1103 b, 13 sqq.); that ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ has to do with πάθη is clear from the fact that it belongs to τὸ ὁρεκτικόν.

ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη. This important doctrine is assumed throughout. Every feeling can be reduced to pleasure or pain, and the difference between feelings is due solely to the differences of the φαντασμοὶ which give rise to them. The relation of pleasure to πράξεις or ἐνέργεια is discussed in the Tenth Book.

§ 4. μνηύουσι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. In medicine cures are effected by op-

ναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γὰρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι
διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὥς καὶ πρῶτον 5
εἵπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ' οἷον πέφυκε γίνεσθαι
20 χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύ-
σιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ
διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἣ ἂς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ
ὥς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ
τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς

1104 b, 18. EE. 1221 b, 27 εἰλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα
λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα
διήρηνται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος διανοητικαί, ὧν ἔργον ἀλήθεια,
ἣ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἢ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δ'
ὁρεξίν (οὐ γὰρ ὀτιοῦν μέρος ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρεξίν, εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν),
ἀνάγκη δὴ φαῖλον τὸ ἦθος καὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν
ἡδονὰς τινὰς καὶ λύπας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ
τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἕξεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ
ἕξεις τῶν παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ διωρίζονται· ὥστε
διὰ τε ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν θέσεις συμβαίνει πᾶσαν ἠθικὴν
ἀρετὴν περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας. πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς ὑφ' οἷον
πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν

positives (e.g. fever is cured by a cold remedy). If the remedy is pain, then pleasure must be the cause of the disease. The medical παράγγελμα expressed in such phrases as βοηθεῖν τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν etc. is often discussed in medical writers. See Mr Stewart's note.

§ 5. πρῶτον. This is the reading of K^b and is not likely to be an invention. The other mss. have the more commonplace πρότερον. The reference is to 1104 a, 27 sqq., and the principle there laid down, ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ. This shows that pleasure and pain are the οἰκεία πάθη of ἀρετῆς. Cf. Phys. 246 b, 10 οἰκεία δὲ (πάθη) ὑφ' ὧν γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν.

πρὸς ταῦτα. Another variation of the phrase expressing the object to which the activity is relative. Cf.

the note on p. 82 and Eudemos there referred to.

τὴν φύσιν ἔχει. A variation of ἐνεργεῖ which is easily explained, if we remember that the οἰκεία φύσις or τελείωσις of any ἕξις is its ἐνέργεια. Things are said ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν, εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει (opp. ἐξίστασθαι) when they are complete. Translate 'shows its true nature.'

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, 'by the rule.'

διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται κ.τ.λ. Comm. Anon. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῶν Στωικῶν ἦν ἡ δόξα αὕτη. The word ἀπάθεια is found once only in what remains to us of Greek philosophy before the Stoics; but we can hardly be wrong in supposing that the reference here is to Speusippos. Cf. Clem. Strom. ii, 21 (Σπεύσιππος φησι) στοχάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀσκλησίας. Eudemos (l. c.) refers the definition to πάντες,

καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ 25
ὥς δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται.
δὲ ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῇ, ἡ δὲ κακία τούναντίον.
γίγνεται δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐτι περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν 30
τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγὰς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ [τριῶν]
τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα
μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρ-
τητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη
τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· 35
8 καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. ἐτι 1105^a
δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀπο-

τὴν ἡδονήν (l. *ἐξ*is Bonitz). δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους εἶναι
φαμέν, τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἢ ὥς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ἄς μὴ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ
διορίζονται πάντες προχείρως ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἡρεμίαν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

and this must mean the Academy (cf. 1144 b, 21). It is noteworthy, then, that ἀπάθεια τοῦ θυμοειδούς occurs in [Plato] Def. 413 a.

ὁπλῶς, ἀνευ προσθήκης Hel., 'without addition' or 'qualification.' Cf. ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται below. Cf. also Phys. 246 b, 17 περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκάστη λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετή, ὑφ' ὧν ἄλλοι οὐσθαι πέφυκε τὸ ἔχον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἡ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὥς δεῖ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικὸν ἢ ἐναντίως ἀπαθὲς.

§ 8. ἡ τοιαύτη, sc. ἡθικῇ. Mr Stewart follows Hel. in understanding ἡ τοιαύτη as ἡ ὁπως ἔχουσα and taking it closely with περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. In that case I should regard τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῇ as an adscript.

§ 7. ἐτι. K^b has ὅτι which Professor Bywater adopts. But would not ὅτι require περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ as Mr Stewart suggests? Hel. read ἐτι.

τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις, a prepositional

equivalent of τῶν αἱρετῶν. So just below we have τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν in the same sense.

καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος. This is an ἐνδοξον. Cf. Top. 105 a, 27 and 118 b, 27 ποσαχῶς τὸ αἱρετὸν λέγεται καὶ τίνων χάριν, οἷον τοῦ συμφέροντος ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος. It is used later in the discussion of φιλία. Often τὸ συμφέρον or χρῆσιμον is dropped (e.g. 1110 b, 9). In that case it is regarded merely as a means towards the other two.

κατορθωτικός. A word coined to form an opposite to ἀμαρτητικός. The verb κατορθοῦν means 'to succeed.'

κοινὴ...τοῖς ζῴοις. The point is that pleasure is possible to all creatures, even though they may not understand beauty or use.

§ 8. συντέθραπται, i.e. σύντροφός ἐστι, 'has grown up with us.' Hippokrates (p. 306, 24) κίνδυνος δὲ συντραφῆναι καὶ συνανηθῆναι, ἣν μὴ

τρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κα-
 νονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἦττον,
 5 ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα 9
 τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις
 εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον 10
 ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ
 δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετῇ·
 10 καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ
 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ
 τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται,
 ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.

“Οτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετῇ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ 11
 15 ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθίρεται μὴ
 ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ
 ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

IV. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν
 δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα
 σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα,
 20 ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ
 καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ 2
 τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι

θεραπευθῶσι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύοις, (p. 307,
 23) ᾧ δὲ ἀπὸ παιδίου συνηύξεται καὶ
 συντέτροφεν (of diseases).

ἀποτρίψασθαι ἐγκεχρωσμένον.
 The metaphor is taken from washing
 out stains. The figurative use of
 ἀποτρίψασθαι occurs more than once
 in Demosthenes, and is worked out at
 length by Plato, Rep. 429 d sqq.

κανονίζομεν. The verb occurs only
 here in Aristotle, but the metaphor of
 the 'rule' occurs several times and is
 still felt as a metaphor (cf. 1113 a,
 33). The word κανὼν did not become
 technical till a later date.

§ 10. καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος.
 Fr. 105 (Byw.) Θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χα-
 λεπὸν· ὅτι γὰρ ἂν χρηλίζῃ γίνεσθαι
 ψυχῆς ὠνείται (Early Greek Philo-

sophy, p. 140). No doubt θυμός was
 here used in the Ionic sense in which
 it is equivalent to ἐπιθυμία.

περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον κ.τ.λ. For
 this test cf. 1109 a, 12 sqq.

§ 11. ὅτι...λύπας, 1104 b, 4—
 1105 a, 13. καὶ ὅτι...γινομένων
 1103 b, 6—25 and 1104 a, 10—26.
 καὶ ὅτι...ἐνεργεῖ 1104 a, 27—b, 9.
 The section on the Mean (1104 a,
 11—27) is not specially referred to.
 Cf. 1103 b, 26 n.

IV. § 1. πῶς λέγομεν. 1103 a,
 31, 34. b, 2. This ἀπορία serves to
 bring out more fully the character of
 ἐθισμός. It falls under the general
 principle that what exists δυνάμει can
 only be made to exist ἐνεργείᾳ by
 something already actual. The form

ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν
 ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ
 γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμ- 25
 3 ματικὴν. ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν
 ἀρετῶν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει
 ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ
 κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δι-
 καίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων 30
 πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαι-
 ρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ
 βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς
 μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν 1105^b
 αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν
 ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν
 δύναται, εἴπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ
 4 σώφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώ- 5
 φρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἡ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώ-
 φρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα
 πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὥς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώ-

of goodness existing in the soul of the lawgiver tends to reproduce itself as *ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*.

§ 2. κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν, i.e. by realising the form (*εἶδος, λόγος*) of γραμματικὴ in his own soul. If he acts *ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου* he is realising the λόγος or form which exists in that other's soul.

§ 3. ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν...κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς. Note the change of the prepositions, which correspond to the distinction between *ποιεῖν* and *πράττειν*, *εἶργον* and *πρᾶξις*.

εἰδῶς. It is essential that he should know what he is doing. The conditions of this knowledge are analysed below 1110 b, 18 sqq.

προαιρούμενος. The act must be willed or intended. *Προαίρεσις* is analysed below 1111 b, 4 sqq.

δι' αὐτά, i.e. *ὅτι καλόν*, as we shall

see later on. We should not praise an act if it was willed not for itself, but to win our praise.

βεβαίως...ἔχων, if the act is ἀπὸ τῆς *ἐξέως*, the outcome of a constant character, not an isolated effort.

τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. The idiomatic use of ἄλλος.

τὸ εἰδέναι. In the sense of theory (*γνώσις*) knowledge is not essential to goodness, though of course it is essential if we mean simply knowing what we are doing. This is discussed fully in Book 111.

τὰ δ' ἄλλα, sc. *προαίρεσις* and *ἐξίς*.

εἴπερ. I have adopted Professor Bywater's correction of MS. *ἄπερ*. The subject of *περιγίνεται* is τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν (Contr. p. 29).

§ 4. οὐχ...ἀλλὰ καί. Cf. 1130 a, 7. For the reading see Bywater (Contr. p. 29).

φρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πρᾶτ- 5
 10 τειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων.
 ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδείς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσκει
 γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττον- 6
 σιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν
 καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς
 15 κάμνουσιν οἱ τῶν ἱατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι
 δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ
 ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυ-
 χὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφούντες.

V. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν
 20 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις,
 τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίας 2

1105 b, 19. EE. 1220 b, 7 λεκτέον δὴ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς
 ποιότης τὰ ἦθη. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ'
 ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη
 ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πως ἡ ἀπαθείς εἶναι. μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ
 διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις (?) τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμειν
 καὶ τῶν ἔξεων. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ

§ 6. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. This practical exhortation brings the discussion of how goodness is produced to an appropriate conclusion. There is no Royal Road to goodness. We cannot become good by studying moral philosophy or listening to sermons.

V. § 1. τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή. The connexion of thought is left to be inferred as usual, but it is quite plain. We found (1103 b, 22) that δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιάς ἀποδιδόναι, seeing that they are κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιάς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις (ib. 31). And that means further that the acts which are to produce goodness must be τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ ἀγαθὸς πρᾶττοι (1105 b, 6). We cannot therefore know what sort of acts make a good ἐθισμός till we have defined this ποιότης of the appetitive soul which we call goodness.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα, sc. ἐν τῇ ὁρεκτικῇ. The explanation given of πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις would be too narrow without this restriction which is easily supplied from the context. The vague expression τὰ γινόμενα is used because τὰ πάθη in the sense here explained are not ποιότητες, as Eudemos rightly points out. At the same time, the διαίρεσις is certainly derived from that of ποιότης, which is said in Cat. 8 b, 25 sqq. to comprise (1) ἔξεις καὶ διάθεσις, (2) ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν, (3) παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, (4) σχῆμα καὶ μορφή.

§ 2. πάθη. The word πάθος is very ambiguous. It may be used of almost all συμβεβηκότα, and especially of qualities, so that it is often equivalent to ποιότης. But even in ordinary Greek it had a more restricted application to what we call 'feelings,'

ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνου χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον
ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις

ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη
καθ' αὐτά. καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης ἀλλὰ πάσχει, κατὰ
δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς λέγονται κατὰ τὰ

and this is the sense in which we are using the word here. Now in this sense a πάθος is not a ποιότης, but a κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποῖόν or ἀλλοιώσις. We can see the distinction well from Met. 1020 a, 33 sqq., where the two senses of τὸ ποῖόν are given as (1) ἡ διαφορά τῆς οὐσίας (cf. 1106 a, 14 n.), and (2) τὰ πάθη τῶν κινουμένων. As goodness and badness are said to be πάθη in this sense (b, 19 ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος τι), this is clearly not the meaning of the word here. Nor can the πάθη here mentioned be identified with the παθητικαὶ ποιότητες of the Categories, which are temporary qualitative affections (such as tastes and colours) accompanying a πάθος, but not the πάθος itself. The latter is there described thus. "Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχυ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνονται πάθη λέγεται, ὅλον εἰ λυπούμενός τις ὀργιλωτέρος ἐστίν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλωτέρος ὢν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι. ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δ' οὐ."

ἐπιθυμίαν, i.e. ὁρεῖν τοῦ ἡδέος (Top. 140 b, 27 etc.) μετὰ λύπης (1119 a, 4). This is one of the three main forms of ὁρεῖς.

ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος. Following the Platonic division, these are all ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ (Top. 126 a, 8 sqq.). The dialectical definition of ὀργή is ὁρεῖς τιμωρίας (Rhet. 1378 a, 31) or ἀτυλιτυλήσεως (De An. 403 a, 30) arising from a feeling of pain caused by the idea of a slight (μετὰ λύπης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν). Cf. also Top. 127 b, 30. 151 a, 15. 156 a, 32. The popular definition of φόβος is προσ-

δοκία κακοῦ (1115 a, 9), but we ought rather to say it is the ὁρεῖς of self-preservation accompanying a λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. The opposite of φόβος is θάρσος, which therefore involves a feeling of pleasure arising from a φαντασία of the opposite kind.

φθόνον χαράν. The latter seems to be used here in a special sense as the opposite of φθόνος, which is λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένη εὐπραγία τῶν ἐπικεικῶν τινός (Top. 109 b, 36).

φιλίαν μῖσος. As βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ (cf. 1155 b, 29) φιλία is ἐν τῇ βούλῃσει (Top. 126 a, 13), and so we should understand the classification of all seven from φθόνος onwards. They are all κινήσεις produced by the φαντασία of something good or bad, and therefore belong to βούλησις. As a πάθος, φιλία is more correctly called φιλησις (1157 b, 28). It is a disinterested feeling of pleasure when good happens to another or pain when ill befalls him (Rhet. 1381 a, 4), and μῖσος the opposite.

πόθος, intense feeling of the pleasantness of the absent and pain of the present.

ζῆλος is the pain a man feels at seeing good things in the possession of another like himself, not because the other has them but because he himself has not (Rhet. 1388 b, 30), while ἔλεος is pain at the φαντασία of evil happening to another like oneself (ib. 1385 b, 13).

οἷς ἔπεται κ.τ.λ., i.e. κινήσεις or ἀλλοιώσεις which are necessarily either μεθ' ἡδονῆς or μετὰ λύπης (see the foregoing notes).

δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυ-
 25 νατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἔξεις δὲ καθ'
 ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργι-
 σθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀναιμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ
 μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν 3
 οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα
 30 κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς
 καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
 οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα—οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φο-
 βούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργι-
 1106^a ζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς—κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας
 ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβού- 4
 μεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ
 ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
 5 κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας
 οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ 5

πάθη οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον ὀργίλος ἀνάληγτος ἐρωτικὸς αἰσχυνηλὸς
 ἀναίσχυτος. ἔξεις δὲ εἰσὶν ὅσαι αἰτιαὶ εἰσι τοῦ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ λόγον
 ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως, οἷον ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη δειλία ἀκολασία.

δυνάμεις. In the present context, these are *φυσικά*, and therefore *ἄλογοι*, *δυνάμεις*. Cf. Cat. 9 a, 16 ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγονται. They are susceptibilities or insusceptibilities to feeling.

ἔξεις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note that *ἔξεις* here are not only qualities, but also relations. Cf. Cat. 11 a, 20 οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὰράτ-
 τεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι συγκαταριθμείσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἔξεις καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι ἐλέγομεν. The *γένος* is ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, for we say ἐπιστήμη (or ἀρετή) τινός, but the particular is not. We do not say γραμματικὴ (or ἀνδρεία) τινός.

σφοδρῶς, sc. ἔχομεν, a natural brachylogy for ἔχομεν ὥστε σφοδρῶς ὀργισθῆναι.

§ 3. πάθη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Three

arguments to show that goodness is not a *πάθος*, (1) feeling is not in itself good or bad, (2) feeling does not imply will, (3) feeling is a motion (or process), while goodness is a state or disposition. All this comes simply to saying that *πάθη* are not *ποιότητες*.

§ 4. **προαιρέσεις.** The meaning of *προαιρέσεις* is explained in Book III. Cf. for the present Met. 1020 b, 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποῖον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαιρέσιν.

κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Met. 1022 b, 15 *πάθος* λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ποιότης καθ' ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται. In Phys. 226 a, 26 ἀλλοίωσις is defined as *qualitative motion* (κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποῖον).

διακεῖσθαι is synonymous with *ἔχειν* in the Ethics, though in the

δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, [οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα.] ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἔξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ, εἴρηται.

VI. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ 2 ποῖα τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετῇ, οὗ ἂν ἢ ἀρετῇ, 15 αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετῇ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἐπι- 20

Categories 9 a, 8 ξῆς is distinguished from *διάθεσις* as being more permanent. Knowledge and goodness are *ἔξεις*, health and disease are *διαθέσεις*. Both are originally medical terms.

§ 5. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Two arguments to show that goodness is not a *δύναμις*, (1) a capacity is not in itself good or bad, (2) capacities are purely natural.

ἀπλῶς. Before we can give praise, we must make a *πρόσθεσις*, viz. ὡς δέ. Cf. 1104 b, 25 n.

οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. As Professor Bywater says, these words have no conjunction to connect them with what precedes, and seem to be an otiose repetition of 1105 b, 32.

πρότερον, supra 1103 a, 18 sqq.

§ 6. λείπεται. This assumes that the enumeration is exhaustive which implies (1) that the *ὑποκείμενον* is the appetitive soul, (2) that we are considering it *κατὰ τὸ ποῖον*.

VI. § 1. ἀλλὰ καὶ ποῖα τις, i.e. to define Goodness we must give its *differentia* as well as its *genus*. The *διαφορὰ ποῖον* τι σημαίνει.

§ 2. ῥητέον οὖν κ.τ.λ. The argument is that the *differentia* of goodness will be the same as the *differentia* of the activities which (1) produce goodness, and (2) result from goodness. Now we have seen above (1104 a, 11 sqq.) that the *ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ* of goodness are activities in a mean, and also (1104 a, 27 sqq.) that activities in a mean are the result of goodness. They are both *πρὸς τὴν ἔξιν* and *ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως*. Therefore goodness will be a *ἔξις ἐν μεσότητι*. So far, then, the *differentia ἐν μεσότητι* has been reached in a purely dialectical way. That it was the *differentia* of good acts was found by *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων* (cf. 1104 a, 12 n.), and that it is the *differentia* of goodness is shown *ἐπὶ τῶν συστοιχῶν* (cf. Ind. s.v.).

ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ. The illustration is from Plato, Rep. 353 b, ἄρ' ἂν ποτε ὁμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάζαιτο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκίαν ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ.

ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετῇ. The illustration is suggested by Plato, Rep. 335 b.

βάτην καὶ μῆναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων 3
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ'
ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος γίνεταί καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔρ-
γον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι 4
25 δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστίν
ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἐστι
λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἑλάττω τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα
ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον
τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πρᾶγμα- 5
30 τος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ
ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονά-

1106 a, 26. EE. 1220 b, 21 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, ληπτέον ὅτι
ἐν ᾧπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἐστὶν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον,
καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἱατρικῇ,
ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὅποιον πράξει, καὶ ἐπιστη-
μονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
κίνησις συνεχές, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος.
πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ξέν· καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον διὰ
τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φθείρει ἀλλήλα, τὰ δ'
ἄκρα καὶ ἀλλήλοισι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἐναντία. τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἑκάτερον πρὸς
ἑκάτερον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἴσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος μείζον, τοῦ μείζονος δὲ

§ 4. ἥδη, supra 1104 a, 10 sqq.
ἡ φύσις. We now show φυσικῶς
that the differentia of ἀρετῆ is ἐν
μεσότητι. Cf. Introductory Note.
With the change of method, the
Platonic reminiscences disappear. In-
trod. § 7.

συνχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ, 'continuous
and (infinitely) divisible.' The current
rendering of διαιρετὸν by 'discrete' is
a mere blunder and makes nonsense
of the argument. The word for 'dis-
crete' is διωρισμένον. Everything
which is continuous is also potentially
divisible *ad infinitum*, and the point
is that πάθη καὶ πράξεις which are the
'matter' of goodness are just such
infinitely divisible *continua*; for, re-

garded as κινήσεις, both πάθη and
πράξεις are συνεχῆ. We shall best
understand the doctrine of the mean
by thinking of a scale which is capable
of infinite gradation. There is one
right degree, and all below it down
to zero are ἐλλείψεις, all above it up
to boiling-point ὑπερβολαί.

ἡ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς. This distinction entirely re-
moves the objection that Aristotle
makes the difference between right
and wrong a quantitative one. The
bad man feels and acts more or less,
as the case may be, than the good
man, but this does not imply that the
good man's feelings are always 50°
centigrade and his conduct middling.

ζει μήτε ἑλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἔν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν.
 6 οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἕξ μέσα
 λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ
 ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν 35
 7 ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ
 εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλεί- 1106^b
 πτης ἕξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ
 τῷ ληφόμενῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ
 ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ
 8 πάλῃς. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ 5
 τὴν ἑλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖ-
 ται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πάγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
 9 εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ
 μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώ-
 θασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν 10
 ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἑλ-
 λείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σφζούσης,
 οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες
 ἐργάζονται), ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ
 ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στο- 15
 10 χαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθη
 καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις
 καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπι-

λαττον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσ' ἅττα εἶναι καὶ
 μεσότητά τινα. ληπτέον ἄρα ἢ ποία μεσότης ἀρετή, καὶ περὶ ποία
 μέσα.

§ 6. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀνα-
 λογίαν. Theon of Smyrna p. 85, 10
 quotes from Thrasyllus the definition
 τὴν ταύτῳ ἀριθμῷ ὑπερέχουσαν καὶ
 ὑπερεχομένην. This is not what we
 call a 'proportion,' but a series in
 arithmetical progression. Cf. ib. p.
 106, 15 τούτων δὲ φησιν ὁ Ἀδραστος
 μίαν τὴν γεωμετρικὴν κυρίως λέγεσθαι
 ἀναλογίαν καὶ πρῶτην... κοινότερον δὲ
 φησι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας μεσότητας ὑπ' ἐνίων

καλεῖσθαι μεσότητας.

§ 9. ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις. Cf. Part.
 An. 639 b, 19 μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα
 καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. If we find that
 the excellence of a work of art con-
 sists in this, that you cannot add to it
 or take anything from it, then *a*
fortiori this will be true of goodness
 as it is of nature.

θυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι
 20 καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω
 οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὐ 11
 ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ 12
 καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ
 25 πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ
 ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται], τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦ-
 ται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν 13
 ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρ- 14
 τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ
 30 Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ
 δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χα-
 λεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν
 δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταύτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ
 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

35 ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικῆ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα —

1106 a, 36. EE. 1227 b, 5 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἡ
 ἠθικὴ αὐτὴ τε μεσότης τίς ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ

§ 12. ψέγεται. Cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 29.

§ 14. τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου. Aristotle here makes an ingenious use of a Pythagorean idea which had at first a cosmological rather than an ethical signification. According to the Pythagoreans, the world was built up of geometrical figures, and these arose from the limitation of the unlimited (space). The unlimited once limited was a point, twice limited a line and so forth (Early Greek Philosophy, p. 312). The limit was thus the principle of order. Just in the same way the infinitely divisible continuum of feeling and action requires to be determined according to the ὁρθὸς λόγος. There are infinite possibilities of wrong in it,

but there is a certain degree in it which is right, and that is the limit, the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

ἀποτυχεῖν ... σκοποῦ ... ἐπιτυχεῖν. For the metaphor of the σκοπός cf. 1094 a, 22 n. Goodness is στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου and we may think of the μεσότης as the bull's eye in the target. The possibilities of missing are infinite, there is one right place to hit.

ἐσθλοὶ κ.τ.λ. The authorship of this verse is unknown.

§ 15. ἕξις προαιρετικῆ. We have seen that the *genus* of Goodness is ἕξις (1105 b, 19), that is, a habitual attitude towards feeling, developed by habituation from a neutral *dónamus*. We have seen too that we cannot say

τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὀρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος 1107^a
 ὀρίσκειν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβο-
 16 λὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλείψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν
 τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ 5
 17 αἰρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ
 τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ

κακία ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ ἀρετῇ, τὴν ἀρετὴν
 εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἕξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσει καὶ
 λυπηροῖς, καθ' οὐσα ποῖός τις λέγεται τὸ ἥθος, ἡ χαίρων ἡ λυπούμενος·
 ὁ γὰρ φιλόγλυκος ἡ φιλόπικρος οὐ λέγεται ποῖός τις τὸ ἥθος.

a man is good unless he acts προαιρού-
 μενος, 'with purpose' and βεβαίως καὶ
 ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων (1105 a, 31). This
 gives us ἕξις προαιρετική, 'a condition
 of the will.'

ἐν μεσότητι οὐσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
 The *differentia* of this ἕξις προαιρετική
 is that it aims at the mean relative to
 ourselves (1106 a, 14 sqq.). The word
 οὐσα implies that τὸ εἶναι of the ἕξις is
 ἐν μεσότητι, so Eudemos is quite right
 (loc. cit.) in saying προαιρετικὴ μεσό-
 τητος.

ὀρισμένη λόγῳ. We took as the
 basis of our discussion that we must
 act κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (1103 b, 32).
 It is now indicated that this is what
 determines the Mean. The Mean is,
 in fact, a provisional formula. We
 cannot yet say what determines the
 proportion. There is still an unknown
 quantity in our "Rule of Three" pro-
 blem. See the beginning of Book vi.

καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσκειν. This
 is added as a hint of the direction in
 which we are to look for our standard.
 We know already that φρόνησις is a
 διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ (1103 a, 6), and now
 we are told that the Mean is deter-
 mined 'by what the wise man would
 determine it by,' a sufficient ἐνδοξον.
 We must, then, be content for the
 present with our provisional formula,

the Mean. We shall learn more
 when we come to Goodness of In-
 tellect.

§ 16. καὶ ἔτι sc. μεσότης ἐστὶ. τὰς
 μὲν...τὰς δὲ sc. κακίας.

τοῦ δέοντος. See 1094 a, 24 n.

§ 17. διὸ κ.τ.λ. We have seen
 that Goodness is a Mean in its
 essential nature (οὐσία) and by its
 definition (τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν
 εἶναι λέγοντα), but from the point of
 view of what is best it is an extreme.
 When we go beyond the Mean,
 though we are ascending towards the
 upper extreme of our scale of feeling,
 we are yet descending in the scale of
 excellence. The explanation of this
 is to be found in the fact that goodness
 is a τελείωσις, and that therefore all
 badness, whether of excess or defect,
 is opposed to it as στέρησις to εἶδος.

τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This curious phrase
 means the real nature (οὐσία) of a
 thing as expressed in its definition by
genus and specific difference. Its
 origin is easily understood if we take
 such a phrase as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀν-
 θρώπῳ lit. 'what it was for him to be
 a man,' 'what his being a man was.'
 The imperfect is to be explained as
 a "philosophical" imperfect (Good-
 win, Greek Moods and Tenses, § 40),
 and represents the definition in a

ἀριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις 18
οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται
10 συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία
ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπή
ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται
τῷ αὐτῷ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν
οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατ-
15 ορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν,
ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν.
ὁμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν 1
καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλ-
20 λειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως με-
σότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως.
ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ 2
ἐλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ'
ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν
25 πράττηται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὁλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἐλλειψις.

VII. Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ

1107 a, 8. EE. 1221 b, 18 οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἔνια τῶν λεγο-
μένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἂν πῶς λαμβάνηται τῷ μᾶλλον
πάσχειν. οἷον μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς
πλησιάζειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ μοιχθρία τις αὐτῇ δὴ ἐστίν.
συνειλημμένον γὰρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕβρις. διὸ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, συγγενέσθαι μὲν φάσκοντες,
ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι—ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἡ ἀναγκαζόμενοι—καὶ πατάξαι μὲν,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕβρισαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. (Cf. Rhet.
1374 a, 3.)

living way as the result of a process, not as a dead formula. This is characteristic of Greek philosophy all through, based as it was on discussion and debate.

§ 18. εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται κ.τ.λ., 'have names which at once involve

badness.' For συνειλημμένα cf. EE. I. c., Met. 1025 b, 32 τὸ μὲν σιμὸν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.

VII. § 1. Δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The definition must now be tested by its applicability to particulars, i.e. particular forms of goodness. So the

καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ 30 μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν * * * ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς 1 διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν <ἐν> τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος 1107^b (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων

a, 32. EE. 1220 b, 36 εἰλήφθω δὴ παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρεῖσθω ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς.

ὀργιλότης

ἀναλγησία

πρώτης

θρασύτης

δειλία

ἀνδρεία

ἀναισχυντία

κατάπληξις

αἰδώς

definition of *eudaimonia* was tested by its applicability to the relevant facts. Cf. 1098 b, 9 sqq. and De Mot. An. 698 a, 11.

κοινότεροι, 'of wider application.' This is the reading of the best mss. and the Greek commentators (πλείοσιν ἐφαρμόζουσι Par.). Cf. e.g. De An. 414 b, 23 γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, δὲ ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ' οὐδενὸς ἐστὶ σχήματος. The reading of the Vetus Versio and inferior mss., *κενώτεροι*, is not so appropriate; for, as will be seen from the references in Eucken, *Methode* pp. 46—47, *κενός* and *κενολογία* (De An. 403 a, 2 *διαλεκτικῶς ἔρρηται καὶ κενῶς*) refer chiefly, if not solely, to arguments not based on the *αἰεταὶ ἀρχαὶ* of the science. Here Aristotle is pointing out the respective advantages of both universal and particular.

δέον can hardly be anything else but an accusative absolute: it cannot stand for *δέον ἐστί*. Bonitz would therefore delete *οὖν* in the next clause. There may be a lacuna in the text. Cf. 1145 b, 28.

ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. In EE. 1220 b, 37 it is called a *ὑπογραφή*, though we have *διαγραφή* 1228 a, 28. Cf. *ιδ.*

γραμμα. We have references to a *ὑπογραφή* in De Interpr. 22 a, 22: Hist. An. 510 a, 30 and elsewhere. It seems, then, that Aristotle's *ἀκροάσεις* were illustrated by a sort of syllabus. In the case of the *Analytics* this must have been quite necessary, and there are other parts of the *Ethics* that are not intelligible unless we assume a *διαγραφή*.

§ 2. περὶ...φόβους καὶ θάρρη. Both fear and its opposite are mentioned because they form a single continuum. It is possible for the soul to pass by continuous *ἀλλοίωσις* from the one to the other. We may therefore look at the Mean from two points of view, and there are thus two excesses and two defects. For it does not follow that ὁ ἐν τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ἐλλείπων (which is what Aristotle means by ὁ ἐν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ὑπερβάλλων) will be the same as ὁ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων. They are different *ἕξεις* altogether; for we are not dealing with the mere *ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές*. It may well be, however, that one or other of the *ἕξεις* has no special name, or that the same name is given to both; but this must not blind us to the qualitative distinction between them.

θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβείσθαι ὑπερβάλλον τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν
 ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ πάσας, 3
 5 ἦττον δὲ καὶ <οὐχ ὁμοίως> περὶ τὰς λύπας—μεσότης μὲν
 σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς
 ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχή-
 κασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δό- 4
 σιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερ-
 10 βολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως
 δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει,
 ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει
 ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, 5
 15 ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐ-

ἀκολασία	ἀναίσθησία	σωφροσύνη
φθόνος	ἀνώνυμον	νέμεσις
κέρδος	ζημία	δίκαιον
ἀσωτία	ἀνελευθερία	ἐλευθεριότης
ἀλαζονεία	εἰρωνεία	ἀλήθεια
κολακεία	ἀπέχθεια	φιλία
ἀρέσκεια	αὐθάδεια	σεμνότης
τρυφερότης	κακοπάθεια	καρτερία
χαυνότης	μικροψυχία	μεγαλοψυχία
δαπανηρία	μικροπρέπεια	μεγαλοπρέπεια
πανουργία	εὐήθεια	φρόνησις

τὰ μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ
 λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν. ὀργίλος μὲν γάρ
 ἐστὶν ὁ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος καὶ θάττον καὶ πλείοσιν ἢ οἷς δεῖ,
 ἀνάληγτος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὥς· καὶ θρασὺς μὲν ὁ

§ 3. οὐ πάσας. We shall see which later on.

καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως. I have adopted Mr Bywater's suggestion to insert οὐχ ὁμοίως from 1117 b, 26. The καὶ in the common text has no meaning. Here is another determination which shows we are not dealing with mere quantity.

οὐ πάνυ γίνονται, 'cannot be said to be common.' Cf. Ind. s.v. οὐ πάνυ. ἀναίσθητοι. This is not the usual meaning of the word. Cf. 1104 a, 24 n.

§ 4. περὶ δὲ δόσιν κ.τ.λ. We pass now from μεσότητες ἐν πάθεσι to μεσότητες ἐν πράξεσι.

ἐν αὐταῖς. See Byw. Contr. p. 30.

δῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις
 αἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
 διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ
 μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλει-
 ψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν 20
 7 ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ
 δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερ-
 βολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·
 8 ὥς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευ-
 θεριότητα, <τῷ> περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ 25
 πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ
 περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὥς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἡττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον
 ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ
 μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ 30
 τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς
 μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλό-
 τιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν

μήτε ἂν χρὴ φοβούμενος μήθ' ὅτε μήθ' ὥς, δειλὸς δὲ ὁ καὶ ἂν μὴ δεῖ καὶ
 ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ * * ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκόλαστος * * καὶ ὁ
 ἐπιθυμητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπερβάλλον πᾶσιν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται, ἀναίσθητος δὲ
 ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ μῆδ' ὅσον βέλτιον καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, ἀλλ'
 ἀπαθὴς ὥσπερ λίθος· κερδαλέος δὲ ὁ πανταχόθεν πλεονεκτικὸς,
 ζημιώδης δὲ ὁ μηδαμόθεν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαχόθεν (?)· ἀλαζὼν δὲ ὁ πλείω
 τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος, εἴρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ κόλαξ μὲν
 ὁ πλείω συνειπαινῶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθητικὸς δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ τὸ
 μὲν λίαν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀρέσκεια, τὸ δ' ὀλίγα καὶ μόγις αὐθάδεια· ἔτι δ'
 ὁ μὲν μηδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην, μῆδ' εἰ βέλτιον, τρυφερός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν
 ὁμοίως ὥς μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀνώνυμος, μεταφορᾷ δὲ λέγεται σκληρὸς
 καὶ ταλαίπωρος καὶ κακοπαθητικὸς· χαῦνος δ' ὁ μεζόνων ἀξιών αὐτόν,
 μικρόψυχος δ' ὁ ἐλαττόνων· ἔτι δ' ἄσωτος ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν δαπάνην

§ 6. διαθέσεις, i. q. ἔξεις. Cf. 1106 a, 6 n.

§ 8. τῷ περὶ μικρὰ, sc. εἶναι, * differing in being concerned with small things.' The insertion of τῷ is

due to Ramsauer.

ἐπιδικάζονται, a legal metaphor. For the κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδι-
 κασίαι see 'Αθ. πολ. c. 43, 4. 56, 6
 with Sandys's notes.

- 1108^a ἐπαινούμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ 9
 τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν
 δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρό-
 πον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ 10
 5 μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον
 πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πράγματα καλέσωμεν· τῶν
 δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ-
 γιλότης, ὁ δ' ἔλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀορ-
 γησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν 11
 10 τίνα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων·
 πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν,
 διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τάληθές τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς,
 αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν
 πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα
 15 μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ
 δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὐτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν

ὑπερβάλλον, ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἐλλείπων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
 μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκων, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρέπον, ὁ δ'
 ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρέποντος· καὶ ὁ μὲν πανούργος πάντως καὶ πάντοθεν
 πλεονεκτικός, ὁ δ' εὐήθης οὐδ' ὅθεν δεῖ· φθονερός δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι
 ἐπὶ πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὖ πράττειν λυποῦσι
 τοὺς φθονεροὺς εὖ πράττοντες), ὁ δ' ἐναντίος ἀγωνυμώτερος, ἔστι δ' ὁ
 ὑπερβάλλον τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι μὴδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν,
 ἀλλ' εὐχερὴς ὥσπερ οἱ γαστρίμαργοι πρὸς τροφήν, ὁ δὲ δυσχερὴς κατὰ
 τὸν φθόνον ἐστίν.—τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτως
 ἔχειν περιέργον διορίζειν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, οὔτε θεωρητικὴ οὔτε
 ποιητικὴ, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε πράττει τοῦτο προσδιορίζουσα, ἀλλὰ τούτ'

§ 9. κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον,
 'according to the method we have
 traced out.' This seems more natural
 than to take the participle in an active
 sense. Cf. Pol. 1252 a, 17 κατὰ τὴν
 ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. Some, however,
 translate 'the method which has
 hitherto guided us.' There is no
 difficulty in taking the perfect parti-
 ciple of a deponent in a passive sense,
 though this is avoided in other tenses.

§ 11. ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν κ.τ.λ.
 Note the motive assigned. It is most
 important all through the discussion
 of the ἀρεταί to remember that Aris-
 totle's aim is not mere description,
 and still less to set up ideal types
 for our edification. It is to show
 that the ἀρεταί are all μεσότητες and
 therefore imply a ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων.
 This must be shown in small things
 as in great.

οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ' ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνε-
12 κα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές
ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, 20
ἡ δὲ προσποίησης ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ
ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ
13 εἴρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος
εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπεία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βω-
μολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων 25
ἀγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ
τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσό-
της φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἄρε-
σκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
4 καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ 30
ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ
αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλ-
λων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
15 ἡ μὴδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμε- 35
σις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ 1108^b
λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας
γινόμενας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνα-
ξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ
πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ 5

ἔστι πρὸς τὰς συκοφαντίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικάς. ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν
διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἀκριβέστερον δ' ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἔξεων
λέγωμεν τῶν ἀντικειμένων.

§ 14. ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is exactly equivalent to περὶ τὰ πάθη. For ἐν c. dat. i. q. περὶ c. acc. cf. Ind. s.v. περί; and for the declension of πάθος in the plural cf. Ind. s.v. These μεσότητες differ from e.g. ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη in not being ἔξεις, but mere παθητικαὶ ποιότητες (cf. 1105 b, 21 n.). It is interesting to note,

however, that the principle of μεσότης applies here too.

§ 15. νέμεσις is the feeling of satisfaction at people getting their deserts. It is not further discussed in EN., but its association with αἰδὼς is as old as Homer. Here too our principle holds good.

λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρει. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἱ
 ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς
 λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν
 πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· [ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν
 10 ἀρετῶν].

VIII. Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς
 μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλείψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς
 τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαι ἀντίκεινται πῶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ
 ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ
 15 μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἑλατ-
 τον μείζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἑλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι
 ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πρά-
 ξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνε-
 20 ται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρᾶσυν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων
 πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον

1108 b, 11. EE. 1222 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ
 τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστα διά-
 κεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς,
 ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστον μεσότητα
 εἶναι καὶ περὶ μέσ' ἅττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς.
 ἔσται δ' ἡ μεσότης ὅτε μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς (καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλείψις),
 ὅτε δ' ἐν λύπαις, ὅτε δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέραις. ὁ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλων τῷ χαίρειν
 τῷ ἡδέϊ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἀπλῶς
 ἢ πρὸς τινα ὄρον, οἷον ὅταν μὴ ὡς οἱ πολλοί· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεῖ.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς τοιοῦτος ἔσται ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ὥστε τοῦ

§ 16. ὁμοίως...ἀρετῶν. The term λογικαὶ ἀρεταὶ occurs nowhere else in Aristotle, and the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ are not μεσότητες.

VIII. § 1. Τριῶν δὴ κ.τ.λ. The question of the nature of the ἀντίθεσις between the three conditions is of cardinal importance to Aristotle. The extremes are opposite to each other and also to the means. We shall see that Speusippus made much of this

and drew unwarrantable conclusions from it. It is necessary to guard against such arguments as that, since intemperance is a vice, insensibility must be a virtue.

διαθέσεων, not distinguishable from ἕξεων. Cf. 1106 a, 6 n.

§ 2. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον κ.τ.λ., the stock illustration of this form of ἀντίθεσις. Cf. 1153 b, 5.

ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσω-
 3 τος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται
 τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι
 τὸν ἀνδρείον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ 25
 4 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις
 τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ
 πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων
 ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν
 5 τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον 30
 ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς
 τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα. τοῖς
 δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλεῖ-
 στον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ
 6 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλείον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον 35

αὐτοῦ πράγματος οὐ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἑλλειψιν,
 ἀνάγκη, ὡς ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἑξεις
 ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ.

EE. 1234 a, 34 ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἢ
 ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδετέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ
 πολλάκις μετ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰσιν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασυδείλοι, καὶ τὰ
 μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς. ὅταν μὲν
 γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ᾖσιν, οἱ μέσοι γίνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ
 πῶς τὰ ἄκρα.

EE. 1222 a, 22 συμβαίνει μέντοι τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ἐνθα μὲν
 φανερωτέρας εἶναι πάσας, ἐνθα δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ
 τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ὅτι οὐκ αἰεὶ ἐπὶ
 ταῦτ' (?) τῆς ἀνισότητος ἢ ὁμοιότητος (?) πρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν
 θᾶττον ἂν μεταβαίη ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μέσῃν ἕξιν, ὅτε δ' ἀπὸ
 τῆς ἑλλείψεως, ἥς <ὅς> πλέον ἀπέχει οὗτος δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτερος εἶναι,
 οἷον καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον ἢ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς
 ἑλλείψεως καὶ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μέσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἢ ἑλλειψις ὑπερ-
 βολῆς. ὥστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικαὶ ἑξεις αἱ φιλογυμναστικαὶ φιλοῦγιεῖς

§ 5. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is
 another peculiarity which has a great
 interest for Aristotle, and is worked
 out in detail with regard to each ἀρετή.
 It is evident that rashness is 'liker'
 courage than cowardice is. This again

shows we are not dealing with mere
 quantity.

τὰ δὲ πλείστον κ.τ.λ. The full
 definition of ἐναντία is τὰ πλείστον
 ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 γένει (Cat. 6 a, 18).

- 1109^a ἀντικειται μάλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ
 ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή
 οὐσα ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὐσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνη
 οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὐσα ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερ-
 5 βολή οὐσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν
 μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι
 καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ
 τοῦναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μάλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον
 10 δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μάλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέ-
 χοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν
 οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μάλλον ῥεπομέν πως, ταῦτα
 μάλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μάλλον
 15 πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν

μάλλον ἴσονται καθ' ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἔνθα μὲν αἱ πολυπονώτεραι, ἔνθα δ' αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὥς ὁ λόγος ἔνθα μὲν ὁ ἄπνονος καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, ἔνθα δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικός καὶ οὐχ ὁ πεινητικός. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφίστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἥττον μὲν φιλόπονοι ἐσμέν, μάλλον δ' ἀπολαυστικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἐναντίαν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν ἕξιν ἐφ' ἣν τε ἀμαρτάνομεν μάλλον καὶ ἐφ' ἣν οἱ πολλοί (ἢ δ' ἑτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὐσα λανθάνει· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον ἀναίσθητος ἐστίν), οἷον ὀργὴν πραότητι καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πράφῃ. καίτοι ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴλεον εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ῥαπιζόμενον. ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δὲ πάντες ῥέπουσι μάλλον.

1109 a, 1. EE. 1234 b, 6 αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέραι, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· αἷτια δὲ τὰ τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα

§ 7. ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος. This αἷτια is generally given in some such short form as χεῖρον γάρ. So 1122 a, 14 (μεῖζον ἐστὶ κακόν), 1125 a, 34 (χεῖρόν ἐστιν), 1126 a, 31 (οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους), 1127 b, 32 (χεῖρων γάρ).

§ 8. ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. This second αἷτια is made use of 1122 a, 15 (μάλλον

ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν), 1125 a, 34 (καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μάλλον), 1126 a, 30 (καὶ γὰρ μάλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γάρ), 1151 b, 30 (διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις εἶναι φανεράν).

ῥεπομέν, Professor Bywater's conjecture for ἐχομεν K^b, πεφύκαμεν L^b. Contr. p. 30. Cf. EE. above.

πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

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a, 20. EE. 1222 b, 5 ἐπεὶ δ' εἴληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἕξεων καθ' ἕκαστα τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων, καθ' ἃς ἔχουσι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον), φανερόν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶ, καὶ ἡδοναὶ καὶ λυπαὶ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἕξεων καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε βελτίστη ἕξις ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα μέση ἐστίν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἔσονται τῶν μεσοτήτων.

ἐπίδοσις, 'growth,' tr. 'in the direction of our growth.'

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practical rules for attaining the mean. This is a practical science.

§ 3. πρῶτον μὲν, Rule I.

ἡ Καλυψὼ. The words are really said by Odysseus, Od. xii, 219. Some

- 1109^a ἀντικειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ
 ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή
 οὐσα ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὐσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνη
 οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὐσα ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερ-
 5 βολή οὐσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν 7
 μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι
 καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ
 τοῦναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον
 10 δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέ-
 χοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν 8
 οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ῥέπομεν πως, ταῦτα
 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον
 15 πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν

μᾶλλον ἔσονται καθ' ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἐνθα μὲν αἱ πολυποντώτεραι, ἐνθα δ' αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἐνθα μὲν ὁ ἄπονος καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, ἐνθα δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικός καὶ οὐχ ὁ πεινητικός. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφίστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἤττον μὲν φιλόπονοι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπολαυστικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἐναντίαν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν ἑξιν ἐφ' ἣν τε ἀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ' ἣν οἱ πολλοί (ἡ δ' ἑτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὐσα λανθάνει· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον ἀναίσθητος ἐστίν), οἷον ὀργὴν πρᾶότητι καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πρᾶφ. καίτοι ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴλεων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι βραπιζόμενον. ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δὲ πάντες ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον.

1109 a, 1. EE. 1124 b, 6 αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· αἷτια δὲ τὰ τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα

§ 7. ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος. This αἷτια is generally given in some such short form as χεῖρον γάρ. So 1122 a, 14 (μεῖζόν ἐστι κακόν), 1125 a, 34 (χεῖρόν ἐστιν), 1126 a, 31 (οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους), 1127 b, 32 (χεῖρων γάρ).

§ 8. ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. This second αἷτια is made use of 1122 a, 15 (μᾶλλον

ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν), 1125 a, 34 (καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον), 1126 a, 30 (καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γάρ), 1151 b, 30 (διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις εἶναι φανεράν).

ῥέπομεν, Professor Bywater's conjecture for ἐχομεν K^b, πεφύκαμεν L^b. Contr. p. 30. Cf. EE. above.

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§ 3. πρῶτον μὲν, Rule I.

ἡ Καλυψώ. The words are really said by Odysseus, Od. xii, 219. Some

BOOK III.

THE WILL—COURAGE, TEMPERANCE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our deliberative analysis of Happiness has shown us that it mainly depends upon goodness of character, and we have seen that goodness of character is produced by habituation. We had to ask in the next place what quality our acts must have if their repetition is to produce goodness of character, and we found that acts which are to produce goodness must be of the same quality as the acts which proceed from goodness when it is formed. This made it necessary for us to define goodness, that is, to ascertain its "formal cause," and now that this is done, the next step will clearly be to discuss its "efficient cause."

It cannot be said that this connexion of thought is explicitly marked by Aristotle himself, and the commentators have generally failed to see it. But we must always remember that the reasons given by Aristotle for undertaking any inquiry are not necessarily or even usually the real motives of that inquiry. It is characteristic of him (1) to keep the metaphysical groundwork of his practical science in the background as much as possible, and (2) to enumerate all the incidental advantages, especially those of a practical character, that are likely to follow from the discussion. We shall have occasion to notice this peculiarity more than once in the sequel.

§ 2. In the first place, then, it is clear that a good act must be voluntary. An act of which we can truly say "I couldn't help it" is neither a sign of character nor productive of it. We must first of all, then, determine the limits of the voluntary. This was a question much discussed in the Athenian courts, especially in

connexion with charges of homicide. Homicide was primarily a religious offence since it carried with it religious impurity or blood-guiltiness, and therefore every form of it, from the accidental or involuntary up to deliberate murder, came under the cognisance of the courts. The speeches of Antiphon are specially instructive with regard to the moral consciousness of the Athenian dikast on this subject, and it is from this, in accordance with his usual method, that Aristotle starts. For us the chief interest of the discussion lies in his anticipation of some of the most important distinctions of Roman and later law. This goes far to justify his claim to be regarded as a teacher of lawgivers. It would have been well for Athens if law had been administered consistently on principles such as those here laid down.

§ 3. It is clear, however, that to call an act voluntary is merely a negative description of it. The acts of children and the lower animals may be voluntary in the sense that they are not done under compulsion or from ignorance; but they are not acts in the full sense of the word at all, and are therefore no sign of character. To be this an act must be willed, that is it must be "intended" or deliberately adopted as a means to some end which forms the object of a wish. This distinction too was already recognised by the Athenian law of homicide, which distinguished *φόνος ἐκ προνοίας* from ordinary homicide even of the voluntary kind. What we want, then, as the efficient cause of action is something related to acts in general as what lawyers call "malice" is related to wrong-doing. This Aristotle calls by the name *προαίρεσις*, a word which was much used in his own day to express the deliberate adoption of any course of conduct or line of action.

By a piece of dialectical argument we are led to see that Will—for this is after all the best rendering of the word—is neither a purely intellectual nor a purely appetitive function. It is the union of an intellectual element, Deliberation, with an appetitive element, Wish. Further, as we only deliberate about things "in our power," we may say that it is a "deliberative appetite of things in our power."

§ 4. We have come at last in our deliberation to something in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῶν*), and so our practical analysis of a good act is complete. The only doubt which can arise as to the question whether an act of will is in our power or not is with regard to

the object of Wish. Is it in our power to wish for the good? Aristotle answers this question in the affirmative, though with an important qualification. It is character that determines the object of wish, and character is produced by activities which are willed and therefore voluntary. We have, therefore, the formation of character in our own hands, though it is true that when the character is once formed we may not be able to change it.

The efficient cause of action, then, is Will. In willing man is an efficient cause just as he is the efficient cause of his children (*ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γινῆ*). To produce Happiness we have only to reverse the order of the series which our deliberative analysis has revealed; though, as our aim is to produce it for the State, that is, for others, we have not yet fully solved the problem with which we started.

§ 5. Now that we know what goodness of character is, the next step will be to go through all its recognised forms and show that our account holds good of each. If we are right we must be able to show that every kind of goodness has as its matter some feeling or act which admits of quantitative determination, that it has as its form a "mean" or proportion in the sense explained, and that its efficient cause is a deliberative wish or will.

So far as we can trace any principle in Aristotle's treatment of the various forms of goodness, he seems to proceed from the more self-regarding virtues to those which have to do with others. This can be the only reason for separating justice from its usual companions Courage and Temperance. The reason given for taking the two latter first is purely "exoteric." They are, we are told, the forms of goodness proper to the "irrational parts," i.e. Temper and Desire, a purely Academic "division."

We notice at once in the treatment of Courage and Temperance a striking difference between Aristotle and Plato. Plato always tries to extend the scope of these virtues as widely as he can, while Aristotle's chief endeavour is to narrow them down to their most literal meaning. Partly, no doubt, this may be attributed to a difference of temperament between the two thinkers, but it is primarily due to the different objects each was aiming at. Plato was seeking for principles of universal application to life, Aristotle is looking for facts by which to test his theory of goodness, and it was important for that purpose to have facts as definite and unmistakeable as possible.

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ 30
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ
δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκού-
σιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς
τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις.

35

3 Δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα· 1110^a
βίαιον δὲ οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὐσα ἐν ἡ μὴδὲν συμ-

1109 b, 30. EE. 1223 a, 9 ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ
τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ ψεκτά (ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ
ἐπαινεῖται οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τύχης ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα, ἀλλ'
ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐσμέν· ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος, ἐκεῖνος καὶ τὸν
ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ
ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὣν αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. ληπτέον ἄρα ποίων
αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅσα μὲν
ἐκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐκάστου, ἐκεῖνον αἴτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δ'
ἀκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἴτιον. πάντα δ' ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἐκὼν δῆλον
ὅτι. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐκουσίων ἂν
εἴησαν.

1110 a, 1. EE. 1224 a, 10 τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ

I. § 1. Τῆς ἀρετῆς, sc. τῆς ἠθικῆς.
συγγνώμης...ἐλέου. Cf. Antiphon
e.g. Περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φόβου § 92 τὰ
μὲν ἀκούσια τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἔχει
συγγνώμην, τὰ δ' ἐκούσια οὐκ ἔχει.

§ 2. χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. A
characteristic touch. Aristotle never
forgets that we are learning to be
lawgivers.

§ 3. βία...δι' ἄγνοιαν. Aristotle
is followed by all subsequent writers
in making compulsion and ignorance
the two conditions of an act being
regarded as involuntary.

ἡ ἀρχή, sc. ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις.

τοιαύτη οὐσα κ.τ.λ. The effect of
this restriction to cases where the
agent contributes nothing to the mo-

βάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι
 ποιῇ ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων 4
 5 κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι
 αἰσχρόν τι πράξαι κύριος ὧν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πρά-
 ξαντος μὲν σφύζονται μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθυήσκειν, ἀμφισ-
 βήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δὲ 5

ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναι φαμεν. ὥστε περὶ τοῦ βία σκεπτόμεν πρῶτον
 τί ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον
 καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἐκονσίῳ καὶ
 τῇ πειθοί ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω
 βία καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαμεν, ταῦτα δ' ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσει
 καὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὰ ὁρμὴν φέρεται, οὐ βία, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκούσια λέγεται,
 ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμος ἢ ἀντίθεσις. ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βία φαμέν. ὁμοίως
 δὲ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ὁρῶμεν βία πολλὰ καὶ ἀσχοντα καὶ
 ποιοῦντα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν ἔξωθεν τι κινῇ. ἐν μὲν τοῖς
 ἀψύχοις ἀπλῇ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πλεονάζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἡ
 ὁρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ. ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπολῶν
 τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὁρεξιν
 ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὁρέξει ζῆ)· ἐν δ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνεστὶν ἄμφω, καὶ ἐν
 τινι ἡλικίᾳ, ἣ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδωμεν. οὐ γὰρ φαμεν τὸ παιδίον
 πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤδη διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα.
 δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθεὶς βία μὲν ποιεῖ χαίρων
 δέ. διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πλείστη ἀμφισβήτησις
 ἐστίν· ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμὰς ἔχων αὐτὸς ἑκαστος αὐτῷ πράττει, ὥσθ' ὁ τ'
 ἐγκρατὴς βία, φασίν, ἀφέλκει αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμιῶν (ἀλγεῖ
 γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντιτείνουσιν τὴν ὁρεξιν), ὁ τ' ἀκρατὴς βία παρὰ
 τὸν λογισμόν. ἦττον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ἣ
 ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρων, ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἐκὼν καὶ οὐ βία, ὅτι οὐ
 λυπηρῶς. ἡ δὲ πειθὴ τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται. ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς
 ἐφ' ᾧ πέπεισται ἄγει, καὶ πορεύεται οὐ βία ἀλλ' ἐκὼν. ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία

tive cause is to limit compulsion as a condition of the involuntary to actual *vis maior*. Where the agent contributes to the cause, the case is more complicated. The contribution may be of two kinds, either fear of greater evils (*metus*, 'duress *per minas*') or hope of greater goods, as in the case

of the man who does a wrong thing to save his parents or children. Are these voluntary agents?

ἡ ὁ πάσχων. This is added as a sort of correction. It is really a *πάθος*, not a *πράξις*.

§ 4. ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει, 'admits of dispute.'

τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ 10
δ' τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν

οὐ πείσασα ἄγει· οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι
μόνοι βία καὶ ἄκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ὅτι καθ' ὁμοιότητά
ταυτοῦ βία, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν, εἴρηται· οὐ μὴν
ἀλλ' εἴ τις προσθῇ τὸ ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον, κακεῖ λύεται τὸ
λγθέν. ὅταν μὲν γάρ τι τῶν ἐξωθεν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν κινῇ ἢ
ἡρεμίσῃ, βία φαμέν, ὅταν δὲ μή, οὐ βία. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ
ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ὁρμὴ ἐνοῦσα ἄγει—ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχει—ὥστ' οὐ βία
οὐδέτερος ἀλλ' ἐκὼν διὰ γε ταῦτα πράττοι ἂν, οὐδ' ἀναγκαζόμενος. τὴν
γὰρ ἐξωθεν ἀρχήν, τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ ἐμποδίζουσιν ἢ κινουσαν,
ἀνάγκην λέγομεν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα τύπτει τινὰ
ἀπιτείνοντος καὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν· ὅταν δ' ἔσωθεν ἢ
ἀρχῇ, οὐ βία. ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστι. καὶ γὰρ
ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος λυπείται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἡδῆ, καὶ
χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφεληθήσεται, ἢ καὶ ἡδῆ
ὠφελεῖται ὑγιαίνων· καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατευόμενος
οὐ ἐπιθυμῇ, λυπείται δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἶεται γὰρ κακὸν
πράττειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν βία ἐκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν
ὀρεξίν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκάτερον ἄκοντά ποτε πράττειν· κεχωρισ-
μένα γὰρ ὄντα ἐκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν
ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχὴν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν. ἐπὶ
μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἢ δ' ὅλη ἐκούσα ψυχὴ καὶ
τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βία δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν
ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος
φύσει ὑπάρχει, ὅτι ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐνέσται,
καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ὅτι εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἔνεστιν. σχεδὸν
δὲ τοῖτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζομεν, τῷ τε ὅσα εὐθὺς γιγνομένοις
ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίνεσθαι
ἡμῖν, οἷον πολιὰ καὶ γῆρας καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὥστε μὴ κατὰ
φύσιν ἐκάτερος πράττει, ἀπλῶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάτερος, οὐ τὴν αὐτήν.

§ 5. ἐκβολάς, *mercium iacturas*.
In a contract quoted by Demosthenes
against Lakritos § 11, we have the
reservation πλὴν ἐκβολῆς ἢν ἂν οἱ
σύμπλοκοι ψηφισάμενοι κοινῇ ἐκβάλωνται.
ἀπλῶς is to be taken closely with
ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν. 'No one, except

in special circumstances, voluntarily
sacrifices his property.' The word
ἀπλῶς merely marks the absence of
qualifying circumstances, such as are
indicated in the clause ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ
κ.τ.λ.

§ 6. μικταί, because the efficient

αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, εἰκάσι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκούσιους· αἰρεταὶ
 γὰρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ
 τὸν καιρὸν ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ὅτε
 15 πράττει λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἐκὼν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ
 κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ
 ἐστίν· ὦν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν
 καὶ μὴ. ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια·
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ
 20 ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν
 αἰσχροὺν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ κα-
 λῶν, ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεί-

1110 a, 11. EE. 1225 a, 2 λέγονται δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον βίᾳ
 καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πράξει, οὐ διαφωνούντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως,
 ὅταν πράττωσιν ὃ καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλ' ἂν
 μὴ τοῦτο πράττωσι, πληγαὶ ἢ δεσμοὶ ἢ θάνατοι ὦσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ
 φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πράξει. ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἐκόντες ποιοῦσιν
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο; ἔξεστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ὑπομείναι τὸ πάθος.
 εἰ ἴσως τούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δ' οὐ. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ
 τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ ὑπάρξαι, αἰεὶ ὅσα πράττει αὐτὸ μὴ βούλεται,

cause lies partly outside the agent (the tyrant's order or the storm) and is partly contributed by the agent (fear and desire).

αἰρεταὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'they are preferable at the time of the action, and the end of the act varies with the occasion.' We cannot call an act which is at a given moment the preferable alternative an involuntary act, simply because, regarded apart from the circumstances (ἀπλῶς), it would not be performed. 'We must use the terms *voluntary* and *involuntary* with reference to the time of the act.'

ὅτε πράττει. This use of the third person in an indefinite sense is specially common after *εἰ*, *ὅτε* etc. Zell quotes 1117 b, 16. 1128 b, 26. 1130 a, 29. 1132 b, 28. 1139 b, 33. 1141 b, 18. 1164 a, 15. 1166 b, 23. 1175 b, 8.

καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. There is no *force majeure* and therefore no compulsion. The agent is free to move his limbs or not. In the 'Parts of Animals' Aristotle distinguishes the 'instrumental parts' of the body from the 'sensory' parts (*αἰσθητήρια*) and the *περιττώματα* (secretions and excretions). Zeller (Eng. Trans. vol. II, p. 39).

ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια, 'though they may be involuntary if we regard them apart from the special circumstances of the case.' They are not *αἰρετά per se* (καθ' αὐτά), though they may become so as an alternative to something else.

§ 7. καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται. The fact that praise is sometimes given to such acts shows they must be voluntary.

ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, i.e. if they accept great dishonour for a trifling advantage.

μηδενὶ καλῶ ἢ μετρίῳ φαῦλον. ἐπ' ἐνόις δ' ἔπαι-
 οὖ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ
 ἢ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μη- 25
 ὑπομείναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι,
 ἄλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντα τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ
 Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγ-
 γελήσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι
 ἐντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι 30
 πώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ
 τι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ' ἀναγκάζον-
 χρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς
 θέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς 1110^b

ἢ πτε καὶ οὐ βία· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων, βία πῶς,
 γ' ἀπλῶς, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρεῖται ὁ πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ
 εἰ καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις ἐστὶ τις διαφορά. εἰ γὰρ ἴνα μὴ λάβῃ
 ἀποκτεῖναι, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βία καὶ ἀναγκαζό-
 λὰ δεῖ μῆζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι, ὃ πείσεται μὴ
 οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ [μὴ] βία πράξει, ἢ οὐ φύσει,
 ὃν ἀγαθοῦ ἔνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττη, καὶ
 οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτα. διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον
 καὶ θυμοὺς ἐνίους καὶ τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν
 καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὥς πεφυκότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν.
 ὃν ἂν δόξειε βία καὶ ἄκων πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ

15 κ.τ.λ. In this case the
 but involuntary; for the
 attribution is at a *minimum*.
 the weakness inseparable
 an nature.

για δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. Still,
 his case, the act is not
 oluntary; for there is no
 ompulsion, and the act may
 bat the most painful death
 ble and will, therefore, be
 intarily.

ριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα. The
 olist quotes the lines—

μέν μ' ἐπὶ ἡρ' ἐπισκῆψας
 2,

88' ἄρματ' εἰσέβαινεν εἰς Θήβας
 ἰών.

Alkmeon killed his mother Eriphyle
 to escape the curse of his father Am-
 phiaraos. The lines quoted below
 1136 a, 13 on the same subject
 probably come from the 'Alkmaion'
 too. See note in loc.

§ 9. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ. The
 fact of the difficulty and of the con-
 sequent praise or blame proves the
 acts voluntary.

§ 10. τὰ δὲ ποῖα κ.τ.λ. This is a
 recapitulation rather than a duplicate
 passage.

μέν, ὅπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ἢ καὶ ὁ πράττων μη-
 δὲν συμβάλληται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν
 δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι,
 5 καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια.
 μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ
 ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίῃ βίαια 11
 10 εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια·
 τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν
 βία καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν
 μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ
 αὐτὸν εὐθέρaton ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν
 15 καλῶν ἐαυτὸν, τῶν δ' αἰσχροῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βί- 12

ἵνα μὴ ἡρέμα, καὶ ὅλως ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἢ ἵνα [μὴ] χαίρῃ. τὸ γὰρ ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ, εἰς ὃ ἀνάγεται ὅλον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις οἶα τε φέρειν·
 ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶα τε, μὴδ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὀρέξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ
 ἐφ' αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας καὶ προλέγοντας, καίπερ διανοίας
 ἔργον ποιούντας, ὅμως οὐ φαμεν ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι, οὐτ' εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον,
 οὔτε πρᾶξαι ἃ ἔπραξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε καὶ
 διάνοιαι τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς
 τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμούς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Φιλόλαος ἔφη εἶναι τινὰς
 λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.

νῦν is equivalent to ὅτε πράττει
 above and opposed to ἀπλῶς, ἀντὶ
 τῶνδε is opposed to καθ' αὐτά.

αἱ γὰρ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This is
 fundamental. There is no such thing
 as an act which is not this particular
 act in these particular circumstances.
 It is, therefore, a false way of speak-
 ing to say that a certain class of acts
 is involuntary. An act performed is
 always *this* act. Hence too the diffi-
 culty; for there can be no scientific
 rules about particulars.

§ 11. εἰ δέ τις κ.τ.λ. A caution
 against an error which language is
 apt to lead us into. The truth is that

it is not τὰ καλὰ or τὰ ἡδέα which are
 the motive or efficient cause of our
 acts, but our own ὀρεξις, which is an
 internal, not an external, ἀρχή.

καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν κ.τ.λ. This
 distinction in our attitude towards
 τὰ καλὰ and τὰ ἡδέα has not been
 mentioned above, but the want of
 logical connexion is merely formal.
 Aristotle is dealing with real life, and
 we know that it is only bad acts of
 which men try to shake off the re-
 sponsibility in this way. No one ever
 declines to be responsible for a fine
 act on the ground that it was so fine
 he couldn't help doing it.

αιον εἶναι οὐ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

- 13 Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἦπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυτον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὅτιοῦν, μηδὲν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν.
- 14 ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' εἴκει καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἀ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως
- 15 κακοὶ γίνονται· τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίλου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου

1110 b, 18. EE. 1225 a, 36 ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὔτε τῇ ὀρέξει οὔτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ ἐκούσιον ὥριται, λοιπὸν δὴ ὀρίσασθαι τὸ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. δοκεῖ δὲ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ,

§ 13. Τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν κ.τ.λ. We now pass to Ignorance, the second condition of the Involuntary, and consider the limits of its application.

ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν κ.τ.λ. If he is not sorry for the act, he makes it his own by his acquiescence in it. Cf. the plea in Antiphon, Τερ. B, β, 8 οὐ συνηδομένων μὲν οὐδὲ συνεβελόντων ἡμῶν, συναλγούντων δὲ καὶ συλλυπομένων.

τοῦ δὲ... ὁ μὲν... ὁ δὲ... For the construction cf. 1127 a, 7.

οὐχ ἐκὼν, 'non-voluntary' as opposed to 'involuntary.' The contradictory is substituted for the contrary.

§ 14. ἕτερον δ' εἴκει κ.τ.λ. To be involuntary the act must be performed not merely *in* ignorance but *from* ignorance.

ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not the case of the ἀκρατής who knows the right and does the wrong, but that of the ἀκόλαστος to whom wrong is right.

§ 15. βούλεται λέγεσθαι, 'really means.'

ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια... οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου. Grant and Stewart seem right in refusing to draw a distinction between these two in the present passage. Ignorance shown in the deliberate preference of bad acts to good, and ignorance of the universal rules of conduct, come to the same thing, ignorance of the major premiss of the practical syllogism. Προαιρεσις has nothing to do with the minor premiss as such.

(ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν
 1111^a οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ
 συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.
 Ἰσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς 16
 τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ
 5 τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς,
 οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν 17
 ἀγνοήσκει μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα·
 πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσκειεν ἄν τις, οἷον
 †λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρ-

καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὃν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἷδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ'
 οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες, ἥτοι ὡς τοῦ
 μὲν πόμα, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα
 καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὃ δι' ἀγνοίαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ δι' ἀγνοίαν,
 καὶ ὁ καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὃν, ἀκούσιον· τὸ ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐκούσιον. ὅσα μὲν οὖν
 ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὃν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι' αὐτόν, ἐκούσια
 ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν, καὶ διὰ
 τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἐν
 μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ
 ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς δικαίως < ἂν > ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον
 εἰ δι' ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρήτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἂν, εἰ ὁ
 ῥάδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν μὴ ἔχει δι' ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην. ταῦτ'
 οὖν προσδιοριστέον.

ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, i.e. ignorance of the minor premiss of the practical syllogism.

ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ, 'the persons or things which are the objects of the acts.' As we cannot use πράττω by itself with an external object accusative, we are forced to use a prepositional equivalent. Thus ἐν οἷς πράττομεν means the persons on whom we act.

§ 16. τίς, 'the agent'; τί, 'the act'; περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι, 'the object'; τίνι, 'the instrument'; ἔνεκα τίνος, 'the effect'; πῶς, 'the manner.' The phrase ἔνεκα τίνος does not mean that the agent may be ignorant of the

right end,—that would be ἡ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει ἀγνοία,—but merely that from ignorance he performs an act which leads to a different result from the one intended. He performs an act ἔνεκα σωτηρίας which, but for his ignorance, he would only perform for the sake of destroying its object. Cf.

1135 b, 14.

§ 17. τὸν πράττοντα, i.e. τίς πράττει.

λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν. The simplest way of dealing with this *locus vexatissimus* is to delete αὐτούς, and to translate 'they say they were put out (or 'flustered') when speaking,' and so did not know what they were

ν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος 10
 ι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν
 πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι
 συγχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίστηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ
 α· πίσας ἀποκτείνει ἄν· καὶ θίξαι βουλόμενος,
 οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ 15
 τῆς ἀγνοίας οὐσης, [ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις,] ὁ τούτων τι

The verb ἐκπίπτειν is sufficed in this sense, though common, and is doubtless a loan from the chariot-race (ἐκ-ζεῦγους, λόγου). A clear example is Lucian, Nigrinos § 77 γυμνάσει καὶ Πύργῳ κατεῖλημ-
 ῶτο μὲν ἰδρωτὶ κατερρεῖν, φθέγγασθαι βουλόμενος ἐξέ-
 ιε καὶ ἀνεκοπτόμην, καὶ ἡ τε λείπει καὶ ἡ γλώττα διημέρ-
 This is just the condition in which a man ἀγνοεῖ τί πράττει. This condition, though it has been used before, is old; for Heliodorus has ἡ γὰρ περὶ ἄλλων συγχυθῆναι ἵτι καὶ περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ἐξασθαι, and Camerarius ren-
 disse arduū se. There is no example for ἐκπίπτειν c. acc. in the literature, but the common version of the story is that it escaped them unawares as they were speaking' (reading and αὐτοὺς).

Αἰσχύλος. This is the reference to the accusation of Herakleides for revealing the mysteries. It tells us that Herakleides of Ephesus gave the details in Book 1. of the Oμηρον. The indiscretions of Herakleides were in the Τροϊάδες, Ἰφίγενεια and Οἰδί-
 α βουλόμενος κ.τ.λ. This is a reference to some rhetorical exercise in the style of the Iliad's Tetralogies.

δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. Ignorance of the subject (ἐν τίνι ἡ πράξις). For

ἀγνοία of the person as a πρόφασις of συγχύω, cf. Dem. Meid. § 38.

ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη. Cf. Poet. 1454 a, 5 ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν· ἀποκτείνει δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισεν.

ἐσφαιρῶσθαι... κίστηριν εἶναι. Ignorance of the instrument (τίνι). Xenophon (Eq. viii, 10) speaks of ἀκόντια ἐσφαιρωμένα.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας. We see from a, 5 above that this is the explanation of what is there called ignorance of the οὐ ἔνεκα. For the reading here see Bywater, Contr. p. 32. In MM. 1188 b, 31 a similar illustration is given—οἷον φασὶ ποτὲ τινα γυναῖκα φίλτρον τινὶ δοῦναι πιεῖν, εἶτα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ φίλτρον, τὴν δ' ἄνθρωπον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἀποφυγεῖν κ.τ.λ. There is a case just like this in Antiphon Κατηγορία φαρμακίας κατὰ τῆς μητριᾶς. Cf. § 9 οὐκ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ φάσκουσιν διδόναι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ φίλτροις. See also EE. 1225 b, 4 quoted on p. 118.

θίξαι βουλόμενος. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 32. The word means 'just to touch' and is appropriate in connexion with 'sparring.' The mistake here is ignorance of the manner (πῶς). The man thinks he is touching ἡρέμα, whereas he really strikes σφόδρα.

§ 18. ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις. I bracket these words with Ramsauer. They are awkward here and occur in their proper place two lines below, where the phrase means, as it ought to do,

ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριωτάτα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα. τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκούσιον 19
20 λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μετα-
μελείᾳ.

Ὅντος δ' ἀκούσιου τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκού- 20
σιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότει τὰ καθ'
ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκού- 21
22 σια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ 22
οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες·
εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν 23

1111 a, 24. EE. 1223 a, 21 ληπτέον ἄρα τί τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τί
τὸ ἀκούσιον, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία
ὀρίζεται τούτοις. πρῶτον σκεπτέον τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον.
τριῶν δὲ τούτων ἓν τι δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι, ἥτοι κατ' ὅρεξιν ἢ κατὰ
προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον κατὰ τούτων τι, τὸ δ'
ἀκούσιον παρὰ τούτων τι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὅρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς
βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε ταῦτα διαιρετέον, καὶ πρῶτον
κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.

δόξειε δ' ἂν πᾶν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ
ἀκούσιον πᾶν δοκεῖ εἶναι βίαιον, τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶν ὁ
ἀναγκαζόμενος ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐνόος φησι

πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφν,

ὥστ' εἴ τι λυπηρόν, βίαιον, καὶ εἰ βίαιον, λυπηρόν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν
ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος), ὥστε βίαιον καὶ
ἀκούσιον. τὸ ἄρα κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτ'

the object of the act. It is true, indeed, that in § 20 it seems to be used in a wider sense to include all the particular circumstances of the act other than the agent, but this will hardly justify its use in two meanings within the limits of the same sentence.

§ 21. Ἰσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reference is to Plato's Laws 863 b, sqq. where the discussion of τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον starts from the enumeration of three αἰτίαι τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, viz. θυμός, ἡδονή and ἄγνοια.

§ 23. εἴτα πότερον κ.τ.λ. There are certain acts proceeding from temper or desire which ought to be performed, and for the performance of which we are praised. It is absurd to say that such acts are involuntary; for there is no sense in saying that it is right to perform an involuntary act. Are we, then, to adopt the convenient doctrine that only the bad acts which proceed from temper and desire are involuntary while the good acts are voluntary? On what principle can we

καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ἀκου-
 24 σίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ
 ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι 30
 ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινων, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως.
 25 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυ-
 26 μίαν ἡδέα. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ

ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικώτερον πᾶσα ποιεῖ, ἢ ὁ ἀκρασία
 μοχθηρία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁ δ' ἀκρατής ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν
 λογισμὸν οἷος πράττειν, ἀκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατ' αὐτήν, τὸ δ'
 ἀδικεῖν ἐκούσιον, ὥστ' ὁ ἀκρατής ἀδικήσῃ τῷ πράττειν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.
 ἐκὼν ἄρα πράξει, καὶ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ
 δικαιότεροι ἔσονται ἀκρατεῖς γενόμενοι. ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν
 εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τοῦναντίον. ἅπαν
 γὰρ ὁ ἐκὼν τις πράττει, βουλόμενος πράττει, καὶ ὁ βούλεται ἐκὼν.
 βούλεται δ' οὐθεὶς ὁ οἶται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατεύόμενος
 οὐχ ἂ βούλεται ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὁ οἶται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν
 δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἔστιν. ὥστε ἅμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν
 ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. ἔτι δ' ὁ ἐγκρατής
 δικαιοπραγῇσιν, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας. ἢ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἢ
 δ' ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ. ἐγκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν πράττῃ παρὰ τὴν
 ἐπιθυμίαν κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ μὲν δικαιοπραγεῖν ἐκούσιον,
 ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (ἄμφω γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτα ἐκούσια εἶναι, καὶ ἀνάγκη,
 εἰ θάτερον ἐκούσιον, καὶ θάτερον), τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιον,
 ἅμα ἄρα ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πράξει ἐκὼν καὶ ἄκων.

ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ. ἀκρασία γὰρ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ
 θυμοῦ δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν θυμὸν
 λυπηρόν, καὶ βίαιον ἢ κάθεξις, ὥστ' εἰ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ κατὰ τὸν
 θυμὸν ἐκούσιον εἶναι πάν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν
 ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέψας ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἢ κώλυσις αὐτοῦ. “χαλεπὸν
 γάρ,” φησι, “θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖται.” εἰ δ' ἀδύνατον τὸ
 αὐτὸν ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν ἅμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος,

justify this when we have admitted
 that both proceed from the same
 source?

§ 26. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. If,
 on the other hand, we say that all
 wrong acts proceeding from temper
 and desire are involuntary, and that
 the only voluntary misdeeds are those

which proceed from the rational part
 of us, we seem to be making an un-
 warrantable abstraction. ‘Irrational’
 acts are, to say the least of it, as
 much incidents of human nature as
 the ‘rational,’ and it is absurd,
 therefore, for a human being to say
 he is not answerable for them.

λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω,
 1111^b δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἦττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα [πάθη], ὥστε ἢ
 καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου <αἱ> ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.
 ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

II. Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου,
 5 περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἢ 2
 προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ'

μᾶλλον ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν.
 τεκμήριον δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν ἐκόντες ἄνευ ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.

λείπεται ἄρα εἰ τὸ βουλόμενον καὶ ἐκούσιον ταῦτ' σκέψασθαι.
 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον. ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δοκεῖ ἢ
 μοχθηρία ἀδικωτέρους ποιεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία τις φαίνεται·
 συμβήσεται δὲ τοῦναντίον, βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὐθεὶς ἃ οἶεται εἶναι
 κακά, πράττει δ' ὅταν γίνηται ἀκρατής. εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν
 ἐκούσιον, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρατής γένηται,
 οὐκέτι ἀδικήσει, ἀλλ' ἔστι δικαιότερος ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἀκρατής· τοῦτο
 δ' ἀδύνατον.

1111 b, 4. EE. 1225 b, 18 περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο
 λέγωμεν, διαπορήσαντες πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς.

EE. 1228 a, 11 ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν
 προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα—καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ
 ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς—ὅτι πράττουσι μὲν φαῦλα καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι,
 προαίρεται δ' οὐδεὶς. ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾶδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν
 ὅποια τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποῖός τις.
 αἰρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινετώτερον δ' ἢ προαίρεσις. ἔκ τε
 τῶν κειμένων οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.

§ 27. ἀνθρωπικός is used, like the
 Latin *humani*, with special reference
 to the weaknesses of mere human
 nature.

τὰ ἄλογα, i.e. τὰ μὴ κατὰ λογισμὸν
 ἀμαρτηθέντα. The word *πάθη* is
 omitted by the first hand of the best
 ms. (K^b), and is better away. If we
 retain it, we must assume that *θυμός*
 and *ἐπιθυμία* are called ἄλογα *πάθη* in
 a loose popular way. Really, they
 are forms of *δρεῖς*.

II. § 1. περὶ προαιρέσεως. See

Introductory note.

μᾶλλον... κρίνειν, 'to be a better
 test of character.' This has been
 shown above, 1105 a, 26 sqq.

§ 2. οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ. This distinction
 becomes of great importance later on
 in the discussion of moral weakness
 (*ἀκρασία*). A man may perform a
 wrong act voluntarily and therefore
 be fully answerable for it, and yet it
 may not show that his character is
 depraved. The acts of children and
 the lower animals are of this sort, and

ἐπὶ πλεόν τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ
 τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης
 3 ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες 10
 αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰ-
 κασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν
 4 ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυ-
 μῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνά-
 5 παλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσει 15
 μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἡ
 μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυ-
 6 πηροῦ οὐθ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἥττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ

EE. 1225 b, 19 διατάσσει γὰρ ἂν τις ἐν τῷ γένει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν
 πόφῃ θεῖναι αὐτὴν χρή, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταῦτὸν τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ
 προαιρετὸν ἢ ταῦτόν ἐστιν. μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρὰ τινων, καὶ
 ζητοῦντι δόξειε δ' ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἢ προαίρεσις, ἥτοι δόξα ἢ
 ὄρεξις· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ
 ἴσθιν ὄρεξις φανερόν. ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμός·
 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀρέγεται μὴθὲν πεπονθὼς τούτων. θυμὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία
 καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπάρχει, προαίρεσις δ' οὐ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει ἀμφω
 ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ προαιροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν
 καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης.

so are acts done when we are taken
 unawares. Full moral, as distinct
 from legal, responsibility—to use a
 modern distinction—only arises when
 we adopt the act as our own as a
 means to the realisation of some end.

§ 3. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ. We do
 not know who gave these inadequate
 definitions or whether there is any
 reference to particular people at all.
 The passage is dialectical, and could
 be expanded into a Platonic dialogue
 on the model of the first part of the
 Theaitetos with its successive defini-
 tions of knowledge.

οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν κ.τ.λ. The argument
 is directed first of all to showing that
 προαίρεσις cannot be identified with

any form of appetite. In the first
 place, it cannot be the same as Temper
 or Desire; for they are found also in
 irrational creatures, while προαίρεσις
 is not. Observe that this argument
 does not apply to Wish, the third form
 of appetite; for it, like προαίρεσις,
 is only found in rational creatures.

§§ 4—5. The next three arguments
 are specially devoted to showing that
 προαίρεσις is not identical with Desire.
 For (1) in the case of the morally weak
 man and of the morally strong man
 we find a conflict between προαίρεσις
 and Desire. This is fully worked out
 in Book VII. (2) Desire never comes
 into conflict with Desire, but προ-
 αίρεσις does. This does not mean,

θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις 7
 20 γέ, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
 ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη
 ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ <καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον
 ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς 8
 δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν·
 25 προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἶεται γενέσθαι
 ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, 9
 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα,
 προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα
 μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει· ὅλως
 30 γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ 10

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις ταῦτόν. βούλονται μὲν
 γὰρ ἔνια [ταῦτόν] καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι
 ἀδύνατον, οὐδ' ὅλως ἂ δυνατόν μὲν, μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ δ' οἶεται πράξαι ἢ μὴ
 πράξαι. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ δηλόν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐδ' ἀπλῶς εἴ τις οἶεται
 τι. τῶν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τι ἦν τὸ προαιρετόν, δοξάζομεν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ
 τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οἷον τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον. ἔτι οὐκ ἔστι
 προαίρεσις ἀληθοῦς ἢ ψευδοῦς. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων πρακτικῶν
 δόξα, ἣ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν. κοινόν

of course, that there can be no conflict of desires, but merely that there cannot be conflicting desires with regard to the same object. We cannot desire both to be asleep and to be awake; but we may desire to be asleep and intend to keep awake.

§ 6. *θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἦττον*. If it cannot be identified with Desire, *a fortiori* it cannot be identified with Temper. Everyone can see that acts proceeding from Temper are *ἀπροαίρετα* in the highest degree.

§ 7. *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ.* We have seen that Wish, the third form of appetite, is, like *προαίρεσις*, confined to rational beings; but we cannot identify *προαίρεσις* even with Wish.

For (1) we may wish for what we know to be impossible, but we cannot will it. (2) We may wish for what, though possible, is not in our own power, but we cannot will it. (3) We wish for the end, but we will the means.

<καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων. The *καὶ* comes from *Aspasios* and is confirmed by EE. above. See Bywater, *Contr.* p. 32.

§ 10. *οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ.* We see, then, that *προαίρεσις* cannot be identified with any form of appetite, and that it is distinguished even from Wish by being confined to what is in our own power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*). We have now to consider the possibility of its being

- δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἢ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν
 11 δόξη ταυτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεῖς. ἀλλ' οὐδέ τι· τῷ γὰρ 1112^a
 προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοὶ τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ
 12 δοξάζειν οὐ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν [ἢ] τι
 τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τίμιν συμφέρει ἢ πῶς·
 13 λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάντῃ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προ- 5,¹⁾
 αἶρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ ^{τ = λτ}
 δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἂ μάλιστα ^{= iδ' εἰ}
 14 ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἂ οὐ πάντῃ ἴσμεν· δοκοῦσι
 δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ'
 ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἂ 10
 15 δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ,

δὲ περὶ δόξης τοῦτο καὶ βουλήσεως· οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· λέγω δ' ὅσον οὐθεὶς ὑγιαίνειν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ περιπατεῖν ἢ καθῆσθαι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἕνεκεν, οὐδ' εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἕνεκα· καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ αἱ προαιρούμενος τί τε καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται, ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνος, οὐ ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ τί, ὃ προαιρεῖται ἕνεκα ἄλλου. βούλεται δὲ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, καὶ δοξάζει δεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν. ὥστε φανερόν διὰ τούτων ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ βουλήσεως. βούλεσθαι μὲν <γὰρ> καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

identified with the intellectual state known as Belief. In the first place, it cannot be identified with Belief in general; for that has to do with every kind of object, and not merely with things in our own power. Belief is true or false, while *προαίρεσις* is good or bad.

§ 11. ἀλλ' οὐδέ τι. Nor can it be identified with any species of Belief, that is, not even with belief as to things in our own power as right or wrong. For (1) Belief does not determine character. (2) To believe

that a thing is good for us is not the same as to will it. (3) We praise a belief for its truth, an act of will for its rightness. (4) We only will what we are fairly sure is good for us, we believe without knowing very well. (5) We find that some persons have excellent beliefs, but that their *προαίρεσις* is bad.

§ 12. τι τῶν τοιούτων sc. ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν. For the reading cf. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 32.

§ 15. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται κ.τ.λ. This we shall find to be the case. The

οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστι δόξη τινί. τί οὖν ἡ ποιὸν τί ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων 16 οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προ- 15 αἰρετόν. ἀλλ' ἄρα γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προ- 17 αἵρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

III. Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως 2 20 βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινό- μενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς 3 βουλευέται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, 4 αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ

dialectical argument, by showing that *προαίρεσις* cannot be identified either with appetition or thought in any form, prepares us for the view that it is the union of both.

§ 16. τί...ἡ ποιόν τι; what is its genus and differentia?

ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. This gives the genus, the τί ἐστίν. τὸ προβεβουλευμένον. This word seems still to be chosen under the influence of Attic legal terminology. Antiphon, κατὰ τῆς μητριᾶς § 5, uses *προβουλή* as a synonym of *πρόνοια*. Cf. also the use of the verb below 1135 b, 10—20.

§ 17. μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας, 'is accompanied by a reason (ground) and thought,' i.e. is based upon consciousness of a ground.

ὡς ὃν, sc. τὸ προαἰρετόν. The fact that the object of *προαίρεσις* is a choice between two alternatives proves that it implies a λόγος; for it is only λόγος that can express at once a thing and its opposite. Cf. Met. quoted on p. 75.

III. § 1. Βουλευόνται δὲ κ.τ.λ. We have seen that *προαίρεσις* contains an intellectual element, namely Deliberation. We have first to examine this, and to determine its scope.

§ 3. περὶ...τῶν αἰδίων. The examples given show that the objects of First Philosophy (or Theology) and Mathematics are meant. Both of these are eternal and immovable, though the objects of the first are separate from matter (*χωριστά*), while those of the second are 'in matter,' though separated in thought. Met. 1026 a, 13 sqq. Zeller (Eng. trans.) 1, 33.

περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. The κόσμος here means the spherical *πρώτος οὐρανός*.

τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς. The incommensurability of the side of a square with its diagonal was the companion difficulty to the incommensurability of the diameter of a circle with its circumference, which makes it impossible to square the circle.

§ 4. περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει. These will be the objects of *ἀστρολογικὴ* or *φυσικὴ* according as they happen ἐξ ἀνάγκης or φύσει. The 'solstices and risings (of the constellations)' are an example of the first, the growth of an animal would be an example of the second.

φύσει ἢ διὰ τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατο- 25
 5 λῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμ-
 βρων. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως.
 6 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύ-
 θαι ἄριστα πολιτεύονται οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται.
 7 οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ 30
 περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπίλοιπα.
 αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι
 δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι

1112 a, 18. EE. 1226 a, 17 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε βούλησις
 οὔτε δόξα οὔθ' ὑπόληψις ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις, δηλόν· τί δὲ διαφέρει
 τούτων, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον; ἅμα δὲ δηλόν ἔσται καὶ τί
 ἴσθι προαίρεσις. ἔστι δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα
 ὥστε ἐνδέχασθαι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐκ ἐνδέ-
 χεται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν ἔστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ἢ γένεσις ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας
 αἰτίας γίνεται, περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν·
 περὶ ὧν δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ * *
 βουλεύσασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστι
 πράξαι ἢ μὴ πράξαι. διὸ οὐ βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, οὐδὲ
 πῶς ἂν ὁ κύκλος τετραγωνισθῇ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· τὸ δ'

§ 5. περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. This
 must be equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτο-
 μέτου. Rains and droughts are not
 regulated by an internal motive or
 efficient cause like organic growth.
 We have the phrase in Part. An.
 641 b, 19 τὸ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ ὡς
 ἰτυχεν, where it is opposed to τεταγ-
 μένον.

περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης. When τύχη
 is distinguished from τὸ αὐτόματον, it
 is what happens by chance in the
 province of human thought or purpose.
 It is, in fact, related as an αἰτία κατὰ
 ἐνμυθεηκός to Thought just as τὸ
 αὐτόματον is related to Nature. The
 finding of the treasure might have
 been due to design if the man had
 any reason to believe that there was

a treasure buried in his vineyard. See
 Bonitz on Met. 1065 a, 30.

§ 6. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. The suc-
 cessive elimination of Nature, Necessity
 and Chance from the sphere of
 Deliberation would leave us with the
 remaining cause, Man. But even here
 there is a limitation.

Σκύθαι. Eudemos substitutes 'In-
 dians.' We may perhaps see in this
 a trace of the extension of the Macedo-
 nian Empire.

§ 7. ἐπίλοιπα. For the reading
 see Bywater, Contr. p. 33.

αἰτίαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For this popular
 and traditional analysis of causation
 see Newman's 'Politics,' Introd. pp.
 16—20.

ἕκαστοι, 'each class of men.'

βουλευόνται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς 8
 1112^b ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον
 περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον). ἀλλ'
 ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' αἰεί, περὶ τούτων βου-
 λευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν,
 5 καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσῳ ἥττον
 διηκρίζονται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ 9
 καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ
 αὐτὰς διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 10
 πολύ, ἀδήλοισι δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς <τὸ πῶς δεῖ>
 10 ἀδιόριστον. συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα,
 ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. βου- 11

ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ ἀπάντων
 (ἢ καὶ δήλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσίς ἐστιν). τὰ δὲ
 προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν
 ἂν τις τί δή ποθ' οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ βουλευόνται περὶ ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν
 ἐπιστήμην, οἱ δὲ γραμματικοὶ οὐ; αἴτιον δ' ὅτι διχῇ γινομένης τῆς
 ἀμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἀμαρτάνομεν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν αὐτὸ
 δρῶντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἀμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ
 γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, περὶ ἧς ἂν σκοπῶσιν, εἰς
 ἀπειρον ἤξουσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησις [ἐστι] προαίρεσις
 ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκάτερον, οὐδ' ἄμφω (ἐξαίφνης γὰρ προαίρεται μὲν οὐθεὶς,
 δοκεῖ δὲ πράττειν καὶ βούλονται). ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα. ἄμφω γὰρ
 ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρουμένῳ ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκ τούτων σκεπτέον;
 δημοῖ δέ πως καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό. ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἵρεσις μὲν ἐστίν,
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς δέ, ἀλλ' ἐτέρου πρὸ ἐτέρου· τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷον τε ἄνευ
 σκέψεως καὶ βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις.

1112 b, 11. EE. 1226 b, 10 περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ τέλους οὐδεὶς

§ 8. ἀκριβεῖς. Cf. *Introd.* § 26. οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων, 'for instance about spelling.' This is explained more fully by Eudemos (*loc. cit.*). The doctor may go wrong (1) in the treatment he adopts, an error of *διάνοια*, (2) in applying it to the particular case, an error of *αἰσθησις*. The latter kind of error alone is possible in the case of spelling; for

it is not an open question how a particular word is to be spelt.

§ 10. τὸ πῶς δεῖ. I have followed *Rassow* in inserting these words. It is true, as *Bywater* says (*Contr.* p. 33), that we can interpret the text as it stands, by supplying *πῶς ἀποβήσεται* in thought. But the fact that MM. (1189 b, 24) has τὸ ὡς δεῖ seems to decide in favour of *Rassow's* proposal.

λενόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
 οὔτε γὰρ ἱατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει,
 οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς
 περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων 15
 ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι
 διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπι-
 τελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν
 ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατον
 12 ἔστιν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν 20
 εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα—φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν
 ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικά, ἡ
 δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις—καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀνα-
 13 λύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει.—κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐν-

βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κεῖται πᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων,
 πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει, ἢ δεδογμένου τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται.
 βουλευόμεθα δὲ τοῦτο πάντες ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς
 γένεως τὴν ἀρχήν. εἰ δὴ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς μὴ παρασκευασά-
 μενος μηδὲ βουλεύσάμενος εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλευέται δὲ ὅσα ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν ἔστι τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ
 προαίρεσις μὲν ἔστιν ὅρεξις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ βουλευτική. ἅπαντες γὰρ
 βουλευόμεθα ἃ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλευόμεθα, πάντα
 προαιρούμεθα. λέγω δὲ βουλευτικήν, ἥς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βούλευσις
 ἔστι, καὶ ὀρέγεται διὰ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι. διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
 ζῷοις ἔστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, οὔτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ, οὔτε πάντως ἔχοντος
 ἀνθρώπου· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, οὐδ' ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί.
 ἀλλὰ δοξάζει μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολλοῖς
 ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι. ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς
 τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός. ἡ γὰρ οὐ ἕνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἔστιν· τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία, οὐ δ' ἕνεκά ἔστιν ἡ γίγνεται τι, τοῦτ' αἰτιὸν
 φάμεν εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ βαδίζειν ἢ κομίδῃ τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα
 βαδίζει. διὸ οἷς μηθεὶς κεῖται σκοπός, οὐ βουλευτικοί. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ

§ 11. οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν. This is fundamental. Cf. *Introd.* § 22.

θέμενοι, or more usually ὑποθέμενοι, is a term of geometry. We assume the Q. E. F. of the problem and then seek for the construction.

πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων. These two phrases are equivalent. Below we have πῶς alone (b, 18) and πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος (b, 30).

§ 12. ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. See *Introd.* § 22.

25 τύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷον τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατόν δὲ ἂ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πῶς ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως
30 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὐ ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. εἰκε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα

μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὃν ἡ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐάν τις πράττῃ ἢ ἀπρακτῇ δι' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἐκὼν πράττει ἢ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν προαιρετὸν ἅπαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον μὴ προαιρετὸν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἐκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. ἅμα δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀππονταί γένηται τῆς ἀληθείας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὅτι οὔτε ἀπλῶς βούλησις οὔτε δόξα ἐστί, δηλόν, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὄρεξις, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσάσθαι συμπερανθῶσιν.

1112 b, 34. EE. 1227 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται αἰεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἔνεκά τινος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπὸς τις αἰεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι' ἀκριβείας), περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ἡ σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οἷον εἰ πολεμῶσιν ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσιν τοῦτο βουλευομένοις. ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, οἷον πλούτος ἢ ἡδονὴ ἢ τι ἄλλο

§ 14. δι' οὐ i.e. τὸ ὄργανον. πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος, i.e. ἡ χρεία. See b, 15 n.

§ 16. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ. Demonstration, like Liberation, has its limits. Cf. Introd. § 21. We cannot demonstrate first principles

nor yet particulars. In the same way we cannot deliberate about ends nor yet about particular acts. The latter are a matter for *αἰσθησις*. In neither case is there an infinite progress or regress.

οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὥς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ 1113^a
 17 ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ αἰεὶ βουλευέσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει. βουλευ-
 τὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ
 προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθέν προαιρετόν
 ἐστίν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει ὅταν εἰς 5
 αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον·
 18 τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν

τοιούτων ὃ τυγχάνει οὗ ἕνεκα. βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος, εἰ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ τέλους ἔσκειπται, <ἢ> ὅτι ἐκεῖ συντείνει ὅπως εἰς αὐτὸν ἀγάγῃ, ἢ
 αὐτὸς δύναται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν αἰεὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ κατὰ μέρος
 βουλεύονται, οἷον ἱατρὸς βουλεύσαιο ἂν εἰ δῶ φάρμακον, καὶ
 στρατηγὸς ποῦ στρατοπεδεύσεται, οἷς ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς
 ἀριστόν ἐστιν· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν οὗ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ'
 ἄλλῃ χρῆσασθαι ἢ πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, οἷον ὄψει· οὗ γὰρ οἷον τ' ἰδεῖν οὐ
 μὴ ἐστὶν ὄψις, οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἀκοή· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης
 ποιῆσαι καὶ οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἢ ἐπιστήμη. οὗ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγείας ἢ
 αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ νόσον, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δὲ παρὰ
 φύσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ, παρὰ
 φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βούλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν, παρὰ
 φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

§ 17. ἀφωρισμένον, 'determined,'
 i.e. it is no longer in the form of a
 problem. For the expression cf.
 1142 b, 11.

κριθέν. Cf. a, 12 κρίναντες, Bywater,
 Contr. p. 83.

ὅταν ... ἀναγάγῃ, 'when he has
 reduced the efficient cause to himself,'
 when he has traced back the series of
 causes to something internal to him-
 self.

τὸ ἡγούμενον, 'the commanding
 part.' This shows that προαίρεσις is
 really what we call the will, though
 the idea is, generally speaking, foreign
 to Aristotle's thought in this form.
 In the Stoic philosophy τὸ ἡγεμονικόν
 plays a very important part. There
 is no need, however, to suspect that

this is a later interpolation; for Aris-
 totle is using popular language, and
 ἡγεῖσθαι was already familiar from
 Plato in a similar metaphorical sense.
 In like manner Aristotle calls it τὸ
 κύριον in Met. 1048 a, 10 (p. 77).
 Translated into Aristotelian language,
 this literary phrase means that προαί-
 ρεσις is the ἀρχὴ πράξεως, the ἀρχὴ
 ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις. Cf. De An. 406 b, 24
 φαίνεται κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῶον... διὰ
 προαιρέσεώς τινος καὶ νοήσεως.

§ 18. τοῦτο, sc. that τὸ προαιρού-
 μενον is τὸ ἡγούμενον, and that προαί-
 ρεσις is subsequent to βούλευσις and
 the cause of πράξις. The union of the
 imperative with the deliberative power
 arises from the fusion of thought and
 appetite in this 'part of the soul.'

- ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν ὡς "Ὀμηρος ἐμμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασι-
 λεῖς ἂν προέλοιτο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ 15
 10 προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις
 ἂν εἴη βουλευτική ὀρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι
 γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν 20
 προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιά ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι τῶν
 πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
- 15 IV. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἶρηται,
 δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὰγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου
 ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰγαθὸν λέγουσι 2
 μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὃ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ
 ἔσται βουλευτὸν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν),
 20 τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ 3
 εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστω τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ'
 ἄλλω φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τὰναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ 4
 ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλή-
 θειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον;
 25 τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ
 τὸ τυχόν—ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ δια-

§ 19. βουλευτική ὀρεξις. The definition of προαίρεσις as a 'deliberative appetite of things in our power' is really the fundamental doctrine of the Ethics.

κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν, 'in the direction of (on the lines of) the deliberation.' Appetition follows all the steps of deliberation, but in the reverse order. Cf. the phrases κατ' εὐθείαν, κατ' εὐθυγράμῳ.

IV. § 1. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις κ.τ.λ. We now come to the appetitive element in προαίρεσις, which has problems of its own.

εἴρηται. Cf. 1111 b, 26.

§ 2. τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is the Academic view derived from Plato's Gorgias 466 e sqq. where ποιεῖν ἂν βούλονται is distinguished from ποιεῖν ἂν δοκεῖ.

ἦν. For this idiomatic use of the

imperfect, cf. 1115 a, 2. 1117 a, 16. 1147 b, 11.

§ 4. τῷ...σπουδαίῳ, exactly equivalent to τῷ ἀγαθῷ or τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. Cf. 1099 a, 23. So τῷ φαύλῳ = τῷ κακῷ.

τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, sc. ἀγαθόν, εἶναι, sc. βουλευτὸν.

ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων κ.τ.λ.

The argument in favour of relativity drawn from morbid conditions is Cyrenaic. Cf. Sext. Math. 192 (RP § 210) καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς (suffering from vertigo) καὶ ἰκτερίῳν (jaundiced) ὡχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὃ δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθναίνεται, ὃ δὲ παραπίεσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ δουρὶ κινεῖται, ὃ δὲ μεμηνῶς δισπὰς ὀρεῖ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισπὰς φαντάζεται τὸν ἥλιον (from Eur. Bacch. v. 918 sqq.) κ.τ.λ. From our present point of view it is a sufficient answer to this to say that health is the normal condition.

κειμένους ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκεὰ καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα—τὸν σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὰληθές αὐτῷ φαίνεται 30
5ται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἰδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τὰληθές ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὔσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ 1113^b
λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

V. Ὅντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ

1113 a, 31. EE. 1227 a, 31 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφή οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόντα γίνεται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ὅσοις ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἐστίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι (ἐναντία δὲ τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον). αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὥστε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἄμεινον, καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν κακὸν καὶ τὸ λυπηρότερον χεῖρον. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπης ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ προαιρετὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ κακὸν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ φύσει ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη.

τὸν σπουδαῖον...κρίνειν. This is the reading of K^b and seems to be more original than the ὁ σπουδαῖος... κρίνει of L^b. I have therefore adopted it, marking the preceding sentence as parenthetical.

§ 5. καθ' ἐκάστην...ἕξιν. It is well to remember here that ἕξιν and διάθεσις are medical terms. Cf. τοῖς εὖ διακειμένοις above.

κανὼν. The κανὼν is the builder's rule, the Latin *norma*. The metaphorical use of the word seems to occur first in Euripides. Cf. Hek. 602. El. 51.

μέτρον. This is a clear reference to the dictum of Protagoras.

§ 6. αἰροῦνται...ὡς ἀγαθόν. All men, the good included, *desire* pleasure; the mistake made by ordinary people is that they *wish* it, i.e. it appears to them in the light of good. Cf. Mot. An. 700 b, 28 δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ· φαινόμενον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν.

V. § 1. Ὅντος δὴ κ.τ.λ. We know that our deliberative analysis of Happiness will be complete when we reach something which is ἐφ'

καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
 5 κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν
 ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως 2
 δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ
 τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ
 πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 10 ἔσται αἰσχροὺς ὃν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν,
 καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχροὺς ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ 3
 καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχροτά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πρᾶτ-
 τειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα
 τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν 4
 15 πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψεύδει τὸ δ' ἀλη-
 θεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκού-

1113 b, 13. EE. 1223 a, 4 ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄν-
 θρωπὸς ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερόν ἐστι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ
 μὴ, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, ὡς γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ
 εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, αἴτιος
 τούτων αὐτός ἐστιν· καὶ ὅσων αἴτιος, ἐφ' αὐτῷ.

ἡμῖν. It is therefore important to show clearly that good acts are ἐφ' ἡμῖν. They are so because they have προαίρεσις as their efficient cause, and all προαίρεσις is ἐκούσιον.

περὶ ταῦτα, sc. περὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. This is the middle term of the syllogism. All acts concerned with the means to an end are προαιρετά and therefore ἐκούσια, the activities of goodness are concerned with the means to an end, therefore the activities of goodness are voluntary.

§ 2. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the deliberative analysis of Happiness. We have at last come to something ἐφ' ἡμῖν. If the activities which produce goodness are voluntary, then goodness is in our power.

ἐν οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is because our capacities are μετὰ λόγον, and

every λόγος implies both 'yes' and 'no.' Cf. above 1103 a, 20 sqq.

§ 3. ἦν, 'is, as we saw.' For this idiomatic imperfect cf. 1117 a, 16. 1129 b, 11. 1134 b, 14.

ἐπιεικέσι...φαύλοις. This passage shows clearly that the various Attic equivalents for ἀγαθός and κακός are used without any distinction of meaning.

§ 4. οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν κ.τ.λ. The Aldine scholiast quotes a fragment from the Ἡρακλῆς ὁ παρὰ Φύλῳ of Epicharmos, in which occurs the line οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄταν ἔχων. Whoever wrote the verse as we have it no doubt meant only 'wretched' by πονηρὸς, as Muretus and Camerarius already saw. Victorius substituted μάκαρ for μακάριος to make an iambic line on the authority of [Plato] περὶ δικαίου 374 a. Cf. Tim. 86 d κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκῶν οὐδεὶς.

ῥσιον. ἡ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν
 ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων
 ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν
 εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ 20
 γαί ἀρχαί ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. τοῦτοις
 ὁ ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν
 τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶν-
 τας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοϊαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ
 αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν 25
 προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μὴτ' ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μὴθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν
 πρὸ ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ

b, 17. Cf. EE. 1222 b, 15 εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσῖαι
 κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἐκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν,
 οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρώπους καὶ ζῶον ὃν ὅλως ζῶα καὶ φυτὸν φυτὰ. πρὸς
 δὲ τοῦτοις ὁ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν
 ζῶων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἵπομεν ἂν πράττειν. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ὅσαι
 τοιαῦται, ὅθεν πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δὲ δικαίως
 ἐφ' ὧν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, ἢν ἴσως ὁ θεὸς ἀρχεῖ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκινήτοις
 ἀρχαῖς, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον, καίτοι λέγεταί
 γε καθ' ὁμοιότητα· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα
 μάλιστ' ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δ' αὐτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει
 ἀναιρουμένου θατέρου ὑπὸ θατέρου, ἂν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ
 δι' ἐκείνης δεῖξαι. ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεώς τινος· ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις
 κίνησις. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ ἀρχὴ αἰτία ἐστὶ τῶν δι' αὐτὴν
 ὄντων ἢ γινομένων, δεῖ νοῆσαι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων. εἰ γὰρ
 ἔχοντος τοῦ τριγώνου δύο ὀρθὰς ἀνάγκη τὸ τετράγωνον ἔχειν τέτταρας
 ὀρθὰς, φανερόν ὡς αἴτιον τούτου τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν τὸ τρίγωνον. εἰ δέ
 γε μεταβάλλει τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον μεταβάλλειν,

§ 5. ἀρχὴν...τῶν πράξεων, sc. ὅθεν
 ἢ κινήσεις.

ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων, i.e. as ἄνθρωπος
 ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. Cf. above, p. 110.

§ 6. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.
 We have 'reduced' the efficient cause
 to something internal to ourselves,
 namely προαίρεσις. Not only so, but
 there is no other ἀρχή to which we

could refer it; for neither Necessity,
 Nature nor Chance could produce
 human actions. Now that of which
 the ἀρχή is ἐν ἡμῖν will itself be ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν.

§ 7. τοῦτοις δ' ἔοικε κ.τ.λ. The
 usual appeal to the practice of νομο-
 θέται. Cf. above 1102 a, 7 n.

πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοι τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἦττον πεισού-
 30 μεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν
 αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ
 ἐπιτίμια. ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυ-
 σθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγροοῦντάς τι
 τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι,
 1114^a κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα δι' ἀμέ- 9
 λειαν ἀγροεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὅν τὸ μὴ ἀγροεῖν·
 τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε 10
 μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι
 5 ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν
 κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες·
 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ 11
 δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν·
 διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγροεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ 12
 10 ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.

οἷον εἰ τρεῖς, ἕξ, εἰ δὲ τέτταρες, ὀκτώ. καὶ εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλοι, τοιοῦτον
 δ' ἐστὶ, κάκεῖνο τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. δῆλον δ' ὅ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι
 ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν· νῦν δ' οὔτε μὴ λέγειν οὔτε λέγειν
 ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τε, πλὴν τοσούτον. εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον τοῦ τὸ
 τρίγωνον οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀρχὴ τις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὑστερον.
 ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἓν τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ
 τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαῖον τὸ
 συμβαῖνόν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ γε ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τὰναντία, καὶ ὁ
 ἐφ' αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν
 τοιούτων εἰσὶν αὐτοί.

§ 8. διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια. A law of Pittakos. Cf. Pol. 1274 b, 19 νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἂν τι πταίσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων. Rhet. 1402 b, 10 εἰ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγροοῦντες γὰρ ἀμαρτάνουσι, ἐνστασις ὅτι οὐκ οὖν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰρετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐὰν τις μεθύων ἀμαρτάνῃ.

§ 10. τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν, sc. οἱ αἱ

αἱ ἐνέργειαι. Cf. above 1103 b, 21 ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται. The words περὶ ἕκαστα are explained 1103 b, 6 sqq.

§ 12. ἀναισθήτου. The word is here used in its common meaning of 'dull,' 'stupid,' cf. 1104 a, 24 n., in which sense it is almost a synonym of ἀνάλγητος (1100 b, 32 n.). It is a very strong term, and is applied to the Thebans in Dem. de Cor. § 240.

13 ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ
τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράτ-
14 τει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἀδικος, ἐκὼν ἀδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε
βούληται, ἀδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής, καίτοι εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς 15
βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ
μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ'
αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ [βαλεῖν
καὶ] ῥίψαι· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ
καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, 20
15 διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσιν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι. οὐ
μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ
αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ
φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένηϊαν καὶ πῆρωσιν· οὐθεὶς 25
γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσκει τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης
16 ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσῃ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κα-
κιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐ. εἰ
δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν 30
17 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἴεν. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ

§ 13. ἔτι δ' ἄλογον κ.τ.λ. It is unjustifiable (οὐκ ἔχει λόγον) for a man who acts dishonestly to say he does not wish to be dishonest. He is making himself so to the best of his power, and that voluntarily. The reference is to the paradox of Sokrates, cf. MM. 1187 a, 8 εἰ γὰρ τις, φησὶν (ὁ Σωκράτης), ἐρωτήσκειν ὀντιναοῦν πρότερον ἂν βούλοιντο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἀδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 4; iv, 6, 6 sqq.

§ 14. καίτοι. Rassow's emendation of MS. καὶ. See Bywater, Contr. p. 34.

προεμένῳ, sc. τὴν ὑγίειαν.

τὸ [βαλεῖν καὶ] ῥίψαι. See Bywater, Contr. p. 34. I prefer to bracket the more common βαλεῖν rather than the

more striking ῥίψαι. No one would require a note on βαλεῖν. ἀρχή, sc. ὅθεν ἢ κίνησις.

§ 15. οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ. We have once more two common τόποι: (1) the analogy of bodily states, (2) praise and blame as a τεκμήριον of τὸ ἐκούσιον. Cf. Plato, Protag. 323 c sqq.

§ 17. εἰ δὲ τις κ.τ.λ. The argument is as follows. "If any one were to say that we are not responsible for our φαντασία, we answer (1) that if a man is responsible in a sense for his ἔξις, he is responsible in the same sense for his φαντασία, (2) that if a man is not responsible for his ἔξις, he is not responsible for any of his bad acts at all. It is all a mere question of natural endowment."

- φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός
 1114^b ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ
 μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἑξεώς ἐστὶ πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς
 φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ
 αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
 5 πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ
 δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἑφesis οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ ὥσπερ
 ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἣ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγα-
 θὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυῆς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν·
 τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὁ παρ' ἐτέρου μὴ οἶον
 10 τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ
 τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινή
 ἂν εἴη εὐφυῖα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ
 ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ¹⁸
 ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἡ ὅπωςδὴποτε φαί-
 15 νεται καὶ κείται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες
 πράττουσιν ὅπωςδὴποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ¹⁹
 φαίνεται οἷονδὴποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε
 τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκούσιως
 τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἥττον καὶ ἡ
 20 κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει
 τὸ δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ²⁰

τῆς φαντασίας. In this pas-
 sage ἡ φαντασία is simply equiva-
 lent to τὸ φαίνεσθαι. Bonitz rightly
 paraphrases the clause by οὐκ εἰσὶ
 κύριοι τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τι ἀγαθόν.

εὐφυῆς. In fact we should in that
 case have to go back to the doctrine
 that goodness comes to us φύσει. Of
 course Aristotle admits the importance
 of εὐφυῖα both in practical and theo-
 retical matters. Cf. Top. 163 b, 15
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εὐφυῖα, τὸ
 δύνασθαι καλῶς ἐλέσθαι τάληθες καὶ
 φυγεῖν τὸ ψεύδος. But he will not
 allow that we have no responsibility
 for the formation of ἑξεις.

εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. If it is all a matter
 of εὐφυῖα, and we are not responsible

for our character, then goodness is as
 involuntary as badness. Plato cannot
 mean this.

§ 19. εἴτε δὴ κ.τ.λ. We may try
 to maintain that goodness is voluntary
 by holding either (1) that the φαντασία
 of the end is not given to a man by
 nature, but is partly due to himself
 (παρ' αὐτόν), or (2) that the end is
 given by nature, but the means are
 voluntary. But both these views will
 make badness voluntary to the same
 extent as goodness.

τὸ δι' αὐτόν. Mr Bywater's pro-
 posal to read τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ is attractive.

§ 20. εἰ οὖν κ.τ.λ. The argument
 may be summed up thus. (1) Our
 πράξεις are in our power and we have

οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν
ἔξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι
τὸ τέλος τοιούνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν·
ὁμοίως γάρ.

25

- 21 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἔξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε
γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικά <καὶ> καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι
ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος
22 προστάξῃ. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοι εἰσι καὶ αἱ 30
ἔξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους
κύριοι ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῆς
ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ 1115^a
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω
χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.
- 23 Ἀναλαμβάνοντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης εἴπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ
περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν. 5
καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. VI. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ

1114 b, 26. EE. 1228 a, 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητές εἰσὶ τε ἐν
ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, καὶ αὐτὰ προαιρετικά, καὶ αἱ ἐναντία κακίαι, καὶ τίνες
εἰσὶν αὐταί, καθόλου εἴρηται· καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν
ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας.

1115 a, 4. EE. 1228 a, 26 σχεδὸν δὴ δοκεῖ πᾶσιν ὁ τ'
ἀνδρείος εἶναι περὶ φόβους καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἀρετῶν. διείλομεν
δ' ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρότερον καὶ θράσος καὶ φόβον ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ
ἐστὶ πως ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις
ταύτας λεγόμενοι ὁμοίως ἀντικείμενοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς

full responsibility for them. (2) Our
ἔξεις proceed from our πράξεις and are
so far in our power. We have partial
responsibility for them, that is we are
responsible at the start (ἐν ἀρχῇ).
(3) Our φαντασία of the τέλος de-
pends on our ἔξεις, so we are just as
responsible for that.

§ 21. Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The
summary as usual destroys the con-
nexion. The words οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ
(b, 30) should be taken closely with

what precedes.

<καὶ> καθ' αὐτάς, not κατὰ συμβε-
βηκός. The καὶ comes from Aspasios
and the Vetus Versio.

ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, 'the right rule'
1103 b, 32 n.

§ 23. περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς, sc. μεσό-
τητές εἰσιν. Aristotle discusses all the
ἀρεταὶ under these two heads.

VI. § 1. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This
chapter deals with the question περὶ
ποῖα μεσότης ἡ ἀνδρεία.

περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἥδη φανερόν γεγενῆσθαι· φοβούμεθα²
 δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν
 κακά, διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.
 10 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν³
 νόσον ἀφίλιαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀν-
 δρεῖος εἶναι· ἕνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ
 δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπι-
 εικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυτος. λέ-
 15 γεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ
 τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

(οὗτος γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ θαρρεῖν ἥττον
 ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασύς· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος
 φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἥττον ἢ δεῖ, θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ παρω-
 νυμιάζεται· ὁ γὰρ θρασύς παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως. ὥστ'
 ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, δεῖ δὲ
 μὴτ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι)
 μὴτ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ταῦτο ποιοῦσι, πλὴν οὐ περὶ
 ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπουσι, τῷ δὲ
 φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουσι), δῆλον ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θρασύτητος καὶ
 δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ βελτίστη.

1115 a, 10. EE. 1229 a, 32 περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν
 ἀπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν
 φοβερά λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται
 ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένοις
 λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν αἰς τις ἰσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος δ'

ἤδη, 1107 a, 33.

§ 2. προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. Plato, Protag. 358 d προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Laches 198 b ἡγοῦμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γηγόντα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ.

§ 3. οὐ περὶ πάντα κ.τ.λ. In EE. 1229 a, 34 sqq. this restriction is made clearer by the amended definition of τὰ φοβερά as ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς, i.e. those

λύπαι ὧσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. But this is not an 'Eudemian development' for we read in Rhet. 1382 a, 21 ἔστω δὲ φόβος λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακά φοβούνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἀδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δυνάται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν.

οἷον ἀδοξίαν. Cf. the Platonic definition of αἰδώς as φόβος ἀδοξίας below 1128 b, 11 and see note there.

κατὰ μεταφοράν i.q. καθ' ὁμοιότητα. This alludes to Plato, see § 7 n.

4 πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα
 μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα
 ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα·
 ἔτιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἔλευ- 20
 θήριοι εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχου-
 5 σιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖ-
 ται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλὸς ἐστίν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ
 6 μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν
 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος 25
 τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ
 οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.
 7 δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος

οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῶτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἢν οἱ φθονοῦντες
 λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἷαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
 μόναίς ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται ὅσων
 ἢ φύσις ἀναιρετική τοῦ ζῆν. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ
 ἔνια ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι, καὶ ἔτιοι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ [καὶ] δειλοί. καὶ
 διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ
 τὴν περὶ τοῦτου λύπην ἔχειν πῶς. εἰ γάρ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος πρὸς
 αἰέας καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικὸς ὡς ὁ λόγος,
 εἰκινδύνους οὖσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ
 δι' ἄλλο τι πάθος ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν
 ἐκείνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθής, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι
 δοξείε δειλός, οὗτος δ' ἀνδρεῖος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις
 λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ἢ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς
 ποιητικόν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, περὶ ὅσα φαμέν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἴρηται δὴ
 ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ποιητικὰ λύπης τῆς φθαρτικῆς· ταῦτα μέντοι πλησίον
 τε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοσαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα
 ὥστ' εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. ἔνια γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαί-
 νεσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερά καὶ διαταράττειν. οὐθέν γὰρ κωλύει, ὥσπερ
 θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ
 τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος ἐξείς, οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
 παθημάτων.

§ 5. φθόνον. We might be tempted
 to think that φόρον is the true reading.
 It goes well with ὕβρις ('ὕβρις or
 murder of children and wife'), and

the corruption is common. This is
 a case, however, where the text is
 guaranteed by Eudemos. See above.

εἶναι, ὅσον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν 8
 30 τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ
 καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ 9
 τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως 10
 δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρείος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεῆς,
 καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγνια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μά-
 35 λιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ 11
 1115^b καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεῆς ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάτ-
 τιοί· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνωκάσι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνα-
 τον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ
 τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκή 12
 5 ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέ-
 τερον ὑπάρχει.

VII. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι
 καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε

1115 b, 7. EE. 1228 b, 4 δοκεῖ δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος ἄφοβος εἶναι
 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς φοβητικός, καὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα
 καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὁ δὲ τὸ
 ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρέμα καὶ μόλις καὶ ὀλιγάκις καὶ μεγάλα,
 καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερά σφόδρα, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἡρέμα. ποῖα οὖν
 ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρείος; πρῶτον πότερον τὰ ἑαυτῷ φοβερά ἢ τὰ ἐτέρῳ; εἰ
 μὲν δὴ τὰ ἐτέρῳ φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἂν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτῷ,

§ 7. ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. This is directed against the doctrine of Plato in Laches 191 d—e that Courage is not displayed only in war. Sokrates asks for τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνους ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους κ.τ.λ. Plato was deepening the significance of ἀνδρεία, Aristotle has to do only with τὰ δοκοῦντα, the moral consciousness of the average Hellene, and he proves his point as usual by referring to the practice of free states and monarchs.

§ 10. ὑπόγνια. Tr. 'close at hand.' Cf. EE. 1229 b, 15 πλησίον γε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω. MM. 1191 a, 33 εἰ γὰρ τις τὸν εἰς δέκατον ἔτος κινδύνον μὴ φοβεῖται, οὕτω ἀνδρείος.

ἐνιοὶ γὰρ θαρροῦσι διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀπέχειν, ἂν δὲ πλησίον γένωνται, ἀποθνήσκουσι τῷ δέει. Cf. also Rhet. 1382 a, 21 sqq. quoted above ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνεται.

§ 11. οἱ μὲν, οἱ μὴ θαλάττιοι. There is surely a touch of humour in this contrast between the cheerful sailors and the brave Hellene who has given up all hope, and laments that drowning is a nasty death, not fit for a gentleman and soldier.

§ 12. ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκή, 'where there is a possibility of a brave defence.'

VII. § 1. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν κ.τ.λ. The μεσότης described and contrasted with the ὑπερβολή and ἑλλειψις.

νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ
 2 μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀν- 10
 δρείος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δέ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ
 3 ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς τοιαῦτα
 4 φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεταί δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἢ μὲν ὅτι <δ> οὐ δεῖ, ἢ 15
 δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως

εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ φοβερά. <φοβερά δὲ τὰ> φόβον ποιητικὰ
 ἑκάστῳ ᾧ φοβερά, οἷον εἰ μὲν σφόδρα φοβερά, εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὁ φόβος,
 εἰ δ' ἡρέμα, ἀσθενής. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸν ἀνδρείον μεγάλους φόβους
 καὶ πολλοὺς ποιείσθαι. ἐδόκει δὲ τοῦναντίον ἢ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρα-
 σκευάζειν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἢ μῆθεν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡρέμα
 καὶ μόλις. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ φοβερόν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ
 ἔστιν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς
 ποιητοῖς ὠφέλιμα καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδίᾳ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 τὰ φοβερά τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἔστι, τὰ δὲ τινί. ἃ μὲν δὴ δειλὸς φοβεῖται
 5 δειλός, τὰ μὲν οὐδενὶ ἔστι φοβερά, τὰ δ' ἡρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις
 φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ' ἀπλῶς φοβερά λέγομεν.
 6 ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά,
 7 ἃ ἔστι μὲν ὡς φοβερά αὐτῷ, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ, ἢ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φοβερά, ἢ
 8 ἀνδρείος, οὐ φοβερά ἀλλ' ἢ ἡρέμα ἢ σὺδαμῶς. ἔστι μέντοι φοβερά
 ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. διὸ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται ἢ ἕξις· ὥσπερ
 γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὑγιεινὸς ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι οὐ τῷ ὑπὸ μῆθενος ὁ
 μὲν πόνου τρίβεσθαι, ὁ δ' ὑπὸ μῆδεμιᾶς ὑπερβολῆς, τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν,
 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἡρέμα, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ
 καὶ οἱ πλείστοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ
 τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσιν τι, πλὴν θάπτων τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ
 πολλοί, * * καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ πάσχουσιν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς
 ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἡρέμα.

ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστι φοβερόν, οὐδ' ἂν φοβηθείη.
 ἢ οὐθέν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον; ἢ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ

§ 2. καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, sc. τὰ κατ'
 ἄνθρωπον.

ὡς ὁ λόγος (sc. λέγει, κελεύει,
 προστάττει), not 'reason,' but the

'rule' which guides him. Cf. 1114 b,
 29. 1115 b, 19. 1117 a, 8. 1119 a, 20.
 1125 b, 35. 1138 b, 20, 29.

ὑπομενεῖ, sc. ὁ ἀνδρείος.

δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, 20 πᾶσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἔστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει.

λόγῳ ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεύει. διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἦτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρείος μόνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἂν μὴ δεῖ φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς καὶ ἂν μὴ δεῖ θαρρεῖ· ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἅμφω ἂν δεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ μέσος ἔστιν. ἂν γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ φοβεῖται. ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικά οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ᾖ. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελεύει, ταῦτα θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδ' ἂν κελεύῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος μόνος, ἔαν κελεύῃ.

1115 b, 17. EE. 1230 a, 21 καὶ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὐτῇ. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὐτῇ οὔτ' ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἂν διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμοσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσῃ, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε δι' ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικάς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἴσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ

§ 5. κατ' ἀξίαν. Not very different from κατὰ τὸ δέον.

§ 6. τέλος δὲ κ.τ.λ. The text here is not quite certain, but the argument is plain. The rule says that an act to be really brave must be done from the right motive (οὐ ἕνεκα δεῖ). It is to be shown that this means τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. This is proved as follows. The end of every activity which proceeds from a ἔξις must be the end which corresponds to the ἔξις from which it proceeds. To the brave man, that is the man who embodies the ἔξις (τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν), bravery appears as τὸ καλόν, and therefore τὸ καλόν is its end. From this it follows that every act, if it is to be called brave, must have τὸ καλόν as its end, that is, it must be performed τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.

τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. We might paraphrase this by saying that the end of

every activity is conformity to a certain type of character or, in more Aristotelian language, the reproduction of a form (εἶδος, λόγος τῆς οὐσίας). So the Paraphrast says the end of every activity according to goodness is τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἐξεως γίνεσθαι. The good man's end is the reproduction of the form of goodness in all his acts. Now a final cause appearing as a formal cause appears as τὸ καλόν, cf. Part. An. 645 a, 25 οὐ δ' ἕνεκα συνέστηκεν ἡ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἰληφεν.

καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. Rassow here reads καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δέ. ἡ <δ'> ἀνδρεία καλόν.

τοιοῦτον, sc. καλόν.

ὀρίζεται...τῷ τέλει, i.e. the end determines the form. Cf. Meteor. 390 a, 10 ἅπαντα δ' ἔστιν ὠρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ.

καλοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ
 7 τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ
 ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστίν 25
 ἀνώνυμα), εἶη δ' ἂν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάληγτος εἰ μη-
 δὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ
 τοὺς Κελτούς· ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ
 8 φοβερά θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζῶν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ
 προσποιοητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὡς γοῦν ἐκείνος περὶ τὰ φοβερά 30
 ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι. ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται,
 9 μιμνῆσθαι. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασυδείλοι· ἐν
 10 τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερά οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ
 δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ
 καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. 35

τροαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἔνεκά τινος
 πάντα αἰρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δηλόν
 ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ τις οὕσα ἔνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερά
 ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὁρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν)
 οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ, ἂν γε μὴ καλὸν ἢ ἀλλὰ μανικόν,
 οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.

b, 24. EE. 1229 b, 22 οἱ μὲν <οὖν> δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς
 ἐπιψευδονται διὰ τὰς ἑξεις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τὰ τε μὴ φοβερά δοκεῖ
 φοβερά εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἡρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον τὰ τε
 φοβερά θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἡρέμα, τῷ δ' ἀνδρεῖ τὰ ληθῆ
 μάλιστα. διόπερ οὗτ' εἰ τις ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερά δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρείος,
 οἷον εἰ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένει φερομένους διὰ μανίαν, οὗτ' εἰ
 γινώσκων ὅσος ὁ κίνδυνος, διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα
 ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρική ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ
 ἐστίν. ἔτι καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
 ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὗτ' εἰ
 διὰ ταύτην οὗτ' εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν

§ 7. ἀνάληγτος, cf. 1100 b, 32 n.
 τοὺς Κελτούς. EE. 1229 b, 28 οἷον
 οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαν-
 τῶσι λαβόντες. Aristotle seems to
 have taken this from Ephoros; for
 Strabo (vii, p. 293) says upon his
 authority ὅπλα αἰρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πλημ-
 μνείδας τοὺς Κίμβρους, καὶ ὅτι ἀφοβίαν

οἱ Κελτοὶ ἀσκούντες κατακλύζεσθαι
 τὰς οἰκίας ὑπομένουσιν.

§ 9. θρασυδείλοι. This compound
 is not found elsewhere, but may be-
 long to the language of comedy.

ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν οἷς δύναται
 μιμνῆσθαι.

- 1116^a ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερ-
βάλλον μᾶλλον καταφανὴς ἐστίν. δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δει-11
λός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ
θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. περὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν ὃ τε δειλός 12
5 καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς
αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέ-
σως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ
βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ
δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.
- 10 Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ 13
θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖ-
ται καὶ ὑπομένει ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μῆ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν
φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ
15 οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. VIII. Ἔστι
μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι
κατὰ πέντε τρόπους. πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ· μάλιστα γὰρ

μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως <ἀν> ἀνδρείος λέγοιτο τούτων. εἰ γὰρ
ἦν ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλάκις ἀν δι' ἀκρασίαν ἀπέθνησκον οἱ
ἀκόλαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος,
τῶν ποιητικῶν δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ δι' ἀκρασίαν περιπίπτουσιν εἰδότες, ὡς
οὐθὲς <ἀν> ἀνδρείος εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἐτοιμῶς ἀποθνήσκειν.
οὐτ' εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων
οὐδεὶς ἀνδρείος, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

“φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσώμενοι,
θανεῖν ἐρώσιν.”

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἔλκουσ ὀδύνην εὐξασθαι ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα.

1116 a, 15. EE. 1229 a, 12 ἔστι δ' εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε
λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα· <τὰ> αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ

§ 12. ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται.
For δὲ connecting a finite verb with
a participle, cf. 1135 b, 31. 1152 a, 4.

§ 13. ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, sc. ἐν τοῖς
καλλίστοις, i.e. ἐν πολέμοις.

VIII. § 1. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.

We pass now to the five forms of
ἀνδρεία καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

ἡ πολιτικὴ. This is the courage
of the citizen army, the courage that
won Marathon.

ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδῆ καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρεϊότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ 20 ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα·

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·

καὶ [Διομήδης]

Ἐκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων

25

“Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμείο.”

ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένην, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδούς, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό· 30 χεῖρους δ', ὅσφ' οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι,

αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτικὴ· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὖσα. δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. τρίτη δ' ἡ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν, δι' ἣν τὰ παιδιά καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἱ μὲν ὑπομένουσι τὰ φερόμενα, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνουσι τοὺς ὄφεις. ἄλλη δ' ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα, καθ' ἣν οἱ τε κατευτυχηκότες πολλάκις ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ οἶνος. ἄλλη δὲ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἷον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. ἂν τε γὰρ ἐρᾷ, θρασὺς μᾶλλον ἢ δειλός, καὶ ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως. ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σὺς ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται. διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία. κατ'

§ 2. Πουλυδάμας κ.τ.λ. Π. xxii, 100.

[Διομήδης]. This seems to be an adscript. Bywater, Contr. p. 35.

Ἐκτωρ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Π. viii, 148.

§ 3. δι' αἰδῶ. For αἰδῶς cf. 1128 b, 10 sqq. Fritzsche quotes Π. v, 529

ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε, καὶ ἄλκιμον ἦτορ ἔλεσθε,

ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας·

αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σοὶ ἡ πέφανται.

καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχροὺν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ

35 ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτόσσοντα νόησω,
οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κίνας.

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες τὸ αὐτὸ 5
1116^b δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατά-
τοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην
ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία 6
ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης φήθη
5 ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἁλ-
λοῖς, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι

ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς
κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα.

1116 b, 3. EE. 1230 a, 4 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι
δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὥνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλείους
τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦναντίον ἔχει
ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὔτε γὰρ
διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερά θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰστούς ἀναβαίνειν
ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσασι τῆς βοήθειας τῶν δεινῶν· οὔτε δι' ὃ θαρ-

§ 4. ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν κ.τ.λ. Il. ii, 391 with slight variants. The words are not Hector's, but Agamemnon's. They are attributed to the right speaker in Pol. 1285 a, 10, but there too with variants. Aristotle quotes his Homer from memory.

§ 5. οἱ προστάττοντες. Lambinus says that Amyot affirmed he saw *προτάττοντες* "in codice quodam pontificio." But ms. authority is of no weight in deciding between these two words. Victorius renders *qui in prima acie locant*. Still *προστάττοντες* is probably right, for it suggests the order of the *δεσπότης* to the *δούλος*. For *κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες* cf. Herod. vii, 223.

οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. τοῦτο περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων λέγοι
ἂν· τοιαύτην γὰρ τινα μάχην, ὅτε πρὸς

Μεσσηνίους ἐμαχέσαντο, ἐπολέμου, ἢ καὶ Τυρταῖος μνημονεύει.

§ 6. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The second form of *ἀνδρεία* καθ' ὁμοίτητα, στρατιωτικὴ ἀνδρεία.

ὁ Σωκράτης. In the *Laches* (199 a sqq.) courage is defined as *ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ*, but this definition is soon shown to involve a great deal more. When Sokrates identifies goodness and knowledge, he does not mean knowledge or experience of any special kind, but knowledge of the good. Aristotle's statement is only accurate if we understand by ὁ Σωκράτης not the final result of the discussion, but a provisional position temporarily adopted, and that too not originated by Sokrates, but borrowed by him from the culture of his time.

οἱ στρατιῶται. These are the pro-

τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι·
 οὐκ ἀνδρείοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν,
 ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμ-
 λας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχον- 10
 ὅποια ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ
 ἶν κράτιστα· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὀπλισμένοι μάχον-
 καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶ-
 οὔχ οἱ ἀνδρεϊότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μά-
 α ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρα- 15
 αὶ δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ
 οὐκ οἶονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοήθειας. σημεῖον
 ἂν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἶονται βοήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλησίον ἢ τὸ δεινόν,
 πομένουσιν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν
 ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖν <ἂν> ἀνδρείοι, καθάπερ καὶ
 οὐκ τὸν Ἑκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν
 Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχροὺς τὸ φεύγειν

τερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ
 οὐκ οἶονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοήθειας.

“πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος.”

ὥς <δ'> ἐνιοὶ δειλοὶ ὄντες ὅμως ὑπομένουσι δι' ἐμπειρίαν· τοῦτο
 οὐκ οἶονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοήθειας. σημεῖον
 ἂν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἶονται βοήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλησίον ἢ τὸ δεινόν,
 πομένουσιν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν
 ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖν <ἂν> ἀνδρείοι, καθάπερ καὶ
 οὐκ τὸν Ἑκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν
 Ἑρμαίῳ.

“Ἑκτορα δ' αἰδὼς εἶλε.”

“Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχέην ἀναθήσει.”

all soldiers of the fourth century
 posed to the citizen soldiers of
 h. Eudemos (l. c.) calls this
 courage στρατιωτικὴ ἀνδρεία.
 α. The mss. vary as usual be-
 κενά and κενά. Both phrases
 have been in use. Cf. Thuc.
 and the commentators. The
 κενά has more point. Regular
 are less likely to be frightened
 ie alarms,' what Tacitus calls
 nia belli. Grant quotes Cic.

Att. v, 20 “scis enim dici quaedam
 πανικά, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου.”

§ 7. ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν. K^b
 adds the explanation καὶ φυλάσσειν
 καὶ πατάξει ‘to ward off and deal a
 blow.’ Perhaps these words should
 be substituted for πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ
 πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν below (b, 11).

§ 9. κἀπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ. Tr. ‘in
 the battle at the temple of Hermes.’
 Schol. Anon. “Ἑρμαῖον ἐν Κορωνεῖᾳ
 τῆς Βοιωτίας τόπος οὕτω λεγόμενος

20 καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ
καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνουν ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γινόντες δὲ
φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ
δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν 10
φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν
25 ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ
ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἱτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς
κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ "Ομηρος "σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ" καὶ
"μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε" καὶ "δριμὺν δ' ἀνὰ ῥίνας μένος"
καὶ "ἔξεσεν αἷμα·" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαί-
30 νειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὀρμῇν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι 11
διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ
θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖ-
σθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἔλει] ἦ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ
δὴ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνας καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
35 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμᾶν οὐθέν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ
οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ
1117^a οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπι-
θυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρώσιν. [οὐ δὴ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία τὰ 12
δι' ἀλγηδόνας ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον.]
φυσικωτάτῃ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσ-

πεδινὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωμάτων
δντων, ἐν ᾧ παρατεταγμένοι ποτὲ Κορω-
νεῖς σὺν τοῖς βοηθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς στρα-
τιώταις ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχόλου μετὰ τῶν
βωιωταρχῶν, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατέλαβε
καὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν εἶχεν ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ
'Ονόμαρχος ὁ Φωκεὺς προδοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ
(B.C. 354-3), αὐτοὶ μὲν μέιναντες ἀπέ-
θανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν 'Ονόμαρχον,
ἀποκλείσαντες τὰς πόλεις, ἵνα αὐτοῖς
μηδὲ βουλομένοις εἴη φυγεῖν καὶ κατα-
λιπεῖν τὴν πατρίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βωιωτῶν
βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιῶται ἐκ τοῦ
Μεταχόλου ἐφυγον εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς
μάχης, αἰσθόμενοι ἕνα τεθνάναι τῶν
βωιωταρχῶν Χάρωνα. Ἰστοροῦσι περὶ
τῆς μάχης ταύτης Κηφισόδωρος ἐν τῇ
ιβ' <τῶν> Περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου καὶ
'Αναξιμένης ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν Περὶ

Φίλιππον καὶ Ἐφορος ἐν τῇ τριακοτῇ
(FHG. I, 274, 153).

§ 10. "Ομηρος. These are inexact
reminiscences of Il. xvi, 529 and Od.
xxiv, 18. The phrase *ἔξεσεν αἷμα*
'his blood boiled' occurs nowhere in
Homer, but *ζέσας τοῦ περὶ καρδίας*
αἵματος was a current definition of
Anger (De An. 403 a, 31). In poetry
it occurs first in Theokritos, Id. xi,
15 *ἔμοι δ' ἄφαρ ἔξεσεν αἷμα*.

§ 11. *ἡ ἐν ἔλει* was bracketed by
Victorius. It seems to be a mere
variant of *ἐν ὕλῃ*.

οἱ ὄνοι. Cf. Homer's comparison
of Aias to a stubborn ass which goes
on eating the corn though the boys
keep on beating it. Il. xi, 558 sqq.

λαβούσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ 5
 ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδον-
 ται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀν-
 δρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ
 διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσιν τι. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλ-
 πιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς 10
 νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι
 ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρη-
 μένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν
 <ἀν> ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι·
 εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, 15
 φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερά ἀνθρώπων ὄντα καὶ
 φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. διὸ
 καὶ ἀνδρειότερου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις
 ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ
 ἔξωτος γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προ- 20
 φανῇ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο,
 τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ
 οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ'
 ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσιν τινα

§ 12. προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, 'will and motive,' i.e. if the man acts προαιρούμενος and τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. As in Plato, θυμός is recognised as the natural basis of courage.

τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονταί. Cf. EE. 1129 b, 31 (l. c. p. 145), Rhet. 1378 b, 1 καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἐπεσθαι τινα ἡδονῇ (ἀνάγκῃ) τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμω-ρήσασθαι.

§ 13. οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι...οἱ δὲ... Bywater points out (Contr. p. 56) that this "twofold use of the article," the first being an ordinary article, the second meaning 'others,' is "a favourite construction with Aristotle." Cf. 1149 a, 16, 1149 b, 2, 1158 a, 31. διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα sc. ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ.

§ 14. εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. Probl.

955 a, 2 διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθύμως, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολλὸς εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γῆρας δύσελπίς ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ νεότης ἐλπίδος πλήρης.

§ 15. ἀπὸ ἔξωτος κ.τ.λ. We know that a man may perform a brave act without being already brave; for it is only so that he becomes brave. But it is only the formed *ἐξίς* that can be trusted in an emergency.

ἦν. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 35 and, for the idiomatic imperfect, 1113 a, 19 n.

§ 16. ἀξίωμα, not 'dignity' but 'self-reliance.' It is the same thing as τὸ οἴεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι.

μένουσι sc. οἱ εὐέλπιδες.

25 χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἡπατημένοι, εἰς γινώσκοντες ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑπο-
 πτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν, ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες
 τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἱ τε δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰρηνται 17
 ποιοῖ τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

IX. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἢ ἀνδρεία οὐσα οὐχ
 30 ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ
 γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος
 μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπο- 2
 μένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ λυπον ἢ
 ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυ-
 35 πηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ 3
 1117^b δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν
 κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κὰν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γί-
 νεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὐ ἔνεκα, ὁ
 στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ
 5 σάρκινος, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ
 ταύτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὅν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.

οἱ δ' ἡπατημένοι, i.e. οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες.
 ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, 'or (even) suspect
 that it is.' L^b has ὑποπτεύουσιν, K^b
 ὑποπτεύουσιν. The corruption is due
 to the scribes having taken ἕτερον ἢ
 together.

ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κ.τ.λ. The story
 is told in Xen. Hell. iv, 4, 10. The
 Spartan cavalry had taken Sikyonian
 shields with a *sigma* upon them.
 This was in the battle at the Long
 Walls of Corinth B.C. 392.

IX. § 1. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ κ.τ.λ.
 We now approach the question πῶς
 μεσότης ἢ ἀνδρεία, and we find that
 it has more to do with pains than
 pleasures, whereas we shall see that
 σωφροσύνη has more to do with plea-
 sures than pains (1117 b, 26). This
 is really the same question as πῶς
 ἀντίκεινται ἀλλήλους καὶ τῇ μεσότητι
 ἢ ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἢ ἐλλείψει; The fact
 that the θρασὺς is like the ἀνδρεῖος
 while the δειλός is not (1108 b, 30 sqq.)
 is due to the fact that ἀνδρεία is

μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά ἢ τὰ θαρραλέα.
 It has already been pointed out how
 important these questions of ἀντίθεσις
 are. Cf. above 1108 b, 11 n.

§ 2. διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The merit of
 ἀνδρεία does not lie in not facing the
 wrong things, but in facing the right
 things; for it has to do with τὰ φοβερά
 rather than τὰ θαρραλέα. That is
 why it is harder to be ἀνδρεῖος than
 to be σώφρων. Ἀνδρεία implies the
 presence of positive pain, σωφροσύνη
 only the negation of certain pleasures.
 For the merit of σωφροσύνη lies in
 abstaining from the wrong pleasures,
 not in enduring the right pains.

§ 3. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος,
 'the end of an act which conforms to
 the definition of ἀνδρεία.' Cf. 1115 b,
 21 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. Being an ἐν-
 ἔργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν, it must be ἡδὺ κατ'
 αὐτό.

ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ, 'by the attendant
 circumstances,' cf. Rhet. 1367 b, 29.
 1407 a, 35. 1415 b, 24.

4 εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος
καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται,
ἵπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μῆ. καὶ
ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστε- 10
ρος ἦ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ
γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀπο-
στερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀνδρείος,
ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ' 11
5 ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὲ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως 15
ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.
6 στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἦττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μη-
δὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν
7 βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν 20
ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύφῳ
γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι
γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν
οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· 25
ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς
αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν
2 ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηρήσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ

1117 b, 20. EE. 1230 a, 34 περὶ ποία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ
ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ τίνων καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύνανται
ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἴρηται κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ἐφοδὸν ἰκανῶς· περὶ δὲ
σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον. λέγεται
δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς.

b, 28. EE. 1230 b, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ

§ 5. ἐφάπτεται sc. τις. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

§ 6. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ. A practical remark for the benefit of the statesman. The ἀνδρεία we have been describing is not necessarily the best for professional soldiers.

X. § 1. τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν, sc. θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. Aristotle starts

as usual from τὰ δοκούντα, in this case the Platonic view. Aristotle did not himself believe in 'parts of the soul.'

ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The question περὶ ποία μεσότης ἢ σωφροσύνη; is discussed after a brief indication of πῶς μεσότης, i.e. ἦττον...περὶ τὰς λύπας. Cf. above 1115 a, 5 n.

αἱ σωματικάί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ
 30 τούτων χαίρει οὐ φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώ-
 ματος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύ-
 τας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως
 δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικάί εἰσιν· τοὺς
 γὰρ φιλομήτους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
 35 κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ
 1118^a λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. περὶ 3
 δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ
 ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀψευς, οἷον χρώ-
 μασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκό-
 5 λαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαί-
 ρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ὁμοίως 4
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως
 χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθὲς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ

ἡδονάς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν
 περὶ τίνας. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων
 σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τε τὸ
 γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἀπτόν· περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ
 τῆς ὀψευς ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἢ λύπην τῶν
 αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐαρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων,
 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι' ὀσφρήσεως, τὰς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ
 δυσωδίας, οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ
 πάσχειν ἢ μὴ πάσχειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος ἢ
 ἵππον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀκρωμένους ἄδοντας, μὴ βούλοιο μῆτε ἐσθίειν
 μῆτε πίνειν μῆτε ἀφροδισιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δ'
 ἄδόντων ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ
 κηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σειρήσιν.

§ 2. οἷον refers to ψυχικάι, which is the emphatic word, as it is really the pleasures of the soul that are being divided from the more obvious pleasures of the body.

ἐκάτερος. For similar constructions *ad sensum* cf. 1118 b, 20. 1161 a, 16.

οὐ, i.e. τούτῳ or τῷ οὐ. The ellipse of the demonstrative or article before the relative is common. Cf. 1132 b,

1. 1156 a, 22. 1168 a, 11. 1174 a, 10. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 45.

§ 3. οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες κ.τ.λ. This distinctive character was already given to the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell by Plato. Cf. *Phileb.* 51 b ἀληθεῖς ἡδονὰς ὁρθῶς τις ὑπολάβοι ἂν τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων.

5 τούς ὡς δεῖ σῶφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμια- 10
 μάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς
 μύρων ἢ ὀψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι
 6 διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι
 δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅταν πεινώσι χαίροντας ταῖς
 τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστον· 15
 7 τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες
 χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἰσθήσιν ἢ ὁσμὴ ἐποίη-
 σεν· οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῦς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι 20
 8 ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἥσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ
 φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν “ἡ [εὐρών] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον

1118 a, 9. EE. 1230 b, 36 ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τᾶλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα,
 καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γενεστὰ καὶ ἀπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ
 τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθητῶς
 διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἢ κάλλος. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον
 λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει
 τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μὴ τί που συμβέβηκε τειρατῶδες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς
 τὰ εὐώδη ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τὰς γε αἰσθήσεις ὀξευτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός

§ 5. πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. There is no ἀκολασία in the pleasures of smell *per se* (καθ' αὐτάς), it only comes in so far as they incidentally suggest the hope or memory of pleasures of another class. Plato (loc. cit.) had said τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας. Aristotle shows with great skill how it happens that to take pleasure in certain smells may be ἀκόλαστον. It is only in so far as they suggest pleasures of taste and touch.

§ 6. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, sc. τοὺς μὴ ἀκολάστους.

ἀκολάστον. In Probl. 950 a, 12 sqq. the example of the smell of

salt fish is given, which is unpleasant when we are not hungry, ἢ τοῦ τὰρίχου ὀσμῇ, ὅταν ἄδην ἔχωμεν τοῦ φαγεῖν. ... ἢ δὲ τοῦ ῥόδου ἀεὶ ἡδέα.

§ 7. ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις. The peculiarly human character of the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell is evidence of their 'pure' character.

τὴν δ' αἰσθήσιν... ἐποίησεν, 'it is the smell that makes them aware of the presence of hares.'

[εὐρών]. This word comes from Aspasios, who meant to correct what seemed a misquotation of Il. iii, 24 εὐρών ἢ ἔλαφον κεραὸν ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα. But εὐρών is pointless, for it does not

αἴγια," ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς 8
 ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
 25 ζῶα κοινωνοῦν, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται·
 αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεύσεις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύ- 9
 σει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστὶν ἡ
 κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες
 καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ
 30 οἷ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι'
 ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις

εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς. λέγω δὲ <μῇ> καθ' αὐτάς, αἷς ἢ
 ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὀψων καὶ ποτῶν (δι' ἑτέραν γὰρ
 ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθ' αὐτάς δὲ οἷον αἱ
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσιν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄξιν
 τὰς δὲ ἡδύ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν
 ἐπτόχηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ' ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἢ αἰσθησις, ἀλλ'
 ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἀφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ
 ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὐχονται τὴν γλώτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα
 γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἀπτόμενα, ὡς
 ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος περὶ
 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐστίν. οἶνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία καὶ

express a definite *αἰσθησις* like sight (see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 36). We have had *ὁσμή* and *ἀκοή*, so we must now have *ὄψις*.

§ 8. ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κ.τ.λ. *Probl.* 949 b, 6 διὰ τί κατὰ μόναν δύο αἰσθήσεις ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται, οἷον ἀφῆν καὶ γεύσιν; ἢ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένης ἡδονὰς κοινὰς εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις. αἶτε οὖν κοιναὶ ὄσαι ἀτιμώτατοι εἰσι. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ μόναι ἐπονεῖδιστοὶ εἰσιν.

§ 9. φαίνονται διὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Even taste, so far as it affords an opening to *ἀκολασία*, may be reduced to touch. So far as it is strictly speaking the sense of taste, i.e. a δύναμις κριτικὴ which distinguishes the various savours which lie between sweet and bitter, it does not appeal to the

ἀκόλαστος. The real *ἀκόλαστος* would certainly refuse to be appointed wine-taster and pass his life in distinguishing vintages. That is rather on the level of artistic pleasure.

τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως κ.τ.λ. Cf. *De An.* 422 a, 8 sqq. for Aristotle's theory of taste.

οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις. It is not the distinction of tastes that gives pleasure to the glutton, but the contact of food with the gullet. Would he be willing to spit it out after tasting it? Cf. *Part. An.* 690 b, 29 ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλώττα τῶν χυμῶν ποιεῖ τὴν αἰσθησιν· τῶν δὲ ἐδεστών ἐν τῇ καθόδῳ ἢ ἡδονή...καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ὀψων καὶ ἐδεστών ἐν τῇ καταπόσει τῇ τάσει ('tension' v. l. θίζει 'contact') τοῦ οἰσοφάγου γίνεται ἡ χάρις.

λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ἠϋξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὦν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ. κοινοτάτῃ δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· 1118^b καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἄνθρωποι ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῷα. τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφήρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς 5 γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινα μέρη. XI. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικῇ·

ὀψοφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἅπερ μόρια ἡ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται. περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ὄψεως ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἡδονὰς οὐθεὶς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος εἶναι ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ὀνειδούς τὰς ἀμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταύτας, καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα μὴ λέγονται ἐγκρατεῖς· οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σῶφρονες.

§ 10. ὀψοφάγος ὦν. Eudemos names him. He was Philoxenos son of Eryxis. A certain pudding was called after him (Φιλοξένειοι πλακοῦντες). As he was a favourite butt of the comic poets, Athenaeus is full of information about him. In a comedy of Krobylos he was called κάμνος, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος because he liked to burn his throat with hot slices of fish. When he went out to dine his servant used to take his own wine, oil, vinegar and sauce, with which he corrected the crudity of his host's cookery. Theophilus (FHG. iv, 516) says of him ἠϋξατό ποτε γεράνου τὴν φάρυγγα σχεῖν, and Machon has put his prayer in verse:

Φιλῶξενός ποθ', ὡς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος
ἠϋξατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πηχέων,
ὅπως καταπίνω, φησί, ὅτι πλείστον
χρόνον
καὶ πάνθ' ἅμα μοι τὰ βρώμαθ' ἡδονὴν
ποῶ.

τὸν φάρυγγα. This is incorrect, of course, from the anatomical point of view. Aristotle himself restricts the name φάρυγξ to the *trachea* or wind-pipe. But it was popularly used for *οἰσοφάγος*. Cf. Eur. Cycl. 215 ὁ φάρυγξ εὐτρεπῆς ἐστω (for dinner), Ar. Frogs, 571 ὦ μαρὰ φάρυγξ. We cannot expect correct anatomy from an ὀψοφάγος, a Satyr and a πανδοκεύτρια. Machon says λάρυγγα, which is equally wrong.

κοινοτάτῃ, i.e. πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις. Cf. Probl. 950 a, 9 sqq. οὐσῶν δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέντε, τὰ τε ἄλλα ζῷα ἀπὸ δύο μόνων τῶν προειρημένων ἡδεταί.

§ 11. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A further restriction to certain pleasures of touch.

XI. § 1. κοινὰι implies φυσικὰι. Certain desires are common to all as opposed to ἴδιαι, and therefore φυσικὰι as opposed to ἐπίθετοι 'adventitious.'

- 10 πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δὲ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὁμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων· τῆς δὲ τοιαύδε ἢ τοιαύδε οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὲν ἄλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἐτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω
 15 τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἓν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἢ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς
 20 παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ 4 πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερ-
 25 βάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ

1118 b, 16. EE. 1221 b, 15 ὀψοφάγοι δὲ καὶ γαστρίμαργοι καὶ οἰνόφυλγες τῷ πρὸς ὀποτέρας τροφῆς ἀπόλασιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν παθητικὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον.

φησὶν Ὁμηρος. II. xxiv, 129.

τῆς δὲ τοιαύδε, sc. ἐπιθυμεῖ. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 36. Keeping the MS. τὸ δὲ τοιαύδε, Ramsauer reads παντός for πᾶς.

§ 2. φαίνεται, sc. τὸ τοιαύδε ἢ τοιαύδε ἐπιθυμεῖν.

ἡμέτερον, i.e. ἴδιον as opposed to κοινόν. Still some things are naturally more pleasant than others to certain classes of people, and even to all.

§ 3. αὐτήν, sc. τὴν γαστέρα implied in γαστρίμαργοι. Cf. 1117 b, 29 n.

§ 4. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων κ.τ.λ. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 36, and for φιλοτοιούτος see 1099 a, 9 n. Aristotle speaks here as if 'φιλο-so-and-so' was always used in a

bad sense, but in discussing φιλοτιμία later on, he calls attention to the fact that τὸ φιλοτοιούτον πλεοναχῶς λέγεται (1125 b, 14), i.e. that compounds with φιλο- are ambiguous and sometimes have a good sense, sometimes a bad one.

τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. For this test cf. 1125 b, 16. 1150 a, 12. b, 1. 1151 a, 5. What οἱ πολλοί do would be the average or ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης, not the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς. But any wide divergence from the average raises the presumption of excess or defect.

κατὰ πάντα δὲ κ.τ.λ. For δὲ connecting a finite verb with a participle, cf. 1116 b, 8 n. The ἀκόλαστος goes wrong in all three ways.

καὶ ἡ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκόλασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δηλόν· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος τῷ μῇ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ 30 λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ 1119^a τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν—μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία—ἀτόπως δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς 5 ἡδονὰς καὶ ἡττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δὲ τῷ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὺν μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἐτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος 10

1119 a, 5. EE. 1231 a, 26 ἀναισθητος μὲν οὖν, ἡ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, ὁ οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὅσων ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον ἀκόλαστος. πάντες γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες), οὐδ' ἀνάληγοι (οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσιν).

§ 5. περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας κ.τ.λ. The question of πῶς μεσότης is here briefly touched, and the relation of σωφροσύνη to pleasure and pain is contrasted with that of ἀνδρεία. To perform a brave act we must endure positive pain, to act in a temperate way we have only to abstain from pleasure. If we are σώφρονες this will give us positive pleasure and not pain; if we feel pain in abstaining, we are ἀκόλαστοι, but the pain is not positive; τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

§ 6. μετὰ λύπης...ἡ ἐπιθυμία. Cf. 1105 b, 21.

§ 7. οὐ πάνυ γίνονται, 'hardly occur.' For the use of οὐ πάνυ, cf. Ind. s. v.

οὐ τέτευχε δ'...ὀνόματος. Cf. 1107 b, 6 where he adds ἔστωσαν δ' ἀναισθητοί. Eudemos (loc. cit.) compares the New Comedy type of the ἀγροῖκος. There were comedies of this name by Antiphanes, Anaxandrides, Anaxilas, Philemon and Menander.

διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ' 8
 ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
 λον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ
 οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπείται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ
 15 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν·
 ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων
 ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμ-
 ποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.
 ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς
 20 ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

XII. Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν,
 τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν 2
 τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον
 25 δὴ ἐκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι
 ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ
 ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε 3
 δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον·

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ
 μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἡ ἕξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία. ὥστ' εἰ
 σωφροσύνη ἢ βελτίστη ἕξις, περὶ αὐτὴν ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἡδέα τὰ
 εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, μεσότης οὕσα
 ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας· ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία· ἢ δ' ἔλλειψις
 ἥτοι ἀνώνυμος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόμασι προσαγορευομένη. ἀκριβέ-
 στερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
 ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.

§ 8. ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, sc. λέγει, κε-
 λεύει, προστάττει. Cf. 1115 b, 12 n.

XII. § 1. Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This discussion of the voluntariness of ἀκολασία and δειλία is due to the need of showing how far the respective ἀρεταί are really ἐφ' ἡμῶν, and therefore how far it is true that our deliberation is really complete with regard to them.

ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν κ.τ.λ. The point

is that it is more in our power not to pursue a good thing than to avoid a bad one.

§ 2. ἐξίστησι, explained by φθείρει τὴν φύσιν, φύσις here being used in the Academic sense of normal state or condition. Cf. below 1149 b, 35.

§ 3. δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. There is no pain in being a coward, for the coward keeps out of the way of pain; but particular acts of cowardice imply

ἐν γὰρ ἄλυτος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε
 ὅπλα ρίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ 30
 εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα
 —ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ—τὸ δ' ὅλον ἦττον·
 γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκο-
 καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι
 αὖ ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν 1119^b
 αὖ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προ-
 οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ
 αἰσχυρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὕξῃσιν ἔχον, τοιοῦ-

9 a, 33. EE. 1230 a, 38 λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλὰ-
 τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως μὴδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ αἵματος
 τμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος· αἵματι
 τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατόν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς
 κολάσιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ
 ς περὶ αὖ ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ
 γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον
 αἱ καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάντες διὰ κολάσεως. πλεοναχῶς δὲ
 τῆς τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς τινὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶ,
 καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακείσθαι πως καὶ ἀλλήλων
 αἱ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκο-
 ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν. τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι'

in. On the other hand, there
 ain—quite the contrary—in
 ng a particular act of intem-

but to be an intemperate
 ways painful (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ

βία εἶναι. Really they are
 ράξεις.

τὸ δ' ὄνομα κ.τ.λ. A note
 ology. The word ἀκόλαστος
 of children like the English
 'It conveys the idea of the
 "Spare the rod," etc.

iv. The verb φέρειν is used
 ring' a name to a thing. See
 52 a, 13 δεῖ τοίνυν τῶν ὀνο-

μάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ δη-
 λούν τι, καὶ μὴ πολλά, μόνον δ' ἐν· αὖ
 δὲ πλείω σημαίνει (i. q. πλεοναχῶς
 λέγεται), φανερόν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ὃ φέρεῖ
 τοῦτομα τούτων. Rhet. 1412 b, 10
 ἐὰν προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ.
 Cf. below 1125 b, 15. b, 28.

§ 6. οὐ κακῶς...μετενηνέχθαι, 'not
 to be a bad metaphor' (μεταφορά). The
 word μεταφέρειν is to be explained
 from the use of φέρειν given in the
 last note. We 'transfer' a name from
 its proper application in virtue of
 some ὁμοιότης or, more strictly, in
 virtue of some ἀναλογία. Cf. Poet.
 1457 b, 6 sqq.

5 τον δὲ μάλιστα ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ
 ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος
 ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ 7
 ἥξει· ἅπληστος γὰρ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ
 ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἢ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές,
 10 καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σφοδραὶ ὥσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν.
 διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μη-
 θὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκο- 8
 λασμένον—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα
 τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν
 15 λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν 9
 τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ
 σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ
 λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης. 10

ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθητόν,
 οἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι δ' οὐ πᾶν
 γινώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον
 ἀμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδῶν
 ἥτταν καὶ αἰσθῆσιν. μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷους οἱ κομμοδοδι-
 σκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἱ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα
 πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσις.

καὶ ὁ παῖς. Cf. above 1103 a, 3
 ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.

§ 7. τὸ συγγενές. Here apparent-

ly in the sense of τὸ σύμφυτον as in
 1149 b, 11 and often.

ἐκκρούουσιν. Cf. 1154 a, 27.

BOOK IV.

GOODNESS IN SOCIAL LIFE.

Introductory Note.

The Fourth Book shows how the principles we have discovered apply not only to the great virtues of Fortitude and Temperance, but also to those "minor morals" which make up nine-tenths of life. If our principles are worth anything at all, they must be capable of explaining these also, and in fact it is the best possible test we can apply to them. The importance of this book is entirely missed if we imagine that Aristotle is setting before us types of character for our admiration and imitation. His aim is not edification, but the application of the test of fact to a general law. From this point of view the criticism that he has strayed from moral philosophy into matters more fitting for a handbook of etiquette will be seen to be wide of the mark. Our principles must be shown to explain what the average Athenian understood by *καλοκάγαθία*, or they stand condemned. The lesser men who came after Aristotle did not rise to this point of view. They apologise for discussing such things, or even deny to them the name of "virtues." But Aristotle's greatness is seen in this, that he felt bound to show that the Mean was exemplified not only in the regulation of such passions as Fear and Desire, but just as much in the ordinary acts of everyday social life.

Δ

Λέγωμεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρί- 25 σεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγωμεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νο- 2

1119 b, 22. EE. 1231 b, 27 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητες. ἡ μὲν ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσεται μὲν πάσῃ μᾶλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ, ἀποβολῇ δὲ πάσῃ λυπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ἀνελεύθερος, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἦττον ἢ δεῖ ἄσωτος, ὁ δ' ἀμφω ὡς δεῖ

I. § 1. περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. The restriction of the word ἐλευθέριος to Liberality in money matters was Attic. Cf. Plato, Rep. 402 c, Theait. 144 d ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότης, Xen. Symp. 4, 15 ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα, passages which show that the limitation did not even in Attic always 'go without saying.' Many points in Aristotle's sketch are suggested by Plato's picture of Cephalos in the Republic.

περὶ χρήματα. The first question is περὶ ποῖα μεσότης. Cf. 1115 a, 5 n. ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, sc. ἐν οἷς ὁ ἀνδρείος. ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, sc. ἐν ἡδοναῖς τισιν. ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, Par. ὥσπερ ὁ δίκαιος. Aristotle speaks as if δικαιοσύνη had already been treated in its natural place along with ἀνδρεία and

σωφροσύνη, though it had really been postponed, on the ground, as we are told above (1108 b, 7), that οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται.

περὶ δόσιν...ἐν τῇ δόσει, a good example of the equivalence of these two prepositional phrases to express the material (ὅλη) of goodness, which is here a πράξις not, as hitherto, a πάθος. Cf. also ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κ.τ.λ. above.

μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. Cf. above 1117 b, 26 ἦττον...περὶ τὰς λύπας.

§ 2. χρήματα δὲ λέγωμεν κ.τ.λ., 'all that has a money value,' not merely money itself. The money value is the continuum in which we have to find the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Aristotle's theory of money is discussed later on in Book V.

3 μίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία
περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνε-
λευθερίαν προσάπτομεν αἰ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρή-
ματα σπουδάζουσιν, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρουμεν ἐνίοτε συμ- 30
πλέκοντες. τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανη-
4 ροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν, διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·
πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγο-
5 ρεῖνται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων,
τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμε- 1120 α
νος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχό-
μεθα.

ἐλευθέριος. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τὸ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων, τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκείνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ
καὶ ἐλλείψει, ὅπου δὲ ἔσχατά εἰσι, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἐν
δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον τῷ εἶδει τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα
μεσότητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ

§ 3. ἀσωτία, 'prodigality.' Antiphanes and Euthyklus wrote comedies called *Ἀσῶτοι*, and Timostratos one called *Ἀσῶτος*. Ennius and Caecilius each wrote an *Asotus*. We shall see that all through this book Aristotle draws more on Comedy than on life. The 'Middle' and New Comedy had provided a *hortus siccus* of types of character, which furnished him with the material he wanted. There could be no better evidence of τὰ δοκούντα.

ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις. The plural is used because each may be either ὑπερβολή or ἐλλείψις according as we refer it to λήψις or δόσις.

ἐπιφέρουμεν, 'we apply.' For φέρειν, ἐπιφέρειν ὄνομα cf. 1119 a, 34 n.

συμπλέκοντες. Of this word Bonitz says 'logice saepe usurpatur de coniungendis in eandem notionem plurimis notis' (Ind. Ar. 718 a, 55). We may render 'in a complex sense,' 'with a wider connotation.' 'Pro-

digality' often connotes Incontinence and Intemperance.

§ 4. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται, i.e. ἀλλοτρίως προσαγορεύονται. We have ἀλλοτρίως ἀποδιδόναι in Cat. 2 b, 35 of those who answer the question τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος in any other category than the τί ἐστὶν (genus and species). So Top. 108 b, 28 οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὀρίζεσθαι. From Phys. 195 b, 3 we see that οἰκείως is also opposed to κατὰ συμβεβηκός, and that term could be substituted for ἀλλοτρίως in the passages above. The meaning here, then, is κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγονται.

§ 5. βούλεται...εἶναι. 'By ἄσωτος we mean ὁ ἐν τι κακὸν ἔχων.' The phrase βούλεται εἶναι is often used in the same sense as βούλεται λέγεσθαι (for which see 1110 b, 30 n.). So below 1125 b, 33. The usage explained 1132 a, 21 n. is a little different.

Ὦν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία τις, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κα-
 5 κῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆ-
 ται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ χρήσεται
 ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετὴν· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν
 ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρήσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ
 10 λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ δίδοναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν
 δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον
 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶ-
 λον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδελον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν 8
 δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λή-
 15 ψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ
 δίδοντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον.
 καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκείου ἦττον 9
 προίενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευ-
 θέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ

ἀποβολήν. διχῶς δὲ τὰ χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν.
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ χρήσις τοῦ κτήματός ἐστιν, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἡ
 ἱματίου, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως ὥς ἂν εἴ τις σταθμῇ
 χρῆσταιτο τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἡ πώλησις καὶ ἡ μίσθωσις· χρῆται
 γὰρ ὑποδήματι. ὁ δὲ φιλάργυρος ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμά ἐστιν ἐσπονδακὴς,
 τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς χρήσεώς ἐστιν·
 ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἄσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον
 τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν
 αὔξησιν διώκει· ὁ δ' ἄσωτος ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος
 τὴν περιουσίαν δίδωσιν.

§ 6. Ὦν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία κ.τ.λ. The middle term of the first syllogism is τὰ χρήσιμα=ὡν χρεία ἐστίν, that of the next is ὁ ἔχων...τὴν ἀρετὴν.

§ 7. χρήσις...κτῆσις. Cf. 1098 b, 32 n. The point is that the ἀρετὴ derives its character from its ἐνέργεια.

§ 8. καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος. We are looking for an ἐπαινετὴ ἔξις, and that will have to do with τὸ χαλεπώτερον and not τὸ ῥᾶον.

§ 9. ἦττον προίενται, sc. τοῦ δέοντος. 'Men are apter to give away too little of their own than to take their neighbours' goods.' It is not the μᾶλλον which is redundant, as editors say, but the οὐ. For μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ after a negative (explicit or virtual) see Liddell and Scott s. v. μάλα II, 6, Kühner, § 516, 6. So in French, "on donne trop peu du sien, plus souvent qu'on ne prend le bien d'autrui."

εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἥττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· 20
 11 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάννυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχε-
 δὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γάρ,
 12 τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ
 τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα
 καὶ ὀρθῶς. οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα 25
 13 ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ
 14 κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἀλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδούς
 οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην
 αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυ-
 πηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς 30
 15 πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ
 δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ τιμώντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη
 16 λήψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦν-
 17 τος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, 1120^b
 ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων, βουλόμενός γε
 διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ
 18 διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ

§ 10. εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα. Cf. Rhet. 1376 a, 28 ἀμφισβητεῖν περὶ τοῦ ἥθους εἰς φανulότητα.

οὐχ ἥττον, i.e. μᾶλλον. We call them 'honest' rather than 'liberal.'

οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες, sc. ὡς δεῖ.

§ 11. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, sc. λεγομένων. Cf. 1152 b, 7 τὸν μακάριον ἀπομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.

§ 12. καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. For the proof of this see 1115 b, 20.

τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει, i.e. τῇ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον δόσει.

§ 13. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως. Cf. above 1104 b, 5 sqq.

§ 16. εὐχερῶς, 'without caring how,' μὴ δυσχεραίνων. The εὐχερῆς is not 'nice' or 'fastidious.'

§ 17. οἷον ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ., e.g. the produce of his own lands or live stock, not from the public property

(ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν), as some politicians do. Cf. below 1163 b, 8.

καλόν...ἀναγκαῖον. This is the literary form of the opposition between the end and the *conditio sine qua non*, the final and the material cause. The ἀναγκαῖον here referred to is not τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως εἶναι, but τὸ οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ εὖ (Met. 1072 b, 12), τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον (Part. An. 642 a, 9), the conditionally necessary, that which must be if something else is to be.

οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων. I prefer οἰκείων, the reading of L^b, to ἰδίων (K^b) which all the editors follow. Above ἰδίων (opp. κοινῶν, δημοσίων) is in place, but here we want an opposite to ἀλλοτρίων.

§ 18. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show the need of the caution given in the preceding section.

5 σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν
 ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίον.
 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ 19
 πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος
 ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν [δίδωσιν]. οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει
 10 ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλατ-
 τόνων διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησά- 20
 μενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς
 ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα,
 ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν
 15 ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν
 δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς
 δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι 21
 ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ
 γὰρ οἷον τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ
 20 οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὲν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ 22
 δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ
 τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς
 ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστὶν ὁ 23
 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον
 25 ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλη-
 θος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς
 δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσότητος 24
 οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ
 δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μι-
 30 κροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν

§ 19. αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, sc. ἐστί. For the reading see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 37. It is the προαίρεσις which makes the man liberal.

§ 20. εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. Cf. *infra* 1167 b, 34. 1168 a, 21. This ἐνδοξον comes from Plato, *Rep.* 330 b οὐ τοι ἔνεκα ἡρόμην, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἐδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ

οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσιν, αὕτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματιστάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ἥπερ οἱ ἄλλοι.

§ 21. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται κ.τ.λ. Cf. the *σκολιόν* of Timokreon ὠφελὲν σ', ὦ τυφλὲ Πλούτε κ.τ.λ. (Bergk-Crusius p. 269), and the *Ploutos* of Aristophanes.

αὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἅμφω οὕσης μεσότη-
 τοιήσῃ ἀμφοτέρω ὥς δεῖ· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δό-
 τοιαύτῃ λήψις, ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν
 πόμηναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαί τῃ δῆ-
 ὅς οὐ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμ- 1121^a
 αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ·
 ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ
 ἱ. καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
 γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ 5
 ὁ ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ-
 ὅς τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδου οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.
 ἰσώτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεσθαι ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προῖοῦσι φανερώ-
 εῖρηται δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ 10
 ἰα καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λή-
 καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
 ἰα τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ
 λάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλ-
 ι, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς. 15
 ἐν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον

ἔπεται. By this word Aris-
 "denotat praedicari aliquam
 em de altera, ita ut hac posita,
 am ponenda sit" (Bonitz).

εὐκοινώνητος, 'easy to do
 ss with.' For the sentiment cf.
 der fr. 95 Kock—

πράτιστος ἐστ' ἀνὴρ, ὦ Γοργία,
 ἀδικεῖσθαι πλείστ' ἐπίστατ' ἐγ-
 ῶς.

τῷ Σιμωνίδου. I have adopted
 er's conjecture for MS. τῷ Σιμωνί-
 See Contr. p. 37. Simonides had
 itation for avarice. Aspasios
 λαργυρίας αὐτοῦ μέμνηται ἄλλοι
 Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἡθῶν
 τῷ Περὶ πλούτου. The saying
 ferred to is probably that given
 et. 1391 a, 8 ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνί-

νίδου εἰρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ
 πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἰέρωνος
 ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρείττον
 πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· Πλούσιον εἰπεῖν·
 τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἐφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν
 πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας.

§ 29. πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς. If it were
 ἐν μεγάλῳ he would be ἀδικος, cf.
 1122 a, 7.

τὰ...τῆς ἀσωτίας, excess in giving,
 defect in taking.

οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται, i.e. οὐχ
 ἔπεται ἀλλήλοις. There is no ne-
 cessary connexion between the two
 attributes of ἀσωτία and so 'they do
 not go much together.' For οὐ πάνυ,
 see Ind. s. v. It does not mean 'not
 at all,' except in the sense that οὐχ
 ἥκιστα may mean μάλιστα.

μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι—ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλεί-
πει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ιδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄστωι
εἶναι—ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι 31
20 τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐίατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας
καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν.
ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβά-
νει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὥς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἢ πως
ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ,
25 καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος
τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεινοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν
διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν 32
τρόπον ἄσματος πολὺν δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διὰ
τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα,
30 ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσμάτων, καθάπερ 33
εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰς κατὰ τοῦτο
ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀνα- 34
λίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ
ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν
1121^b πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλι-
γώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι,
τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευ- 35
θέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου
5 ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλου-
σίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν,
τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ
ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες
καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς
10 τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσω- 36

§ 30. οἵπερ καί, 'and it is just these,' i.e. private persons as opposed to tyrants.

§ 31. ἐπεὶ, *quamquam*. ὁ γε τοιοῦτος, i.e. ὁ μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνων καὶ πᾶσι διδούς. This is the prodigal young man of the New Comedy, who is usually a sympathetic character.

§ 34. εὐχερῶς here is simply 'con-

veniently,' 'easily,' opp. to *δυσχερῶς*. In this sentence the meaning expressed by *εὐχερῶς* above (1120 a, 34) is given by *ὀλιγώρως*.

§ 35. τούτου ἕνεκα, sc. τοῦ καλοῦ, cf. 1120 a, 24.

εὐχερῶς once more with the same meaning as 1120 a, 34.

πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν. Rhet. 1389 b,

ιδιαιότητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
 λείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. ἡ δ'
 εἰρία ἀνιάτος τ' ἐστίν—δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα
 ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν—καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 ροις ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον 15
 οὐ καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν·
 γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ
 α, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς
 οὐ πᾶσιν ὀλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χω-
 καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δό- 20
 ῖπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις
 ἰδῶλοι γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλεί-
 ῶν δ' ἄλλοτριῶν οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβά-
 μὲν διὰ τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχροῶν
 γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ 25
 ἀγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πράξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ
 ρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς

b, 21. EE. 1232 a, 10 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων εἶδη λέγονται
 α τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον περὶ μόρια, οἷον ἀνελεύθερος φειδωλὸς
 λιξ καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, φειδωλὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ μὴ προίεσθαι,
 ρδῆς δ' ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ δὲ ὁ σφόδρα περὶ μικρὰ
 ενος, παραλογιστῆς δὲ καὶ ἀποστερητῆς ὁ ἄδικος κατ' ἀνελευ-
 καὶ τοῦ ἀσώτου ὡσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀτάκτως ἀναλί-
 ὄγιστος δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ λύπην.

εσβύται) πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον
 οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν. 1390 a,
 πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον
 τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς

δ γῆρας. The New Comedy
 represented old men as ἀνελεύ-
 Rhet. 1389 b, 28 ἀνελεύθεροι
 τεροί). ἔν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγ-
 ῦστα· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν
 ἴσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ κτή-
 ῖ βῆδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν.

ωρίζεται opp. το συνδύζεται
 1 a, 16.

§ 39. οἷον κ.τ.λ. Cf. EE. 1232 a,
 12 above. We are here in the midst
 of the New Comedy vocabulary.

κίμβικες. According to Coraes,
 quoted by Stewart, the word κίμβιξ
 properly meant 'flea' (Modern Greek
 τῖβικι = κίμβικιον). The name seems
 to have been applied to Simonides (by
 Xenophanes, according to schol. Ar.
 Peace 697), cf. Athenaeus 656 d ὅντως
 δὲ ἦν ἀληθῶς κίμβιξ ὁ Σιμωνίδης καὶ
 αἰσχροκερδής, ὡς ὁ Χαμαιλέων φησί.

κυμινοπρίστης, 'cummin-sawer.'
 Cf. our 'skin-flint,' 'cheese-parer.'

ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι). οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέ-
 χονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὥς οὐ ῥάδιον αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων
 30 λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους μὴ ἄρέσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ
 μῆτε λαμβάνειν μῆτε διδόναι. οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν 40
 ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ
 τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ
 πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ.
 1122^a πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅποσον οὐ δεῖ.
 κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ 41
 ἔνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς 42
 γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἂ δεῖ, οὐ
 5 λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας
 καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ
 ἀδίκους. ὁ μὲντοι κυβευτῆς καὶ λωποδύτης [καὶ ὁ ληστής] 43
 τῶν ἀνελευθέρων· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἔνεκα
 ἀμφοτέροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ
 10 μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἔνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ
 τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφοτέροι δὲ ὅθεν
 οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ
 τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι 44
 ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς
 15 ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
 λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1357, has the expressive compound *κυμνοπιστοκαρδαμογλύφος*. The word is found in Alexis (fr. 251) and Poseidippos (fr. 26), while *κυμνοκίμβιξ* is quoted from an anonymous comic writer.

ἄρέσκειν. I prefer this, the reading of both K^b and L^b, to the more colourless *ἀρέσκει* of inferior sources. The sudden transition to indirect speech brings vividly before us some comic old man's tirade.

§ 40. *πορνοβοσκοί*, the *lenones* of the New Comedy. Cf. Theophr. Char. 6 *δεινὸς δὲ καὶ πανδοκεῖσθαι καὶ*

πορνοβοσκήσαι καὶ τελωνῆσαι καὶ μηδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν ἐργασίαν ἀποδοκιμάσαι, ἀλλὰ κηρύττειν μαγειρεῖν *κυβεύειν*.

κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ, 'in small sums and at high interest.'

§ 43. *καὶ ὁ ληστής* is omitted by Aspasios and is inconsistent with *ἀμφοτέροι* below. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 38.

οἱ μὲν, the robbers (*λωποδύται*); *οἱ δέ*, the sharpers.

§ 44. *μεῖζόν τε γάρ κ.τ.λ.* For the question *πῶς ἀντίκειται* see notes on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

II. Δόξαι δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν 20 χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. 2 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ 25 3 περὶ δ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ "πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτην," ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευ- 4 θέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἢ μὲν ἑλλειψίς μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, 30

1122 a, 18. EE. 1233 a, 31 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ περὶ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πρᾶξιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ μὴ πού κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν· ἄνευ δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων ἀναλωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὴ ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῦ πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικός, καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῇ ὀρεκτικός, μεγαλοπρεπής. ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μῆζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος, ἀνώνυμος· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει τινὰ

II. § 1. περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας, 'munificence.' This was a form of goodness regularly expected of the Athenian upper classes, and showed itself chiefly in *λητουργίαι* and *ἐπιδόσεις*.

ὑποσημαίνει, cf. 1112 a, 16.

ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα. Of course in the compound *μεγαλοπρεπής*, *πρέπειν* has its original sense of 'to be conspicuous,' but Aristotle treats it as if it meant 'to be fitting.'

§ 2. *πρὸς τι*, 'relative.'

τριηράρχῳ...ἀρχιθεωρῷ. The trierarchy was an *ἐγκύκλιος* *λητουργία* (Dict. Ant. s. v.), the *ἀρχιθεωρία* was an extraordinary one. The *ἀρχιθεωρός* had to equip the sacred pilgrimages to Delos, Olympia and else-

where. See 'Ab. πολ. 56, 3 καθίστησι δὲ καὶ (ὁ ἄρχων) εἰς Δῆλον χορηγούς, καὶ ἀρχιθεωρὸν τῷ τριακοντορίῳ τῷ τοὺς ἡθέους ἄγοντι. These are the *δὲς ἐπτά* of Plato, *Phaid.* 58 a and *Bakchylides*.

ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ δ, synonymous, 'the object.' Cf. above 1119 b, 25 n. The expression is condensed for *πρὸς τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ δ*. For the omission of the antecedent, cf. below 1122 b, 2.

§ 3. *πολλάκι κ.τ.λ.* Od. xvii, 420-1

Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔναιον ὄλβιος ἀφνειόν, καὶ πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτην.

§ 4. *μικροπρέπεια*. The word does not seem to occur before Aristotle.

ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ 5
 35 δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ 6
 1122^b γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται καὶ ὧν ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαί καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἐσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δα-
 5 πάνης ἄξιον δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἡ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ 7
 ἔνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ 8
 προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλ- 9

γαιτνίαςιν, οὗς καλοῦσιν τινες ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας. οἷον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλούσιος ὢν, δοκεῖ πρέπειν ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν οἷον ἀγαθοδαιμονιστὰς ἐστιῶντι, οὗτος μὲν μικροπρεπὴς, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους δεχόμενος ἐκείνως μὴ δόξης χάριν μηδὲ δι' ἐξουσίαν ὁμοίως τῷ σαλάκωνι, ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὥς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπὴς· τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι [καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρέποντος (l. πράττοντος) κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον (περὶ ὃν Jackson)] καὶ περὶ ὃ (οἷον περὶ οἰκέτου γάμον ἕτερον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένου) καὶ αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐπὶ

ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κ.τ.λ. EE. 1233 a, 38. Isokr. Dem. 7 d ἐστι φιλοκάλου μὲν τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, καλλωπιστοῦ δὲ τὸ περιέργον.

βαναυσία. The origin of the word is unknown, but its primitive application was clearly to mechanical arts unworthy of a free citizen. In the Politics we find it in this sense without any moral implication, e.g. 1277 b, 35 ἡ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θεέον.

ἀπειροκαλία, 'want of taste,' coupled with ἀμυσία in Plato, Rep. 403 c.

§ 5. **ἐπιστήμονι,** 'an artist,' 'a connoisseur.'

§ 6. **ἐν ἀρχῇ.** No such statement has yet been made, but that will not justify us in bracketing the sentence

with Ramsauer. It has been implied throughout in the discussion of ἕξις under the two heads περὶ ποῖα (= ὧν ἐστίν) and πῶς (= ταῖς ἐνεργείαις). The point here is that we must have πρέπον μέγεθος not only in the ἐνέργεια, i.e. the δαπάνη, but also in the ἔργον, the object of the δαπάνη. I therefore read αἱ δὲ for the MS. αἱ δὴ.

§ 8. **προετικῶς,** 'profusely,' already in Xen. Mem. iii, 1, 6.

ἀκριβολογία, 'nice counting of the cost.' This use of the word for the habit of ἀκριβῆς λογισμός instead of ἀκριβῆς λόγος (cf. ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι 1139 b, 19) is rare. The usual term for this is μικρολογία (Theophr. Char. 10). A similar idea, however, under-

πρεπωδέστατον σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ
 ἴστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλο- 10
 αι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἂ δεῖ καὶ ὡς
 ἴτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
 α τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δα-
 ῖργον ποιήσκει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ
 ματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον 15
 ν, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ
 του ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυ-

son) τοσούτον ἢ τοιούτον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾔετο
 πρέπειν, ἣν ἐποίησατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προὔπρξασαν
 , ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἔχων πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν [δ]
 ον. καὶ ἐπ' ἐλευθεριότητος ὡσαύτως· ἔστι γὰρ τις οὗτ'
 οὗτ' ἀνελεύθερος.

of ἀκριβῆς in Andok. 33
 καιτᾶσθαι and Menander
 κ ἀκριβῆς τοὺς τρόπους.
 , Laws 844 b ἐὰν δὲ δι'
 τὸ ὕδωρ), i.e. so scarce
 e to count every bucket-

ν καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου,
 it will cost and how it
 cheapest.'

οὔτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. ἐν
 ὡς δεῖ. 'It is here that
 e. the μέγεθος) of the
 shows itself, and this is
 y has to do with. He
 a more magnificent re-
 ie μικροπρεπῆς or the
 he same expense.' The
 ce is intended to show
 f the ἐλευθέριος and the
 . It is not the actual
 he spends which makes
 nt, but the way he
 he clause ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
 does not, I think, con-
 nce with Liberality, but
 xcess and defect. Sup-

pose the μικροπρεπῆς and the βάναισος
 to spend the same sum as the μεγαλο-
 πρεπῆς on a public object, the result
 will be neither μέγα nor πρέπον. In
 the one case it will be spoiled by a
 desire to do more for the money than
 can properly be done, in the other by
 the desire to make the ἔργον look ex-
 pensive at the cost of higher qualities.
 Cf. 1122 a, 32.

οἷον μέγεθος, quasi dicas μέγεθος.
 Aristotle uses οἷον to introduce ex-
 planations of an etymology. Cf.
 1128 a, 10.

κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Public
 munificence is not to be gauged by
 its money value like property, but by
 its impressive character. The word
 θεωρία is a characteristic Greek touch.
 The munificent man is the man who
 provides fine 'sights,' processions,
 tragedies, public buildings and the
 like. The Athenians were born φιλο-
 θεάμονες. The munificent man pro-
 duces something 'grand,' not merely
 something costly.

μαστόν)· καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ [μεγαλοπρέπεια] ἐν μεγέθει.
 20 ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ 11
 περὶ θεοῦς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσαίαι, ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν
 εὐφιλοτιμήτᾳ ἔστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμ-
 25 πρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ἅπασιν δ' 12
 ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς
 25 ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ
 μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιῶντι πρέπειν—διὸ 13
 πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν
 πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ
 τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς—πρέ- 14
 30 πει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν

καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. 'The goodness of an *ἔργον* lies in its grandeur,' not in its cost. I bracket *μεγαλοπρέπεια* with Muretus. Its shifting place in the mss. indicates that it is an adscript.

§ 11. τίμια. Cf. 1101 b, 11 n.

κατασκευαί. The word is used absolutely for 'buildings.' Here temples etc. are clearly meant.

πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτιμήτᾳ. This is said to mean 'objects of patriotic ambition.' But *εὐφιλοτιμήτᾳ* is a very strange word, and ought to mean 'easy objects of ambition.' I believe that we should read οὐκ *εὐφιλοτιμήτᾳ* or *ἀφιλοτιμήτᾳ* (the confusion of *εὐ*- and *ἀ*- is constant in mss.). The greatest *λειτουργίαι* were far from being objects of public ambition, as we know; but just for that reason they attract the *μεγαλοπρεπής*. Cf. what is said of the *μεγαλόψυχος* 1124 b, 23. Dion. Hal. has the phrase *εἰς τὰ κοινὰ ἀφιλοτιμία*.

λαμπρῶς is a word of constant occurrence in connexion with the *λειτουργίαι*.

ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. The *λειτουργία*

of the *ἐστιάτορες* was simply *ἐστιᾶν τὴν φύλιν*, and this might conceivably be *πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν φιλοτιμήτορ*. Here we have something 'grander,' appealing only to a *μεγαλοπρεπής* like Konon who *τῇ περὶ Κνίδος ναυμαχίᾳ νικήσας Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τευχίσας τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἐκατόμβην τῷ ὄντι θύσας καὶ οὐ ψευδονύμως πάντας Ἀθηναίους εἰστίασεν*. (Athenaeus i, 3 d.)

§ 12. τίνων ὑπαρχόντων, 'what are his antecedents?' The reference is not merely to property, though it includes that.

πρέπειν. The sentence continues after the parenthesis with *πρέπει δὲ* (b, 29). Bywater, *Contr.* p. 38. For the example given in EE. 1233 b, 11 (p. 175), cf. Plutarch, *Them.* 5 εἰς 'Ὀλυμπίαν ἐλθὼν Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ διαμυλλώμενος τῷ Κίμωνι περὶ δέιπνα καὶ σκηναὶς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λαμπρότητα καὶ παρασκευὴν, οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν. ἐκεῖνῳ γὰρ ὄντι νέφω καὶ ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγάλης φόντο δεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα συγχωρεῖν· ὁ δὲ μήπω γνώριμος γεγονώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δοκῶν ἐξ οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπαίρεσθαι, προσωφλίσκαεν ἀλαζονείαν.

τρογόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς
 ἑνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει
 καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ
 ἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότερα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα 35
 ἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περὶ 1123
 α ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ
 ἑνῶν δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντι-
 δωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής ἀλλ'
 εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. 5
 μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως
 ἐν πλούτῳ (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
 πολλὸν δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα
 γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀρ-
 ιώζει θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ 10
 τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλο-
 πρεπέστατον <ἀπλῶς> μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ
 ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ
 δαπανήματι—σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλο-
 πρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἢ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ 15
 ἀνελεύθερον—διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ
 γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐνέπρβλη-
 τον) καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν
 ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάνανσος τῷ

§ 14. ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, 'those
 they have to do with' by relationship
 (τῶν γένει προσηκόντων) or otherwise.

§ 15. τῶν δὲ ἰδίων, 'private' as
 opposed to τὰ περὶ θεοῦς and τὰ πρὸς
 τὸ κοινόν.

ἑνῶν...ἀποστολάς. Specially used
 in connexion with gifts given to the
 departing guest.

§ 17. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. A long com-
 pound protasis which goes down to
 14 δαπανήματι, followed by a paren-
 thesis (α, 14 σφαῖρα...α, 16 ἀνελεύθερον).
 The apodosis begins at α, 16 διὰ τοῦτο.
 ἀπλῶς, inserted by Bywater (Contr.

p. 38), seems necessary to make an
 antithesis to ἐνταῦθα. 'Expenditure
 is munificent ἀπλῶς when it is great
 expenditure on a great object, in a
 given kind of expenditure, it is what
 is great in that kind.' The words
 ἐνταῦθα and ἐν τούτοις are equivalent
 to ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει.

§ 20. βάνανσος. Cf. above 1107 b,
 19. 1122 α, 31, where βανανσία καὶ
 ἀπειροκαλία are coupled. Eudemos
 (loc. cit. p. 174) speaks of ἀπειρο-
 κάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας, and Theo-
 phrastus (ap. Stob. II, 140 Wachsm.)
 called the ὑπερβολή by the name

20 παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστίων, καὶ κωμφοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ
 25 καλοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλούτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικρο- 21
 πρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅτι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ
 30 σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσας, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰς μὲν οὖν αἱ ἔξεις 22
 αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνειδῇ γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μῆτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μῆτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

III. 'Η δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνό-

1123 a, 34. EE. 1232 a, 19 περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδόμενων δεῖ διορίσασθαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ

of σαλακωνία. Cf. also Hesych. s.v. σαλακωνεῖσθαι. 'Ο δὲ Θεόφραστος σαλάκωνά φησιν εἶναι τὸν δαπανῶντα ὅπου μὴ δεῖ. Cf. Rhet. 1391 a, 3 (of the ἡθῆ which go with wealth) καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλάκωνες· τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τρυφήν καὶ τὴν ἐνδείξιν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας εὐθελῆς διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἐρώμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῷ ὀλεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους αὐ καὶ αὐτοί.

παρὰ μέλος, i.e. πλημμελῶς, *absone*, opposed to ἐμμελῶς (1122 a, 35) for which Plato has ἐν μέλει Soph. 427 d. Cf. also παρὰ μέλος φθέγεσθαι, εἰπεῖν Phileb. 28 b, Kritis 106 b, Laws 696 d and EE. 1233 a, 39 (p. 173).

ἐρανιστὰς, "Ἐρανος being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course

bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour." Grant. Eudemus refers to ἀγαθοδαιμονιστάς.

κωμφοῖς χορηγῶν. For the cost of a comic χορηγία Zell refers to Lys. p. 699 κωμφοῖς χορηγῶν Κηφισοδότῃ ἐνίκων καὶ ἀνῆλθσα σὺν τῇ τῇ σκενῇ ἀναθέσει ἑκκαίδεκα μνᾶς. A tragic χορηγία might cost 30 minae.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ, sc. τοῦ χοροῦ.

ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 38. Megarian comedy was thought φορτικῆς at Athens.

§ 21. ἐν μικρῷ...ἀπολεῖ are to be taken together. He will spoil the beauty of his work 'for a trifle' (Welldon). This use of ἐν resembles its use in the phrase κινδυνεύειν ἐν c. dat. for which see Kühner § 431, 1.

— III. § 1. 'Η δὲ μεγαλοψυχία, best rendered 'Pride.'

- 2 ματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν· δια- 35
 3 φέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἔξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ 1123^b
 δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μέγλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἄξιος ὢν· ὁ
 γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 4 οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος.
 ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξίων ἑαυτὸν σῶφρων, μεγα- 5
 5 λόψυχος δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ
 τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμ-

ἀλλα <ἀ> κατὰ τὴν γειννίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι του λανθάνει πόρρω
 προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταῦτ' συμβέβηκεν. διὸ ἐνίστε οἱ
 ἐναντίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦνται, οἷον ὁ ἄσματος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ αὐ-
 θάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ
 ὁμοιοὶ μέχρι τίνος, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ ὁ θρασὺς,
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὦδε ὁ δ' ὦδε· ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει πλείστον. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν
 μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει
 τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως. ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεί
 ὁμοιοὶ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅτε καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται.

περὶ ποῖα...πρῶτον. Cf. 1115 a, 5 n.
 λάβωμεν. For the dialectical phrase
 λαβεῖν περὶ with an interrogative cf.
 1130 b, 7. 1139 a, 15. 1168 b, 13.

§ 2. τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, 'the man
 who corresponds to the ἔξιν,' who
 embodies the type. Cf. 1126 b, 20.
 For the τόπος of σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ
 τὴν ἔξιν, cf. Top. 147 a, 12.

§ 3. δοκεῖ δὴ...εἶναι. These words
 are enough to show that Aristotle is
 not depicting an ethical ideal of his
 own, as has been supposed, but is
 still analysing *ἐνδοξα*. His own ideal
 we learn from Book X; this is the
 ideal of the average Hellene, and the
 character described reminds one of
 Περικλέης οὐλύμπιος. The description
 itself has much quiet humour and is
 surely half-ironical. In An. Post.
 97 b, 15 Aristotle takes the search for
 the definition of the μεγαλόψυχος as an
 illustration of method—οἷον λέγω εἰ τί
 ἐστὶ μεγαλοψυχία ζητοῦμεν, σκεπτέον
 ἐπὶ τινῶν μεγαλοψύχων οὐτε ἴσμεν

(σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν) τί
 ἔχουσιν ἐν πάντες ἢ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον εἰ
 Ἀλκιβιάδης μεγαλόψυχος ἢ Ἀχιλλεὺς
 καὶ ὁ Ἄλας, τί ἐν ἅπαντες; τὸ μὴ ἀνέ-
 χεσθαι ὑβριζόμενοι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπολέ-
 μησεν, ὁ δ' ἐμήνησεν, ὁ δ' ἀπέκτεινεν
 ἑαυτὸν. πάλιν ἐφ' ἐτέρων, οἷον Λυσάν-
 δρου ἢ Σωκράτους, εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀδιάφοροι
 εἶναι εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ ἀτυχοῦντες, ταῦτα
 δύο λαβὼν σκοπῶ τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχουσιν ἢ
 τε ἀπάθεια ἢ περὶ τὰς τύχας καὶ ἡ μὴ
 ὑπομονὴ ἀτμαζομένων (the definition
 here fulfils this condition). εἰ δὲ μη-
 δὲν, δύο εἶδη ἂν εἴη τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας.

§ 4. σῶφρων, here in its popular
 sense, equivalent to κόσμος, 'modest.'

§ 5. τὸ κάλλος κ.τ.λ. Cf. Poet.
 1450 b, 34 ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ
 ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα δὲ συνέστηκεν ἐκ
 τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ
 ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ
 τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ
 τάξει ἐστίν. Pol. 1326 a, 33 ἐπεὶ τό
 γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰσθε
 γίνεσθαι. Probl. 915 b, 37. 920 b, 29.

μετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξίων ἀνάξιος ὢν 6
 χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων 7
 10 ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἅντε μεγάλων ἅντε μετρίων, ἅντε
 καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ
 μάλιστ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει εἰ
 μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν με- 8
 γέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν
 15 ἀξιοῖ, οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὴ μεγά- 9
 λων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ
 ἐν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη. ἢ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ 10
 μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὐ
 μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
 20 ἀθλοῦν· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς
 ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμᾶς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
 ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ 11

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρίναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν.
 δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι μεγάλα ἃ διώκει ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἕξιν περὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα [εἶναι ἡδέα]. ἢ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη· κρίνει δ' ἡ περὶ
 ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν
 κελεύσειε καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὥστε ἐπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ αὐτὴν
 ἐπεσθαι πάσαις.

1123 b, 13. EE. 1232 b, 14 οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως
 ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ εἶναί τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι
 τῶν πολλῶν [καὶ] δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. δεῖ δὴ τοῦτο διορίσαντας
 εἰπεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ τιμὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς· ἡ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ
 πολλῶν τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀξίων λόγου, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ἐπὶ
 τίνι ἢ τιμῇ διαφέρει. μεγάλη γὰρ οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ
 τῷ ποιῶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τιμίαν εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαί καὶ
 τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἔστω,

§ 6. χαῦνος. The literal sense of this word is 'gaping.' It is then applied to anything porous, spongy or loose (Liddell and Scott) as for instance snow. It is from this that the meaning 'flimsy,' 'frothy,' 'inane' is derived.

§ 8. τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος κ.τ.λ.

Cf. 1107 a, 6 διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

§ 11. ἄνευ λόγου, 'we need not prove,' i.e. it is evident on the face of it even apart from the explanation or ground. Cf. 1131 a, 13. 1143 b, 2.

- 12 τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,
 13 κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
 14 καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς 25
 ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ
 δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
 μείζονος γὰρ αἰεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.
 τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ
 δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα. 30
 15 οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι,
 οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνας γὰρ ἔνεκα πράξει αἰσχροῦ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα;
 καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πᾶμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ
 μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος
 φαῦλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται 35

ὥστε καὶ ἀρετὴ οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοψύχους
 ποιεῖν ἐκάστη, περὶ ὃ ἐστὶν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν. ἀλλ'
 ὁμως ἐστὶ τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς μία μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ
 ἰδίᾳ μεγαλόψυχον τοῦτον λεκτέον τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν
 ἓν αὐτῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια τὰ δ' ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, τῶν
 τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά, καὶ
 τούτων ἓνιοι ἄξιοι καὶ ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτούς, ἐν τούτοις ζητητέος ὁ μεγαλό-
 ψυχος. τετραχῶς δ' ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι
 μεγάλων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δὲ μικρὰ καὶ ἀξιόν τινα
 τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δ' ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς ἐκάτερα
 αὐτῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος ἄξιος ὢν μικρῶν μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν
 ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ ἄξιος ὢν μεγάλων ἀξιοίῃ ἂν μικρῶν
 ἑαυτόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιος μικρῶν, μεγάλων δ' ἀξίων ἑαυτὸν ψεκτός
 (ἀνόητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τυγχάνειν), ψεκτὸς δὲ
 καὶ ὅστις ἄξιος ὢν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει μὴ ἀξιοῖ
 ἑαυτόν· λείπεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίος τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις, ὅστις ὢν

§ 12. οἱ μεγάλοι. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 38.

§ 14. τὸ...μέγα, 'the grand.' Everything is 'on the grand scale' with the μεγαλόψυχος.

§ 15. φεύγειν παρασείσαντι. The meaning is made quite clear by De Motu Animalium 705 a, 17 καὶ οἱ

θέοντες θᾶπτον θέουσι παρασείοντες τὰς χάρας, Probl. 881 b, 6 ὁ δὲ θᾶπτον θεῖ παρασείων ἢ μὴ παρασείων. The attitude is familiar from vase-paintings and is certainly beneath the dignity of our hero. Is it possible not to see that this is a humorous touch?

1124^a τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος 16
 τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνε-
 ται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλό-
 ψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. μάλιστα 17
 5 μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι. καὶ
 ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως
 ἡσθίσεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρε-
 τῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμῇ, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
 ἀποδέχεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν.
 10 τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλι-
 γωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ
 γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ 18
 εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ
 πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν
 15 μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὗτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς
 ἔσται οὗτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει
 ὥς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν
 τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν
 βούλονται· ὧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα.
 20 διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα 19
 συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦν-
 ται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ
 γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινων·
 25 κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ὧ δ' ἄμφω 20
 ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ

ἀξιος μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τούτων, καὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος
 ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὗτος ἐπαινετός καὶ μέσος τούτων. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ
 τιμῆς αἵρεσιν καὶ χρῆσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντιμῶν ἀρίστη
 ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀποδίδομεν, καὶ οὐ περὶ τὰ
 χρήσιμα, τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης αὐτῇ ἐπαινετωτάτη,
 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἂν εἴη.

§ 16. κόσμος...τῶν ἀρετῶν. Sim-
 ply 'an adornment of goodness.' Grant
 rightly translates 'the crown of the

virtues.'

§ 19. τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον. For
 this τόπος, cf. Top. 117 a, 16.

τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιού-
 σιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς
 21 παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ 30
 ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ
 φέρειν καὶ οἴομενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν κατα- 1124^b
 φρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται
 γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν
 οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρο-
 22 νοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως κατα- 5
 23 φρονεῖ—δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς—οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ
 ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν,
 μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὡς
 24 οὐκ ἄξιον ὅν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος
 δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. 10

1124 b, 1. EE. 1232 a, 38 ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ
 καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι. ἐκάστη δ' ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικούς ποιεῖ τῶν
 παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, ὅλον ἀνδρεία κινδύνων (μέγα γὰρ οἶεται εἶναι
 (ὑπομείναι τι Fritzsche) τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ πληθὺς (πάθος Fritzsche)
 οὐ πᾶν φοβερὸν), καὶ σώφρων ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ
 ἐλευθέριος χρημάτων. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα
 σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἐτέρῳ τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος τί δοκεῖ ἐνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς
 τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν
 ἀπολογία ἐπαινέσαντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλίγων τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστα
 εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ
 ὧν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς. καὶ λυπῆσεται ἀτιμαζόμενος καὶ ἀρχόμενος ὑπὸ
 ἀναξίου. καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων.

§ 21. καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ.
 Those who have wealth and power
 (without goodness) become haughty
 too. We have seen already (a, 20)
 that the μεγαλόψυχος is considered
 supercilious. As Aristotle goes on to
 say, haughtiness is the one point in
 which they can successfully imitate

the μεγαλόψυχος.

ἐν οἷς δύνανται. Cf. 1115 b, 31.

§ 23. μικροκίνδυνος. L^b and As-
 pasios have μικροκίνδυνος.

ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὅν κ.τ.λ. 'Life at
 any price is not worth having.' The
 adverb πάντως corresponds in meaning
 to the verbal phrase πᾶν ποιεῖν.

καὶ ἀντευεργητικὸς πλείονων· οὕτω γὰρ οἱ προσοφλήσει
 ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημο- 25
 νεύειν οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὗ (ἐλάττων
 γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν), καὶ
 15 τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ
 λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
 Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ 26
 μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς
 μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ
 20 τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ
 σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ
 ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθε-

§ 24. ἀντευεργητικὸς πλείονων, 'he is apt to return it by a greater benefit.' For the reading in the next clause, see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 39. By ὁ ὑπάρξας is meant the man who starts the interchange of benefits, 'the original benefactor.' Cf. 1136 b, 13. 1163 b, 21. In the same way ὁ ὑπάρχων is the aggressor in war as opposed to ὁ ἀμυνόμενος.

§ 25. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle enjoys noting the *travers* of this character. The μεγαλόψυχος was an object of raillery from the days of the Old Comedy downwards,—Perikles got his share,—but all the same he was the type that all true Hellenes inwardly admired.

οὗ ἂν, neuter, 'any benefit they have conferred.' This is Bywater's correction of MS. οὗς (Asp. ὧν). See *Contr.* p. 39. If we keep οὗς, we shall have to insert ἐφ' before ὧν with Münscher.

ἀκούειν, sc. δοκοῦσι, 'to be told of.' Bywater's correction of MS. ἀκούει (*Contr.* p. 39).

Διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν κ.τ.λ. This seems to be referred to as if it were a well-known difficulty. Achilles had told Thetis to remind Zeus of certain

definite services she had done him (II. i, 394 sqq.), but she contents herself with saying εἴποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν ὄνησα | ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργῳ (ib. 503). The question why she did not take her son's advice is just the sort of πρόβλημα that ancient critics propounded, and Aristotle here gives the λύσις. Cf. *Poet.* c. 25.

οἱ Λάκωνες. The schol. quotes Kallisthenes ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν who related ὅτι Θηβαίων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν εἰσβαλλόντων, ἐπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχίας δεόμενοι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅσα μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεποιθήκασιν εὖ τούτων ἐπελάθοντο ἐκόντες, ἃ δ' αὐτοὶ χρηστὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων ἐπεπόνθεσαν τούτων ἐμνήμητο, ὥς διὰ τούτων αὐτοὺς ἐπαξέμενοι πρὸς τὴν συμμαχίαν μάλλον. If this refers to 369 B.C., the speeches in Xen. *Hell.* vi, 5, 33 do not bear it out.

§ 26. ἐπ' ἐκείνοις... ἐν δὲ τοῖς. Both expressions are admissible. For ἐπὶ cf. χαίρειν ἐπὶ, and for ἐν cf. γέλῳ ἐν σοὶ γελῶ. Aristotle likes to vary his prepositions. So we have immediately after εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς.

27 νεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὐ προ-
 τεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἄργον εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου
 τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων 25
 28 δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστών. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομίσῃ εἶναι καὶ
 φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβούμενον, καὶ ἀμελεῖν
 τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν
 φανερώς (παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι,
 καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν [εἰρωνεία δὲ] 30
 29 πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν
 ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουρικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κό- 1125^a
 30 λακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ
 μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ
 31 μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐ- 5
 τοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει
 αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός
 ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι'
 32 ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός
 καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. 10
 33 καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν
 34 καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κί-
 νησις δὲ βραδεία τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ
 βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπενστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα

§ 27. εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα κ.τ.λ., i.e., if I am right, he reserves himself for τὰ ἀφιλοτίμητα. Cf. above 1122 b, 22 n.

§ 28. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. On the reading and interpretation of this passage see Bywater, Contr. p. 39. The ms. tradition is more confused than anywhere in the Ethics.

ἀληθευτικός, 'frank.' Cf. below 1127 a, 13 sqq.

δι' εἰρωνείαν. For the meaning of this word see below 1127 a, 21 n. The proud man affects a certain mock-humility in order to evade those who would trouble him with small matters. "I fear that is not quite in my line."

§ 29. πρὸς ἄλλον...ζῆν, 'to take his rule of life from another.' The preposition πρὸς is used of the standard. So πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν, πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν ζῆν etc.

§ 31. ἀνθρωπολόγος, apparently here only. The proud man does not care for personal conversation.

εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. The proud man will not indulge in weak abuse, though, when he wants to insult and humiliate people, he will speak his mind freely enough.

§ 34. καὶ κίνησις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle knows in his heart that the μεγαλόψυχος is something of a poseur.

15 σπονδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μὴδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτής διὰ τούτων.

Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρό- 35
ψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ.
20 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὧν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν
ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν
τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγεται γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος
ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἡλίθιοι γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ
25 χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφί-
στανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδε-
μάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ 36
δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς·
οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελέγchon-

1125 a, 17. EE. 1233 a, 9 τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ὥσπερ διεγράψαμεν,
ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων ἀνάξιον ὄντα χανόντης
(τοὺς τοιοῦτους γὰρ χαῦνους λέγομεν, ὅσοι μεγάλων οἰοῦνται ἄξιοι εἶναι
οὐκ ὄντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν μεγάλων
μικροψυχία (μικροψύχου γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅστις ὑπαρχόντων δι' αὐτὸν
ἀν' ἡξιοῦτο, μὴ ἀξιοῖ μηθενὸς μεγάλου ἑαυτόν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν
μεγαλοψυχίαν εἶναι μεσότητά χανόντητος καὶ μικροψυχίας. ὁ δὲ
τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων οὔτε πάμπαν ψεκτὸς οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος,
περὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον^ς ὧν μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε ἀξιοῖ μεγάλων,
διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἀξίῳ
ὄντι μεγάλων τὸ μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον <μικρῶν> ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὐκ ἔστι
δ' ἐναντίος οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς εἶναι (ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἔχει)
καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ (ὧν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τοῦτων
ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοὺς ἄμφω)· καὶ ὁ μὲν γένοιτ' ἂν μεγαλόψυχος (ἀξιώσει γὰρ

σύντονος, 'shrill,' as is shown by
Gen. An. 786 b, 35 δοκεῖ γενναιοτέρας
εἶναι φύσεως ἢ βαρυφωνία καὶ ἐν τοῖς
μέλεσι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον·
τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, ἢ δὲ βαρύτης
ὑπεροχὴ τις. This seems better than
making it a mere synonym of σπεν-
στικός. We want a word for the voice

as well as one for the gait. So
ὀξυφωνία immediately afterwards.

§ 35. οὐδ' οὗτοι, any more than
the μικροπρεπῆς and the βδανυστος.
Cf. 1123 a, 31.

ὀκνηροί, 'backward,' 'shy,' 're-
tiring.' They are not ἡλίθιοι like the
others. Cf. 1123 b, 3.

ται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, 30
καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερά εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέ-
37 γουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθισόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται
δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἢ μικροψυχίᾳ μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος·
38 καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χειρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλο-
ψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. 35

IV. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, καθάπερ ἐν 1125^b
τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἢ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς
τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν με-
γαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὐταὶ τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφυστάσι,
περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ· 5
2 ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δώσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ
ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ
3 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τὸν τε
γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ
τῆς τιμῆς ἐφίεμενον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς 10
4 καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον
ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον
ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπο-
μεν. δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιοῦτου λεγομένου οὐκ
ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες 15

ὧν ἐστὶν ἀξίος), ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, ὃς ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ μεγάλων κατὰ
τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, τί ἂν ἐποίει εἰ μικρῶν ἀξίος ἦν; εἰ γὰρ [ἂν]
μεγάλων ἀξίων χαῖνος ἦν, * * ἢ ἐλαττόνων ἔτι. διὸ καὶ οὐθεὶς ἂν
εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις μέτοικος ὧν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ'
ὑπεῖκει· ἀλλ' εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὧν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.

§ 36. σχήματι, 'manner.'

§ 37. ἀντιτίθεται. We expect ἀντί-
κειται, but cf. 1145 a, 25 n.

καὶ γὰρ γίνεται κ.τ.λ. See notes
on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

IV. § 1. ταύτην, sc. τὴν τιμὴν.
ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις 1107 b, 24.

§ 4. πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιοῦτου
λεγομένου, 'as φιλο-so-and-so is am-
biguous, it is clear that we do not

always apply the name φιλότιμον (on
the reading, Bywater, Contr. p. 40)
to the same thing.' In other words,
compounds with φιλο- sometimes have
a good sense, sometimes a bad one.
Mr Stewart instances φιλομαθής and
φιλοῦνος. On φιλοτοιοῦτου cf. 1099 a,
9 n., 1118 b, 22 n., and for φέρειν
ὄνομα ἐπὶ τι 'to ἄρρly a name to a
thing,' see 1119 a, 34 n.

μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ 5
20 δεῖ καὶ ἦττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἔξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνωνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ἀμφοτέρω πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' ὅτι εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' 25 οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

V. Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσιν, ἀνωνύμου οὖσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἂν. 2

1125 b, 26. EE. 1231 b, 5 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ πραότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρῶον περὶ λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γιγνομένην ὀρώμεν ὄντα, τῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν πῶς διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ

τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. On this text see 1118 b, 23 n. It is put here to vary the expression. The more accurate μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ follows in the next clause.

ὡς ἐρήμης...ἀμφισβητεῖν. In the sense of 'lay claim to' ἀμφισβητεῖν takes the genitive like ἀντιποιεῖσθαι (e.g. Pol. 1283 a, 11 ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, Isaios 3, § 1 οὐδὲις προσεποιήσατο οὐδ' ἡμφεσβήτησε τῆς κληρονομίας). The best commentary is the parallel passage 1107 b, 31 ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας. We are not to understand δίκης with ἐρήμης, for the allusion is to the κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδικασίαι, and in that connexion ἐρημος means 'unclaimed.' Cf. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 43, 4 καὶ τὰς λήξεις τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ὅπως μηδὲνα λάθῃ μηδὲν ἐρημον γενόμενον, Isokr. Aigin. § 3

τὸν οἶκον ἐρημον ποιῆσαι, and especially Isaios 3 § 61 ὡς ἐρήμων τῶν κλήρων ἐπιδικάζεσθαι.

§ 6. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Cf. 1108 b, 19—25.

ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. If ὁ μέσος had a name, one or other of the ἄκροι would have been thought μᾶλλον ἀντικεῖσθαι τῷ μέσῳ. As it is, they are only opposed to one another.

V. § 1. Πραότης, 'good temper,' 'patience.'

φέρομεν, 'we apply the name Patience to the mean.' See 1119 a, 34 n.

ἀνωνύμου οὖσαν. But see EE. 1231 b, 8 διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ (EN. 1126 a, 13) καὶ χαλεπῷ (EN. 1126 a, 26) καὶ ἀγρίῳ...τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη (EN. 1126 a, 8) καὶ τὸν ἀνέητον (cf. ἡλίθιοι EN. 1126 a, 5).

τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ 30
 3 διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος,
 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρῶτος
 δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἵπερ ἡ πρῶτης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται γὰρ
 ὁ πρῶτος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους,
 ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ 35
 4 τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον 1126^a
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικός ὁ πρῶτος ἀλλὰ μᾶλ-
 5 λον συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ' ἑλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν
 εἴθ' ὅτιδήποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς
 δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μὴδ' ὅτε μὴδ' 5
 6 οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργι-
 ζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προσηλακίζόμενον
 7 ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδώδες. ἡ δ'

(πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ διαθέσεως) τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη καὶ
 τὸν ἀνόητον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μὴδ' ἐφ' ὅσοις
 δεῖ κινουμένους τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ προσηλακίζόμενους εὐχερῶς καὶ
 ταπεινοὺς πρὸς τὰς ὀλιγωρίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ
 μόλις, τῷ δ' ἡρέμα τὸ σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον τὸ ὀλίγον λυπεῖσθαι
 ταύτην τὴν λύπην ἣν καλοῦμεν θυμόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων εἵπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὁ καὶ θάττον καὶ μᾶλλον πάσῃων καὶ πλείω
 χρόνον καὶ ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅποιοις οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς, ὁ δ' ἀνδραπο-
 δώδης τούναντίον), δηλον ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ὁ μέσος τῆς ἀνισότητος.
 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτημέναι ἀμφοτέραι αἱ ἕξεις ἐκείναι, φανερόν ὅτι ἐπιεικὴς
 ἡ μέση τούτων ἕξις· οὔτε γὰρ προτερεῖ οὐθ' ὑστερεῖ οὔτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ
 ὀργίζεται οὔτε οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὀργίζεται. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ πρῶτης ἡ βελτίστη
 ἕξις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐστίν, εἴη καὶ ἡ πρῶτης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ
 πρῶτος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους.

§ 3. ἐφ' οἷς neut., οἷς masc.

βούλεται ... εἶναι, 'we mean by patient one who is imperturbable and not led on by feeling.'

ἐπὶ τούτοις neut., cf. above ἐφ' οἷς.

§ 5. εἴτ' ἀοργησία. Eudemos and MM. call it ἀναληψία, on which see 1100 b, 32 n. Probably the usage by which ἀνάληγτος meant rather

'coarse' or 'stupid' prevented Aristotle from giving it this more restricted sense. Cf. 1115 b, 26 n.

ἐφ' οἷς, neuter. Cf. 1125 b, 31 n.

§ 6. αἰσθάνεσθαι, like *sentire*, 'to have a sense of one's position,' to realise what is going on whether pleasant or otherwise. Hence ἀναίσθητος, cf. 1104 a, 24 n.

ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται—καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ
 10 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάττον, καὶ πλείω
 χρόνον, —οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ ὁλό-
 κληρον ἢ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν 8
 ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
 15 δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμ-
 βαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ'
 ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ἀπο-
 παύονται. ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκράχοιοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς 9
 πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ 10
 20 δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ
 τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἢ γὰρ
 τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.
 τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπι-
 φανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπίθεται αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι
 25 τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνον δείται. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότα-
 τοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' 11
 οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω
 χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.
 τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ 12
 30 γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται—ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι—
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 13

1126 a, 13. EE. 1221 b, 10 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων
 εἶδη κατονομάζεται τῷ διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνον ἢ τοῖ
 μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τι τῶν ποιούντων τὰ πάθη. λέγω δ' οἷον ὀξύθυμος μὲν
 τῷ θάττον πάσχειν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπὸς δὲ καὶ θυμώδης τῷ μᾶλλον, πικροὶ
 δὲ τῷ φυλακτικὸς εἶναι τῆς ὀργῆς, πλήκτης δὲ καὶ λοιδορητικὸς ταῖς
 κολάσεσι ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.

§ 8. ἢ φανεροί εἰσι, sc. ἀνταποδι-
 δόντες, 'in an open way.'

§ 10. ἢ γὰρ τιμωρία κ.τ.λ. Cf.
 1117 a, 6 n.

τὸ βάρος. "The πικρός has as it
 were a load of indigestible anger in
 him." Stewart.

δείται. For the reading see By-

water, Contr. p. 41. The metaphor
 of digesting anger is at least as old as
 Homer. Cf. Il. i, 81.

§ 12. μᾶλλον γίνεται κ.τ.λ. See
 notes on 1109 a, 6 and 12.

ἀνθρωπικώτερον. Cf. 1111 b, 1 n.
 συμβιοῦν. We have the more
 correct συζῆν below 1126 b, 11.

εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
 ορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον
 γιγνέσθων, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἄμαρ-
 μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ 35
 οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας
 καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀν- 1126^b
 ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκ-
 ρεκτός, οὐ ῥᾶδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
 τα κὰν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον
 ἢ ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργι- 5
 αὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,
 ἐρβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν
 ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα.
 οὐτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ
 ἡ ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν. 10

Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ
 ὡν κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα
 ἣν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι
 τοι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις
 τα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φρον- 15
 δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ

b, 11. EE. 1233 b, 29 φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἐχθρας καὶ κολα-

γὰρ ῥᾶδιον...ἀνθεκτέον.
 is repeated almost ver-

109 b, 14 sqq.
 ἰς καθ' ἕκαστα, sc. τὰ τοι-
 b, 23). κὰν τῇ αἰσθήσει
 c. τῶν τοιούτων. See the
 9 b, 23. The reading κὰν
 is due to Professor By-
 e parallel passage has καὶ

1. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις
 Iemos says (1234 a, 24)
 are not ἀρεταί· ἀνευ προ-
 ρ. They are mere παθη-
 ητες. The author of the
 talia says (1193 a, 35) εἰ
 αὐταὶ ἀρεταί ἢ μὴ ἀρεταί,

ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος. We see how the
 notion of ἀρετή had been narrowed
 and starved. The principle of the
 Mean must apply here too if it is any
 good at all. Cf. below 1127 a, 14—
 17.

ἄρεσκοι. The ἄρεσκος is beautifully
 described by Theophrastos. The
 'Good-natured Man' has always been
 a type in Comedy. The Schol. here
 says ὡς περ ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν κωμωδιοποιῶν
 προαγόμενος Ὅμοιος.

§ 2. δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες. There
 were comedies entitled Δύσκολος by
 Mnesimachos and Menander. For δύσ-
 ρεις cf. Isokr. Demon. 8 d, ὁμιλητικὸς
 δ' ἔσει, μὴ δύσρεις ὧν μὴ δὲ δυσάρεστος.

εἰρημέναι ἔξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση
 τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέχεται ἡ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ 4
 20 τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλία. τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν
 μέσῃ ἔξιν οἶον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπεικῇ φίλον, τὸ
 1011 στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ 5
 πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ
 ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος
 25 εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνωστας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις
 καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμό-
 ζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὁθνεῶν φροντίζειν,
 οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, 6
 ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται
 30 τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ 7
 λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας· τούτων δ' ὅσας
 μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερα-
 νεῖ, καὶ προαιρησέται λυπεῖν· κὰν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημο-
 σύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσις
 35 μικράν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέχεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφόρως 8
 δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον
 1127^a ἢ ἡττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς,

κείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ
 δὲ πρὸς ἀπάσας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ [τε] πρὸς ἅσας
 ἡδονὴν μὴτ' ἀκολουθῶν μὴτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον
 βέλτιστον, φίλος.

1126 b, 36. EE. 1233 b, 34 σεμνότης δὲ μεστότης αὐθαδείας καὶ
 ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικὸς αὐθάδης,

§ 4. **φιλία**. The Greeks had no word for 'amiability.' Aristotle is careful to note the difference between *φιλία* in that sense and the *ἀρετή πρὸς ἕτερον* discussed in Books VIII and IX. With the addition of affection (τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόν) the amiable man becomes the friend. Without it he is not so, for his amiability does not depend on feeling for another, but

on his own character (τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι).

§ 8. **διαφόρως**. The usual reading is *διαφερόντως*. It is true that Aristotle often uses this word incorrectly in the sense of 'differently'; but here K^b has *διαφερόντως διαφόρως δ'*, which may perhaps justify us in substituting the more Attic adverb.

ἐκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ἢ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαυθις μεγάλης μικρὰ 5 λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ διὰ τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικείμεθα δὲ 10 φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

VII. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ 15 ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεῦσαιμεν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθεύοντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ 20 δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ

ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνός.

1127 a, 12. EE. 1233 b, 38 ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἀπλοῦς, ὃν

§ 9. τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν... ὁ δὲ... For the construction cf. 1110 b, 22.

κόλαξ. The κόλαξ is the Parasite of the New Comedy. Athenaeus vi, 235 c sqq. has a learned dissertation on the words. The word *παράσιτος* was originally *σεμνὸν καὶ ἱερὸν*, being the name of certain persons associated with the priests in the sacrificial meal. Accordingly οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ποιηταὶ τοὺς παρασίτους κόλακας ἐκάλουν. Eupolis wrote a comedy entitled *Κόλακες*, satirising Kallias the son of Hipponikos and his train of parasites. The first to use the word *παράσιτος* in its later sense was Ἀραρῶς ἐν Ὑμεναίῳ [Kock II, 218].

ἀντικείμεθα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1125 b, 24.

VII. § 1. Περὶ τὰ αὐτά, sc. περὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας καὶ τὸ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν (1126 b, 11).

ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης, 'the mean between ἀλαζονεία and its opposite.' It is unnecessary to insert καὶ (τῆς) *εἰρωνείας* with Imelmann and recent editors. It is idiomatic Greek to omit one of the extremes with μέσος and μεταξύ, cf. Aristophanes, Birds, 187 ἐν μέσῳ δῆπουθεν ἀῆρ ἐστὶ γῆς (καὶ οὐρανοῦ).

οὐ χεῖρον κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1126 b, 11 n.

§ 2. ὁ ἀλαζὼν. The original meaning of ἀλαζὼν was 'vagrant'

ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἶρων ἀνάπαλιν³
 ἀρνέισθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθι-
 καστός τις ὦν ἀληθευτικὸς κἀν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ
 25 ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε
 ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ⁵
 μηδενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει
 καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μὴ τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ⁶
 μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθές καλὸν καὶ
 30 ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὦν ἐπαινε-
 τός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ
 ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀλη-
 θευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος⁷
 λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης
 1127^b γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου δια-
 φέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἔξιν
 τοιούτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιούτος ἐπικεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ⁸
 φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει

καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον, μέσος τοῦ εἶρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τὰ χεῖρω καθ' αὐτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἶρων, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ
 βελτίω ἀλαζών, ὁ δ' ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθής καὶ καθ' Ὁμηρον πεπνυμένος.
 καὶ ὅλως ὁ μὲν φιλαλήθης, ὁ δὲ φιλοψευδής.

(ἀλάσθαι), cf. πλάνος. Hence the meaning 'charlatan,' 'quack' (Italian *ciarlatano*, 'a mountebank doctor'). In Plato and Aristophanes the word still means 'impostor' quite generally and is associated with γόης. Sokrates is an ἀλαζών as well as an εἶρων. For the specialised sense here given to the word cf. Xen. Kyr. ii, 2, 12 quoted below b, 15 n. In the New Comedy the ἀλαζών is the Miles Gloriosus. The original adapted by Plautus had this title.

§ 3. ὁ εἶρων. The εἶρων is properly the 'sly' man. Cf. Philemon, fr. 89 Kock:
 Οὐκ ἔστ' ἀλώπηξ ἢ μὲν εἶρων τῇ φύσει,
 ἢ δ' αὐθέκαστος.

The word occurs first in Aristophanes, Clouds, 449.

§ 4. αὐθέκαστος, not 'the man who is always himself,' but ὁ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον λέγων, 'the man who calls each thing itself,' i.e. 'by its proper name.' So ὁ τὴν σκάφην σκάφη λέγων, 'the man who calls a spade a spade.' The opposite is given in Antiphanes fr. 52 Kock, αὐτὸ μὲν μηδέν. See last note.

κἀν. Cf. 1127 b, 2 καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ. The reading κἀν is suggested by Professor Bywater. The mss. have καί.

§ 7. τῷ... τοιούτος εἶναι. Cf. 1126 b, 24. We are not discussing truthfulness as an ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἑτερον.

ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὥς γὰρ αἰσχυρὸν τὸ ψεῦ- 5
 ὑλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἡύλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοι-
 εῖς ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
 λινεῖ· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς
 βολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιού-
 μηδενὸς ἔνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε 10
 ψεύδει—μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ δ'
 ἰτινος [ὥς ὁ ἀλαζών], ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν
 ὅς, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος.
 ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει·
 τὴν ἔξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστίν· ὥσπερ 15
 ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης

that point of view it comes to the head of δικαιοσύνη.

ἀποκλίνει. So Coraes for τοκλίνει. The Paraphrast has

χθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς. Theives ἐπαχθεῖς and φορτικόν are not found together in the MSS. The sentiment is thoroughly and accounts for the use of μέτριος and σπουδαῖος in the of ἀγαθός. Cf. 1137 a, 34 n.

ὥς ὁ ἀλαζών. This seems to adscript; for in the MSS. it after οὐ λίαν ψεκτός where it not make sense. I take it that itais who μηδενὸς ἔνεκα προσ-μ is not classed as an ἀλαζών at id that the object of the awk-entence οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. eitate this. But there may be further dislocation; for Aspasioς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. after na 1127 b, 22. Bywater, Contr.

2. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. άταιος who μηδενὸς ἔνεκα προσ-μ has only the 'potency' of an in him; he only becomes one he of deliberate purpose uses αἰσῖς as means to an end. ie expression, cf. Top. 126 a,

30 ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἡ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατόν ἔ-θηκεν, οἷον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἢ διάβολον, ἢ κλέπτην τὸν δυνάμενον λάθρα τὰ ἀλλό-τρια κλέπτειν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν εἰρη-μένων τῷ δυνατόν εἶναι τι τούτων τοι-ούτος λέγεται· δύναται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ φαῦλα ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι· πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται. This is just the difference between the διαλεκτικός and the σοφιστής. Cf. Met. 1004 b, 22 περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ δια-λεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει. Rhet. 1355 b, 17 ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει.

κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, opp. κατὰ τὴν δύνα-μιν.

ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης κ.τ.λ. We may best understand the point by asking whether we call the man who 'spins yarns' a liar. In the same way 'innocent vanity' is not ἀλαζονεία. Cf. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 12 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζών ἐμογε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι καὶ ποιή-σιν ἂ μὴ ἱκανοὶ εἶσιν ὑπὸ σχυρνομένοις, καὶ ταῦτα φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις ὅτι τοῦ

ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονεύονται¹³
 τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός,
 οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ δια-
²⁰ λαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἱατρὸν. διὰ τοῦτο
 οἱ πλείστοι προσποιούνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται·
 ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλατ-¹⁴
 τον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἥθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ
 κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν·
²⁵ μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἐνδοξα ἀπαρνούνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκρά-
 τῆς ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερά [προσποιούμενοι]¹⁵
 βαυκοπανούργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ
 ἐνίστε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἢ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ
 γὰρ ἢ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἢ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν· οἱ δὲ¹⁶

λαβεῖν τι ἔνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι ποιοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ μηχανώμενοι γέλωτα τοῖς συνοῦσι μῆτε ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῶν κέρδει μῆτ' ἐπὶ ζημίᾳ τῶν ἀκουόντων μῆτ' ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μηδεμῆ, πῶς οὐχ οὗτοι ἀστείοι ἂν καὶ εὐχάριτες δικαιότερον μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλαζόνες;

§ 13. οἱ δὲ κέρδους, sc. τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται, 'they pretend to things from which their neighbours derive benefit.' Then καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα is added as if προσποιούνται τοιοῦτοι εἶναι had preceded; for ὄντα must be masculine singular if μάντιν σοφὸν ἱατρὸν is to have any construction. 'They assume characters the unreality of which may escape detection.'

§ 14. οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης. This passage seems to be the origin of the current phrase 'Socratic irony,' a thing which is almost as mythical as 'tragic irony.' We know from Plato that Sokrates was often called 'sly' by his opponents, and no wonder. But neither here nor anywhere else is the word used in a good sense.

§ 15. προσποιούμενοι, bracketed by Vahlen, is exactly the opposite of what is meant. The verb to be supplied is ἀπαρνόμενοι. It seems to

have come from the correct προσποιούμενοι μὴ ἔχειν of Aspasio. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 41.

βαυκοπανούργοι. A word from the language of comedy. Schol. Anon. β. φησὶν ὡς ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς εἰπῶν τοὺς σεμνοπανούργους. βαυκὸς γὰρ ὁ τρυφερός, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς Ἀραρῶς ἐν Καμπυλίῳ (Kock, *Com. Frag.* II, 217)

βαυκά μαλακὰ τερπνὰ τρυφερά. μετενήρεται δὲ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τῶν βαυκίδων, ὃ ἐστὶν εἶδος ὑποδημάτων Ἰωνικῶν, οἷς αἱ Ἰάδες χρώνται, οὐ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν Θεομοφιαζούσαις (sc. β. Kock I, 482) μέμνηται. Κλείταρχος μέντοι ὁ γλωσσογράφος τὸ σεμνόν ἀποδέδωκεν.

ἢ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής. Schol. Anon. εὐτελής ἄγαν ἱστορεῖται Ἰεσοφῶντι (Λακ. πολ. 2 § 4). διὰ ταῦτα καὶ σκώπτουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ κυμῶδοι, ὡς Πλάτων ἐν Πέρσῃσι (Kock I, 634)—Χαίρεις οἶμαι μεταπεττεύσας αὐτὸν ἡλικμακίσας τε, τὸν ὑπὸνρόβιον σπαρτιοχαίτην ῥυκεῖν δυλὸν ἐλκετρίβωνα.

I do not know why the editors think this refers to Laconising Athenians, not to the Spartans themselves.

μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν 30
17 καὶ φανερά εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικείμεναι
δ' ὁ ἀλαζῶν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.

VIII. Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ
διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις
ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. 1128*
διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιοῦτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.
2 δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἑλλειψις
3 τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, 5
καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν
εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ'
αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραί-
νοντες ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς

1127 b, 33. EE. 1234 a, 4 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐτραπεία μεσότης, καὶ
ὁ εὐτράπελος μέσος τοῦ ἀγροίκου καὶ δυστραπέλου καὶ τοῦ βωμολόχου.
ὥσπερ γὰρ περὶ τροφήν ὁ σικκὸς τοῦ παμφάγου διαφέρει τῷ ὅ μὲν
μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα καὶ χαλεπῶς προσίεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς, οὕτω
καὶ ὁ ἀγροίκος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν φορτικὸν καὶ βωμολόχον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
οὐθὲν γελοῖον ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς προσίεται, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς καὶ ἡδέως.

§ 17. χείρων γάρ, sc. τοῦ εἰρωνος.
For this test see 1109 a, 6 n.

VIII. § 1. ἀναπαύσεως. For
Aristotle's theory of Rest, see below
1176 b, 34. It is *ἀνεσις τῆς ψυχῆς*
(Pol. 1337 b, 42), 'relaxation of the
soul,' and is necessary for the worker
(ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως ib.
38). It must be carefully distinguished
from *σχολή* (διαγωγή) which is an end
in itself, not a means to further ex-
tention.

καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ κ.τ.λ. Besides Play,
Aristotle recognises Sleep and Drink
(μέθη) as forms of ἀνάπαυσις (Pol.
1339 a, 17). For the importance of
μέθη cf. the Second Book of Plato's
Laws.

διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδιᾶς. The word
διαγωγή is here used in its wide
popular sense of passing time, not in

the narrow sense (equivalent to *σχολή*)
which it often has, and in which it is
contrasted with ἀνάπαυσις.

λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν. This distinc-
tion is elaborated in the Eudemian
Ethics (1234 a, 14 sqq. p. 198). The
man who can *make* a joke (the μέσος
between the φορτικός and the ψυχρός),
and the man who can *take* a joke
even at his own expense are both
described.

ἐν τοιοῦτοις...τοιούτων, 'whether
those in whose company he speaks
are like himself, and whether those
by whom he is spoken to are like
himself.'

§ 3. πάντως, 'at any cost.' Cf.
1124 b, 9 n.

ἄγροικοι. All MSS. but K^b have
ἀγριοι, which, however, means 'sa-
vage' and is out of place here. In

ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

- 10 IX. Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν·
πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις
ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλή- 2
σιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον
φοβούμενοι ὠχρῶσιν. σωματικά δὴ φαίνεται πῶς εἶναι
15 ἀμφοτέρα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι. οὐ 3

1128 b, 10. EE. 1233 b, 16 σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα
τῶν περὶ τὸ ἥθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαὶ τὰ δ' ἐλλείψεις
τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικά. οἷον ὁ φθονερός καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος.
καθ' ὧς γὰρ ἔξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ'
ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρέκακου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
κακοπραγίαις. μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ
ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις· διὸ καὶ θεὸν
οἶονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν. αἰδῶς δὲ μεσότης ἀναίσχυντίας καὶ κατα-
πλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ

IX. § 1. Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς κ.τ.λ. In 1108 a, 30 sqq. we were told of two μεσότητες which were ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη, viz. αἰδῶς and νέμεσις. Here we are told that αἰδῶς is not an ἀρετή, because it is the feeling itself, not a ἔξις or habitual attitude towards the feeling. Nothing is said of νέμεσις at all. The two seem to be μεσότητες in the feelings of fear and anger which come by nature.

ὀρίζεται. Plato, Laws 646 e φοβούμεθα δὲ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοὶ πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνῃ. (Aristotle does not distinguish αἰδῶς and αἰσχύνῃ at all in this discussion, see next note.) In Top. 126 a, 6 he criticises this definition of shame. Shame, he says, is ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, fear ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ. So in the Rhetoric (1383 b, 13) we

have an amended definition which leaves out fear, ἐστὼ δὴ αἰσχύνῃ λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, or more shortly περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία (1384 a, 13).

§ 2. ἐρυθραίνονται... αἰσχυνόμενοι. We see here that Aristotle ignores the thoroughly Hellenic distinction between αἰδῶς and αἰσχύνῃ. The sign of the former is not blushing, but the downcast eye. Cf. Rhet. 1384 a, 36 where Aristotle himself quotes the proverbial ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰδῶς. The tendency was to use αἰσχύνῃ for αἰδῶς; Aristotle, at least in the Ethics, uses αἰδῶς for αἰσχύνῃ. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen I, 168, sqq.

σωματικά δὴ κ.τ.λ. De An. 403 a, 16 εἰκε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πρῆξις, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἐτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τοῦτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα.

πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν 20
 4 αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνῃ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοὺς ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσχυνῇ, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ
 5 πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχροὶ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα,
 6 ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)· φαύλου δὲ καὶ τῷ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἶον 25
 πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῇ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἢ αἰδῶς, ἐκὼν δ' ὁ
 7 ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδῶς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικής· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν· οὐκ ἔστι 30
 δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυνητία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχροὶ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ
 8 τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτὴ· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν. 35

πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξῃ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων.

EE. 1234 a, 24 πᾶσαι δ' αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μὲν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' ἀρεταί, οὐδ' αἱ ἐναντία κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τί ἐστιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἐστὶ γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, ἐκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδῶς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην· ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς ὁ μὲν ἔμφρων, ὁ δ' ἄφρων.

§ 3. αἰδήμονας. The regular Attic word for this was αἰσχυνηλός, which is used in exactly the same sense below. Cf. Plato, Charm. 158 c καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυνηλὸν αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἔπρεψεν. (Cf. also 160 e.) So Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1389 a, 29 that the young are αἰσχυνηλοὶ but not the old. It is characteristic of

Xenophon's diction that αἰδήμων is a favourite word with him.

§ 6. καὶ τῷ εἶναι. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 42, and for the construction cf. 1107 a, 3. 1127 b, 15.

§ 7. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, 'conditionally good,' and the hypothesis is that we have done something bad.

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, in Book VII.

BOOK V.

JUSTICE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Justice receives a much more elaborate treatment than any other form of goodness. This is not only because of its great importance, but also because of the greater complexity of the problems to which it gives rise. The object of the whole discussion is, of course, to show that the principle of the Mean applies to Justice as well as to other forms of goodness; but justice differs from the forms of goodness we have studied hitherto in being essentially relative (*πρὸς ἕτερον*). It thus involves four terms and not three only; for there are at least two persons and at least two things which are just for those persons. The mean which Justice aims at is at first an unknown x which has to be found by some application of the Rule of Three.

Aristotle begins at once by limiting the sense of the word justice. In Greek *ἀδικεῖν* meant not merely "to be unjust," but also "to be guilty" of any offence whatsoever against the law, and the word *δικαιοσύνη* could therefore be used as equivalent to "righteousness," that is to say, the whole of goodness regarded as relative to others. In the Republic, Plato had given it a wider meaning still, and had made it include the relations between the different "parts" of the individual soul, a view which Aristotle discusses later on (1138 b, 5 sqq.). It was therefore necessary at the outset to distinguish "particular" from "universal" justice; but the distinction is of little interest to us, seeing that the English word "justice" is never used naturally in the wider sense which Aristotle is anxious to distinguish and set aside. We have only to consider justice in the special sense in which it refers to the fair apportionment of "external goods."

§ 2. The first form of justice in this sense which Aristotle treats of is Distributive Justice. He has to show that the principle of the Mean applies to this, and he does so by showing that the formula of justice may be expressed as a proportion of the form $A : B :: C : D$ or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$. This is what the Greeks called a "geometrical" proportion. The name of the second kind is usually mistranslated "Corrective Justice," and this mistranslation has led to much confusion in the interpretation of the argument. Really this form of justice regulates *obligationes ex contractu* quite as much as *obligationes ex delicto*. The true meaning of διορθοῦν is to "adjust" whether by correction (ἐπανόρθωσις) or otherwise, and the scholastic term *iustitia directiva* is really far more accurate. There would be no harm in calling the form of justice which adjusts the damages and penalties imposed by a court of law *iustitia correctiva*, and that which regulates the exchange of commodities and the like might then be called by S. Thomas's name *iustitia commutativa*. But this would obscure the fact that the two are applications of the same principle, that, namely, of "arithmetical proportion."

We are not in the habit of calling an equation of the form $A - B = C - D$ a proportion at all, but it was one of the recognised Pythagorean μεσότητες, and in Aristotle's day it was commonly called an ἀναλογία, though that word was properly confined to the γεωμετρικὴ μεσότης. It will be convenient for us to speak of "arithmetical proportion" too.

Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας
 τε τυγχάνουσιν οὐσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ
 5 δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν 2
 ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ 3
 πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην,
 ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπρα-
 γοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
 10 περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ
 καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ 4
 τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων

I. § 1. περὶ ποίας...πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης. The two regular questions περὶ ποία μεσότης and πῶς μεσότης; cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

§ 2. κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον, i.e. that of starting with τὰ ἐνδοξα and arguing dialectically from them. For μέθοδος, see 1094 a, 1 n.

§ 3. ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ κ.τ.λ. This ἐνδοξον comes from Plato, Gorgias 460 b (referred to by Fritzsche). Τί οὖν, ὃ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκώς τεκτονικός ἢ οὐ;—Nal.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;—Nal.—Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός κ.τ.λ.;—Πάνν γε.—Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκώς δίκαιος;—Πάντως δήπου.—Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δικάει πον πράττει;—Nal.—Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;—Falconetal γε.

ὡς ἐν τύπῳ. Schol. Anon. καὶ ταύτας αὐτῶν ἀποδοὺς ὑπογραφάς τινας· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ὁρισμοὺς εἶπεν αὐτά· οὐ γὰρ ὁλόν τε ἓνα λόγον ἀποδοθῆναι οὔτε τῇ δικαιοσύνης οὔτε τῇ ἀδικίας, ἐπεὶ προῖων δείξει ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγονται.

§ 4. οὐδὲ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. I understand the connexion of this section with the preceding exactly as Professor Stewart does; and, if we suppose that there is a direct reference to Plato's Gorgias, it comes out still better. Plato was right in adding ἀνάγκη τὸν δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν, for the case is really different from that of the ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ δυνάμεις (τεκτονική, μουσική and ἱατρική) from which he starts. If δικαιοσύνη were a δύναμις, then the just man would also be the clever thief (Plato, Rep. 334 a). It is, however, an ἔξις, and we know that the

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ
 τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων
 οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ 15
 τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν
 5 βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἢ
 ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ἢ φανερά, καὶ ἡ
 καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία 20
 καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης
 σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκός
 6 καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολου-

ἔξις determines βούλησις (and therefore προαίρεσις) by determining τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. So in Top. 145 b, 34, the definition of δικαιοσύνη as δύναμις τοῦ ἴσου διανεμητικῆς is criticised; δικαίος γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ προαιρούμενος τὸ ἴσον διανεῖμαι τοῦ δυναμένου. For δύναμις and προαίρεσις cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

δύναμις μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is true, of course, only of αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις (cf. 1103 a, 26 n.). Plato had already shown in the First Book of the Republic that, if we regard justice as an art, it will be the art of doing unjust things as well as just, exactly as νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάσσειν, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας (Rep. 333 c).

ἡ ἐναντία. It is needless to read ἢ αὐτή, though it would be more logical. The double ἐναντία is idiom-atic, cf. below a, 18.

ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας, the typical ἔξις.

ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, here in the sense of τὸ σημαντικὸν ὑγιείας, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως, cf. Top. 106 b, 36 τὸ ὑγιεινῶς ἢ ποιητικῶς ἢ φυλακτικῶς (i.e. πρὸς τὴν ἔξιν) ἢ σημαντικῶς (i.e. ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως) ῥηθήσεται.

§ 5. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For σκέψις ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου as applied to ἔξις, cf. Top. 147 a, 17.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. I cannot believe that this means anything else

than the things in which the ἔξεις are found. As a ποιότης, δικαιοσύνη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ λέγεται τῷ δικαίῳ (Bonitz, Ind. 260 b, 41). If this is so, the ὑποκείμενα will be σύστοιχα, and σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν συστοιχῶν is a recognised dialectical method. Further, this is in accordance with the actual procedure which Aristotle follows; for what he actually does is to consider the ἀδικός, i.e. the ὑποκείμενον of the ἐναντία ἔξις. If I am right, τῶν εὐεκτικῶν must = τῶν εὐ ἐχόντων as below 1176 a, 15 and often.

τὸ ποιητικόν. The ambiguity of the word εὐεκτικός seems to have caused a transition to another class of σύστοιχα, for τὰ ποιητικά are not properly ὑποκείμενα. But it matters little; for τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔξιν are identical with τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως and these are such as τὰ ἔχοντα perform. The mention of them here will not seem irrelevant if we remember that our aim is not merely to know justice but to produce it.

§ 6. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Top. 106 a, 9 πότερον δὲ πολλαχῶς ἢ μοναχῶς τῷ εἶδει λέγεται, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου σκοπεῖν εἰ πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἐάντε τῷ εἶδει ἐάντε τῷ ὀνόματι διαφωνῇ.

θεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐὰν θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται,
 25 καὶ θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἶον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ
 ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιο-
 σύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
 αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δῆλη μᾶλλον,
 (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλή ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν) οἶον ὅτι καλεῖται
 30 κλείς ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἢ τὰς
 θύρας κλείουσιν. εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. 8
 δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ
 ἄνιστος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ [ὁ] δίκαιος ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος
 καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ
 1129^b δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνιστον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεο-9

ἐὰν θάτερα κ.τ.λ. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 42 and Stewart's note in loc. I have followed Stewart in keeping the θάτερα of K^b L^b. Bywater reads θάτερον from the Vetus Versio and omits καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. But (1) the idiomatic θάτερα is more likely to have been lost in the Versio than invented by the scribes, and (2) we really want the two pairs, the ἔξεις and the ὑποκείμενα. 'If one pair of terms is ambiguous, the other pair will be so too.' I do not think it necessary to insert καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη after τὸ δίκαιον with Stewart. Aristotle does not care for minute symmetry in such clauses. Cf. 1108a, 16 οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὐτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά, quoted by Bywater, Contr. p. 29.

§ 7. τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν. The word is here used in the widest sense, in which any two things which share the same name are called ὁμώνυμα, not in the restricted sense explained in 1096 b, 27 n. As a matter of fact they are συνώνυμα (cf. 1130 a, 33).

λανθάνει, sc. ἡ ὁμωνυμία. Cf. Phys. 249 a, 23 εἰσὶ τε τῶν ὁμωνυμῶν αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσιν τινα ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δ' ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμῆαι εἶναι οὐσαι. So Top. 139 b, 28 λανθανούσης

τῆς ὁμωνυμίας, An. Post. 97 b, 30 αἱ ὁμωνυμῆαι λανθάνουσι. In the present case the ὁμωνυμία is σύνεγγυς γένει and therefore properly a συνώνυμα.

ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ κ.τ.λ. The γὰρ introduces the reason for the choice of the instance which follows. Cf. 1104a, 13. κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, 'in outward appearance.'

§ 8. καὶ ἄνιστος, 'unfair, i.e. unequal.' This is added because the popular word πλεονέκτης does not bring out the fact that the ἄδικος not only takes more than his share of good things, but less than his share of bad things. Cf. 1129 b, 10. (Bywater, Contr. p. 43).

τὸ παράνομον. Of course the English word 'unjust' has not this wider sense, but it was quite familiar to Athenian ears. 'To be guilty' of any offence whatsoever was in the language of the courts ἀδικεῖν. The ὁμωνυμία is, therefore, a mere accident of the Greek language, and we should not erect the distinction between "universal and particular injustice" into a part of Aristotle's system. He is only clearing the ground as usual by narrowing the application of the word.

νέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ,
 τινὲς δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται καὶ διώκουσιν·
 δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς 5
 10 ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ' ἄδικος
 οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ πλεον αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν ἀγαθόν
 πῶς εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ
 11 πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστω δ' ἄνιστος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ 10
 12 κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος,
 δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πῶς δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ
 ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ-
 13 των δίκαιον εἶναι φάμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάν-
 των, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς 15
 ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρό-
 πον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιη-
 τικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ

§ 9. περὶ ὅσα κ.τ.λ., sc. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. Cf. 1099 b, 8 n. For ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, cf. Top. 115 b, 33 ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀπλῶς ῥηθήσεται. See too Pol. 1332 a, 21 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώριστα κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ὃ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ.

§ 11. ἔστω, Vermehren's conjecture for MS. ἔστι.

περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. The word ἄνιστος includes the man who τὸ πλεον αἰρεῖται τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν and also the man who τὸ ἔλαττον αἰρεῖται τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. It is 'common' to both.

§ 12. ἦν. Cf. 1113 b, 13 n.

πῶς δίκαια, i.e. in the wide sense in which τὸ δίκαιον includes the practice of all goodness so far as it is enjoined by law.

§ 13. ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων. This need not be taken too literally.

Aristotle only means that the laws deal with all departments of life, but we are looking for the particular department to which Justice belongs. The verb ἀγορεύειν belongs to Attic legal style, and is never used in Aristotle except of οἱ νόμοι.

στοχαζόμενοι κ.τ.λ. This refers to the distinction between ὁρβαὶ πολιτεῖαι and παρεκβάσεις, for which see below 1160 a, 31 sqq. I think Rassow is right in his view that the ὁρβὴ πολιτεία στοχάζεται τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις, while the παρεκβάσεις στοχάζεται τοῦ συμφέροντος τοῖς κυρίοις, whether one (tyranny), few (oligarchy), or many (democracy). I therefore retain κατ' ἀρετὴν, though omitted by K^b, and I understand it of ἀριστοκρατία, while κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον refers to τιμοκρατία and the like.

ἓνα μὲν τρόπον, i.e. in the wide sense. The μὲν is answered by δὲ γε in 1130 a, 14.

πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀν- 14
 20 δρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν
 μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὄπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοι-
 χεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πρᾶου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν
 μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς
 καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὁρθῶς
 25 μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὁρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη 15
 μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν
 ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ "οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἑῷος"
 οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φάμεν "ἐν δὲ δικαιο-
 30 σύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῇ ἐνι." καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ,
 ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστίν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ
 ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι,
 ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις
 τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνα-

§ 14. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος κ.τ.λ. The argument is intended to show that δικαιοσύνη as a separate form of goodness must have some other meaning than legality. That is shown to extend to all forms of goodness so far as they are πρὸς ἕτερον.

§ 15. οὐθ' ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. (p. 210, 9 Heylbut) τοῦτο ἐξ Εὐριπίδου σοφῶς (Σοφῆς Usener, or is it a marginal exclamation?) Μελανίππης· λέγει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ (fr. 486 Nauck)—

δικαιοσύνας τὸ χρύσειον πρόσωπον. This is explained and confirmed by Plotinos Enn. i, 6 ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἔσπερος οὔτε ἑῷος οὕτω καλὰ, ib. vi, 6 δικαιοσύνη... ἥς ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ. Bywater, Hermes v, 356.

παροιμιαζόμενοι φάμεν κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. (loc. cit.) τοῦτο Θεόγνιδος· ἐρρηται δὲ οὕτως (v. 145-6)—
 Βούλεο δ' εὐσεβέων ὀλίγοις σὺν χρέ-
 μασιιν οἰκεῖν

ἡ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως χρήματα πασά-
 μενος.

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετὴ (sic) χώραν μέντοι παροιμίας ἐπέχει καὶ μέμνηται αὐτῆς ὡς παροιμίας Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περί ἡθῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν ὡς <Φωκυλίδου αὐτοῦ μέμνηται. καὶ ἴσως καὶ > Φωκυλίδης αὐτῷ ἐχρήσατο.

καὶ τελεία κ.τ.λ. We shall not feel any difficulty about this passage if we remember that it is purely literary, and that we must not look for technical precision in it. Justice (=Righteousness) is 'complete' because it is all goodness, 'complete' goodness. It is 'complete' because it is the use (not merely the possession) of goodness. It is 'complete' because it is πρὸς ἕτερον.

χρῆσις. The implied antithesis is κτήσις. Cf. 1098 b, 34 n. In Pol. 1328 a, 38 εὐδαιμονία is defined ἀρετῇ ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις τελείος.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος ὅτι ἀρχὴ 1130^a
 δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἦδη ὁ ἀρχων.
 τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ
 τύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλω
 συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. **κάκι-** 5
 ἐν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος
 θηρία, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ
 ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ
 τύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐν-
 ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει 10
 ἡ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέων·
 ἐν γὰρ ἡ αὕτη, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν
 τερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἥ δὲ τοιάδε ἔξις ἀπλῶς, ἀρετῇ.
 Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι

τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος. In L^b the
 s ἀρχά, but why should Bias
 speak Doric? This is one
 γνῶμαι which Sophokles has
 o poetry. Cf. Antig. v. 175

ε vi termini. We may bring
 force of ἦδη by paraphrasing
 e come to the ruler, a relation
 s is at once implied.' Cf.
 14. 1177 a, 6. This is cor-
 o the idiomatic use of οὕτω
 u. See Ind. s. vv.

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν. This is
 e definitions given by Thrasy-
 a the First Book of the Re-
 Cf. 343 c, 'Righteousness
 are really ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν,
 ood for the stronger and the
 εἰα δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ
 ετος βλάβη.'

οντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. The first
 he case in a παρέκβασις, the
 an ὀρθὴ πολιτεία. Jackson.
 καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν κ.τ.λ. Since
 man is he who acts badly,
 πρὸς αὐτόν, but also πρὸς
 he best man is he who acts

well not only with regard to himself,
 but also with regard to others.

§ 20. τὸ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. For the
 phrase cf. 1141 b, 24. The full ex-
 pression would be οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ
 εἶναι ἀρετῇ καὶ τὸ εἶναι δικαιοσύνη, cf.
 Top. 133 b, 23 ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἕτερον
 εἶναι αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι· οὐ ταῦτόν γάρ
 ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τε τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι
 καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ
 λευκῷ. Simplicius in Phys. (p. 735,
 12 Diels) speaks of τὸ εἶναι συνήθως
 ὑπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου λεγόμενον καὶ τὸ
 εἶδος σημαῖνον. Cf. Phys. 202 a, 18,
 ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἐν πρὸς δύο
 καὶ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ τὸ ἀναντες καὶ τὸ
 κάταντες· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν μὲν ἐστίν, ὁ
 μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἰς, with Met. 1066 a,
 32 where we have the same examples
 but the last clause runs ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι
 οὐχ ἓν. (Ramsauer.)

ἀπλῶς, closely with τοιάδε ἔξις,
 'without qualification.' Translate
 'regarded simply as a state of this
 kind, it is the same as goodness.'

II. § 1. Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε, 'Yes,
 but we are looking for—.' This an-
 swers ἐνα μὲν τρόπον 1129 b, 17. The

- 15 γάρ τις, ὥς φαμεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας 2
μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ρίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ
20 πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δὲ γέ τινα (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὥς μέρος 3
τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἀδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἔνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ 4
25 προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἀδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ· δηλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται 5
ἢ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινα μοχθηρίαν αἰεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, 30 ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ δ' ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία 6

particles δὲ γὰρ are used with their idiomatic force.

τὴν ἐν μέρει δικ., 'particular justice,' i.e. that justice which is a part of goodness and not ὅλη ἀρετή. The phrases ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος below are equivalent. The force of the preposition here is modal (Ind. Ar. 245 b, 27 sqq.) and may be best brought out by 'as,' 'justice as a part of goodness.' So we have ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης below a, 22.

§ 2. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The argument is as follows. In the case of particular vices we say that a man ἀδικεῖ even although he gains no unfair advantage for himself, and in this use of the word ἀδικία=ὅλη κακία πρὸς ἕτερον. But, on the other hand, there are cases where a man gains an unfair advantage and therefore ἀδικεῖ, but where his ἀδικία is neither identical

with any particular vice nor yet with ὅλη κακία. Yet it is κακία (for we blame it), and it is ἀδικία (for in one sense of the word, ἀδικος=πλεονέκτης, cf. above 1129 a, 32).

οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας. We have the same argument about ἀκρασία below 1146 b, 4.

§ 3. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 43.

ὡς μέρος, equivalent to ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος above.

§ 4. προσλαμβάνων...προστιθεὶς, 'making money,' 'spending money.' Cf. Plato, Euthyphro, 3 d λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἀνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἀν' ἑδέως εἰ τις μου ἐθέλει ἀκούειν.

διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν, sc. ἀδικος λέγεται.

§ 5. ἀδικήματα, in the wider sense=παράνομα.

ἐμοίχευσεν. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τιτι ἐχοιμεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ δὲ περὶ πάντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.

5

7 "Οτι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ποία 8 τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ 9 μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ 10 δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταῦτόν ἀλλ' ἕτερον καὶ ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτά ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρος τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιο- 15 σύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου 10 καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὕσα χρήσις πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ 20 τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερόν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν

§ 6. συνώνυμος. This is more technical than the ὁμωνυμία of 1129 a, 27, and for the reason given. The definition is in the same genus, and συνώνυμον τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος (Top. 1123 a, 28).

τὴν δύναμιν, i.e. τὸ εἶναι above 1130 a, 12.

ταῦτα πάντα. They are, of course, περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία (1129 b, 3), i.e. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ.

§ 7. "Οτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. A striking example of the cumbrous transitions and recapitulations which disfigure

the Ethics. We may attribute these to Nikomachos if we please. Introd. § 5.

§ 9. τὸ παράνομον. For the reading see Stewart's note.

§ 10. τὰ...πραττόμενα. I agree with Professor Stewart in preferring the πραττόμενα of L^b to the προσπαττόμενα of K^b. See, however, Bywater, Contr. p. 44. The νόμια are called δίκαια τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι and τῷ ποιητικῷ εἶναι (b, 25), i.e. τῷ πρὸς ἐν εἶναι, cf. 1096 b, 27 n. They are related to justice exactly as τὰ εὐδεκ-

προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην μοχθηρίαν καλῶναι ὁ νόμος.
 25 τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίων ὅσα νενο-
 μοθέτῃται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς
 καθ' ἑκάστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι,
 πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ
 γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτόν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.
 30 τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου
 ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων
 ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν
 τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἐτέρου), ἐν

τικὰ το εὐεξία (1129 a, 20), or τὰ ὕγιενά το ὕγεια. This does not mean, however, that general and special justice are related in that way.

§ 11. τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, 'the education which is to make a good citizen.' For the expression cf. Pol. 1310 a, 14 τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας... εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημοτικῶς, εἰ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοί, ὀλιγαρχικῶς.

ἀπλῶς, i.e. without any such qualification as 'a citizen of a democracy or an oligarchy.'

οὐ γὰρ ἴσως κ.τ.λ., 'it is not perhaps the same thing for a man to be a good man and to be a good citizen of any state' (lit. 'any citizen'). For the question here raised see Newman's Politics, Introd. pp. 234 sqq. The main point is that the goodness in virtue of which a man is a good citizen is relative to the constitution (πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν) and cannot therefore in all cases be identical with the goodness of a good man. Pol. 1276 b, 34 ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ. This is because the state is not the κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτεία, the true ἀριστοκρατία. In it the good man and the good citizen coincide. Cf. Pol. 1293 b, 5 ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ (ἀριστοκρατία) ἀπλῶς ὁ αὐτός ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστω, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοί

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν. Yet even here the good man in the fullest sense and the good citizen are completely identified only in the ruler; for he alone has occasion to exercise φρόνησις.

ἀνδρὶ...ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. This use of εἶναι with a predicative dative is a favourite way of expressing the category of οὐσία or, in other words, the definition of a thing (λόγος). Cf. the account given of the similar phrase τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό 1130 a, 12. As a ποιότης, ἀγαθός has always the same meaning; but, since it is a relative term also (πρὸς τι), it will have different definitions when it is predicated in the category of οὐσία.

παντί. Jackson illustrates this use from Pol. 1277 a, 13 ἄλλ' ἄρα ἐστὶ τιμὸς (in any state) ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου;

§ 12. τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος κ.τ.λ. We now come to the two divisions of Justice in the particular sense, the only sense which the word has in English.

ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς. Citizenship meant to a Greek the right to share in the goods of the state, and only in the second place the corresponding duty of contributing to them. The citizen was a shareholder, not a taxpayer.

13 δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη 1131^a
 δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια ἔστι τὰ δ'
 ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμός
 ἐγγύη χρήσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται,
 ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν δ' 5
 ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμα-
 κεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία,
 τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἀρπαγὴ πῆρως
 κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.

III. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὅ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, 10
 2 δὴλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἔστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ἴσον·
 ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἔστι τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ
 3 ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ
 λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι
 4 ἂν εἴη. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ 15

ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι. A wide word which includes all business transactions and is not at all confined to 'contracts' (συνθήκαι). The ἐκούσια are contracts, but the ἀκούσια are *obligationes ex delicto*.

διορθωτικόν. Much confusion has been caused by the current translation 'Corrective Justice.' The *iustitia distributiva* of the schoolmen is really more accurate; for διορθοῦν is a word of far wider meaning than ἐπανορθοῦν and signifies 'to adjust,' whether before or after the transaction. Cf. Lobeck on Phrynichus p. 250 "Ὁρθοῦν et erigere et dirigere notat; signate dicitur illud ἀνορθοῦν hoc διορθοῦν. Utrique affine est ἐπανορθοῦν quod locum habet in iis quae ad pristinum statum, unde luxata erant, reducuntur; omnibus autem subest notio mutationis in melius; quomobrem usum promiscuum habent."

§ 13. ἐκούσια. Jackson maintains that the form of justice applicable to these is only the "rectification of wrong arising out of such trans-

actions." But this will not do; for, if a wrong has arisen, the *συνάλλαγμα* at once becomes ἀκούσιον. And we shall see that all the examples given refer to the preliminary adjustment of terms, and not to the rectification of wrong.

πρᾶσις ὠνὴ *emptio venditio*, δανεισμός *mutuum*, ἐγγύη *pignus*, χρήσις *commodatum* (loan for use as distinct from loan for consumption), παρακαταθήκη *depositum*, μίσθωσις *locatio conductio*.

τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων κ.τ.λ. These correspond roughly to the *obligationes ex delicto*. The distinction between λαθραῖα and βίαια is like that between *furtum* (κλοπή) and *rapina* (ἀγπαγή). Cf. also Plato, Laws 864 c.

III. § 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὅ τ' ἄδικος κ.τ.λ. We now begin the discussion of Distributive Justice.

§ 3. ἄνευ λόγου. Cf. 1142 b, 2 n. The view is universally held apart from any ground. Cf. Pol. 1282 b, 18 δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἡ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλείον καὶ ἔλαττον), ἡ δ' ἴσον, δυοῖν, ἡ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον 5 ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει 20 ὄν, δύο ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ 6 εἶναι ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ μὴ ἴσα ἴσοι ἡ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχῃσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν 7 25 τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες [ὑπάρχειν], ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ'

§ 4. καὶ πρὸς τι. This follows from the fact that all δικαιοσύνη is πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ τισίν. This is explanatory of καὶ πρὸς τι. Translate 'the just is necessarily...relative, i.e. just to certain individuals.' Pol. 1282 b, 20 τί γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον.

§ 5. ἐν οἷς explained by τὰ πράγματα (which may be an adscript), 'the objects' which are to be divided. For the use of ἐν cf. 1111 a, 1 n.

§ 6. ἡ αὐτὴ...ἰσότης, 'there will be the same equality in the persons and in the objects,' i.e. if the persons are equal, the objects will be equal; if the persons are unequal, the objects will be unequal.

ὥς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'there is the same ratio between the one pair, the objects, as there is between the other pair.' It is not necessary to follow K^b in omitting τὰ ἐν οἷς, nor is there any difficulty in the double ἐκεῖνα.

ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1301 b, 28 ὅπως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. Eur. Hec. 306—

Ἐν τῷδε γὰρ κάμνουσιν αἱ πολλαὶ πόλεις,

ὅταν τις ἐσθλὸς καὶ πρόθυμος ὦν ἀνὴρ μὴδὲν φέρηται τῶν κακίωνων πλέον.

§ 7. ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, 'from the

principle of according to merit.' Cf. Isokr. Nik. § 12 δικαίωτατον μὴ τοῦ ἀνομοίου τῶν ὁμοίων τυγχάνειν ἀλλὰ καὶ πράττειν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστους. Aetop. § 21 οὐδὲν ἰσοτήτοι νομιζομέναι εἶναι καὶ τῆς μὲν ταύτῃ ἀπασιν ἀπονεμούσης, τῆς δὲ τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστοις...τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον τιμῶσαν καὶ κολάζουσαν προοῦντο.

[ὑπάρχειν]. See Bywater, Contr. p. 44.

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1280 a, 22 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἀνισοὶ ὦσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅπως οἴονται ἀνισοὶ εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅπως ἴσοι. ib. 1317 a, 40 ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία. ib. 1290 b, 1 δῆμος μὲν ἐστὶν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι. ib. 1301 b, 1 εἰσι δὲ τινες οἱ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων αὐτοῦς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος. ib. 1293 b, 40 ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν ταῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν. ib. 1293 b, 9 καλοῦνται ἀριστοκραταὶ...ὅπου γε μὴ μόνον πλουτινὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστινὴν αἰροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς.

τοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι—
 ἢ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' 30
 ἀριθμοῦ—ἢ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν
 τρισὶν ἐλαχίστοις. ἢ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι,
 1. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὧς δυσὶ χρήται
 δις λέγει, οἷον ὧς ἡ τοῦ Α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Β, οὕτως ἡ 1131^b
 3 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Γ. δις οὖν ἡ τοῦ Β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν
 Β τεθῇ δις, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ
 καὶ οὖν ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός·

μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, 'abstract
 number', which is not a number of
 any particular but a number of
 things. Cf. Met. 1092 b, 19 αλεῖ δ' ἀριθμὸς
 τινῶν ἐστίν ('is always a number
 of something'), ἡ πύρινος ἢ γῆϊνος (e.g.
 proportion of fire and earth in
 wood and bone) ἢ μοναδικός. As this
 is the object of ἀριθμητική, it is
 called ἀριθμητικός. So already
 Phileb. 56 d οἱ μὲν (οἱ πολλοὶ)
 οὐκ οὐκ μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθ-
 μῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν, οἷον στρατό-
 βου καὶ βοῦς δύο...οἱ δ' (οἱ φιλο-
 σοφοί) οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακο-
 ῶμεν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάσ-
 τος μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης
 οὐσαν τις θέσει. Cf. Rep. 525 b

ρ κ. τ. λ. This gives the reason
 for the statement made in a, 29. I
 therefore marked τὸ γὰρ ἀνά-
 λογον as a parenthesis.

ἡς λόγων, 'equality of ratios.'

Book v, def. 3 defines *ratio*
ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ δύο μεγεθῶν ὁμογενῶν
πληρότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλα ποιᾶ
 and in def. 8 we have ἀνα-
 λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λόγων ταυτότης.
 This is a various reading ἡ τῶν
 ὁμοιοτήτης. On the question
 of Proportion is identity or
 equality of ratios, see Stewart's
 interesting note.

διηρημένη...συνεχής, 'con-

tinuous...discrete.' Cf. Theon of
 Smyrna p. 82, 10 (Hiller) λέγεται δὲ
 ἡ μὲν συνεχὴς ἀναλογία, ἡ δὲ διηρη-
 μένη, συνεχὴς μὲν ἡ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις
 τρισὶν ὅροις, διηρημένη δὲ ἡ ἐν ἐλαχίσ-
 τοις τέσσαρσιν. For instance the ἀνα-
 λογία 8, 4, 2 is 'continuous,' while
 6, 3, 4, 2 is 'discrete.' Theon points
 out, just as Aristotle does, that a
 continuous proportion may be re-
 regarded as discrete, ἐστὶ δὲ τρόπον
 τινὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχὴς ἐν τέτταρσιν ὅροις,
 δις λαμβανομένου τοῦ μέσου. Other
 terms were in use for 'continuous'
 and 'discrete,' e.g. *συνημμένη* and
διεξενγμένη.

ἡ τοῦ Α, sc. γραμμῇ, 'the line A.'
 The ellipse of γραμμῇ is regular, but
 the usual phrase is ἡ Α or ἡ ἐφ' ἧς
 (ὑπὲρ) Α (cf. 1132 b, 6 sqq.). I suspect
 that τοῦ has crept in from the reading
 ἡ τοῦ πρώτου etc. found in K^b, and
 this, as we can see from Michael of
 Ephesus, originated in the absurd
 idea that ἡ τοῦ πρώτου σχέσις was
 intended. In the absence of a system
 of numeration based on the zero,
 arithmetical questions must be treated
 geometrically. Jackson's defence of
 ἡ τοῦ πρώτου (sc. ὅρου) γραμμῇ in
 the sense of 'the line which we
 take for our first term' is not quite
 convincing, but the sense would be
 the same.

5 διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ᾧ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ πρῶτος ἕως ὅς τε ὁ δεύτερος, οὕτως ὁ τρίτος πρὸς τὸν τέταρτον, καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ πρῶτος πρὸς τὸν τρίτον, ὁ δεύτερος πρὸς τὸν τέταρτον. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει, καὶ οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ πρῶτου ὅρου τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου τῷ τετάρτῳ σύζευξις 12
10 τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, <τὸ δ' ἄδικον> τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον—(καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν 13 γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμ-

§ 10. διήρηται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is quoted in Pol. 1280 a, 17 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς. The πράγματα are here expressed by ᾧ instead of ἐν οἷς as the verb lends itself to this. 'There is a similar division into persons and things,' i.e. the line which represents A+C is 'similarly divided' to that which represents B+D.

§ 11. ὡς ὁ πρῶτος ὅρος κ.τ.λ. In Mathematics ὅρος is the 'term' of a proportion, and the word was transferred by Aristotle from Mathematics to Logic. It is evident from 1133 a, 6 that it was customary to arrange the 'terms' in a square, a fact which may explain the word ὅρος and the symbol ::. I have read α, β, γ, δ as ordinals here with Jackson, since we are now dealing with ὅροι, not γραμμαί.

ἐναλλάξ, *alternando*, i.e. A:Γ::B:Δ. Cf. An. Post. 74 a, 18 τὸ ἀνάλογον ὅτι ἐναλλάξ. Euclid, v, def. 13 ἐναλλάξ λόγος ἐστὶ λήψις τοῦ ἡγουμένου πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, καὶ τοῦ ἐπομένου πρὸς τὸ ἐπόμενον.

τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, sc. ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον (b, 14), i.e. *componendo*, A+Γ: B+Δ :: A: B. Euclid calls this σύνθεσις (cf. συντεθῇ here). Cf. v, def. 15 σύνθεσις λόγου ἐστὶ λήψις τοῦ ἡγουμένου μετὰ τοῦ ἐπομένου ὡς ἐνὸς πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπόμενον.

ἅπερ, i.e. the two terms in each ὅλον, the person and the thing. I have adopted Bywater's correction of MS. ὅπερ. See Contr. p. 44.

§ 12. σύζευξις. The 'conjunction' of the terms. The word refers merely to the drawing of lines in the graphic formula, thus—

$$\begin{array}{cc} \text{A} & \text{B} \\ | & | \\ \text{Γ} & \text{Δ} \end{array}$$

Cf. the note on ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις below (1133 a, 6).

<τὸ δ' ἄδικον>. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 11.

§ 13. καλοῦσι... ἑκάτερον. This would be a footnote in a modern work. It breaks the connexion, for it seems to make the next sentence say that geometrical proportion cannot be continuous, which is absurd.

γεωμετρικὴν. Cf. Theon of Smyrna p. 85, 8 (Hiller) ἀναλογίας δὲ ὁ μὲν Θράσυλλος φησιν εἶναι προηγουμένας τρεῖς (1) ἀριθμητικὴν, (2) γεωμετρικὴν, (3) ἁρμονικὴν. In the first each mean exceeds and is exceeded by the same number; in the second by the same ratio, e.g. 2, 4, 6, 8 form an ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία while 2, 4, 8, 16 form a γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία. The 'harmonic proportion' does not concern us here. Properly speaking, the name ἀναλογία should be confined to geometrical proportion, and so it was originally. But

βαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκά-
 14 τερον)—ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται 15
 εἰς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-
 λογον· τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ
 μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμ-
 βαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλεόν ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος
 15 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ 20
 γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον κακόν·
 16 ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ
 17 δ' αἰρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν
 εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.

IV. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς 25
 2 συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ
 τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ πρότερον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανε-
 μητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ
 τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν εἰς γίνηται
 ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι 30

we see that by Aristotle's time it was already extended to series in arithmetical progression (cf. 1106 a, 35 n.), and later it was used for all manner of series. See Gow, *Greek Mathematics*, p. 93, n. 1.

§ 14. αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία, sc. ἡ τοῦ διανεμητικοῦ δικαίου, not ἡ γεωμετρική. We cannot have the continuous proportion—

$$A : B :: B : \Gamma$$

for the person (ᾧ) and the thing (ὅ) cannot be an identical term, which is necessary for continuous proportion. Cf. 1131 a, 33 and *Phys.* 262 a, 19 τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων, ἀρχῆς μέσου τελευτῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ἄμφω ἐστί, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ δὲ δύο. The phrase ἀριθμῷ ἐν expresses the complete identity of a particular thing with itself (cf. *Met.* 995 b, 33 τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ἡ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον λέγειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει), as opposed to unity of species, unity of genus and analogical unity.

τὸ μὲν...τὸ δὲ... i.e. the one ὅλον—the other ὅλον. In unjust distribution of good things, if A is ὁ ἀδικῶν and B ὁ ἀδικούμενος, $\frac{A+\Gamma}{B+\Delta}$ becomes more than $\frac{A}{B}$.

§ 15. ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ, cf. 1129 b, 8.

IV. § 1. Τὸ...λοιπὸν ἐν. These and the following words imply that there is but one other kind of justice, viz. τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον, and that it is applicable, not only to ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα (which are treated first), but also to ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα (for which see 1132 b, 30 sqq.). The notes will show how I avoid making a third εἶδος ('Catallactic or Commutative Justice') with Professor Ritchie (*Classical Review*, vol. viii. pp. 185 sqq.).

§ 2. τὴν εἰρημένην, sc. τὴν γεωμετρικήν.

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ' ἐν 3 τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιόν ἐστι μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἀδικόν 1132^a κοιν ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἰ ἐπιεικὲς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικὴ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὲς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέ-

τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα. This word is properly used of the εἰσφορά or property-tax raised from the wealthier citizens in time of war. But here it cannot be intended as anything more than an illustration; for it implies that the principle of κατ' ἀξίαν is understood of wealth. In Pol. 1280 a, 28 the argument οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατὸν μῶν τὸν εἰσενεγκόντα μίαν μῶν τῷ δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν is dismissed as ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος.

§ 3. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν, sc. ἀναλογίαν. Cf. 1106 a, 35 n. An arithmetical proportion—we do not usually call it a proportion—is one in which the first term exceeds the second by the same number (or length) that the third exceeds the fourth. Its formula is $a - b = c - d$, not $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d}$. The

ἴσον τι involved in such a proportion arises from the fact that, if four quantities are in 'arithmetical proportion,' the sum of the means is equal to the sum of the extremes, $a + d = b + c$, whereas in geometrical proportion the equation is $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{a+c}{b+d}$.

οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. The persons (οἷς) are regarded as equal, but the things (ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα) are usually unequal. So Demosthenes, Meid. § 46, speaking of the extension of the γραφή ὑβρεως to slaves, says οὐ γὰρ ὅστις ὁ πάσχων ῥέτο δεῖν σκοπεῖν (ὁ νομοθέτης) ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁποῖον τι τὸ γιγνόμενον. It is the

business of τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον to make the same difference between the persons as exists between the things, either (1) before they enter into a συνάλλαγμα at all (ἐν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις), or (2) before the συνάλλαγμα is dissolved by process of law (ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις). The διόρθωσις consists in the process of adding to A or subtracting from B till an ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία is established.

ἐπιεικὲς...φαῦλος. This is a different illustration of the principle of τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον from that implied by τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα above. It is taken from ἀριστοκρατία, not from ὀλιγαρχία, and κατ' ἀξίαν this time means κατ' ἀρετήν.

τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν. This is usually supposed to mean simply 'the amount of the damage' or 'the difference produced by the hurt'; but surely Aristotle is not to be credited with the childish doctrine that a court of law simply awards compensation. The Athenians were too well accustomed to discussing the question διὰ χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι by their elaborate process of τίμησις and ἀντιτίμησις, not to be aware that the wrong done by the one party may be much greater or much less than the damage suffered by the other, and Plato has preserved in the Laws such formulae as διπλάσιον τοῦ βλάβου... ἐκτείσσῃ (843 d), τὸ βλάβος ἀποτινέτω (843 c) and τοῦ βλάβους ὃ ἤμισυ τίνειν (767 e, 915 a) to be applied in different circumstances. The διαφορὰ

πει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρήται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδι- 5
4 κείται, καὶ εἰ ἐβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον
τοῦτο ἄνισον ὃν ἰσάζειν πειράται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν
ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διή-
ρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ
5 ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς 10

to which the judge really looks in assessing the penalty is that between the *ἀδικία* (*iniuria*) and the *βλάβος* (*damnum*), and Aristotle is only following Greek idiom in omitting one of the terms (cf. 1127 a, 13 n.). Cf. Plato, Laws 862 b πρὸς δύο δὴ ταῦτα βλεπ-
τεον, πρὸς τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην. Justice is not done either by transferring the gain of the wrong-doer to the injured party, or by making the wrong-doer compensate the injured party for his loss. We must assess the penalty κατ' (ἀριθμητικὴν) ἀνα-
λογίαν, not κατ' ἰσότητα (1132 b, 33).

ἀδικεῖται and βέβλαπται are both perfect in sense.

εἰ ἐβλαψεν. For the idiomatic omission of ὁ μὲν, cf. below ἡ καὶ κτείνῃ, and Vahlen on Poet. 1447 b, 14.

§ 4. πληγῇ...πατάξῃ, 'has been wounded,' 'has wounded,' not 'has been beaten,' 'has beaten,' which would be πληγὰς ἐμβάλη...πληγὰς λάβῃ.

κτείνῃ. The archaic κτείνω (Attic prose has only ἀποκτείνω) is regularly used as a legal term, and so occurs in Plato, Euthyphron 4 b εἰτε ἐν δίκῃ ἐκτενε ὁ κτείνας κ.τ.λ. and often in the Laws. ἀποθάνῃ is of course its passive.

τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις, lit. 'the being done to and the doing.' If the verbs had been used, we should have had ποιεῖν, not πράττειν, but πράξις has to do duty as the noun of ποιεῖν, since ποίησις has been specialised in meaning. It has not, I think, been observed that this sentence is a highly

compressed reference to a passage in Plato's Laws, 876 d sqq., which leaves no doubt as to the meaning. The question there is how far we are to leave it to the judges προσάπτειν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ πράξεως, and this is illustrated by the various degrees of wounding and killing as here, and a law is given for the γραφὴ τραύματος. We have first the case of the man who wounds intending to kill, a case where the wrong done (*ἀδικία*) far exceeds the wrong suffered (*βλάβος*). The guilty man is not to be punished for murder, but he is not to be let off with the penalty of wounding. He is sentenced τὸ βλά-
βος ἐκτείνω τῷ βλαφθέντι, and also to be banished. Then come cases such as that of a child wounding his parents, where the *ἀδικία* includes *ἀσέβεια* and the penalty is death. The whole passage will repay study.

εἰς ἄνισα. The *πάθος* and the *πράξις* are of course just the same thing looked at from different points of view, and yet they are represented by a line divided into *unequal* segments. The common view of the passage can afford no explanation of this; it would require an undivided line simply transferred from one side to the other, and thus making the two sides unequal. But nothing is said of this.

τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, sc. τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν, 'to equate the wrong suffered and the wrong done by the penalty he imposes.' I think Michael

1-2-2-4

εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τιςιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη,
 τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι·
 ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία⁶
 τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον
¹⁵ μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεον τὸ δ' ἐλατ-
 τον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἐλαττον
 κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὣν ἡν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέ-
 γομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη
 τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν,⁷
²⁰ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἵέναι
 ἵέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον

was right in taking τῇ ζημίᾳ here as instrumental dative, though the accepted interpretation seems to be that of Münscher and Jackson, *πειράται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν τὸ κέρδος ἀφαιρῶν αὐτοῦ*, 'to equalise the unjustly augmented advantages of the one (τὸ κέρδος) and the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (τὴν ζημίαν) by taking from the former and giving to the latter.' In any case the meaning will be the same, and it will not be that the judge forces A to make good the loss of B. What the judge has to do is *τιμᾶν* *ὅτι* *χρὴ* *παθεῖν* *ἢ* *ἀποτεῖσαι*, and that means that, if the wrong done by A is greater than the damage suffered by B, A will have a severer penalty than merely *τίνειν* *τὸ* *βλάβος*. How much severer, we shall see presently.

§ 5. *ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις*, sc. *τοῖς ἀκούσις*. We find *κατηγορεῖν*, *λέγειν ἐπὶ τινι* in the same sense as *ἐπὶ τινος*. The words *ζημία* and *κέρδος*, 'loss' and 'profit' are properly used of *ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα*. They are therefore not appropriate (*οἰκεῖον*) to all kinds of *ἀκούσια*, though they are to some (*τισίν*), e.g. theft and fraud.

§ 6. *ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ*. The words *ζημία* and *κέρδος* can be applied as soon as the damage and the wrong have been assessed.

ὥστε κ.τ.λ. We have now got a more and a less, namely the profit of the wrong-doer and the loss of his victim. We know that the just is the equal, and the equal is the mean between the more and the less. Therefore the just sentence will be that which imposes upon the wrong-doer, not the exact equivalent of the damage he has inflicted, but the arithmetical mean between the damage he has inflicted and the wrong he has committed. Cf. Plato's case of the man who wounds intending to kill.

ἐπανορθωτικόν. The narrower term is correct when we are speaking of *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*. We now see how corrective justice in *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* is a *μέσον*, and that is the object of the discussion.

§ 7. *διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.* An argument from popular language for the benefit of those who are not impressed by mathematical formulae. A good judge is *μέσος*—(this really meant 'impartial,' but it will serve as a *λογικὴ πρότασις*)—but a good judge is living justice, therefore justice is a *μέσον*. Q.E.D.

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1133 b, 14. 1160 b, 18. 1161 a, 28. 1171 a, 12. This is a Platonic way of expressing the ideal which anything aims at. Cf. Phd. 74 d.

δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν
 ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχῃσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξό-
 8 μνοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ
 δικαστής ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμη- 25
 μένης, ᾧ τὸ μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ'
 ἀφείλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ
 δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτοῦ ὅταν
 9 λάβῃσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ
 ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ 30
 ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι
 0 δίκαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστής διχαστής. ἐπὶ γὰρ δύο ἴσων
 ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τού-
 τοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ
 δέ, ἐνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερέιχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, 1132^b

ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον. For the predicative object after ζητεῖν, cf. 1144 b, 7. 1158 a, 31. For the phrase Thuc. IV. 83 μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν.

ἔνιοι, 'some peoples.' The word is constantly used to introduce terms belonging to some dialect (γλώσσαι).

μεσιδίου. Pol. 1306 a, 26 ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν (αἱ δολιχαρχίαι) στρατιώταις καὶ ἀρχοῦντι μεσιδίῳ. The context does not enable us to decide whether this was at Larisa or Abydos.

§ 8. ἐπανισοῖ, 'restores equality.'

ὥσπερ γραμμῆς. Cf. 1131 b, 8 n. The διαφορά τοῦ βλάβους is ᾧ...ὑπερέχει ἢ πρᾶξις τοῦ πάθους or vice versa. Observe that it is the excess of the larger segment over the half, and not its excess over the lesser segment, which is subtracted from the one and added to the other.

δίχα, i.e. εἰς ἴσα. So in Phys. 139 b, 18 we read that Zeno's second argument (the Achilles) differs from his first ἐν τῷ διαιρεῖν μὴ δίχα (= μὴ διχοτομεῖν) τὸ προλαμβανόμενον μέγεθος.

§ 9. τῆς μείζονος, sc. γραμμῆς.

ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν. This is a Pythagorean fancy if we can trust Alexander. But it sounds more like Kratylus.

§ 10. ἐπὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We now get the mathematical proof of the formula, which may best be stated as follows. It is to be shown that, however the wrong and the damage may be apportioned, the just sentence will be that A shall pay and B shall receive the arithmetical mean of the difference between them. Let the whole πάθος καὶ πρᾶξις (C+D)=10, of which C (ἀδικία estimated as κέρδος)=7, while D (βλάβος estimated as ζημία)=3. The parties come before the judge as A+7 and B-3. The problem is to restore equality by equating ζημία and κέρδος. This implies the formula

$(A+7)-(B-3)=(C+5)-(D-5)$. Therefore 5 is the μέσον (=δίκαιον) required. However the 10 may be divided, A will always have as his ὑπεροχὴ twice the arithmetical mean.

τοῦ μέσου ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Fully expressed this would be τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνὶ ὑπερέχει θάτερον, καὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριούμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν 11
 δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεόν ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον
 ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι
 5 δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ 12
 ἀφηρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ΓΔ,
 ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ· τῆς
 ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ. [ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·
 10 ἀννροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον,
 καὶ τὸ πᾶσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.] ἐλή- 13
 λυθε δὲ τὰ ονόματα ταῦτα, ἧ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ
 τῆς ἐκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὐτοῦ
 κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι,

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη ἐνί ὑπερέχει. For the ellipse of τοῦ (which Zell would insert) before ἀφ' οὗ, cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 45 and 1117 a, 30 n.

§ 11. τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, sc. τοῦ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη. ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται sc. τὸ μέσον.

§ 12. αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ κ.τ.λ. sc. γραμμαί. τὸ ΑΕ, τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ΓΔ, sc. μῆμα. The figure is

A	E	A
B		B
Δ	Γ	Ζ Γ

Now, in whatever proportions the πᾶθος καὶ πρᾶξις ΑΑ is divided, the line ΒΒ will always be the arithmetical mean between ΑΕ and ΔΓΓ, and will therefore represent τὸ δίκαιον. Mr Jackson says "In the following figure ΓΔ = ΓΖ = ΑΕ. It is strange that this is not expressly mentioned in the text." But Aristotle had doubtless a διαγραφὴ to refer to, and in that case it might seem superfluous to write down that ΑΕ = ΓΖ. And it is wrong to say that ΓΔ = ΑΕ, for the whole argument implies that ΔΓ = ΕΑ, a very different thing. Aristotle is not putting in an el-

aborate way the obvious fact that, if the gain and the loss are equal, the judge must take the gain from the one party and give it back to the other. He is discussing the more interesting case where the gain and the loss are unequal, and showing that however we split up, say the number 10, the same principle will apply. For instance we may get such equations as 17 - 10 = 10 - 3, or 16 - 10 = 10 - 4, or 15 - 10 = 10 - 5, or 14 - 10 = 10 - 6 etc. In all these cases 10 represents justice.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. This seems to have been interpolated here from 1133 a, 13-16. But it is a very valuable interpolation; for it shows that whoever noted the sentence as a parallel passage here took the right view of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός in its relation to τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον. See the notes on 1132 b, 21 sqq.

§ 13. ἐλήλυθε. Cf. 1133 a, 20. 1142 a, 8. 1143 a, 16. 1166 a, 2. Note in passing that, if the words ζημία and κέρδος have been transferred in this way from ἐκούσια to ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα, we have a strong presumption that these two fall under the same kind of justice.

οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν 15
 14 δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μῆτε πλέον μῆτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ'
 αὐτὰ <τὰ> δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασιν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε
 ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας
 μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν
 καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

20

V. Δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον,
 ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὠρίζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δί-
 15 καιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῃ. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρ-
 μόττει οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτι-

ἄδειαν δέδωκεν. The judge does not restore equality in ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα, they must be adjusted beforehand. Even if the purchaser makes a bad bargain, the law says *caute emptor*. Of course if the vendor is fraudulent, it is an ἀκούσιον συναλλάγμα and not a contract at all.

§ 14. ὅταν... γένηται, sc. αὐτοῖς, 'when the parties have got exactly what they gave,' <τὰ> δι' αὐτῶν sc. γινόμενα. Rassow's insertion of τὰ is much simpler than any of the interpretations which have been proposed. Nothing is commoner than the omission of τὰ after αὐτά by haplography.

τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, i.e. τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συναλλάγμασιν, in *obligationibus ex delicto*. We are coming to the ἐκούσια in the next chapter, and we shall see that the same holds good of them.

V. § 1. τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς, 'the inverse' or 'reciprocal.' It is confusing to start from Euclid's definition of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι, for that refers solely to geometrical proportion. If we can speak of an arithmetical proportion at all, we can surely have an 'inverse' or 'reciprocal' arithmetical proportion of the form

$$a - b = d - c.$$

There seems to be an instance of this usage in Theon of Smyrna p. 87, 11 (Hiller) τὸ δὲ ἀντιπεπονθότως ἐστὶ

τοιούτον· ὅσον ἂν τοῦ μεγέθους ἀφέλῃς τῆς ὅλης ἐν τῷ κανόνι χορδῆς, τοσούτον τῷ τόνῳ προστίθεται, καὶ ὅσον ἂν τῷ μεγέθει τῆς χορδῆς προσθῇς, τοσούτον τοῦ τόνου ὑφαιρεῖται, which certainly appears to refer to addition and subtraction only. The phrase τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῃ would mean literally 'that which has had done to it the opposite of something else,' and would very well apply to a quantity from which the same sum was subtracted as had been added to another.

ἀπλῶς is the emphatic word and is repeated. Aristotle, as we shall see, has no objection to τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς, if we add κατ' ἀναλογίαν. To omit this qualification is to neglect the διαφορά τοῦ βλάβους, i.e. to assume that the κέρδος and the ζημία are equal.

οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι. According to Alexander's commentary on Met. 985 b, 26 the Pythagoreans regarded τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς and τὸ ἰσάκεις ἴσον (quadrature) as the proprium of Justice, whence some gave the number of Justice as 4 (the first *even* square), some as 9 (the first *odd* square).

§ 2. οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικόν. This is obvious; for distributive justice is κατ' ἀξίαν and is therefore determined by a (geometrical) proportion.

οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν, for the

25 κόν—καίτοι βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 'Ραδαμάνθους 3
δίκαιον·

εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεία γένοιτο

—πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ 4
δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι
30 μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ 5
ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς 6
ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς
κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ

ζημία and κέρδος have to be measured by the judge in each case. We must not assume that they are equal; for **πολλαχοῦ διαφωνεῖ**. The *βλάβος* is seldom exactly equal to the *ἀδικία*.

§ 3. **καίτοι βούλονται γε**, i.e. people generally, not the Pythagoreans. For this formulation of the *lex talionis*, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,' cf. Hesiod fr. 212 Mark. The case is well stated in MM. 1194 a, 37 οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἴ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκοψεν τινος, ἀντεκκοπῆναι μόνον ἀλλὰ πλείονα παθεῖν ἀκολουθήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ἦρξε πρότερος καὶ ἡδίκησεν, ἀδικεῖ δὲ κατ' ἀμφοτέρα, ὥστε ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα, καὶ τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν πλείω ὧν ἐποίησεν δίκαιόν ἐστιν.

οἷον εἰ κ.τ.λ. There is no inconsistency between this and 1132 a, 5 χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις. The inequality does not lie between the officer and the private, but between the blow given and the blow received. If an officer strikes a private, that is not merely a blow, but may also be an act of discipline; if a private strikes an officer, that is not merely a blow, but also an act of mutiny. Cf. Probl. 952 b, 28 εἰ μὲν τις ἀρχοντα κακῶς εἴπῃ, μεγάλα τὰ ἐπιτίμια, εἰ δὲ τις ἰδιώτην, οὐθέν. καὶ καλῶς· οἴεται γὰρ τότε οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἀρχοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν τὸν κακηγοροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὑβρίζειν. The case of

Demosthenes v. Meidias is in point here. The judge must therefore 'measure' the *πάθος* καὶ *πρᾶξις* before he can treat the parties as equal, and strike the balance of debit and credit between them. The amount of *damnum* (*βλάβος*) being the same, the amount of *iniuria* (*ἀδικία*) is quite different. Accordingly we do not apply the principle of the arithmetical mean 'simply' (*ἀπλῶς*), but 'proportionally.'

§ 5. **ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον κ.τ.λ.** In *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* the *ἀδικούμενος* ἀδικεῖται ἄκων, but the *ἀδικῶν* ἀδικεῖ either ἐκὼν or ἄκων. Here we see a clear case where the damage suffered may remain the same, while the wrong committed is quite different. Cf. Dem. Meid. § 43 οἱ νόμοι... ἂν μὲν ἐκὼν βλάβῃ, διπλοῦν, ἂν δ' ἄκων, ἀπλοῦν τὸ βλάβος κελεύουσιν ἐκτείνειν.

§ 6. **ἐν...ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς**. These are precisely the same as τὰ ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα described above (1131 a, 2 sqq.) and they therefore belong to τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον in the widest sense (1131 a, 1 n.). We shall therefore find that they are regulated by the *arithmetical* mean, and this must therefore work out as a case of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς, not ἀπλῶς indeed, but κατ' ἀναλογίαν.

κατ' ἀναλογίαν κ.τ.λ. In the case of τὰ ἀκούσια, we must not assume that *ἀδικία* and *βλάβος* are equal, and

ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἡ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν—εἰ δὲ μὴ, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ—ἡ τὸ εὖ—εἰ 1133^a δὲ μὴ, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. 1 διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῷ 8 χαρισασμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ 5 δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύ- ζευξις. οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ A, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ B, οἰκία ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκο- δόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾗ τὸ κατὰ τὴν 10

in the case of ἐκούσια we must not assume that the things to be exchanged are of equal value.

συμμένει κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1261 a, 30 διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σφίξει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ἐργαῖσι πρότερον.

τὸ κακῶς sc. ἀντιποιεῖν. I am not sure that Muretus was right in bracketing εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ. It is redundant, of course; but the future indicative clause, δουλεία ἐστὶν εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσω, 'if I am not to retaliate,' is rather too idiomatic for an interpolator. For the omission of the subject of ἀντιποιήσῃ, cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

§ 7. ἐμποδῶν ποιοῦνται. Zell notes that according to Pausanias there were temples of the Charites in the ἀγορὰ at Sparta, Orchomenos and Olympia.

ἄρξαι, 'to take the initiative.' Cf. 1135 b, 26.

§ 8. ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, 'diagonal conjunction.' If we arrange our ὄροι in the same way as above (1131 b, 9 n.), and we wish to effect a μετάδοσις, it is clear that we must 'conjoin,' not A with Γ and B with Δ as we did in the case of διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον (this might have been called ἡ κατὰ πλευρὰν σύζευξις), but A with Δ and B with Γ. Thus



Now the condition of such a σύζευξις being just ('equal') is that the terms should form an ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία, for it is only in that case that the sum of the extremes will be equal to the sum of the means. The meaning of 'diagonal conjunction' is well illustrated by Jackson from EE 1242 b, 15, where we are told that in unequal friendships (φιλαὶ καθ' ὑπεροχήν) the ὑπερέχων is apt to expect to get more services from his friend than he gives in proportion to his own superiority (on the principle of τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον), whereas the ὑπερεχόμενος τοῦναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν, i.e. he says the rule is not $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{A + \Gamma}{B + \Delta}$

but $A + \Delta = B + \Gamma$.

Cf. below 1163 b, 33.

ἐφ' ᾧ, sc. ὄρω. Mr Jackson says "ἐφ' ᾧ A κ.τ.λ. are lines, not...points." But the line A is ἐφ' ᾧ A (Stewart). The ὄροι are neither lines nor points, but dots.

δεῖ οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'the problem is.'

τοῦ...ἔργου, τοῦ αὐτοῦ. This is the reading both of K^b and L^b, and

ἀναλογίαν ἴσων, εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἴσων, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνηροῦντο
 15 γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ <δ> ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πᾶσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἱατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ,

I do not think it impossible. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 45) reads τὸ...ἔργον (so M^b), τὸ αὐτοῦ on the authority of the Vetus Versio. This is certainly neater, but the authority of the Versio is not high upon a point of this kind.

ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. Before we can say that $A + \Delta = B + \Gamma$ we must make a διόρθωσις of the terms. In this διόρθωσις there are two stages. First (πρῶτον), we must equate Γ and Δ . Say $\Gamma = x\Delta$. This is τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσων, the stage which the Pythagorean formula ignores. Secondly (εἴτα), we must bring the terms A and B into inverse arithmetical ratio of 1 and x . This will give us $A + (x - 1) - B = \Gamma - \Delta$ (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός). After this διόρθωσις 'diagonal conjunction' becomes possible (ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον) thus;

$$A + (x - 1) + \Delta = B + \Gamma.$$

οὐδὲ συμμένει, sc. τὸ συνάλλαγμα. The parties enter into a συνάλλαγμα or 'business relation' (συναλλάττονται) as soon as the one offers a house for shoes and the other shoes for a house. If, however, it is found impossible to effect the διόρθωσις or adjustment of terms, οὐκ ἐμμένουσι τῷ συναλλάγματι. Having failed to come to terms, they break off negotiations (διαλύονται τὸ συνάλλαγμα). It is not correct to say, as Mr Jackson does, that "one of the two parties will be obliged to have recourse to corrective justice in order to obtain his rights"; for this is a case in which ἀδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ

νόμος (1132 b, 15). Surely an action will not lie against a man with whom one has made a bad bargain unless force or fraud were used, in which case the συνάλλαγμα, being βία ἢ δ' ἄγροισιν, would be by definition ἀεσίσιον (βίαιον or λαθραῖον).

§ 9. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. The case of a builder and a shoemaker is comparatively simple; for we may say roughly that a house is worth, say 125 pairs of shoes, and then

$$x - 1 = 124.$$

But the same principle applies to more complicated cases, like that of a doctor and a farmer, whose ἔργα are not definite units, but things like ὕγεια and τροφή. What meaning can we assign to $\Gamma = x\Delta$ in that case? It seems as if Γ and Δ were incommensurable.

ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. There can, I think, be no doubt that, in this context, τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πᾶσχον must refer to the two terms A and B which are ἀντιπεπονθότα to 1 and x . The use of τὸ ποιοῦν in this sense will not seem very strange if we remember that the case primarily in view is that of the doctor who produces health and his 'patient.' In the language of modern economics τὸ ποιοῦν is Supply and τὸ πᾶσχον is Demand. What Aristotle really means, then, is that there would be an end of all commerce unless Supply and Demand can be made identical in every respect. The insertion of δ is due to Rassow.

καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
 10 διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγὴ. ἐφ'
 ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ 20
 μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα
 ἅττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ
 οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ
 τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία.
 1 τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα ἐνὶ τινὶ πάντα 25
 μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν
 ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρεΐᾳ, ἢ πάντα συνέχει—εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν δέοιντο
 ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ—οἶον δ'

τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι, sc. κατ'
 (ἀριθμητικὴν) ἀναλογίαν, not κατ'
 ἰσότητα. We must equate the pro-
 ducers (τούτους) as well as the pro-
 ducts (ταῦτα δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι 1133 a, 13)
 to get the ἀναλογία required for pur-
 poses of exchange.

§ 10. συμβλητὰ, 'comparable,'
 i.e. commensurable (σύμμετρα). The
 formula we have been working with
 assumes that the value of the one
 product can always be expressed as
 a multiple of the other. But, since
 the products are dissimilar, there must
 be some "common measure" of both
 if this is to prove true. The principle
 is clearly laid down in Gen. Corr. 333 a,
 10 εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πᾶν (συμβλητὰ)
 ἀνάγκη ταῦτό τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον πᾶσι
 τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ᾧ μετροῦνται. The
 "common measure" is money, which
 forms as it were 'a middle term'
 (γίνεται πως μέσον) under which
 both the ἔργα may be brought.

ἐλήλυθε. Cf. 1132 b, 12 n.

πως μέσον. This is the important
 point. The existence of money tends
 to disguise the fact that justice ἐν τοῖς
 ἑκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν is an arith-
 metical mean like the other forms.

τὴν ὑπεροχὴν...τὴν ἔλλειψιν. These
 words show we are dealing with differ-
 ence, not ratio.

πόσα ἅττα δὴ κ.τ.λ. If the value
 of shoes is fixed in money, it becomes
 comparable, not only with the value of
 a house, but also with that of τροφή.

δεῖ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., what is wanted,
 then, is that the proportion

$$A + (x - 1) - B = \Gamma - \Delta$$

should be generalised in such a way
 that it will represent not one equation
 only, but a whole series. We know
 already that 'x shoes' (τοσαδὶ ὑπο-
 δήματα) = 1 house. But, unless this
 can be extended, so that we can
 also equate shoes with τροφή etc.,
 commerce is impossible.

ὅπερ, sc. διαφέρει. Identity of differ-
 ence, not of ratio, as above 1131 b, 14.

§ 11. ἡ χρεΐα. Aristotle derives
 this idea from Plato (Rep. 369). A
 modern economist would say rather
 that Normal Value is determined by
 Cost of Production (which some editors
 import into the argument here); but
 Aristotle is thinking of the more
 ultimate fact that, but for χρεΐα, the
 thing would have no value at all,
 whatever the cost of production might
 be, and infers from this that 'x shoes'
 = 1 house because the shoemaker's
 'need' of the builder exceeds the
 builder's 'need' of the shoemaker
 by $x - 1$.

ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ, e.g. if the need of

ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην·
 30 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ
 ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται 12
 δὴ ἀντιπεπονητός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς
 σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ.
 1133^b εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται (εἰ
 δὲ μὴ, ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον), ἀλλ'
 ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ

the builder for the services of the shoemaker were not so great, the rate of exchange would not be the same. Aristotle does not seem to see that Cost of Production narrows this variation to a comparatively slight fluctuation.

ὑπάλλαγμα, 'a pledge, security.' This is one of the non-Attic terms which Aristotle may have brought from Stageira. Phrynichos even says **ὑπάλλαγμα** ἀμαθῶς τινες ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνέχυρον. The meaning is precisely the same as in 1133 b, 11 τὸ νόμισμα οὐκ ἐγγυητής κ.τ.λ.

κατὰ συνθήκην...οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. In Pol. 1257 b, 10 Aristotle quotes this view in an extreme form, probably derived from the Cynics, λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασιν, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων ('adopting a new currency') οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδέν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλὰκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἀποπον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλουτῶν οὐ εὐπὼρῶν λιμῷ ἀπολείεται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδα μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. It is true that there is an element of *συνθήκη* or *νόμος* in currency—we may have a gold or a silver standard—but it has an intrinsic (*φύσει*) value also determined by its Cost of Production.

§ 12. **ἔσται δὴ κ.τ.λ.** After the

digression on currency, we are reminded of the two stages of the *διόρθωσις*. The inverse arithmetical ratio will only be applicable (**ἔσται**) after the equation has been made in money value (**ὅταν ἰσασθῇ**). We can then work out the new problem of exchanging shoes and *τροφή*, as easily as that of exchanging them with a definite *ἔργον* like a house.

ὅπερ, sc. *διαφέρει*. Cf. 1133 a, 21. The *διαφορά* is *ὑπεροχή* or *ἐλλείψις* of *χρεία*.

εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας κ.τ.λ. The translation certainly is 'We must not bring them into the figure of proportion after they have exchanged, but when they still have their own products, otherwise one of the extremes will have both excesses.' This can only have any real meaning if we understand it of the generalisation of the equation to other cases than that first stated. The *ἔργον* of the *σκυτοτόμος* must not be equated with that of the *γεωργός* in the form it received from its exchange with that of the *οἰκοδόμος*, otherwise the *γεωργός* will have not only his excess over the cobbler, but the excess of the builder over the cobbler as well. The *σχῆμα ἀναλογίας* then is

οἰκία ὑποδήματα τροφή

It is only such a figure that can give any meaning to τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον.

- ισότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς Α, τροφή Γ, σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω 5
 13 μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἐν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρεία ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὐ <οὐκ> ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηται τις, οἶον οἶνον, διδόντες σίτου ἑξα-
 14 γωγὴν. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης 10 ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἶον ἐγγυητῆς ἐστ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέρουντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πᾶσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μάλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγῇ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινω- 15 νία. τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσά-

γεωργὸς Α κ.τ.λ. Having equated τσαδὶ ὑποδήματα to τροφή, we can now apply τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός by 'diagonal conjunction' in the same way as we did before.

§ 13. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία κ.τ.λ. These constant equations would be very troublesome, and we therefore look for some common *pekus*, which will enable us to measure each commodity once for all.

ὥσπερ ὅταν κ.τ.λ. This must surely be an instance of failure to effect an exchange (οὐκ ἀλλάττονται), and it must lead up to the view of money as ἐγγυητῆς τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς. The meaning must therefore be 'no exchange takes place when the producer (τις) wants something which the consumer (αὐτός) has not got.' I have therefore written οὐ <οὐκ> ἔχει for οὐ ἔχει (L^b), or οὐχί (K^b).

Διδόντες...ἐξαγωγὴν, 'offering the privilege of exporting corn.' The phrase διδόναι ἐξαγωγὴν is technical in the sense of to permit exportation of a home product. Cf. Isokr. Trapez. § 57 where we read that Satyros, King of Bosphoros, and his father treated the Athenians as 'the most

favoured nation' and, πολλάκις ἤδη διὰ σπάνιν σίτου τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπόρων ναὺς κενὰς ἐκπέμποντες, ὑμῖν ἐξαγωγὴν ἔδοσαν, Theophr. Char. xxiii καὶ διδομένης αὐτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς ξύλων ἀτελοῦς ('duty-free'). Bywater (Contr., p. 46) also compares CIG 3523 (= Cauer 126) and Dittenberger, Sylloge 60 b 1 and 354, 6. The plural participle referring to the same subject as a singular indefinite pronoun is quite a common construction. Cf. 1135 b, 31.

§ 14. οἶον ἐγγυητῆς, cf. ὑπάλλαγμα above 1133 a, 29.

πᾶσχα...τὸ αὐτό, 'the same thing, indeed, happens to money,' i.e. there is not always the same demand for it. I think that the context sufficiently justifies this interpretation; for in 1133 a, 28 the two cases have been already distinguished, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγῇ (failure to exchange, when wine is wanted and corn offered), ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή (unfavourable exchange). See, however, Bywater, Contr., p. 46.


τετιμῆσθαι, 'to have a price put on them,' not, we may be sure, by the 'higgling of the market.' Aristotle no doubt is thinking of a tariff prescribed by the magistrates.

ζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγῇ
 ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν
 οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα
 20 γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς. ἐν δὲ τι δεῖ 15
 εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο
 γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομί-
 σματι. οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἡμισυ,
 εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἡ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον
 25 μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δηλὸν τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον
 οἰκία, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα 16
 εἶναι, δηλὸν· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἡ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας,
 ἡ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.

Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. 17
 30 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δηλὸν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸ δ'
 ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν·
 1134^a ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ

§ 15. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, i.e. κατὰ συν-
 θέκην.

οἰκία α κ.τ.λ. The sum of 10
 minae is taken as the common measure
 of houses and beds, which are not
 directly commensurable. We know,
 however, that a house is worth five
 minae and a bed worth one, so we
 can say that $a = \frac{\beta}{2}$ and $\gamma = \frac{\beta}{10}$ from
 which it follows that $a = 5\gamma$. The
 diagram is given thus by the Par.—



The 10 minae take the place of 'x
 shoes' in the earlier diagram.

ἡ ἴσον, 'worth five minas or = 5
 minas.' For the use of ἴσον in the
 sense of the sign =, cf. 1133 a, 22.
 οὕτως, i.e. five beds for a house.

§ 17. Τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We now
 come to the question πῶς μεσότης ἡ
 δικαιοσύνη; That δικαιοπραγία, the
 ἐνέργεια, is a μέσον, we have suffi-
 ciently shown; but what are we to
 say of the ἔξις?

οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. The dif-
 ference arises from the fact that δικαιο-
 σύνη is an ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον. We
 have no longer to find simply a μεσότης
 πρὸς ἡμᾶς, but an unknown x which
 involves a proportion, whether geo-
 metrical or arithmetical. Justice is
 τοῦ μέσου because, whether in distri-
 bution or in adjusting penalties and
 prices, it seeks to find this x , while
 Injustice seeks to secure for oneself
 $x + n$ of good things and $x - n$ of bad,
 and to secure for others either $x + n$
 or $x - n$ of good things or bad, as the
 case may be.

καθ' ἣν, sc. ἔξιν.

τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεταί τυράννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ 1134^b
 6 τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἵσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν
 αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος—(οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ
 7 ἐτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν 5
 τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)—μισθὸς ἄρα
 τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ
 8 τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τυράννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον
 καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτὸν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν
 ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, 10
 9 ἕως ἂν ἡ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν
 δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς
 αὐτά. οὐδ' ἄρα ἀδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ
 νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν
 οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον 15
 πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο
 γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πο-

to mean 'contrary to the general principle' embodied in the law, τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου of Pol. 1286 a, 17. But surely this would not be sprung upon us without anything in the context to suggest it. For the confusion of νόμος and λόγος in the MSS., see 1138 a, 10 n. In later times λόγος was supposed to mean 'reason.'

§ 7. μισθός...δοτέος. All this comes from Plato, Rep. 345 e sqq.

§ 8. τὸ δεσποτικόν...τὸ πατρικόν. Justice between master and slaves or between father and children resembles the δίκαιον of the state. But it is not the same; for these κοινωνίαι do not fall under the head of ἐν οἷς ἀδικία. There cannot be ἀδικία ἀπλῶς to parts of oneself, but only ἀδικία καθ' ὁμοιότητα. The word πατρικός properly means 'hereditary,' but Aristotle gives it a new application.

ἕως ἂν ἡ πηλίκον κ.τ.λ., 'till it attains a certain age and has been separated.' L^b inserts μὴ before χω-

ρισθῇ, the scribe supposing ἕως ἂν to mean 'as long as.'

ὥσπερ μέρος. Cf. Pol. 1254 a, 9 τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μέριον.

§ 9. πρὸς αὐτά, Ramsauer's reading for MS. πρὸς αὐτόν, seems clearly right.

ἦν, ἦσαν, as we saw above a, 24 sqq.

ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. This is not quite how the equality was formulated above, but it comes to the same thing; for, in the Third Book of the Politics, Aristotle shows that the citizen is necessarily ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι (1283 b, 42).

μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκα. Cf. Pol. 1259 a, 39 γυναῖκας ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναῖκας μὲν πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς.

τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον. In Pol. 1253 b, 8 the τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς are thus given. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ δεσ-

λιτικοῦ. VII. τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ
 δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν,
 20 καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν
 διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ
 μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα,
 ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρα-
 σίδᾳ, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα 2
 25 τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν
 ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει,
 τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως 3
 ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς· καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδα-
 μῶς, παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μὲν καὶ φύσει, κινήτων μέντοι
 30 πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον 4
 δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ
 ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινήτᾳ ὁμοίως,
 δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός· φύ-
 σει γὰρ ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδε-
 35 ξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν 5
 1135^a δικαίων ὁμοιά ἐστὶ τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ

ποτικὴ καὶ γαμικὴ (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἢ
 γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις), καὶ τρίτον
 πατρικὴ (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ὠνόμασται
 ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). The word γαμικός pro-
 perly means not 'conjugal,' but 'per-
 taining to a wedding,' while πατρικός
 is properly 'hereditary.'

VII. § 1. φυσικόν...νομικόν. See
 1094 b, 16 n.

ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, 'when they have
 adopted it.'

μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι. In Herodotos,
 vi, 79 we are told ἀποινα δὲ ἐστὶ
 Πελοποννησίοισι δύο μνᾶι τεταγμέναι
 κατ' ἀνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἐκτίλει. But
 Asia in the 4th century is not Pelopon-
 nesos in the 5th.

τὸ αἶγα θύειν κ.τ.λ. We do not
 know what this refers to.

τὸ θύειν Βρασιδᾶ, at Amphipolis.
 Cf. Thuc. v, 11.

τὰ ψηφισματώδη. On the dis-

tinction between ψηφίσματα and νόμοι
 see below 1141 b, 27.

§ 3. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. It
 is true that τὰ δίκαια are κινήτᾳ, but
 it is not true that τὸ φύσει is ἀκίνητον.
 On the contrary, τὰ φύσει ὄντα πάντα
 φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινή-
 σεως καὶ στάσεως (Phys. 192 b, 13).

καίτοι παρά γε κ.τ.λ. In heaven
 there is 'immutable justice,' so the
 argument would not be true at all
 of the gods. There is nothing re-
 markable in the fact that Aristotle
 attributes justice to the gods in a dia-
 lectical argument like this. It is true
 that he shows below (1178 b, 10) that
 it is absurd to talk of the gods being
 just, but ordinary speech does so, and
 that is enough to make an ἐνδοξον.

§ 4. ποῖον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle means
 τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Cf. Introd. § 26.

οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ
 δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ'
 ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολί-
 6 τεῖται, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη. τῶν 5
 δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ'
 ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ'
 7 ἕκαστον ἓν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ
 ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ
 ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδί- 10
 κημά ἐστὶ, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ
 κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ'
 ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα
 τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. VIII. ὄντων δὲ τῶν 15
 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ
 ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε
 δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέ-
 2 βηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ
 δικαιοπράγημα ὥριστα τῷ ἐκονσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν γὰρ 20
 ἐκούσιον ᾗ, ψέγεται, ἥμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότε ἐστίν· ὥστ'
 ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὐπω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον
 3 προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται,
 ὃ ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ
 μήτε ὅν μήτε φ' μήτε οὐ <ἐνεκα>, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ 25
 τίνος ἔνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ
 βία (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον,
 οὐχ ἐκὼν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον
 πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις

§ 5. οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται κ.τ.λ., i.e. wholesale and retail measures differ.

§ 7. τὸ κοινόν, sc. τῷ διανεμητικῷ καὶ τῷ διορθωτικῷ. Aristotle had used δικαίωμα above to get a neat antithesis to ἀδίκημα. But he admits that this is stretching the meaning of the word considerably.

VIII. οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'they perform

acts of which justice or injustice are accidents,' the regular way of explaining the term κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

§ 3. καὶ πρότερον, 1111 a, 1 sqq. μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός represents μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν. He strikes some one φ' συμβέβηκε πατρὶ εἶναι, but not καθ' αὐτόν.

30 γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατήρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διω-
 ρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πράξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὲ
 ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ
 βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδό-
 1135^b τες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὐθ' ἐκούσιον οὐτ'
 ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως 4
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
 καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίῃ τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ
 5 φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον
 ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζό-
 μενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδिका πράττειν. τῶν 5
 δὲ ἐκούσιων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελο-
 10 μενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα
 δὲ ὅσ' ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς 6
 κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν
 μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ὃ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ
 οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα φήθη,
 15 ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα φήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ'
 ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὄν, ἢ οὐχ ὢ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως 7

μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν. This is the same class of things as is referred to at 1113 b, 26. It is explained in the next sentence, πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

οὐτ' ἀκούσιον. This has been suspected, but it seems to me quite correct. We cannot rightly call τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα involuntary any more than voluntary. They are altogether outside that classification, for they happen φύσει and not βίᾳ. It would be absurd to say that we grow old intentionally.

§ 4. καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as well as τὸ καθ' αὐτό.

§ 5. τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι. For τὸ ἐκούσιον is a wider term than τὸ προαιρετόν. See above 1112 a, 14 ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται (τὸ προαιρετόν), τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προ-

αιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἀρά γε τὸ προβουλευ- μένον;

§ 6. μετ' ἀγνοίας, sc. τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα.

ἀμαρτήματα is here used in its widest sense including ἀτυχήματα. In legal terminology, ἀτύχημα is *casus*, ἀμάρτημα implies *culpa*, ἀδικημα implies *dolus*. Cf. Menander fr. 426 Kock—ἀτύχημα κἀδικημα διαφορὰν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίγνεται, τὸ δ' αἰρέσει. The distinction was a commonplace of the δικαστήρια.

§ 7. παραλόγως. Cf. Rhet. 1374 b, βέστιν ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ ἐστιν. The παραλόγον is what is contrary to reasonable ex-

αι, ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἀνευ
 ῥητημα (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ
 αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν). ὅταν δὲ
 προβουλευσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ 20
 πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει
 ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνον-
 ν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι
 πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβη·
 αἰρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς 25
 ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
 ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ
 ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ
 ὅστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι
 ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι 30
 διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες
 ὁμολογῶντες, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβη-

stance it is not
 intentionally kill
 ag in the street,
 if you shoot in an
 and a man suddenly
 l.
 as. Mr Jackson
 τῆς ἀγνοίας. But
 means simply 'the
 s,' as often in the

ύσας δέ. It does
 is to make an act
 o not call a man
 ct comes from a

ιδά. The ἀναγκαῖα
 h τὰ σωματικά, τὰ
 αὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδι-
 , 26); the φυσικά
 that, ὅσα κοινὰ
 οινά (1149 b, 5).
 though not ἀναγ-

, the legal phrase.
 'malice.'

οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει, sc. τῆς αἰτίας, 'is not
 the aggressor.'

§ 10. οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ.
 The issue of fact is not raised, but
 only that of justification.

ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is the
 φαντασία of wrong suffered that is the
 ἀρχὴ κινήσεως of that form of *δρεξις*
 called *θυμός*. The process is ex-
 plained below 1149 a, 32.

ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν.
 Cf. Rhet. 1417 b, 27 μὴ λαθρανέτω
 δ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβη-
 τήσῃ μόνῃ (sc. ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι)
 τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν
 ἀγνοία αἰτία ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις περὶ
 τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν (the present
 case).

ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην κ.τ.λ., 'unless in
 cases where the wrong has been done
 from forgetfulness.' For instance a
 man may forget to pay a bill, and in
 that case is not μοχθηρός. There is
 no difficulty about the plural, cf.
 1133 b, 9 n.

περὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For δέ connecting a

τοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδι-
 1136^a κείσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ 11
 κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ
 τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν
 προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν
 5 πρᾶττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγγνωμονικά· τὰ δ' 12
 οὐ συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ
 καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι'
 ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν
 μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

10 IX. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης
 εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

Μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.

— Ἐκὼν ἐκοῦσαν, ἢ <οὐχ> ἐκοῦσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν;

15 πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ'
 ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον; καὶ ἄρα

finite verb with a participle, see 1116 a, 8 n.

ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ. Clearly ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας is contrasted with ὁ μὴ προβουλεύσας above (b, 20). He is the man who has received no provocation and is the aggressor (ἀρχει). He cannot plead ἄγνοια, and the ἀμφισβήτησις, if there is one, will be περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι, not περὶ τοῦ δίκαιον. The word ἐπιβουλεύειν implies an unprovoked act, not a retaliation of any kind.

§ 11. ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ. The presence of προαίρεσις, i.e. of βουλευτική βρεξις, not mere βρεξις like θυμός, at once makes the man ἄδικος, though his act may be an ἀδικημα even without προαίρεσις.

παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον, according as the citizens are equal κατ' ἀναλογίαν or κατ' ἀριθμόν (1134 a, 27). The reference is not to Distributive and Corrective Justice.

ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν, i.e. even without προαίρεσις.

§ 12. διὰ πάθος δὲ κ.τ.λ. An act of this kind would not be an ἀδικημα, but something worse. In the Seventh Book these 'bestial' πάθη are discussed.

IX. § 1. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. In the light of the distinctions just made certain old difficulties may be solved. The first is 'Can a man be wronged with his own consent?'

Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε. Cf. 1110 a, 28 n. The two lines seem to have formed part of a στιχομυθία. The mss. have ἢ θέλουσαν, but the sense seems to require an antithesis to ἐκοῦσαν. Grotius restored οὐ θέλουσαν, Jackson and Bywater read οὐχ ἐκοῦσαν, comparing Hippol. 319 φίλος μ' ἀπόλλυς' ὥχ ἐκοῦσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν. The speakers are probably Alkmeon and Phegeus.

καὶ ἄρα πᾶν κ.τ.λ. On the ditto-graphia see Bywater, Contr. p. 47.

πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, [ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον,] ἢ
 2 τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιο-
 οὔσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ὥστ' εὐλογον
 ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δι- 20
 καιοῦσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ δικαιοῦνται
 3 οὐχ ἐκόντες. ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ὁ
 τὸ ἄδικον πεπονηθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράτ-
 τειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐν- 25
 δέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· ὁμοίως
 δὲ δηλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ τᾶδिका
 πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι·
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνα- 30
 τον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικούντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιο-
 4 πραγούντος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα
 τινά, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δ' ἀκρα-
 τῆς ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν, ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐν-
 δέχοιτο αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῶν ἀπο-
 5 ρουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις 1136^b
 δι' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλον βλάπτοιτο ἐκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ'
 ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ
 βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου

The alternative is whether (1) τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι is in every case necessarily one or the other, or whether (2) it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other.

§ 2. δικαιοῦσθαι, 'having justice done to one.' Aristotle requires an opposite to ἀδικεῖσθαι and uses δικαιοῦσθαι in a sense of his own. So above (1135 a, 12) he used δικαίωμα as the opposite of ἀδίκημα.

εὐλογον, opp. ἄτοπον (a, 21), marks a dialectical argument.

§ 3. ἔπειτα answering to πρῶτον μὲν a, 11. The reading is Bywater's correction of MS. ἐπεὶ. See Contr. p. 47. The second ἀπορία is 'Can we say that every man who suffers a

wrong is wronged?'

ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων, sc. ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν. We have seen already that ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν it is possible to commit an ἀδίκημα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, e.g. when we act δι' ἄγνοιαν. Is it also possible κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀδικεῖσθαι?

§ 4. ἀπλῶς, opp. to ἢ προσθετέον below (b, 3). If we say that a wrong is 'simply' *damnum* knowingly inflicted, we shall have to say that the ἀκρατής, who knowingly suffers *damnum* at the hands of another or his own, ἀδικεῖται. We must, however, regard *iniuria* as well as *damnum*, and *volenti non fit iniuria*.

§ 5. προσθετέον, i.q. προσδιοριστέον.

- 5 βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τὰδικα πάσχει, ὁ ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὁ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρατής οὐχ ἂ οἶεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρός φησι 7
 10 δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει "χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἐκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων," οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ δίδοναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον, 8
 δῆλον.
- 15 Ἔτι δ' ὅν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεόν ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον 9
 λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν, εἴ τις πλεόν αὐτοῦ ἐτέρῳ νέμει εἰδῶς καὶ ἐκὼν, οὗτος αὐτὸς
 20 αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ
 τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο,
 25 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερόν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διανέ- 10
 μων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ πλεόν ἔχων ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ἂ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὃ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
 τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιῶν 11
 30 λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἀψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.
 ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δέ- 12

§ 6. βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We may consent to *damnum*; but, if it is essential to *iniuria* that it should be παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν, we cannot consent to that. For no one 'wishes' anything but τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.

§ 7. Ὀμηρος. Il. vi, 236.

§ 8. ὅν προειλόμεθα. This has no reference. Aristotle forgets that he has

not enumerated the ἀπορίαί. He now mentions the third and fourth.

§ 9. ἐλαττωτικός, opp. πλεονεκτικός.

§ 11. κτείνει, the legal word.

§ 12. ἀγνοῶν, sc. τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα. The case supposed is one in which material facts were not before the court.

καιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρι-
νεν ἄδικως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. 1137^a

- 13 ὥσπερ οὖν κὰν εἴ τις μερίσαιοτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ
ταῦτα κρίνας ἄδικως πλεόν ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν
14 ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ'
ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ 5
δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ
τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ
τὸ ἀργύριον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδι ἔχοντας
15 ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ
γινῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, 10
ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλ' οὐ
ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· ἀλλὰ πῶς
πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλεόν ἔρ-
γον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κακεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ
ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομῇν εἰδέναι ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς 15
δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον
16 ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται
εἶναι οὐδὲν ἥττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἥττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ
καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πράξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ
συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν 20

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτός. The unjust judge ἀδικεῖ, for he takes more than his share of the ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά. It is not essential that he should literally share the spoils of the ἀδίκημα. Even if he were to decide the case on those terms (ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ), it is not the land in dispute but a money equivalent that he would receive. So the equivalent need not be more than the gratitude of the one party (χάρις) or the pleasure of punishing the other (τιμωρία). These are enough to constitute πλεονεξία.

§ 14. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδι κ.τ.λ. It is not easy to be ἄδικος, though it is easy to commit an ἄδικον.

§ 15. ἀλλ' οὐ κ.τ.λ., 'though these

things are not just except accidentally.' For a parenthesis introduced by ἀλλά='though,' followed by a main clause introduced by ἀλλά='but,' Bywater (Contr. p. 48) compares 1139 b, 2. 1150 b, 6 sqq.

τοῦτο δὴ, sc. τὸ γινῶναι πῶς πραττόμενα κ.τ.λ. The mss. have τοῦτο δέ, but see Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

§ 16. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, i.e. because they ignore the fact that it is easy to do an unjust act, but not to be unjust. Plato had already shown in the First Book of the Republic that, if we regard Justice as a mere external accomplishment or τέχνη, the just man will be the best thief (Rep. 334 a).

ἀσπίδα ἀφείναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὅποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ
 τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστὶ, πλήν
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσ-
 περ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ
 25 τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 ὡδί. ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς¹⁷
 ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς
 μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς
 δ' οὐδὲν μόνον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα
 30 βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

X. Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν
 ἐπιεικεία πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,
 ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὐθ' ὡς
 ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοποῦμένοις· καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιει-
 35 κὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ
 1137^b ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιει-
 κέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι
 φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὄν ἐπαι-
 νητόν ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἡ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς [οὐ
 5 δίκαιον] εἰ ἄλλο· ἡ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταυτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν²
 οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς,
 ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον

§ 17. τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, i.e. τῶν
 ἐκτός, things which are good in them-
 selves, though they may be bad in
 relation to something else. Cf. 1129
 b, 3.

ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ., 'but
 admit of excess or defect in them.'
 Of course ἔχουσι is the dative of the
 participle, which is connected with
 the finite verb by δέ. Cf. 1116 a, 8.

τοῦτο δ'. This is the reading im-
 plied by the Vetus Versio, and I
 have followed Stewart in preferring
 it. The mss. have διὰ τοῦτ', which
 leaves ἐστίν without a subject. Others
 read διὸ for διὰ.

X. § 1. Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας κ.τ.λ.

The questions of legal casuistry we
 have been discussing lead up naturally
 to the question of "equity."

ὥστε καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'so much so that
 in praising things we even transfer the
 word ἐπιεικὲς to other things than
 δίκαια, and use it as equivalent to
 ἀγαθόν.' Attic avoids the strong
 terms ἀγαθός and κακός and prefers
 the milder terms ἐπιεικής, μέτριος and
 φαῦλος or ὁ τυχών. Aristotle often
 uses ἐπιεικής in this sense. Cf. 1102 b,
 10.

[οὐ δίκαιον]. These words are not
 translated in the Vetus Versio and
 seem better away, as Giphanius saw.

ἐαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπικεικὲς δίκαιον τινὸς ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δίκαιου. ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπικεικὲς, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαῖον ὃν- 10
 3 τοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπικεικὲς. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπικεικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρ-
 4 θωμα νομῖμου δίκαιον. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷον τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷον τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ 15
 τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἡττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός 5
 ἐστίν· εὐθύς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ 20
 τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθὲν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ἡδεῖ, ἐνο- 6
 μοθέτησεν. διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δίκαιον, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος. 25
 καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπικεικούς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι 7
 νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ

§ 2. δίκαιον τινός, 'better than a species of justice.' It is itself a species of τὸ δίκαιον, not another γένος.

§ 4. ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Polit. 294 a νόμος οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναίτο τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιοτάτον ἀκριβῶς πᾶσιν ἅμα περιλαβῶν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτάττειν.

εὐθύς, 'from its very nature.' This use of εὐθύς is derived from such phrases as εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς, εὐθύς φύσει ὑπάρχει. Cf. 1140 b, 17.

ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη, sc. τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, for ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἡ πράξις.

§ 5. δ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ. Cf.

Rhet. 1374 b, 11 (ἐπικεικὲς) τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ('the letter') ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου. We see from the word παρών that Aristotle is thinking of the lawgiver's ἀποδημία in Plato, Polit. 294 a sqq., and that in turn is suggested by the story of Solon.

§ 6. ψηφίσματος δεῖ. Ἀ ψήφισμα is an executive, not a legislative, act. The ἐκκλησία was an executive, not a legislative, body. Allowing for differences, we may think of an Order in Council.

30 ὁ κανὼν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολί-
βδινος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται
καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τινὸς βέλ-8
τιον δικάιον, δῆλον. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικής τίς
35 ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικός καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ
1138^a ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ
ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπι-
είκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὕσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

XI. Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, φανερόν
5 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶ-
σαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀπο-
κτινύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. ἐπὶ 2
ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων ἐκὼν, ἀδι-
κεῖ, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ φ'. ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν
10 σφάττων ἐκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ

§ 7. τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας.

This is said to refer to the 'Cyclo-
pean' building, e.g. at Tiryns, where
polygonal stones were used and a
μολίβδινος κανὼν would doubtless be of
service. But why should it be called
'Lesbian'? Stewart asks whether the
reference is not to the Lesbian κύμα
or 'moulding' (Dict. Ant. s. v. *Cyma*).
The Lesbian κύμα was undulating,
not a simple hollow like the Dorian.
Surely this must be right. Cf. Aes-
chylus fr. 72, Dindorf—

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τις Λέσβιον φατνώματι
κῦμ' ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπεραίνεται ῥυθμοῖς.

XI. § 1. Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται
κ.τ.λ. All the other ἀπορίαι lead up
to this one, and it derives its im-
portance from its bearing on Plato's
account of δικαιοσύνη.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Even in the
wide Platonic sense of Justice it is
impossible.

ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. It is
now common to say after Victorius,

that οὐ κελεύει = ἀπαγορεύει just as οὐκ
ἐᾷ = κωλύει, and that the remark here
is merely an explanation of this. But
then it would be mere tautology, and
if οὐ κελεύει is idiomatically equivalent
to ἀπαγορεύει, no explanation would
be needed. If we had to do here
with an explanation of an idiomatic
οὐ κελεύει = ἀπαγορεύει, we should
most certainly have ἀ δὲ οὐ κελεύει,
not ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει. Further, there
is really no authority for οὐ κελεύει =
ἀπαγορεύει. The simple interpreta-
tion, and the right one, is to supply
ἀποκτινύναι after μὴ κελεύει.

The law forbids us to kill anything
which it does not expressly enjoin us
to kill. We must not kill except
where the law gives us ἄδεια. The
argument is that as suicide is not
expressly exempted from the penalties
of φόνος, it must come under them.

§ 2. παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον, 'in
violation of the same law' as the μὴ
ἀντιβλάπτων who βλάπτει παρὰ τὸν

ιος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ;
 γὰρ πᾶσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πό-
 ημοῖ, καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι
 ἢν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν
 μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτὸν—τοῦτο 15
 ἄλλο ἐκείνου· ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥς-
 δειλός, οὐχ ὥς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ
 ἡν ἀδικεῖ—ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη ἀφηρηθῆσαι καὶ
 κεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' αἰὲν ἐν πλείο-
 νάγκῃ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσιόν 20
 ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον· ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ
 ὑπὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' αὐτόν, ταῦτα
 καὶ πᾶσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖ-
 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων
 ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ 25
 ἑαυτοῦ τοίχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ
 μὴ τὸ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ
 ὥς ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα,
 τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ

above. The L^b reading *παρὰ
 ὃν λόγον* seems to me meaning-
 this context. K^b has *παρὰ
 τὸν λόγον* and the Vetus Versio
νόμον, whence we may infer
 the reading of M^b, though doubt-
 conjecture, is right. For the
 on of λόγος and νόμος in MSS.,
 see 1134 a, 35.

ἢ πόλιν ἡμῶν. Cf. Aischines
 Ktesiphon § 244 *ἐάν τις αὐτὸν
 ἡται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο
 ἂν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν*.
 clear from this that the *ἀδικία*
 ed in bringing blood-guiltiness
 i) on the state, not in depriving
 te of a citizen. Hence *ἀτιμία*
 appropriate punishment, not
 ss.

ἔτι καθ' ὃ κ.τ.λ., in the special
 o which we have limited *ἀδικία*,
 ar as it has to do with *πλεονεξία*
ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. Here ὁ ἀδικῶν

is *ἀδικος μόνον* (there is no *ἐπαναφορά*
 to any other kind of badness 1130 a,
 28), but not *ὅλως φαῦλος* (i.e. his
κακία is not *ὅλη κακία πρὸς ἕτερον*, but
 the *ἐν μέρει κακία*).

οὕτω πονηρός, 'bad in the same
 sense,' i.e. as having a particular form
 of badness.

ἅμα γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ. If A and B are
ἀριθμῶ ἔν, there can be no *ἀδικία*, for
 Γ and Δ (*τὰ πράγματα*) cannot be
 added to A=B and subtracted from
 it at the same time.

§ 5. *ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Not only is an
 act of injustice voluntary and deli-
 berate, but doing wrong is prior to
 having wrong done to one—if wrong
 has first been done to one, there is no
ἀδικία—but, if a man could wrong
 himself, the agent and patient being
 identical, the wrong done would be
 simultaneous with the wrong suffered.

30 δὲ πλεόν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου * * * καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν
 ἐν ἱατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ)· ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ
 ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ
 κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν
 τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ
 35 ἀδικίας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἦττον φαῦλον,⁸
 1138^b κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μείζον εἶναι κακόν.
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρίτιν λέγει μείζω
 νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίῃ ὑπὸ
 5 τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν.

Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς 9
 αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ
 τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις
 διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον· εἰς
 10 ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν
 τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν
 ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ
 τούτοις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [τῶν ἠθικῶν 10
 15 ἀρετῶν] διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτου.

§ 7. καὶ ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. These words seem to have no grammatical connexion as they stand. Some phrase like τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον (Rassow) may have been lost by homoeoteleuton.

ἢ ἐγγύς, for the ἀδίκημα may be ἄνευ προαιρέσεως, in which case the agent is not ἀδικος.

§ 8. τῇ τέχνῃ, as usual τῇ πολιτικῇ, but illustrated by ἱατρικῇ. No art as such takes account of συμβεβηκότα.

§ 9. Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

We can now dispose finally of the account of δικαιοσύνη in Plato's Republic. It is based on a metaphor, and (1) it only refers to the relation between 'parts of the soul,' (2) it is not true πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, which implies equality.

τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν. For this Platonic phrase, cf. e.g. Crito 47 c ποῖ τέλει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος; 47 c ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων.

ἐν τούτοις... τοῖς λόγοις, i.e. in the writings of Plato and his followers.

BOOK VI.

GOODNESS OF INTELLECT.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our account of goodness cannot be complete until we have described Goodness of Intellect as well as Goodness of Character. We know that Happiness is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it may be that this will prove to be some kind of intellectual goodness. But there is a still more pressing need for such a discussion, since the nature of goodness of character cannot be made perfectly clear without it. We have assumed all along that the mean state in which goodness is to be found was determined by the "right rule" (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*), and we said also that this meant it was determined "by what the wise man would determine it by." Now Wisdom is certainly a form of intellectual goodness, and we must therefore discuss that if we are to make our previous inquiries thoroughly intelligible. The case is just like that of health. We may define that roughly as a mean, and we may say truly enough that we can feel when we are healthy and when we are not (*ἐν τῇ αἰσθησει ἡ κρίσις*). This will even enable us to look after our own health to some extent; for we can always warm ourselves by exercise if we find we are too cold. But such an account of health will not be enough for us if we intend to become doctors. In that case we must have the form of health in our souls. Now the object of the present course is not to give empirical rules for action, but to train lawgivers; for we know that the fairest and grandest aim of practical science is to produce Happiness for a state. The lawgiver, then, must have the "right rule," the form of goodness, in his soul; and we cannot fulfil the task we set before us at the

beginning of the course if we do not address ourselves to the solution of this problem.

§ 2. We may convince ourselves by a process of dialectical reasoning that the forms of intellectual goodness are two in number, namely Practical and Theoretical Wisdom (*φρόνησις* and *σοφία*). This might have been deduced at once from the doctrine that all thought is either theoretical or practical (Intro. § 11); but it is more in accordance with our method to work it out from current philosophical views, and especially those of the Academy. In any case we find that there are these two forms of intellectual goodness; and if we compare them and ask how they are related to each other, we shall come very near the final answer to the question with which we started.

§ 3. All forms of thought, practical and theoretical alike, perform their functions through syllogism; but there is a fundamental difference between the syllogism of action and that of knowledge. This is due to the fact that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is always an action, and an action is necessarily particular, it is this action and not another. Now we know that there can be no demonstration of the particular, and therefore the thought which enters into the practical syllogism must be of a different character altogether from that which is operative in demonstration. Practical Wisdom, the virtue of that form of thought, must be capable, not only of apprehending the things that are good for man, the "right rule" (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*) to apply in each department of life; it must also enable us to see that the particular act under consideration is in the circumstances a case of that general rule. In theoretical science, it is to sense we must go for the particulars; but we can hardly call our perception of the character of a particular act by the name of sense. It is not unlike the intuition by which we apprehend mathematical relations; but even that is not the same. It is better to call it "practical thought," and to leave the explanation of its true nature to the physicist or the "first Philosopher." We all know quite well what is meant by it. And we now see how it is that the Mean is determined. The wise man, the lawgiver, has the form of goodness, the "right rule" in his soul, and he has also the power of seeing how that form is to be embodied in a particular act. And he has the form of goodness in his soul just because he knows the end of human life; for the form is

always determined by the end. The test, then, of whether a certain state of the soul is goodness or not is just the degree in which it is subservient to the supreme end of all human activity.

What, then, is that supreme end? We know that it is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it looks as if we had already stated what that is. For it is clear that Theoretical Wisdom is something far higher than Practical. Practical Wisdom has to do with what is good for Man ; but Man is far from being the highest thing in the world. We shall come back to this in Book X ; meanwhile it is enough to point out that Practical Wisdom is, as it were, the handmaid of Theoretical Wisdom, and that all its commands are subservient to the realisation of the highest kind of activity by the highest thing in man.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ 20 μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν.

Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐστὶ τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίσιν, καὶ τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων,

I. § 1. ὡς ὁ λόγος...λέγει, 'as the rule says.' Cf. 1115 b, 12 n.

διέλωμεν. This sense of *διαίρειν* (*διαίρεισθαι*) τι or *περί τινος* is often found in Herodotos (Stein on vii, 16, γ) and seems to be derived from such phrases as *διαίρειν διαφοράς*, *dirimere controversias*. The oldest example is probably Herakleitos fr. 2 *διαίρων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει*. It cannot therefore come from *διαίρειν* in its special Platonic or Aristotelian sense, as Bonitz seems to suggest (Ind. 180 a, 23).

ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, sc. *ταῖς ἠθικαῖς ἀρεταῖς*.

τῶν ἄλλων, e.g. health and strength, cf. 1104 a, 11.

σκοπός. Cf. 1094 a, 24 n. Here the metaphor changes at once from 'hitting the mark' to 'tuning a lyre,' from which we may infer that the literal meaning of *σκοπός* was already lost sight of. This is only natural, since the correlative verb *τυγχάνειν* was constantly used without any feeling for the metaphor. There is no justification for Grant's view that

the non-metaphorical use is a mark of Eudemian authorship (see Stewart's note); for it is found already in Plato, e.g. *Gorg.* 507 d *οὗτος ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν*.

ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων, i.e. the man who has in his soul the *λόγος* (*λόγος τῆς οὐσίας*, *εἶδος*, formal cause) of goodness, as the doctor has the *λόγος* of health. Cf. 1138 b, 31 and note. The definition of *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* has already suggested that this is the *φρόνιμος*.

ἐπιτείνει...ἀνίσιν. The true pitch (*ἁρμονία*) is a *μεσότης* between τὸ ὀξύ and τὸ βαρύ, and the *μουσικός* has its *λόγος* in his soul. The process of *ἐπίτασις* and *ἀνεσις* is that described 1109 a, 24 sqq.

ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων. This is also supposed to be a 'Eudemian' touch on the ground (1) that the word *ὅρος* in the sense of 'standard,' 'determining principle,' is not found in the undisputed books of EN, and (2) that it is found in EE 1222 b, 7 (quoted on p. 105) and 1249 a, 21 (quoted on p. 251). But (1) though the word

αἷς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως,
 2 οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως 25
 ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπι-
 μελείαις, περὶ ὧσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν,

1138 b, 23. EE. 1249 a, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ὁρος καὶ τῷ
 ἱατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν
 μέχει ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ (l. εἶναι) ὑγιαίνειν, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ
 πλεόν, οὐκέτι· οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἱρέσεις τῶν
 φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως

is not found in EN, it is distinctly implied in the definition of *ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ* as *ἐν μεσότητι... ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν*, and (2) the passages from EE can be most naturally explained as reproductions of the present passage. Indeed it seems incredible that Eudemos should have written 1249 a, 21 sqq. if he also wrote the passage before us as part of the same work. Further, there is no difficulty in supposing that Aristotle should have used the word *ὅρος* in the sense here given to it. It meant originally 'land-mark,' and its metaphorical use is as old as Bakchylides, fr. 10 εἰς ὅρος, μὲν βροτοῦσιν ἐστὶν εὐτυχίας ὁδός, | θυμὸν εἰ τις ἔχων ἀπενθῆ διατελεῖν δύναται βίον. So Demosthenes says (De Cor. § 296) τὴν δ' ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδέν' ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτοῦ, ἃ τοῖς πρότερον Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετροφότες. In the more precise sense of 'standard,' 'regulative principle,' it is used by Plato (Rep. 551 a ὅρον πολιτείας δολιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων) and Aristotle (Pol. 1294 a, 10 ἀριστοκρατίας ὅρος ἀρετῆς, δολιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, *et passim*). Note that the *ὅρος* and the *σκοπός* are the same thing and identical with whatever we may ultimately find to be man's chief end.

§ 2. ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές. This has been supposed to be a

criticism of Aristotle by Eudemos; but, as Eudemos repeats the remark on the last page of his own Ethics 1249 b, 5 (quoted p. 252), it would seem as if he had applied the same criticism to himself. In this case too, it appears incredible that one writer should have written both passages as part of the same work. It is true that Eudemos is fond of the phrase, cf. 1216 b, 32 (p. 40), 1217 a, 19 (p. 14), 1220 a, 17, and that it occurs nowhere else in EN. But (1) it is a thoroughly Aristotelian way of speaking, cf. de An. 413 a, 11 ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ γίγνεται τὸ σαφές καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτερον. And (2) there is no occasion for the alleged criticism, since the theory of the Mean is avowedly given as a provisional sketch or *τύπος* (EN 1104 a, 1 sqq., 1114 b, 27), and in Book X Aristotle explains what the *ὅρος* or *σκοπός* is much more fully than Eudemos ever does. We there learn that it is the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* on which the *φρόνιμος* keeps his eye, and the meaning of this is thoroughly worked out, while Eudemos dismisses in half a page his corresponding doctrine that the *ὅρος τῆς καλοκάγαθίας* (i.e. τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς) is τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν.

ἐπιμελείαις. The word is used both of Medicine and Politics.

ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ
τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἂν
30 τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς
τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἱατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς
ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ 3
μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον
τίς ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὁρος.

35 Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι 4
1139^a τοῦ ἡθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν

καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος
καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ “ὡς ὁ
λόγος.” τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν
εἴπειεν “ὡς ἡ ἱατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης.” τοῦτο δ' ἀληθές μὲν,
οὐ σαφές δέ.

πονεῖν... ῥαθυμεῖν. These words are taken from the ἐπιμέλεια of the γυμναστικής or παιδοτρίας. Cf. e.g. Plato, Rep. 410 b τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τοὺς πόρους. Isokr. Dem. § 12 τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις... ἀβξεσθαι πέφυκε. Galen says on Hippokrates, Epid. 6, 5, 9 τὸ πόνος ὄνομα πολλὰκις μὲν εἰσθεν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἀντὶ τοῦ γυμνασίου λέγειν, ἐνίοτε ἀντὶ τῆς ὁδύνης (cf. 1154 b, 7). So ib. 6, 6, 5 πόνοι, σιτία, ποτά, θπνοι, ἀφροδίσια, πάντα μέτρια, et passim. The usual opposite of πόνος in this sense is ἀνάπαυσις (cf. 1127 b, 33 n.), but cf. Rhet. 1370a, 14 (ἡδέα) αἱ ἀπονῆλαι καὶ ῥαθυμίαι. We see that the use of ῥαθυμία in a bad sense is secondary from e.g. Isokr. Evag. § 42 τὰς ἀληθινὰς τῶν ῥαθυμιῶν οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἀργαῖαις... ἐνούσας.

οὐδὲν... πλέον, ‘would be none the wiser.’ Cf. the idiomatic οὐδὲν πλέον ποιεῖν, the negative of πλέον τι ποιεῖν.

ἡ ἱατρικὴ... ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. Observe that these take the place of ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος and ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων and thus show how we are to understand those expressions.

§ 3. καὶ περὶ κ.τ.λ., i.e. with regard to ἕξεις of the soul as well as those of the body.

τούτου τίς ὁρος. The ὁρος is indifferently the ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων and the ὁρος τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. This is quite correct; for the λόγος is the εἶδος of goodness, i.e. the Mean, existing in the soul of the φρόνιμος, just as the art of medicine is the form of health existing in the soul of the doctor. Cf. Met. 1070 a, 29 ἡ γὰρ ἱατρικὴ ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγίειας ἐστίν, 1070 b, 32 ὑγίεια γὰρ πῶς ἡ ἱατρικὴ. (Introductory Note, § 1.)

§ 4. Τὰς δὴ κ.τ.λ. There is nothing in Rassow's view that an independent introduction to Book VI begins here (see Stewart's note on 1138 b, 18). The connexion of thought is this. We know from the definition that the φρόνιμος has the ὁρος we are looking for, and we know that φρόνησις is a διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ (1103 a, 6), so we must go on to discuss διανοητικὰ ἀρετὰ.

ἔφαμεν, 1103 a, 3 sqq.

διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη
αἱ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλο-
γόν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δια- 5
καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ
μεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέ-
ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ
γένηται ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ
ὁ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα 10
ειότητα ἢ γνώσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τού-
μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέ-
ται λογίζεσθαι ταῦτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ

πρότερον, 1102 a, 27 sqq.

τὸν τρόπον. Aristotle did
elf admit 'parts of the soul'
per sense (cf. 1102 a, 31 n.),
still content for the purpose
to take his psychology from
λόγοι (1102 a, 26 n.).

τῶν, cf. 1103 b, 32 n.

ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Introd.

χόμενα, sc. καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

no difference whether we
things themselves or their
e necessary or contingent.
a, 34 n.

τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός.

a clear reference to the
of Plato, Rep. 476 e, sqq.

ially 477 b ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ
ἐφύκε. The principle is laid

γ d δυνάμει δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο
πω ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἐστι (= πρὸς ὃ
καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, ... καὶ τὴν
τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ
γυαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ,
πὶ ἐτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπερ-
ῶ ἄλλην. The distinction,
that between ἐπιστήμη and

αδ' ὁμοιότητα κ.τ.λ. Aris-
self did not hold the *similia*
theory of knowledge in this

naked form; the argument still pro-
ceeds on Platonic lines.

§ 6. λεγέσθω. The imperative
marks the dialectical character of the
argument. Cf. ὑποκείσθω above.

λογιστικόν. We expect *δοξαστικόν*,
and so this 'part' is called below
1140 b, 26. In Plato the name
λογιστικόν is given to the highest of
the three parts of the soul, and
includes τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν instead of
being opposed to it. Aristotle never
uses the word elsewhere except in
discussing Platonic psychology, and
then he always uses it in the Platonic
sense, as opposed to τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν
and τὸ θυμοειδές. He does, however,
speak of *λογιστικὴ φαντασία* (cf. App.
A), and this has led to the use of the
word here.

τὸ γὰρ... λογίζεσθαι κ.τ.λ. As usual
Aristotle appeals to the language of
common life to justify him in giving
a narrower sense to the word than
Plato had done. The phrases *λογί-
ζεσθαι τὰ συμφέροντα*, *λογισμὸς τοῦ
συμφέροντος* were of everyday occur-
rence.

οὐδεὶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1112 a, 21.
This completes the proof that τὸ
λογιστικόν has to do with τὰ ἐνδεχό-
μενα.

τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐστὶν
15 ἔν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ' ἐκατέρου τού-
των τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἔξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἡ δ'
ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.

II. Τρία δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀλη-
θείας, αἰσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις, τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῇ 2
20 πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως
δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατὰφασις καὶ

§ 7. βελτίστη ἔξις...ἀρετὴ...πρὸς
τὸ ἔργον. Cf. 1097 b, 24 sqq.

II. § 1. Τρία δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle approaches the question of the οἰκεῖα ἔργα of the two 'parts' from the other side, that of the distinction between theoretical and practical (Intro. § 11), and bases it now upon his own psychology. There are two specifically human ends, namely πράξις and γνῶσις, or, as he here says, πράξις and ἀλήθεια. If we wish to find the οἰκεῖον ἔργον of any 'part' of the human soul, we must find what it contributes to either of these. That this must be the connexion of thought is made clear, I think, by the difficulties into which we get if we take πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας as equivalent to πρακτικῆς ἀληθείας (see Stewart's note). It seems much more likely that Aristotle should here oppose πράξις to ἀλήθεια. Though, as we shall see, πράξις also implies ἀλήθεια, ἀλήθεια is not the τέλος in practical matters (τὸ τέλος οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις). If Aristotle had written here πράξεως καὶ γνώσεως there would have been less misunderstanding.

κύρια. The adjective κύριος corresponds to the substantive ἀρχή, especially in the sense of efficient cause. Cf. 1147 a, 26.

αἰσθησις. There can be no γνῶσις without αἰσθησις (de An. 432 a, 7 μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι) nor without νοῦς (An. Post. 87 b, 28 sqq. δι' αἰσθήσεως οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐπίστασθαι).

Therefore νοῦς and αἰσθησις are κύρια τῆς (θεωρητικῆς) ἀληθείας, κύρια τῇ γνώσεως. The position of the word νοῦς between αἰσθησις and ὄρεξις indicates that it is to be taken with both.

§ 2. τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις κ.τ.λ. We turn now to consider our more immediate object, the κύρια πράξις, i.e. νοῦς and ὄρεξις. Cf. de An. 432 a, 9 φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταῦτα κινούμενα, ἡ ὄρεξις ἡ νοῦς. de Mot. An. 700 b, 18 ταῦτα δὲ πάντα (sc. τὰ κινούμενα) ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν.

οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῇ πράξεως. This is not fully explained here and must be supplemented from the de Anima and the de Motu Animalium, for which see App. A and B. The lower animals have τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, but this can be explained by αἰσθησις and ὄρεξις alone. There can be no ὄρεξις without a φαντασία, but φαντασία may be either αἰσθητικὴ or λογιστικὴ (βουλευτικῇ). It is only the latter of these that implies νοῦς, and we do not call a κίνησις by the name of πράξις unless it arises from an ὄρεξις moved by νοῦς, i.e. by a λογιστικὴ φαντασία.

ἔστι δ' ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. To find the οἰκεῖον ἔργον of τὸ λογιστικόν (i.e. νοῦς so far as it is a κύριον πράξεως), we now analyse the contributions of νοῦς and ὄρεξις to πράξις. Now the characteristic activities of νοῦς are affirmation and negation, while those of ὄρεξις are pursuit and avoidance, and these are evidently 'analogous'

οις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὁρέξει δίδωμι καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔστι προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὁρεξις βουλευ-
 δεῖ διὰ τὰυτα μὲν τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθὴ εἶναι καὶ τὴν
 ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν 25
 ἀναί τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ
 πρακτική· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακ-
 μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ
 —τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον—τοῦ δὲ
 τοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ 30
 τῇ ὀρθῇ. πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ
 οὐκ ἄλλ' οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὁρεξις καὶ λόγος

s. Hence their relation is a proportion.

νοία. There is no distinction between διάνοια and νοῦς.

ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ. As Ramsauer the middle term of this argument is σπουδαία προαίρεσις. We have that ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ is ἔστι προαιρε-
 (cf. b, 36), and that προαίρεσις is βουλευτική (1113 a, 10). It is that a good προαίρεσις (and a good πράξις) implies (1) an ἔστι, i.e. βούλησις τἀγαθοῦ, and ἀληθὴς λόγος, or true judgment of a certain class of persons a class of acts is good. The of νοῦς here is strictly analogous to its function in creating practical truth. In the latter case is explicit the universal latent σις, and thus produces a λόγος, in turn becomes an ἀρχὴ ἀπο- in the former it makes explicit the universal latent in ὁρεξις, is produces a rule of conduct (λόγος), which in turn becomes βουλευσις, the major premiss of the practical syllogism.

μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Practical has for its function the conversion of ὁρεξις into a λόγος or rule of conduct. This is the truth and the οἰκείον ἔργον of

τὸ λογιστικόν which we are seeking.

§ 3. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς κ.τ.λ. Introduced. § 11. In both its aspects the οἰκείον ἔργον of διάνοια is truth.

§ 4. πράξεως...ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις, 1113 a, 6 n.

ἀλλ' οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα. The final cause of πράξις is τὸ ὁρεκτόν, i.e. τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.

προαιρέσεως δὲ κ.τ.λ. The ἀρχὴ προαιρέσεως is ὁρεξις (as κινούμενον κινεῖν) and a λόγος ἔνεκά του (as κινεῖν ἀκίνητον). For the different way in which these 'move,' cf. App. A.

λόγος ὁ ἔνεκά τινος. This is a general rule of conduct, such as παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά (1147 a, 5), the λόγος which tells us what sort of thing we must do if we are to attain the object of ὁρεξις, and which therefore forms the major premiss of the practical syllogism. It is the fact of its being ἔνεκά του that brings such words as δεῖ, συμφέρει into it (cf. 1140 b, 18 δεῖν τοῦτο ἔνεκα πράττειν). The prime mover of πράξις, then, is always something distinctly formulated by thought; for the ὁρεκτόν can only become an efficient cause τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι (De An. 433 b, 12), and if it is only in φαντασία we have no πράξις. We must not infer from this, however, that thought constitutes the

ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ
 ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἢ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ
 35 ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἡθους οὐκ ἐστὶν. διὰ-5
 νοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆ·
 1139^b αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιῆ
 πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς—ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ
 τινος—τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος,
 ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἡ
 5 ὄρεξις διανοητικῇ, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος.

end. Thought simply universalises and formulates the material furnished by *ὄρεξις* in the same way as it universalises and formulates the material furnished by *αἰσθησις*. In itself it is indifferent to right or wrong, and we shall see that it can universalise wrong *ὄρεξις* as well as right, and formulate false *λόγοι* as well as true.

οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας. Two words for the same thing.

οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς... ἕξεως. This secures that the *ὄρεξις* which thought has to universalise into rules of conduct are right, and thus that τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν shall be the same as the true good, i.e. τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.

§ 5. διάνοια δ' αὐτή, 'thought by itself,' 'thought alone,' i.e. without *ὄρεξις*.

ἡ ἕνεκά του, cf. λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος above.

αὕτη, sc. ἡ ἕνεκά του διάνοια. This completes the proof that διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ. We have seen that this is true of πρακτικῆ διάνοια, and it is also true of ποιητικῆ διάνοια. There too the ἀρχὴ ἡ ἕνεκά του διάνοια, and that implies *ὄρεξις* as well as *νοῦς*. The end of the builder or the doctor is the realisation of the form, whether of a house or of health, existing in his soul. The formal becomes the final cause, and that can be effected by *ὄρεξις* alone. It is not necessary to

prove that the third kind of thought, θεωρητικὴ διάνοια, οὐθὲν κινεῖ by itself; for its objects are either ἀκίνητα or have their ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in themselves. Cf. *Introd.* § 10.

οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς. The process of production (τὸ ποιητόν) is not an end in the unqualified sense in which *πρᾶξις* is so. It is relative (πρὸς τι) and it is the production of something (τινός). By τὸ ποιητόν here we must not understand the thing produced (τὸ ἔργον). It is used in the same way as τὸ πρακτόν and means the thing *done*, not the thing *made*, the building and not the house. We may say either ποιεῖν ποίησιν or ποιεῖν ποίημα (*ἔργον*). Here τὸ ποιητόν corresponds to the internal accusative.

ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι κ.τ.λ. Tr. 'though it is etc.' For the structure cf. 1137^a, 11 n.

ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν, sc. τέλος ἀπλῶς. The end of the *πρᾶξις* is the *ἐνέργεια* itself, not an external *ἔργον*.

ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. 'This sort of efficient cause is Man.' For the others see 1112^a, 31. Aristotle sometimes calls this efficient cause *νοῦς* or *διάνοια* (see the note referred to). In those cases we must understand the qualification *ἕνεκά του*. The language here brings out well the absolute interdependence of *νοῦς* and *ὄρεξις* in *προαίρεσις*.

εἴ ἐστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαι-
 ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλευέται περὶ τοῦ
 τοῦ ἄλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γε-
 νῆκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὁρθῶς Ἀγάθων

μόνον γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,

10

ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἄσπ' ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα.

ρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ'
 μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκάτερον, αὐται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.
 Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.
 ἢ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι 15
 τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις
 νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξη ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.
 ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ
 λογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάν-

ὅκ ἐστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. This seems
 detached fragment loosely
 as usual to the end of a
 It appears to be part of a
 at Practical Thought deals
 ἐσομένου, for which doctrine
 l. § 12.

ν, fr. 5. The quotation
 embodies a favourite γνώμη,
 see also Pindar, Ol. ii, 17;
 is fr. 52; Soph. Aias 378,
 40; Plato, Protag. 324 b,
 3 a.

ητικῶν μορίων, sc. τοῦ ἐπι-
 οῦ καὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. As
 equivalent to διάνοια, so is
 το διανοητικός.

ς οὖν κ.τ.λ., for ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς
 τὸ οἰκεῖον 1139 a, 17.

§ 1. ἄνωθεν, cf. 1155 b, 2 n.
 ἢ, the regular formula in in-
 a dialectical πρότασις, in
 ent case a λογικὴ πρότασις
 105 b, 20) used also in An.
 b, 30—89 b, 9. We must
 his as a mere preliminary
 ion of states with a *prima*
 m to be regarded as διανοη-
 ται, and not as Aristotle's

own list. We shall find that he re-
 duces them to two, φρόνησις and
 σοφία (so Prantl). For a similar pre-
 liminary list afterwards reduced to
 two, cf. Met. An. 700 b, 17 (App. B).

ὑπολήψει...δόξη. Here these are
 introduced as coordinate, quite in ac-
 cordance with the tentative character
 of the present discussion. Later we
 shall see that ὑπόληψις is the genus of
 which ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις
 are species.

§ 2. Ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ. It is natural
 to start with the familiar pair ἐπιστήμη
 and τέχνη, which look as if they might
 be the two ἀρεταὶ we are seeking for.

εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολεγεῖσθαι. We are
 now going to fix the precise meaning of
 these vague popular terms. The name
 of ἐπιστήμη is given to many things
 καθ' ὁμοιότητα (1115 a, 19 n.) which
 are not ἐπιστήμη at all τῷ ἀκριβεῖ
 λόγῳ, e.g. it is given to πολιτικὴ itself.
 This passage is referred to in Met.
 981 b, 25 εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς
 τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν. This, so
 far as it goes, is evidence of the
 Aristotelian character of Book vi.

20 *τες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἰδίου ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰδία, τὰ δ' αἰδία ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀφθαρτα.*
 25 *ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν 3 μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν—ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῷ· ἢ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχή ἐστι*

πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As usual in discussing a *ἔξις*, the first question is *περί ποῖα*; cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν, 'when removed from actual observation.' The verb *θεωρεῖν* expresses the *ἐνέργεια* of knowledge (cf. 1146 b, 31 n.). A triangle has its angles equal to two right angles whether any one actually knows Eucl. I, 32 or not. We cannot say the same of τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, the facts of nature and of human life.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 21 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀπλῶς ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐπιστητόν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην.*

αἰδίου ἄρα. On the *αἰδία* see 1112 a, 21 n.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης...ἀπλῶς, 'necessary in an unqualified sense' as opposed to *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα*, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 21 quoted above. That the angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles is necessary *ἀπλῶς*, that a saw should be of iron if it is to cut is necessary *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως* (Phys. 200 a, 12). The results of *πολιτική* are only *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα*, but *πολιτική* is not τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ an *ἐπιστήμη*. Note that the *ὑπόθεσις* in this phrase is the Q.E.F., the problem to be solved.

ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀφθαρτα, not subject to *γένεσις* and *φθορά*, 'coming into being' and 'ceasing to be.' Cf. Part.

An. 639 b, 23 *ὑπάρχει δὲ τὸ μὲν* (sc. *ἀναγκαῖον*) *ἀπλῶς τοῖς αἰδίοις, τὸ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενέσει πάσιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς, ὅσον οἰκία κ.τ.λ.*

§ 3. *διδακτὴ*. Met. 981 b, 7 *ὅλως τε σημείον τοῦ εἰδέντος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγοούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι· δύναται γὰρ, οἱ δ' οὐ δύναται διδάσκειν.* This introduces us to the second question, *πῶς*;

ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς. An. Post. 71 a, 1 *πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.*

ἢ μὲν γὰρ, sc. *διδασκαλία*, not *ἐπιστήμη*. Aristotle never admits that *ἐπιστήμη* can be got δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, for it is always apodeictic. For the present statement cf. An. Post. 71 a, 6 *ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ* (sc. *οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ οἱ διὰ συλλογισμῶν λόγοι*) *διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ συνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δηλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον.*

ἀρχή ἐστι κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. 1393 a, 26 *ἢ δ' ἐπαγωγή ἀρχή*. This must be a proof that *ἢ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς διδασκαλία* is ἐκ προγινωσκομένων just as much as *ἢ συλλογισμῷ*, so the reading of L¹, *ἀρχῆς ἐστι*, cannot be right. To say that *ἐπαγωγή* 'is of the ἀρχή and the universal' is true, but not to the point here. The *ἀρχή* must be iden-

ὁ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου—εἰσὶν
ρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογι- 30
ἐπαγωγή ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀπο-
τή, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυ-
ῶν γάρ πως πιστεύη καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ
ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος,
τυμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. 35

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον
τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν 1140^a
ακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις—πιστεύομεν
ὅτι αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις—ὥστε καὶ ἡ

th the προῦπάρχουσα γνώσις, there is no difficulty in taking it ἀρχή simply means 'starting-Intro. § 22), and it is just to call τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα the 'point' of our knowledge of ὧν as to call τὸ καθόλου the 'point' of demonstration. In the words of διδασκαλία there is an ἀρχή. The meaning of καὶ τοῦ ὧν now becomes clear. The ἀρχή has an ἀρχή (principium) just as much as syllogism demonstration has, and that ἀρχή ἐπαγωγῆς. The reading of L^b must be to a corrector who thought ὧν could be used only in the sense of ἀρχή ἀποδείξεως.

ἄρα ἀρχαί. Intro. § 22. There is no inconsistency between the ἀρχή here that ἐπαγωγῆς is τῶν ὧν and the statement made 1141 a, ὧν is τῶν ἀρχῶν. No amount of ἐπαγωγῆς could give us an ἀρχή ὧν, but on the other hand we must have data.

καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα, sc. ἐξ ἀληθῶν ὧν καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμῶν καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος (An. Post. 71 b, 20). 'in a certain way,' i.e. in the manner explained by the quotation from the analytics above, especially ἐκ

γνωριμωτέρων, as we see from the next sentence. Not every kind of πίστις is ἐπιστήμη.

μᾶλλον, sc. γνώριμοι.

κατὰ συμβεβηκός. He will have something which as a matter of fact is knowledge (ὧν συμβαίνει ἐπιστήμη εἶναι), but he will not have it as knowledge (καθ' αὐτό). Cf. An. Post. 71 b, 28 τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ὧν ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τὸ ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστὶ, ib. 99 b, 20 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι δι' ἀποδείξεως μὴ γινώσκοντι τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους.

IV. § 1. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης κ.τ.λ. The positive result of this discussion is that, though (1) ἐπιστήμη is περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν and so far fulfils the requirements of the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, yet (2) it always implies a προῦπάρχουσα γνώσις upon which all its necessity depends, and therefore cannot be the ἀρετὴ itself.

τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου κ.τ.λ. We might suppose that τέχνη was the ἀρετὴ of the λογιστικόν, but we are met by the distinction between ποίησις and πρᾶξις. A little dialectic will show that τέχνη has to do only with the former, and therefore will not cover the whole ground of τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. Observe that the distinction is taken from ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι. Cf. Intro. § 11.

μετὰ λόγου ἔξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιη-
 5 τικῆς ἔξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ
 ἢ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἢ ποίησις πρᾶξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ 3
 οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ὅπερ ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου
 ποιητικῆ, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἣτις οὐ μετὰ λό-
 γου ποιητικὴ ἔξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη, ταυτὸν
 10 ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆ. ἔστι 4
 δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεω-

§ 2. μετὰ λόγου ἔξις. This is the correct Aristotelian designation for what popular philosophy calls ἔξις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. As we are coming to a dialectical κατασκευὴ of the definition in due form, it is necessary to substitute the true genus. It was not necessary to define ἐπιστήμη, as we could refer to the Analytics for a sufficient ἐνδοξον, but it is necessary to define τέχνη. On the distinction between μετὰ λόγου and κατὰ λόγου see 1144 b, 26.

ἕτερόν ἐστι. The τόπος here is σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν πτώσεων καὶ συστοίχων, which is applied to the πρόβλημα of ταυτὸν ἢ ἕτερον in Top. 151 b, 30. Assuming, on the basis of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, that πρᾶξις and ποίησις are γένη ἕτερα (cf. 1140 b, 3), it follows that ἔξις πρακτικὴ and ἔξις ποιητικὴ are γένη ἕτερα, for the ἐνέργεια and the ἔξις are σύστοιχα.

Διὸ οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Therefore neither is contained in the other.' This follows from the fact that they have ἀντιδιηρημέναι διαφοραί. They are co-ordinate γένη falling under the higher genus from which they are differentiated. For the phraseology, see next note.

§ 3. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ κ.τ.λ. Building is an εἶδος both of τέχνη and of ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ. The same εἶδος cannot be in two γένη neither of which is contained in the other (see last note). Therefore τέχνη and ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ are the same γένος. For the principle here applied cf. Top. 144 a,

12 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτον ἐν δύο γένεσιν εἶναι μὴ περιέχουσιν ἀλλήλα. So 140 a, 1. 144 b, 14. 152 a, 16.

ὅπερ...τις. The pronoun ὅπερ is used to mark predication ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, and when τις is added as here, it marks that the γένος is predicated of the species or of the individual (cf. 1153 b, 6 and Bonitz, Ind. 533 b, 36 sqq.). It is necessary to mark that the γένος and the διαφορά are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, for otherwise we should have no definition. Cf. An. Post. 97 a, 23 εἰς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν ὄρον διὰ τῶν διαιρέσεων τριῶν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, (1) τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰ κατηγορούμενα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, (2) καὶ ταῦτα τάξαι τί πρῶτον ἢ δεύτερον, καὶ (3) ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα. Here we see that (1) ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ is predicated of οἰκοδομικῆ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, and that (2) it is first, for ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται τῇ οἰκοδομικῇ.

καὶ οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. This is added to secure the third requirement for the κατασκευὴ of a definition, viz. ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα. Cf. Top. 154 a, 37 δὲ γὰρ κατὰ παντὸς οὐ τούνομα (i.e. τέχνη) κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸν ὄρον, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τοῦτοις ἀντιστρέφειν, εἰ μέλλει ἴσως εἶναι ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς ὄρος.

μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς. The qualification ἀληθοῦς may be added because ἀλήθεια is the ἔργον of διάνοια, whether theoretical or practical (1139 a, 29).

§ 4. περὶ γένεσιν. An. Post. 100 a, 6 τὸ καθόλου...τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπ-

ρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἢ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι 15
5 ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποιήσεις καὶ πράξεις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγαθῶν φησὶ

τέχνη τύχην ἑσπερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

20

6 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοῦναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

V. Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὲ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ 25

στήμης· ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν. Most editors bracket καὶ with Muretus, making τὸ τεχνάζειν a new subject. See, however, Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. This is added to distinguish the sphere of τέχνη from that of φύσις, which is also περὶ γένεσιν. Introd. § 10.

§ 5. τρόπον τινά. Cf. Part. An. 640 a, 28 ἐνία γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου γίνεται ταῦτα τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὅλον ὀργία. Phys. 197 a, 5 ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἑνεκά του. διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τύχη· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις οὐκ ἀνευ διανοίας. Rhet. 1362 a, 2 αἰτία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι. Both have to do with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. The limits of the operation of τύχη in the sphere of προαίρεσις are discussed in Met. 1034 a, 9 sqq.

Ἀγαθῶν, fr. 6.

V. § 1. Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως κ.τ.λ. We shall see that φρόνησις is the ἰσότης of the 'calculative part'; but

we must first discover its precise meaning. In Plato the word φρόνησις is exactly equivalent to σοφία, but Xenokrates had already marked a difference between the two. Cf. Clem. Strom. p. 441, 20 Pott. ἐπεὶ καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐν τῷ περὶ φρονήσεως τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῶν πρώτων αἰτιῶν καὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας εἶναι φησιν, τὴν φρόνησιν ἡγούμενος διττήν· τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν, τὴν δὲ θεωρητικὴν· ἣν δὲ σοφίαν ὑπάρχειν ἀνθρωπίνην· διόπερ ἡ μὲν σοφία φρόνησις· οὐ μὲν πᾶσα φρόνησις σοφία. We see here that φρόνησις, though still regarded as both theoretical and practical, is made something specifically human. Aristotle also makes φρόνησις something human, but he confines it to the practical, a restriction which he justifies as usual by an appeal to the use of the word in current language.

οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, 'the way to get a definition of φρόνησις is—.' For the use of λαβεῖν in the dialectical sense (opp. ἀποδοῦναι) with περὶ, cf. 1142 a, 32 n. The method is σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, cf. 1123 a, 35 n.

δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ
 συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς
 ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημείουν δ' ὅτι καὶ
 20 τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπου-
 30 δαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἔστι τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν
 εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν 3
 ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
 πρᾶξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ'
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπό-
 35 δειξις—πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν—καὶ οὐκ
 1140^b ἔστι βουλευσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 ἢ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέ-
 χεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ
 γένος πρᾶξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι 4
 5 ἔξιν ἀληθῇ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ

καλῶς βουλευσασθαι, cf. the defini-
 tion in *Rhet.* 1366 b, 20 φρόνησις
 δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ' ἣν εὖ
 βουλευέσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ
 κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

ὅλως, opp. κατὰ μέρος.

§ 2. σημείουν δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ. This is
 the argument from πρόσθεσις and ἀφαί-
 ρεσις (cf. 1094 b, 28 n.). If the various
 φρόνιμοι περὶ τι are all βουλευτικοὶ περὶ
 τι, we may generalise this and say
 that βουλευτικός (ἀπλῶς) will be
 φρόνιμος (ἀπλῶς). The words ὥστε
 καὶ ὅλως mark the argument as an
 ἐπαγωγὴ.

ὧν μὴ ἔστι τέχνη, i.e. where πρᾶξις
 and not ποίησις is concerned.

§ 3. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς κ.τ.λ. We
 pass to the first question asked with
 regard to every ἔξις, viz. περὶ ποῖα;

ὥστ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. The argument is
 that φρόνησις is deliberative (i.e. not
 τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης), ἐπιστήμη is demon-
 strative (i.e. τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης), therefore
 φρόνησις is not ἐπιστήμη.

πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If the ἀρχή is
 contingent, so is everything that
 follows from it. This is added to

anticipate the objection that, though
 the ἀρχή may be contingent, yet,
 when once it is determined, what
 follows may be necessary, and there-
 fore capable of demonstration. This,
 however, is not what Aristotle means
 by necessary. It only gives us τὸ ἐξ
 ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον, while the object
 of knowledge must be ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἀπλῶς. Cf. 1139 b, 23 n.

καὶ οὐκ ἔστι. As this is a new
 protasis dependent on εἴπερ, we might
 expect μὴ instead of οὐκ. But the
 use of οὐ after εἰ (εἴπερ) in a causal
 sense is well attested in classical
 Attic (Kühner § 513, 5), and in
 post-classical Greek becomes the rule
 (Jannaris *Hist. Gr. Gr.* § 1807 sqq.).
 There is therefore no need to continue
 the parenthesis down to ὄντων with
 Ramsauer and Stewart.

§ 4. ἔξιν ἀληθῇ μετὰ λόγου. There
 is no difficulty in the substitution of
 this phrase for ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθεῖν
 above. The ἔξις in which the soul
 ἀληθεύει (1139 b, 12) may be called
 ἀληθής just as well as the λόγος.

κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ
 ξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ
 οὗτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι,
 τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεω-
 εῖναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς 10
 τικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύο-
 τῶ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν, σώζει δὲ τὴν
 ἑτέραν ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει
 διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγω-
 δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακ- 15
 αῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα τὰ
 εἰρηστικά· τῶ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς
 φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἔνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ'
 εἶναι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ
 ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἔξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου 20
 ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν. ἀλλὰ μὴν

τὰ ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ. These
 are necessary to complete the
 definition; for all *ἐξεις* are relative,
 and a *διαφορά* must be relative when
 the *ἕξις* is relative. Cf. Top. 145 a,
 γὰρ πρὸς τι καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ πρὸς
 ἀπὲρ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης (in the
 sense)· θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακ-
 αὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται, ἕκαστον δὲ
 πρὸς τι σημαίνει· θεωρητικὴ
 πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ποιητικὴ πρὸς τὸ καλόν·

μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This remark is
 to justify the way in which the
 definition of *φρόνησις* has been made
 above. As the end of *πρᾶξις* is the
 good for Man, this is the proper quali-
 fication. We cannot determine the
 definition of *τέχνη* in so simple a
 manner.

διὰ τοῦτο, since *φρόνησις* is
 relative to human good.

Περικλέα, as opposed to *σοφοί* like
 and Anaxagoras. Cf. 1141 b, 4.
οἰκονομικούς...πολιτικούς. These
 are the *ἐκείνοι* of *φρόνιμοι κατὰ μέρος*.

§ 6. ἔνθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. From Plato,
 Krat. 411 c *σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὐ
 νυνδὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως*.

δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει. For the reading cf.
 Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν. Introd. § 22.
 οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, sc. τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα.
 His *φαντασία* is warped (*διέστραπται*)
 by pleasure, so that his *φαινόμενον*
ἀγαθόν is not the true good.

φθαρτικὴ ἀρχὴς. Cf. 1151 a, 15
σώζει τὴν ἀρχήν.

ὥστ' ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ. We now get
 the complete definition by genus (*ἐξίς*
μετὰ λόγου ἀληθείας) and *differentia*
 (*περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴ*).

§ 7. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This is the
 first of the *ἐξεις* we are considering to
 which we are able to give the name
 of *ἀρετή*. Incidentally this section
 gives the reason for refusing that
 name to *τέχνη*. It is really the ad-
 dition of the words *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα*
ἀγαθὰ that shows *φρόνησις* to be an
ἀρετή, for all *ἀρετή* is relative to the
οἰκεῖον ἔργον, and it is clear that

τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν
 τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν
 ἥττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή
 25 τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοι μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς 8
 τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ·
 ἢ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἢ
 φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον
 δ' ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ'
 30 οὐκ ἔστιν.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπό-

τέχνης is not in the same way relative to the οἰκίον ἔργον of Man.

τέχνης...ἀρετή. We learn from 1141 a, 12 sqq. that σοφία in its original sense is the ἀρετή τέχνης, and that it connotes ἀκρίβεια. In other words, we may say that τέχνη admits of τελείωσις just as ἐπιστήμη does, and therefore neither is an ἀρετή in the full sense (see p. 69 sqq.). On the other hand, φρόνησις requires no such τελείωσις, for it implies its own ἀρχαί as we have just seen. It is therefore a complete ἀρετή.

ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος. This is a Socratic paradox (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 20) which was used in various forms by Plato, but most explicitly in the 'Hippias Major,' to show that goodness was no mere art or external accomplishment. The reason why the ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων is αἰρετώτερος is that he has the δύναμις, while the ἄκων ἀμαρτάνων has not, and πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν αἰρετῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῶν φαύλων δυνάμεις αἰρεταί, διὰ καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἔχειν φαιμέν αὐτάς· δυνατοὺς γὰρ εἶναι τὰ φαῦλα πρᾶσσειν (Top. 126 a, 36). Now the φρόνιμος necessarily has a good προαίρεσις, and so he cannot go wrong intentionally, but this is not so with the οἰκοδόμος. He may have a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆς ποιητικῆς οἰκίας, and yet deliberately build a bad house.

On the relation of δύναμις to προαίρεσις, cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

§ 8. τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ. The substitution of the name δοξαστικόν for λογιστικόν makes a more Platonic antithesis to τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. The term itself is not, however, Platonic, nor does Aristotle ever refer to it elsewhere. We have to pass lightly over the fact that the Platonic distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα does not correspond to the Aristotelian distinction between θεωρητικὴ and πρακτικὴ διάνοια. We are able to ignore the difference only because τὰ φύσει γινόμενα do not at present enter into the inquiry.

λήθη...ἔστι. Cf. 1100 b, 17 τοῦτο γὰρ (sc. τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταξὴν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους) οἶκεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτάς (sc. τὰς τιμωτάτας τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν) λήθην. From this it seems to follow that here too the point is that the ἐνέργεια of φρόνησις is more continuous than that of other ἕξεις μετὰ λόγου (ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη) just because it is πρακτικὴ. We shall see later (cf. 1175 a, 4 sqq.) that a continuous ἐνέργεια is impossible to man, and τέχνη depends upon external conditions.

VI. § 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ. We have seen that ἐπιστήμη always implies a προϋπάρχουσα γνώσις

ληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικ-
τῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ), τῆς
ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμῃ εἴη οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε
φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχά- 35
νουσιν οὔσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ 1141^a
σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπό-
2 δεῖξιν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαφεν-
δόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τού- 5
των δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία
φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν
ἀρχῶν.

and cannot therefore be the complete ἀρετὴ of τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. We have now to consider what is lacking to ἐπιστήμῃ in this respect. We shall then be able to discover the ἀρετὴ which is coordinate with φρόνησις.

περὶ τῶν καθόλου... ὑπόληψις. This point was not specially mentioned in the account of ἐπιστήμῃ given above, and it is no doubt brought in now because it is of importance in the contrast between φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμῃ. Cf. 1141 b, 14 sqq. For the doctrine cf. Met. 1059 b, 25 πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμῃ τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων, 1060 b, 20 τὸ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῶν καθόλου καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦδε. An ὑπόληψις that *this* triangle has its angles equal to two right angles is not ἐπιστήμῃ, we only have that when we know it of *the* triangle as a whole. Knowledge does not descend to particulars, there is no knowledge of 'a this' (τόδε τι), but only of 'a such' (τοῖόνδε τι).

μετὰ λόγου γάρ. This puts shortly the proof given above 1139 b, 25 sqq. All ἐπιστήμῃ implies a ground (λόγος) and therefore an ultimate ground; for otherwise we should have a process *ad infinitum* (Introd. § 22). Now

the ultimate ground cannot have a ground, and therefore (ἐπιστήμῃ being μετὰ λόγου) it cannot be the object of ἐπιστήμῃ. It must be the 'starting-point' (ἀρχή) of ἐπιστήμῃ or ἀπόδειξις.

§ 2. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Note that τέχνη is tacitly dropped from the ἐνδοξον which we are using as a major premiss. This may be accidental, or it may be due to the fact that σοφία is the ἀρετὴ τέχνης.

νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. In An. Post. 100 b, 5 the same result is reached by a similar dialectical process. 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξεων αἱ ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν αἰεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθὴ δ' αἰεὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμῃ δ' ἅπαντα μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμῃ μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τε τοιούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστήμης. To understand the meaning of the doctrine νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, we must remem-

VII. Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστά-
 10 τοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν
 καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθέν ἄλλο
 σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δὲ 2

ber that νοῦς and αἰσθesis are both 'immediate' (ἀνεν λόγου). We cannot give a ground for the 'principle of contradiction' any more than we can give a ground for our perception of this triangle. This immediate cognition Aristotle described in a metaphor taken from sense as a 'contact' (θιγεῖν). No error (ψεῦδος) is possible about the ἀρχαί, we either apprehend them or we do not, in which case we have, not ψεῦδος or ἀπάτη, but ἀγνοια. Cf. Met. 1051 b, 24 with Bonitz's note, Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. trans. vol. 1, p. 197.

VII. § 1. Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν κ.τ.λ. A consideration of the use of the word σοφία in current language will show that it connotes ἀκρίβεια or 'finish,' and that therefore it will be a better name for the complete ἀρετὴ we are seeking.

ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις, followed, after the parenthesis ἐνταῦθα μὲν κ.τ.λ., per anacoluthiam by εἶναι δὲ instead of καὶ εἶναι. The first use of the word σοφός in current language is of the skill of the cunning workman. This is a correct observation. The word σοφία occurs only once in Homer, and then it is used of a carpenter (Il. xv, 412). The method here is just like that by which we discovered the meaning of φρόνησις, cf. 1140 a, 24 n. We ask to whom we give the name σοφός, and we find in the first place that we give it to δημιουργοὶ and τεχνῖται in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια.

§ 2. εἶναι δὲ τινος κ.τ.λ. Just as we found that current language recognises φρόνιμοι ἀπλῶς as well as φρόνιμοι περὶ τι, so we find that it

recognises σοφοὶ ἀπλῶς as well as σοφοὶ λιθουργοὶ and ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ. Here as there we are entitled to use the τόπος of πρόσθεσις and ἀφαίρεσις, and we may infer that they are called σοφοὶ in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια also. Much light is thrown upon this passage by the discussion of ἐνδοξα concerning the σοφός in Met. 982 a, 4 sqq. These are (1) ἐπιστάσθαι πάντα τὸν σοφόν, (2) τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γινῶναι δυνάμενον... τοῦτον σοφόν, (3) εἶναι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ διδασκαλικώτερον σοφώτερον εἶναι, (4) οὐ θεῶν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφόν ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν. From the examination of these which follows (982 b, 25) we learn that ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσιν· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λαμβανόμεναι, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας (cf. 1078 a, 9 καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπλουσιτέρων, τοσοῦτ' ἂν μάλλον ἔχει τάκρυβές· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν). The conclusion is (982 b, 8) ἐξ πάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν. We may, then, from the fact that when σοφία is predicated of τεχνῖται it connotes ἀκρίβεια, infer that when it is predicated ἀπλῶς it connotes the same thing, and that means that it is (1) knowledge of the most primary and simple things, (2) dependent on the immediate first principles of all knowledge; for such knowledge alone can have perfect ἀκρίβεια. It alone can be free from irrelevant ὅλη.

τινας σοφούς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ "Ομηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα
οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

15

- ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σο-
3 φία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέ-
ναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ
σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη
τῶν τιμωτάτων· ἀτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν 20
φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἶεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀριστον τῶν
4 ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρώπος ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγα-
θὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ
ταυτὸν αἰεὶ, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταυτὸν πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρό-
νιμον δὲ ἕτερον—τὸ γὰρ περὶ [αὐτὸ] ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν 25

ὥσπερ "Ομηρος. That the Homeric authorship of the 'Margites' was taken quite seriously by Aristotle is clear from Poet. 1448 b, 28 sqq. The end of the second verse, πάσης δ' ἡμάρτανε τέχνης, is preserved by Clem. Strom. i, 281 a. The quotation is humorously made for the sound rather than the sense. Aristotle seems to have been suddenly reminded of it by his own words οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς, and he did not shrink from enlivening his lecture by a joke at the expense of his own favourite pursuits. Of course the quotation also illustrates the primitive meaning of σοφός.

§ 3. δεῖ ἄρα κ.τ.λ. The argument is that the σοφός must be in a true state as to the ἀρχαί, for otherwise his knowledge would not be ἀκριβής, and there would be nothing in common between the σοφός περὶ τι and the σοφός ἀπλῶς.

κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα. Cf. Rhet. 1415 b, 8 ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλὴν (sc. ὁ λόγος). This comes from Plato, Gorg. 505 d ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἀνευ κεφαλῆς περιῶν (sc. ὁ λόγος). Phileb.

66 d ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Tim. 69 a τελευταίην ἤδη κεφαλὴν τε...ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πρόσθεν.

τῶν τιμωτάτων. This is added because the διαφορά of σοφία must be made relative as well as its genus ἕξις (cf. 1140 b, 5 n.). The section beginning at ἀτοπον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. justifies our making it relative in this particular way. By τὰ τιμώτατα Aristotle means as usual God, the πρῶτος οὐρανός and the like. Cf. Met. 1026 a, 21 τὴν τιμωτάτην (sc. ἐπιστήμην) δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμωτάτων γένος εἶναι. For the meaning of τίμιος, cf. 1101 b, 11 n.

§ 4. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. I follow Zell in taking this as a long protasis going down to προνοητικήν. The argument is that, while the φρόνησις we have been studying is relative to Man, there are other φρονήσεις relative to each species of living beings. Now we have no right to assume that Man is the highest thing in the world.

τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα κ.τ.λ. 'For that which sees the good (τὸ εὖ) of (περὶ) a given class of beings (ἕκαστα),

φαίεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν <ἂν> αὐτά, διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἓνα φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικὴν—φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ
 30 τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλοὶ ἔσονται σοφαί· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ
 1141^b θεϊότερα τὴν φύσιν, ὅλον φανερώτατά γε ἔξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρο-

they would call "wise" (e.g. φρόνιμος περὶ ἵππους, πρόβατα) and would entrust that class (αὐτά) to him' (as groom or shepherd). I still think (see Classical Review vol. III, p. 373) that περὶ αὐτό and περὶ ἕκαστα are alternative readings, of which the latter deserves the preference. The words περὶ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ will then be equivalent to τὸ ἐκάστων ἀγαθόν in accordance with the regular periphrasis of the genitive by περὶ c. acc. Bywater, however, reads τὰ for τὸ at the beginning of the sentence and construes τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν τὰ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα, 'particulars concerning itself' (Contr. p. 50). He also reads with K^b φησὶν and ἐπιτρέψει which may well be right. It is worth while noting that this is simply the old Socratic problem of the ἐπιστάτης, for which cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 20 b εἰ μὲν σου τῷ νεί πῶλῳ ἡ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἰχομεν ἂν αὐτοῦ ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι...νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῦ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν;

τῶν θηρίων ἓνα. Not only the ἐπιστάται, but even the beasts themselves are called φρόνιμα if they have the capacity of foresight, e.g. ants, bees

etc. Cf. Gen. An. iii, 2 (quoted in the Introductory Note to Book VIII), Hist. An. 488 b, 15 τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ δεῖλα, ὅλον ἔλαφος, δασύπους, and often in the biological works. So too in Met. 980 b, 21 we read that animals which have memory are φρονιμώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν. Cf. Plato, Pol. 263 d εἴ που φρόνιμὸν ἐστὶ τι ζῷον ἕτερον.

ὅλον φανερώτατά γε, 'as, to take the most visible things only, the bodies of which the heavens are composed.' That the stars are meant is clear from Met. 1026 a, 18, where they are called τὰ φανερά τῶν θεωρῶν, and Phys. 196 a, 33 τὰ θεϊώτατα τῶν φανερῶν. The First Mover is ἀφανές, but the stars are visible. In them we already see τὸ θεῖον. Cf. also de Caelo 290 a, 32, Zeller (Eng. Trans.) I, p. 504.

§ 5. δῆλον. This shows that the purpose of the preceding section is to justify the addition of τῶν τιμωτάτων to the differentia of σοφία.

Ἀναξαγόραν...Θαλῆν. This seems to be suggested by Plato, Hipp. Maj. 281 c οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκείνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ...τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Μιλήσιον Θαλῆν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑστέρων

νίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμ- 5
φέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ
καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ
ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

6 Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι
βουλευσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί 10
φαιμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι, βουλευέται δ' οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν
ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο
πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου
ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.

7 Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ 15
τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ
τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδότες
πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη
ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγμεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα

μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου... φαίνονται ἀπεχό-
μενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων. For
the anecdotes told to show the 'use-
lessness' of σοφία, cf. my "Early
Greek Philosophy" pp. 41 n. 29, 273
n. 8. Thales and Anaxagoras are
contrasted with Perikles (1140 b, 8).

§ 6. καὶ περὶ ὧν κ.τ.λ. This
limits τὰ ἀνθρώπινα by excluding
everything which is not δι' αὐτοῦ
πρακτόν. Cf. 1112 a, 28—31.

ἀπλῶς, as opposed to κατὰ μέρος,
explained above 1140 a, 27.

στοχαστικός, 1106 b, 15 n.

κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν, equivalent here
to κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν, cf. 1139 a, 12 τὸ
γὰρ βουλευέσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν.

§ 7. Οὐδ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. A second
point of difference between φρόνησις
and σοφία.

τῶν καθόλου μόνον. This of course
implies that φρόνησις is also τῶν
καθόλου, and hitherto that is the
aspect of it we have been discussing.
We have only spoken of φρόνησις as
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ, and both
ἀνθρώπος and ἀγαθὰ are universals.

We must not suppose, however, that
it is φρόνησις which makes us aim at
the φαίνόμενον ἀγαθόν (that is the
sphere of δρεῖς), nor that it makes
our φαίνόμενον ἀγαθόν the true good
(that is the function of ἦθος). What
ἡ καθόλου φρόνησις does is, given the
true good as an ὁρεκτόν, to frame
general rules for its attainment. This
is the aspect in which it resembles
science; for πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθό-
λου (Met. 1059 b, 26 et passim).

περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Cf. 1110 b,
6 αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα.
The sphere (περὶ) or matter (ἐν) of
πρᾶξις is always the particular; for
we cannot perform any act that is
not a particular act. Hence our
deliberative analysis cannot be com-
plete till we have carried it as far as
the particular. In science this is
impossible; for particulars are the
objects of αἰσθησις alone.

διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. For the opposition
of ἐμπειρία and τέχνη see p. 67.

εἰδείη, 1110 a, 14 n.

20 ἀγροοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.

VIII. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὕτη μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ 2
25 πόλιν ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἡ δὲ ὡς [τὰ] καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική. αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν

κοῦφα καὶ. It does not seem necessary to bracket these words with Trendelenburg. The case given is the analysis of τὰ ὑγιεινὰ in the sense of τὰ ποιητικά καὶ φυλακτικά ὑγίειας, and its terms are (1) digestible, (2) light, (3) poultry. The empirical practitioner may be supposed to know steps 2 and 3, and his treatment will therefore be more successful than that of the theorist who knows only steps 1, 2, but stops short of the particular 3. What the ἐμπειρος does not know is the middle term connecting κοῦφα and ὑγιεινά.

ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον, sc. τὴν περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

καὶ ἐνταῦθα, 'in this case' as well as in that of diet, there is a master art (i.e. πολιτική) which it will be better to know, for it will teach us the αἰτία. Aristotle returns to this point at 1180 b, 13 sqq. On ἀρχιτεκτονική (sc. τέχνη) see Introd. § 13.

VIII. § 1. τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτόν. Cf. 1130 a, 12 n. Here the meaning is that ἡ περὶ πόλιν φρόνησις or πολιτική is a special application of φρόνησις generally. There is also φρόνησις concerned with the family (οἰκονομία) and the individual.

§ 2. ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονική, corresponding to the master-science of physiology in the case of medicine.

ὡς καθ' ἕκαστα. The words καθ' ἕκαστα are treated as a single in-

declinable adjective. Cf. 1097 a, 13 n. I have followed Mr Stewart's suggestion in bracketing τὰ. Cf. 1110 b, 3 ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀγνοοῖα.

τὸ κοινὸν... ὄνομα. In Aristotle's terminology πολιτική includes νομοθετική, but he is here speaking of ordinary language. The cheirotechnic art has usurped the name which belongs equally to the architectonic.

πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική, while νομοθετική is concerned with τὸ καθόλου and therefore not πρακτική.

τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα κ.τ.λ. The νόμος corresponds to the major premiss of the political syllogism and the ψήφισμα to the minor. We must always remember that the Athenian ἐκκλησία was not a legislature, and that its ψηφίσματα were executive acts applicable to particular cases. Cf. 1137 b, 29. 1152 a, 20. Now the restriction of the name πολιτικός to the 'practical politician,' the ῥήτωρ or σύμβουλος in the ἐκκλησία, is only one effect of the general tendency of the Athenian democracy to put ψηφίσματα in the place of the νόμοι. Demosthenes complains of this in his speech against Leptines § 91 καὶ γὰρ τοὶ τότε μὲν τέως τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐνομοθέτουσιν, τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι νόμοις ἐχρῶντο, καινοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐτίθεσαν, whereas now ψηφισμάτων οὐδ' ὅτιον διαφέρουσιν οἱ νόμοι, ἀλλὰ νεώτεροι οἱ νόμοι, καθ' οὓς τὰ ψηφίσματα δεῖ γράφεσθαι, τῶν

ὁ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν· γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ αὖτε φρόνησις μάλιστα εἶναι ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ 30 αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν οἰκία ἢ δὲ νομοθεσία ἢ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἢ βουλευτική ἢ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη ἕως τὸ αὐτῷ εἶδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν, δοκεῖ ὁ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρέβων φρόνιμος 1142· οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης—

ματῶν αὐτῶν ὑμῖν εἰσιν. In Pol. 1297b, Aristotle speaks strongly of the same subject. He says that the transformation of democracy into a tyranny is a great thing (κύριον εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος τὸν νόμον) comes about when the laws are not observed (ὅταν τὰ νόμιμα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος). The people then becomes a monarch, or, as it is said in many places, its arbitrary behests (ἡμῶς) of a tyrant, and the flatterers. Diogenes Laërtius (v, 17) attributes to Aristotle the remark that, of the two great things of Athens, wheat and laws, wheat is used while the laws are

ὁ ἔσχατον, sc. ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει, 'ultimate,' the last step of the analysis. * Cf. 1112 b, 23 καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι γενέσει, De An. 433 a, 15 οὗτοί εἰσι, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ (the efficient cause which sets things at work), τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ ἀξείων. The first thing we come to in our analysis that is ἐφ' ἡμῖν is the last step of the analysis and the step in action. The πολιτικός lies this in a ψήφισμα.

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. 'There is a belief that—.' Of course this is not Aristotle's view, but a popular usage like the restriction of the πολιτική to 'practical politics,' in which cases one branch has usurped the ὄνομα.

ἐκείνων, 'the other species.' The pronoun refers vaguely to all forms of φρόνησις which have to do with more than the individual, whether the family (οἰκονομία), or the state (νομοθεσία and πολιτική).

βουλευτική...δικαστική. Cf. Pol. 1297 b, 40. We should say 'executive and judicial,' the functions of the ἐκκλησία and the δικαστήρια. The 'legislative function' was not exercised by the δῆμος, but by the νομοθέτης.

§ 4. εἶδος μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. To know one's own good is a species of φρόνησις just as οἰκονομία and πολιτική are, but it is so differentiated from the other species that it is taken for a different genus and incorrectly called by the κοινὸν ὄνομα. There is no difficulty in γνώσεως, which is simply the noun of εἶδέναι. The variant φρονήσεως is probably a conjecture.

ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν. There are degrees in the differentiation of εἶδη within a γένος. The greatest διαφορά in a given γένος makes the εἶδη into ἐναντία.

τὸ περὶ αὐτόν, i.e. τὸ αὐτοῦ. I read τὸ with K^b; the reading τὰ doubtless originated from a misunderstanding of the periphrasis περὶ c. acc. = gen.

Εὐριπίδης. The quotation as given by Aristotle is as usual defective, indeed in the present case it is unintelligible. The whole passage can be restored from Plutarch and Stobaeus with the help of Dion Chry-

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρὴν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριθμημένον στρατοῦ

5

ἶσον μετασχεῖν...

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πρᾶσσοντας πλέον....

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἶονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρόνιμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἀδελον καὶ σκεπτέον.

Σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν 5
νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν
15 ἡ φρόνησις, ἣ γίνεται γινώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ 6
τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ'

sostom (Or. 59), from whom we learn that the words are spoken by Odysseus in the Prologue to the 'Philoktetes.' It ran thus—

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρὴν ἀπραγμόνως

ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριθμημένον στρατοῦ ἶσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχῃ;

* * * * *

οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω γαῦρον ὡς ἀνὴρ ἔφυ· τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πρᾶσσοντας πλέον

τιμῶμεν, ἀνδρας τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν. The quotation is made solely to illustrate the sense popularly given to φρονεῖν. 'How can I be wise, seeing I have preferred πράγματα to minding my own business?'

ζητοῦσι, sc. οἱ ἄνθρωποι implied in δοκεῖ 1142 a, 1. It is the practice and belief of the many that gives rise to the popular abuse of the term φρόνιμος.

ἐλήλυθε. Cf. 1132 b, 12 n.

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. The reason is that man is φύσει συνδυαστικόν and φύσει πολιτικόν (1162 a, 17).

καὶ σκεπτέον. This seems to refer to the discussion at the end of the

Ethics on the functions of the family and the state in producing goodness.

§ 5. τοῦ εἰρημένου, sc. τοῦ τῆς φρόνησιν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα εἶναι. This is plainly the meaning, though the reference is a little obscure. That does not justify us, however, in bracketing the highly characteristic passage 1141 b, 23—a, 11. This is a lecture, not a treatise.

διότι, only here in the Ethics = εἶναι, though common enough elsewhere in Aristotle, especially after σημείον.

δοκεῖ. For the change of number cf. 1141 b, 18.

καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, as well as τῶν καθόλου. Young men may know the general principles of conduct, but they do not know the facts of life, and cannot therefore complete the deliberative analysis. They may know that men should not drink too much; they do not see that 'This is too much for me.'

§ 6. ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ. We may widen the question and ask not only why a boy may be a mathematician though he cannot be φρόνιμος, but also why he cannot be a σοφός (philosopher) or even a φυσικός.

οφὸς δ' ἡ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἡ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; ἔτι 20 ἀρτία ἡ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευέσασθαι ἡ περὶ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἡ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα α, ἡ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἤγηται, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχατοῦ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται·

φυσικός. Cf. Met. 1005 b, 1. σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' ἡ πῃ. The object of φυσική is πῃ, which has its ἀρχὴ κινήσεως πῃ, that of the πρώτη φιλοσοφία πῃ ὅν, 'Reality as such.'

ἀφαιρέσεως 'abstract.' Cf. Met. 1028 b, 28 ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἡμετέρας τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται· περι- ἵπτον πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, ὅτι καὶ κουφότητα κ.τ.λ. ...μόνον ἀλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές. The mathematician strips τὰ αἰσθητὰ of their sensible ἐναντιώσεις and them as mere quantities. It is taking away' which is called ἀφαίρεσις, abstractio. The opposite of ἀφαίρεσις is πρόσθεσις, cf. De Caelo 285 a, 15 τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐκ προσθέσεως (motion is 'added to' experience). Aristotle means here that mathematics so much is 'taken away' that a minimum of experience is enough; he does not mean to say that the ἀρχαὶ of mathematics are independent of experience, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἐστὶ δι' ἐπαγωγὴν γινώρισμα ποιεῖν (An. Post. 81 b, 25).

δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. The ἀφαιρέσις of the first principles of mathematics, being ἐκ προσθέσεως as compared with Mathematics, require a demonstration before they can be applied by νοῦς.

πιστεύουσιν, 'have no conviction in.' Cf. 1147 a, 18 τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὅτι τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡμεῖς...καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθη-

ματικὸς. Cf. Met. 1005 b, 1. νοῦς συνεύρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἵσασιν δ' οὕτως.

τὸ τί ἐστιν, 'the definition' (ὁ ὁρισμὸς δηλοῖ τὸ τί ἐστίν), e.g. the definitions of the point, line etc. which are the ἀρχαὶ of mathematics.

§ 7. ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία κ.τ.λ. There are two opportunities for going wrong in deliberative analysis, (1) with regard to the general rule, (2) with regard to its particular application. In mathematics the second does not exist. We must know the definition of a line, but the question 'Is this a line?' is irrelevant.

ἡ γὰρ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Note the brachylogy. The full sense is ἡ γὰρ ἡ ἀμαρτία περὶ τὸ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

τὰ βαρύσταθμα. Theophrastus ap. Athen. 42 c χεῖρων δ' ἐστὶ τὰ βαρυστάθμωτερα (ὑδατα)...δυσκατεργαστότερα γὰρ ἐστὶ...τῷ πολὺ τὸ γεῶδες ἔχειν.

§ 8. τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχατοῦ. Cf. De An. 433 a, 15. App. A. Like ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις implies both the universal and the particular; but, while ἐπιστήμη only uses τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον in order to arrive at τὸ καθόλου (there being no ἐπιστήμη of τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον), φρόνησις is emphatically τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον. Its analysis is not complete till it reaches τὸ ἐσχάτον, the ultimate individual which can be analysed no further, for an act is always a particular act and φρόνησις is practical. Then what is ἐσχάτον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει becomes πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

25 τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κάκει. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις 30 ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

IX. Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβου-

§ 9. τῷ νῷ, in the special sense in which νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν.

τῶν ὄρων, i. q. τῶν ἀμέσων ἀρχῶν. Cf. 1143 a, 36 τῶν πρώτων ὄρων...νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὗ λόγος. These are the definitions (ὄρος=ὀρισμός) which are the starting-point of every science.

λόγος, i. q. συλλογισμός, ἀπόδειξις. It is impossible λόγον ἀποδοῦναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, sc. αἰσθητῶν. An ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν is one ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἐτέρᾳ αἰσθῆσαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, e.g. colour, sound, taste; τὰ κοινὰ αἰσθητά are κινήσεις, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος. These are αἰσθητά, but are not perceived by one special αἰσθητήριον. On *propria* and *communia sensibilia* see De An. 418 a, 7 sqq., and on the 'intuitional' element in φρόνησις Introd. § 23.

οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα κ.τ.λ., i.e. like the perception of the fact that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle. Introd. §§ 22, 23. Bywater brackets ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς because the words seem to imply that there is no mathematical ἔσχατον except a triangle. See Contr. p. 51. We must bear in mind the ἀναλύνειν ὥσπερ διάγραμμα of 1112 b, 20. The case supposed is that of the geometer who breaks up his figure till he comes to something—say a triangle—which enables him to start the construction or proof at which he aims. It is in this way, for instance, that the properties of parallelograms are discovered.

στήσεται γὰρ κάκει, 'for on that

side too there will be a stop.' We reach the limit of analysis just as much when we descend to particulars as when we ascend to the ἀρχαὶ or πρώτοι ὄροι. It is as impossible to give a reason why a triangle cannot be divided any further as it is to give a reason for the axioms. For the impersonal use of στήσεται (opp. εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν 1094 a, 20 n.), cf. e.g. Phys. 242 a, 19 οὐ δὲ εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν ἀλλὰ στήσεται που.

ἀλλ' αὕτη κ.τ.λ. Mathematical intuition (αὕτη) is more properly called αἰσθησις than φρόνησις can be. It really is αἰσθησις, though not ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, while φρόνησις is of course intellectual, not sensuous. I have no hesitation in preferring the reading of K^b, ἡ, to that of L^b, ἡ. Still better, I think, would be ἡ ἡ.

ἐκείνης, sc. τῆς φρονήσεως. Mathematical and practical intuition belong to the same genus, but they are specifically different, their differentiae being αἰσθητική and διανοητική.

IX. § 1. ζητεῖν τι, a species of τὸ ζητεῖν. It is necessary to put βούλευσις into its genus, in order that we may have the needful προτάσεις for the following piece of dialectic. We shall see that the qualities now to be discussed are the natural basis of φρόνησις. They are δυνάμεις and come by nature.

λαβεῖν...περὶ. Cf. 1140 a, 24. Here the sense is made more explicit by the addition of τί ἐστὶ, cf. 1123 a,

τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι ὧν ἴσασιν, ἢ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὃ δὲ βουλευόμε- 1142^b ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ εὐστοχία, βουλευόμενοι δὲ πο- χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχύ τὰ βου- έντα, βουλευέσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἢ ἀγχίνοια ἔτερον 5 ἢ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἢ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ ἢ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὃ μὲν κακῶς βουλευό- ἀμαρτάνει, ὃ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρ- 5 τις ἢ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὐτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· τήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία— 10 δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισταί ἦδη πᾶν οὐ

We shall see from the sequel Aristotle's reason for discussing it is that Plato, and doubtless others, had made certain statements about it which must be dis- if they are not to confuse the it we have given of φρόνησις. argument is therefore on strictly mic lines.

ρον ἐπιστήμη τις. Plato had ο. Cf. Rep. 428 b ἢ εὐβουλία ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἐστίν. Alc. I.,

Πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα ἐπιστήμην;—Εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε. ἴξα. The most obvious Platonic ative.

στοχία. We may perhaps infer some such definition was current e Academy from [Plato] Def.

ἀγχίνοια εὐφυῖα ψυχῆς, καθ' ἔχων στοχαστικός ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ οντος. On ἀγχίνοια as a species τοχία cf. 1142 b, 6.

ἄνευ...λόγου. The εὐστοχος can o account of his success, he has asscious ground for what he does. ot quite correct to say that ἄνευ = ἄνευ λογισμοῦ, though it comes ch the same thing. Rather, it opposite of μετὰ λόγου. See i.v. λόγος.

καὶ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. A favourite γνώμη. Cf. Isokr. Demon. § 34 βουλευόμενοι μὲν βραδέως, ἐπιτέλει δὲ ταχέως τὰ δόξαντα.

§ 3. εὐστοχία τις ἢ ἀγχίνοια. Cf. 1142 a, 33 n. So too An. Post. 89 b, 10 ἢ δ' ἀγχινοία ἐστίν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου (the middle term), οἷον εἰ τις ἰδῶν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχύ ἐνενόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· ἡ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται· ἡ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Since εὖ- in εὐ-βουλία means ὀρθῶς, εὐβουλία must be an ὀρθότης.

ὀρθότης τις. The mention of δόξα seems to have suggested the Platonic ὀρθή δόξα. It is an ὀρθότης, though not an ὀρθότης of δόξα. The word ὀρθότης in this sense, as opposed to ἀμαρτία, is not Aristotelian but Platon- 10

ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There can be no rightness of knowledge any more than a wrongness, for know- ledge is always right; there is a right- ness of belief, but it is truth and not εὐβουλία.

ὥρισταί ἦδη. Everything which is an object of belief is already deter-

δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὐπω φάσις. καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὃ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάντε
 15 εὖ ἐάντε καὶ κακῶς βουλευῇται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστίν ἢ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλή ζη- 4
 τητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὁ προ-
 τίθεται δεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται

mined one way or the other, but the object of βουλή is still ἀόριστον, for ὁ βουλευόμενος has not yet determined which course to adopt.

οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου, even though it is not the rightness of either knowledge or belief, it is μετὰ λόγου, i.e. it proceeds upon grounds and can give a reason for what it does.

διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται, sc. αὕτην ὀρθότητα εἶναι. This implies an exhaustive division of ἔξεις μετὰ λόγου into ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and διάνοια. Such a division is to be found only in Plato, and we have seen that we are here criticising him. For the definition of διάνοια in this sense cf. Theait. 189 e (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καλῶ) λόγον δὲ αὕτη πρὸς αὕτην ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. Soph. 263 e ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὕτην διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γινόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῶν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια. All the difficulties of this section disappear if the reference to Plato is borne in mind. The older commentators took the sentence to mean 'it falls short of thought,' while modern editors suppose Aristotle to be using διάνοια here in the unparalleled sense of the 'discursive faculty.' In Aristotle διάνοια includes *all* intellect, theoretical and practical, intuitive and discursive, but here the terminology is not his own. See next note for the relation of διάνοια to δόξα in Plato.

φάσις τις ἤδη. This is also from Plato. Cf. Soph. 263 e καὶ μὴν ἐν

λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνόν—Τὸ ποῖον;—Φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.—Ἰσμεν.—"Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπης αὐτό; Hence δόξα is called διανοίας ἀποτελεῦσθαι ib. 264 b. Note the idiomatic οὐπω and ἤδη. Ind. s.vv.

ζητεῖ τι. Here again we make use of the premiss τὸ βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι (1142 a, 31).

§ 4. ὀρθότης...βουλῆς. There is no contradiction; for the Platonic διάνοια includes the Aristotelian βουλή.

ζητητέα. Aristotle may have trusted his memory to fill in at lecture the usual statements that no one deliberates about what is necessary or due to chance, etc. At any rate, he goes on to discuss ὀρθότητι and not βουλή.

πλεοναχῶς, sc. λέγεται. Cf. 1125 b, 14 n.

ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής κ.τ.λ. The *first* requirement is that the end should be right. We do not call the bad man εὐβουλος, though he gains his end by deliberation (φαῦλος here is equivalent to ἀκόλαστος). Nor do we call the morally weak man (the ἀκρατής) by that name. As we shall see, the ἀκρατής, though against his better knowledge, aims at the pleasure of the moment, and the ἀκόλαστος does so on principle.

ὁ προτίθεται δεῖν. This reading is implied by the Vetus Versio, while the mss. have the meaningless βίω.

βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθὸν 20
 τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλευθῆναι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς
 5 εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ
 συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι'
 οὗ δ' οὗ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ'
 αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὐ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μὲν- 25
 6 τοι δι' οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολλὸν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν,
 τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθό-
 7 της ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι
 ἔστι καὶ ἀπλῶς εὖ βεβουλευθῆναι καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν
 δὴ ἀπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθούσα, τὶς δὲ 30
 ἡ πρὸς τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλευ-
 σθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς
 τὸ τέλος οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις ἔστιν.

It is true, as Bywater points out (Contr. p. 51), that *δεῖν* strictly speaking implies *ὑποτίθεται*, but (1) we can hardly credit the author of the Versio with the emendation *δεῖν* for *ιδεῖν*, and (2) the pleonasm of *δεῖν* is extremely common with *verba imperandi*, and is still easier with *verba proponendi*. Jackson quotes Plato, Soph. 221 a *ὅπερ ἄρτι προῖθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν*. The absence of *τούτου* is idiomatic, cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

§ 5. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ κ.τ.λ. The *second* requirement is that the means shall be right as well as the end.

δ...τυχεῖν. For the ellipse of *τούτου* cf. b, 19 above.

ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον. Strictly speaking the *ὅρος* can neither be true nor false; the meaning is that the wrong middle term altogether may be taken, so that one or both of the *προτάσεις* of the practical syllogism are false, though the *συμπέρασμα* is a true statement of the particular act that must be done to reach the end. Aristotle even speaks of *πράγματα* as *ψευδῇ* when they are not what

we take them to be (Met. 1024 b, 25).

§ 6. ἔτι ἔστι κ.τ.λ. The *third* requirement is that the time should be right.

ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον κ.τ.λ. This sums up the three requirements of *ὀρθότης*, (1) end (οὗ), (2) means (ὥς), (3) time (ὅτε).

§ 7. ἔτι ἔστι κ.τ.λ. A *fourth* requirement is that it must be directed to *the* end, not merely to *an* end, to *εὐδαιμονία*, not merely to e.g. health or strength. Cf. 1140 a, 27.

κατορθούσα, 1098 b, 29 n.

οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις, sc. τοῦ συμφέροντος πρὸς τὸ τέλος. This avoids the contradiction of making *φρόνησις* a true conception of the *end* of Man. Others read *πρὸς τι τέλος*. It is not *φρόνησις* but *δρεξις* which makes us aim at the good, and it is not *φρόνησις* but *ἦθος* which makes our good the true good. But, on the other hand, τὸ *δρεκτόν* can only become an efficient cause *τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι* (App. A), and neither *δρεξις* nor

X. "Ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἃς λέ-
 1143^a γομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὐθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη
 ἢ δόξη—πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί—οὔτε τις μίᾳ τῶν
 κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικῇ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἢ γεω-
 μετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ
 5 ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσις ἐστίν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁπουοῦν,
 ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλευσάιτο. διὸ περὶ
 τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταυτὸν σύνεσις
 καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν, τί γὰρ 2
 δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μὴ, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις
 10 κριτικὴ μόνον. ταυτὸν γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συν-
 ετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν 3
 οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἢ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαθάνειν
 λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρήται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῇ
 χρήσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ
 15 φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ

ἦθος could give us an ἀληθῆς ὑπό-
 ληψις of τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος
 such as the rule παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ
 συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά. That is the
 function of the πρακτικὸς νοῦς, and
 φρόνησις is the ἀρετὴ which enables it
 to discharge it. In Mot. An. 700 b,
 25 τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος is distinctly
 called an object of thought (δια-
 νοητόν).

X. § 1. σύνεσις. This term was also
 somewhat loosely used by Plato. Cf.
 Phileb. 19 d νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν,
 τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὐτὰ τούτων συγγενή,
 and Aristotle himself had enumerated
 it provisionally along with σοφία and
 τέχνη as a διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ (1103 a,
 5). It is therefore important to show
 how it is really related to ἐπιστήμη
 and φρόνησις. The word was very
 popular in the 4th century, as may be
 seen from Demosthenes and Aischines.

πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This must surely
 refer to δόξη alone. Everyone has at
 least δόξα.

οὔτε περὶ... ὁπουοῦν, 'not any or
 every γιγνόμενον.' It has nothing to
 do with τὰ φύσει or κατὰ τύχην γιγνώ-
 μενα, nor even with such human
 affairs as are beyond our reach.

§ 2. ἐπιτακτικὴ... κριτικὴ. Aris-
 totle here uses the Platonic διαίρεσις.
 Cf. Pol. 260 b ἀρ' οὐδ' συμπάσης τῇ
 γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος,
 τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προσείπομεν,
 ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαίμεν διηρῆσθαι; The
 fact of its being a κριτικὴ δύναμις
 shows that it belongs to νοῦς. Cf.
 Mot. An. 700 b, 20 (App. B).

§ 3. ὥσπερ τὸ μαθάνειν κ.τ.λ.
 The point is the distinction of the
 two meanings of μαθάνειν, (1) 'to
 understand,' (2) 'to learn.' Cf. Top.
 165 b, 32 τὸ γὰρ μαθάνειν ὁμῶναι,
 (1) τὸ συνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ,
 (2) τὸ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

ἄλλου λέγοντος. This is the main
 point and marks σύνεσις as subordinate
 to φρόνησις. The πολιτικός need only
 be συνετός, the νομοθέτης must be

καλῶς ταυτόν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοῦνομα ἡ
ς, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνητοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν
ὁ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

1. 'Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ
φαιμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. 20
ν δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγ-
νικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἓνα συγγνώμην.
συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή·
δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

σὺ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· 25
εν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν
οὓς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη
ρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται

As Stewart well says, is the distinctive ἀρετή of the

§ 1. γνώμη. Plato had used d too in a way which suggested was equivalent to ἐπιστήμη. 476 d οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν ὡς γιγνώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν αἶμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς οὗτος; Aristotle as usual wishes it to the sense it had in actual

In that sense it corresponds feeling, 'when we call anyone of fine feeling' or say some ants feeling.' Cf. the use of ctives εὐγνώμων and ἀγνώμων ng, 'harsh.' The συγγνώμων ρο συγγιγνώσκει, 'gives his on our side.' It is probable s meaning of the word is con- with its use in the heliastic ὡμη τῇ ἀρίστη κρίνειν in cases tided for by law. "If σύνεσις is ly the κρίσις in the ἐκκλησία, s especially that in the δικα- " Stewart.

πεικοῦς, neuter not masculine, own by the last words of the

κή. This, therefore, is also a of νοῦς. Cf. 1143 a, 10 n.

ὀρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, i.e. τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικοῦς. There is no diffi- culty in the fact that the definitions given of γνώμη and συγγνώμη are the same; they are related just in the same way as σύνεσις and εὐσυνεσία. Cf. the opening words of cc. 10, 11 and 1143 a, 10. On ἐπιεικεία cf. 1137 a, 31 sqq.

§ 2. πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις. We see from what follows that this means νοῦς, γνώμη, σύνεσις, i.e. all the practical ἔξεις which apprehend their object im- mediately. Εὐβουλία is not included; for that is μετὰ λόγου.

εὐλόγως, 1096 a, 2 n.

εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι. Cf. 1096 b, 27 πρὸς ἐν συνετελεῖν and the note there. All these ἔξεις are πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, sc. πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν.

λέγομεν... ἐπιφέροντες. The con- struction is a little mixed; for some of the objects are governed by λέγομεν and some by ἐπιφέροντες. For ἐπι- φέρειν cf. φέρειν 1119 a, 34 n. The phrase νοῦν ἤδη is explained by ἡδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει (1143 b, 8).

δυνάμεις. They were called ἔξεις above, but δυνάμεις is the more correct term; for φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα (1143 b, 6) and no ἀρετὴ φύσει παρα-

τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ
 30 κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ [εὐγνώμων
 ἢ] συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάν-
 των ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ 3
 τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον
 δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ
 35 πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' 4
 ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
 1143^b νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις
 τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς
 τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως·

γίγνεται. They are *πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα* as all *εὐφύια* is to its formed *ἔξις* (cf. 1144 b, 4). As a *διανοητικὴ ἀρετή*, *φρόνησις* is gained mainly by teaching (1103 a, 15 n.)—such teaching as we find in the 'Ethics'—but the teaching requires as a foundation (1) *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* and (2) *εὐφύια*.

[*εὐγνώμων ἢ*]. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 52.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the sphere of *γνώμη* is really as wide as that of *φρόνησις*.

§ 3. καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ. Here we see another difference between these *δυνάμεις* and *φρόνησις*. They are restricted to the particular, *φρόνησις* has to do with the universal besides.

§ 4. καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. The difficulties which have been raised about this passage are mainly imaginary. The chief point to remember is that *νοῦς* in its restricted sense (not when it is equivalent to *διάνοια*) is a *δύναμις* which apprehends its object immediately (*τῷ θιγεῖν*) like *αἴσθησις*, not mediately like *ἀπόδειξις* or *βούλευσις*. Now, both in theory and in practice we must assume such a faculty. We have seen that in theory it is called *νοῦς*, and everyone knows that a man

who can see the right thing to do is said *νοῦν ἔχειν*. We need not discuss now whether this is strictly speaking the same *νοῦς*. It is in any case an element in *φρόνησις* and bears the same name as the other.

τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα, for τὰ πρώτα are *ἔσχατα* viewed from beneath, they are the ultimates of demonstrative analysis.

ὁ κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις, that described 1140 b, 31 sqq.

ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς. Cf. 1147 a, 28 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς. These two phrases must surely have the same explanation, and there can be little doubt that in the latter the word *προτάσεις* is to be 'understood.' As this whole passage really deals with *προτάσεις* also, it does not seem impossible to suppose such an ellipse, especially in so condensed a piece of writing. We can hardly suppose even Aristotle to have meant such a *contradictio in adjecto* as *πρακτικαὶ ἀποδείξεις* would involve.

τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως, 'the minor premiss,' usually called *ἡ δευτέρα πρότασις*. Its formula in the Practical Syllogism is *ἐγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε καὶ τόδε τοιοῦνδε*, and this is just what the *νοῦς* *ἔχων* sees.

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὐταὶ· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ
 5 τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθῆσιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. 5
 διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν
 6 οὐδεὶς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ'
 ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἴομεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία
 νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. [διὸ
 καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις 10
 καὶ περὶ τούτων.] ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπειρίων καὶ
 πρεσβυτέρων [ἢ φρονίμων] ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ
 δόξαις οὐχ ἡττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ
 7 τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὁρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ
 φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τίνα ἑκάτερα τυγχάνει 15
 οὔσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκάτερα,
 εἴρηται.

XII. Διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1139 b, 28
 ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου.
 The universal rules of conduct and the
 definition of *eudaimonia* can only be
 found by a dialectical process which
 starts from particular moral judgments.
 We generalise 'I ought to do this'
 into 'οἱ τοιοῦτοι must do τὰ τοιαῦτα.'

§ 5. ἔχειν αἰσθῆσιν, used in the wide
 sense, like αἰσθάνεσθαι, and including
 νοῦς. So we say 'I see,' when we
 mean an intellectual not a sensuous
 perception. The sense in which
 αἰσθησις is used here has been ex-
 plained above, 1142 a, 25 sqq. We
 were told there that this αἰσθησις
 ἀντίκειται τῷ νῷ, here that it is νοῦς.
 But Aristotle is only examining the
 subject dialectically from every side,
 and we are left with a very clear and
 definite idea of a certain aspect of
 φρόνησις, however vague the termin-
 ology may be. And the vagueness is
 not in Aristotle's own mind, but in
 the popular language from which he
 feels bound to start.

§ 6. ταῖς ἡλικίαις... ἀκολουθεῖν.
 This puts the acquisition of σύνεσις,

γνώμη and νοῦς (not φρόνησις) on the
 same level as τὸ πολιουσθαι ἀνθρώπων,
 which is the example given of τὰ ὡς
 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γιγνόμενα in the sphere of
 φύσις (An. Post. 32 b, 6).

διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. These words
 break the argument here, nor do they
 come in very well after αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ
 νοῦς above, where Rasso and Bywater
 would place them. In that position
 they would commit us to the strange
 doctrine that ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ
 ἀποδείξεις.

ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν κ.τ.λ. This
 goes closely with ταῖς ἡλικίαις...
 ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ.

ἢ φρονίμων. These words are sus-
 picious. The φρόνιμοι can always put
 his advice in syllogistic form, and no
 one can become φρόνιμος merely by
 getting old. Perhaps, however, the
 word is used in its popular sense.

§ 7. τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This re-
 capitulation strongly favours the view
 that there are only two διανοητικαὶ
 ἀρεταί, σοφία and φρόνησις.

—XII. § 1. Διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις
 κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορίαι concerning σοφία

εἰσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων
 20 ἄνθρωπος—οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως—ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο
 μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρό-
 νησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀν-
 θρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν,
 οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἶδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἔξεις
 25 αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά,
 ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται·
 οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ γυμνα-
 στικὴν ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ 2
 τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος·
 30 ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διόισι αὐτοὺς ἔχειν
 ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἰκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ
 καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ
 μανθάνομεν ἱατρικὴν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀτοπον ἂν εἶναι δό- 3
 ξειεν εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται·
 35 ἡ γὰρ ποιούσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὲ

and φρόνησις are (1) What is the use of σοφία since it can produce nothing, and of φρόνησις regarded as the power of apprehending τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς? (2) What is the use of φρόνησις even if we regard it as the power of apprehending τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν? (3) How are we to reconcile the imperative character of φρόνησις with its inferiority to σοφία?

εἴπερ ἔξεις αἱ ἀρεταί. The whole ἀπορία turns on this; for ἔξεις inevitably give rise to τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως. If we have the ἔξις, intellectual knowledge of the ἐνέργειαι which will follow from it is superfluous. They will follow whether we know them or not.

ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. This is added to make it clear that τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ are to be taken in a sense analogous to that of τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικά, so called τῷ σημείῳ εἶναι τῆς ὑγίειας καὶ εὐεξίας (τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς

εἶναι 1096 b, 27 n.), as when we speak of a 'healthy complexion,' or a 'healthy tread' (ὀγιεωῶς βαδί(σ)ειν). We do not take them in the sense of τὰ ποιητικά καὶ φυλακτικά till the next ἀπορία.

§ 2. τούτων χάριν, sc. τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως.

τοῦ γίνεσθαι, equivalent to τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ φυλακτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικῶν, the sense in which ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικά are used of wholesome diet and exercise.

τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις... τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν. Argyropoulos read τοῖς μὴ οὖσι, which gives a clearer sense. The healthy man does not need to know what produces health, the unhealthy man consults his doctor.

§ 3. χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα, 13 was shown above 1141 a, 20 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ ποιούσα, i.e. ἡ περὶ γένεσιν. Of course σοφία can have no imperative character; for its objects are

τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἡπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.
 4 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετὰς 1144^a
 αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ' οὐσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου,
 5 καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι
 μὲν, οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἱατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως
 ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὐσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5
 6 τῷ ἔχουσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον
 ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ
 πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράτ- 10
 7 τειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέ-
 ρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνω-
 θεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ
 δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὐπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον

ἀκίνητα. The τόπος here is *εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχον τοιόνδε ἢ ᾧ ἂν ὑπάρχῃ, μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο* (sc. αἰρετόν) *δ' ποτε ποιεῖ ἢ δ' μὴ ποιεῖ.* (Top. iii, 5.)

§ 4. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first λύσις. The τόπος is τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν.

§ 5. ἔπειτα καὶ. The second λύσις. Σοφία is not the efficient but the formal cause of εὐδαιμονία. The λόγος of health as it exists in the soul of the doctor is ἱατρικὴ and an efficient cause, when realised in the body of his patient it is a formal cause.

ὥς ἡ ὑγίεια, sc. τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ποιεῖ.

τῷ ἔχουσθαι, 'by being possessed.' I think we may understand τῷ ἐνεργεῖν as τῷ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἔχοντα.

§ 6. ἔτι. The third λύσις. The function of Man (which we know to be πρακτικὴ τις ζωὴ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος) cannot be discharged by ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ alone. Note the positive result which is emerging from these three λύσεις. We begin to see (1) that the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ are necessary to the τελείωσις of Man, (2) that σοφία

is the ἀρίστη ἀρετὴ, and therefore that εὐδαιμονία will be above all ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, and (3) that φρόνησις is ancillary to σοφία. All this will be worked out later.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. While ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ can ensure the rightness of the end (for the βούλησις of the good man is τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτόν), yet this is not enough. Goodness cannot do without Wisdom, which ensures the rightness of τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ. The four μέρη (we are using popular language) are τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν (goodness σοφία), τὸ λογιστικόν (goodness φρόνησις), τὸ ὁρεκτικόν (goodness ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ), and τὸ θρεπτικόν. The point of its being mentioned here is that, as it is not an ἴδιον of Man, its function is not the ἔργον of Man. Cf. 1097 b, 34.

§ 7. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν κ.τ.λ. The fourth and most complete λύσις, involving the other three.

μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον. Cf. 1139 b, 14.

λέγομεν. 1134 a, 17 sqq.

- 15 τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιούντας ἢ ἄκοντας
 ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἑτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πρᾶ-
 τουσί γε ἂ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρή τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγα-
 θόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν
 20 πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, δ
 τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σα-
 φέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δει- 9
 νότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα
 25 σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχά-
 νειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ἦ καλός, ἐπαινετὴ ἐστίν,
 ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινούς
 καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύ- 10
 ναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἔξις τῷ
 30 ὀμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς
 εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρα-
 κτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ
 ἄριστον, ὅτιδῆποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν).

δι' ἑτερόν τι, i.e. κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
 e.g. τιμῆς καὶ δόξης χάριν.

οἷον, 'that is' (not 'for instance').

§ 8. ἐπιστήσασι, sc. τὴν διάνοιαν
 (Met. 987 b, 2), τὴν σκέψιν (Met.
 1090 a, 2), τὸν λόγον. The object is
 often omitted as here, cf. H. A. 487 a,
 12 περὶ ὧν τύπῳ μὲν εἰπώμεν πρότερον,
 ὕστερον δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἐπιστή-
 σαντες ἐροῦμεν.

§ 9. δύναμις in the strict sense as
 opposed to ἔξις. Being a μετὰ λόγου
 δύναμις it is τῶν ἐναντίων. See above
 1103 a, 20 sqq. and notes.

ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα, sc. the
 members of the Academy, cf. [Plato]
 Def. 413 a δεινότης διάθεσις καθ' ἣν ὁ
 ἔχων στοχαστικός ἐστι τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους.
 This was doubtless suggested by the
 famous discussion in the Theaitetos.

πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπόν. All
 πρακτά are only ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα.

αὐτῶν. Bywater reads αὐτοῦ, sc.
 τοῦ σκοποῦ.

δεινούς καὶ πανούργους. Cf. Plato,
 Theait. 177 a δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι,
 Dem. Olynth. 1 § 3 πανούργους ὧν καὶ
 δεινὸς πράγμασι χρῆσθαι. Aristotle
 is referring to the rhetorical device of
 qualifying people by the δύναμις with-
 out reference to the προαίρεσις.

§ 10. ἡ δ' ἔξις, sc. φρόνησις.

τῷ ὀμματι τούτῳ, sc. τῷ νῷ. Cf.
 1096 b, 29. In the face of the constant
 description of νοῦς as ὀμμα τῆς ψυχῆς,
 we can hardly understand this other-
 wise. Nor is there any inconsistency;
 for δεινότης is a δύναμις of νοῦς.

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ κ.τ.λ. On the
 practical syllogism see Introd. § 21.

ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες. The two words
 have coalesced into one. The ultimate
 ἀρχή of all practical reasoning is the
 definition of εὐδαιμονία.

τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ
 μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεται ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρ- 35
 χὰς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα
 ἀγαθόν. XIII. σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ 1144^b
 γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν
 δεινότητα—οὐ ταῦτόν μὲν, ὅμοιον δέ—οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ
 ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν
 ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ 5
 ἀνδρείοι καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως
 ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον
 τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ
 ὑπάρχουσιν ἔξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὐσαι.
 πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὀρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ 10
 ἄνευ ὀψέως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ
 2 τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν,
 ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἔξις ὁμοία οὐσα τότ' ἔσται
 κυρίως ἀρετῇ. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν

XIII. § 1. σκεπτέον δὴ κ.τ.λ.
 We now see the purpose of the discussion of δεινότης. Just as the δύναμις of δεινότης cannot become the ἔξις of φρόνησις without ἡθικὴ ἀρετῇ, so—and this is the main point for our present purpose, the λύσις of the ἀπορία,—the δύναμις of φυσικὴ ἀρετῇ cannot become the ἔξις of ἡθικὴ ἀρετῇ without φρόνησις. Observe that, with characteristic carelessness, the terms of the ἀναλογία are given in the wrong order.

ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετῇ. The *locus classicus* on this subject is H. A. 588 a, 18 sqq. ἔνεστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἔχνη τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τρόπων, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει φανερωτέρας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ γὰρ ἡμερότης καὶ ἀγριότης, καὶ πρῶτης καὶ χαλεπότης, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δειλία, καὶ φόβοι καὶ θάρρη, καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ πανουργίαι, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν συνέσεως ἐνεσίαν ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῶν ὁμοιώτητες, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐλέγομεν· τὰ

μὲν γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων (ἐνια γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐνια δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις μᾶλλον), τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει, ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις οὕτως ἐνίοις τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶ τις ἑτέρα τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύναμις· φανερώτατον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τῶν παιδῶν ἡλικίαν βλέψασιν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τῶν μὲν ὑστερον ἐξεῶν ἐσομένων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ὅλον ἔχνη καὶ σπέρματα, διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὥστ' οὐδὲν ἀλογον εἰ τὰ μὲν ταῦτα τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια τὰ δ' ἀνάλογον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις.

σωφρονικῶς. The termination conveniently marks the φυσικὴ δύναμις.

Ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι. For the predicative object after ζητεῖν, cf. 1132 a, 22 n.

§ 2. ὁμοία οὐσα, i.e. τῷ ὄψιν ἡ νοῦν λαβόντι.

15 εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο
 ἐστὶ, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ
 κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινές φασι πά- 3
 σας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν
 ὀρθῶς ἐξήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο
 20 εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρο-
 νήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημείον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, 4
 ὅταν ὀρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασιν, τὴν ἔξιν εἰπόντες
 καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἐστὶ, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ
 κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. εἰκόασιν δὴ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἄπαντες
 25 ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ 5
 δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις ἀρετὴ [ἐστίν]· ὀρθὸς
 δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν. Σωκράτης
 μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι
 30 πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων 6

οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. Above (1144 a, 29) we found that φρόνησις οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἀρετῆς. We may express the relation of the two by saying that ἀρετὴ without φρόνησις is blind, φρόνησις without ἀρετὴ is empty. Our naturally good tendencies cannot become goodness unless φρόνησις is present to show us both the general rules of conduct which must be obeyed if we are to attain the good, and also what particular acts come under these rules. It was this fact which made Sokrates identify goodness and knowledge.

§ 4. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες. In Met. 992 a, 33 and 1069 a, 26 we read that γέγονε τὰ μαθήματα τοῖς νῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία, and that οἱ νῦν τὰ καθόλου μάλλον οὐσίας τιθέασιν. These passages show that οἱ νῦν are certainly not the Peripatetics, but the contemporary Academy. We have been told already (1103 b, 32) that the doctrine of κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον is κοινόν (note *ad loc.*) and we may infer that it belonged to

the Academy.

προστιθέασιν, 'after naming the ἔξις and that to which it is relative, add the qualification κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.'

§ 5. δεῖ...μεταβῆναι, 'we must take a little step in advance' (cf. 1097 a, 24 n.). The Platonist κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον implies a merely external standard; we say that the ἀρετὰς are μετὰ λόγου, and that goodness is inseparably bound up with wisdom.

ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος...ἡ φρόνησις. It is true that the ὀρθὸς λόγος is not an ἀρετὴ nor identical with φρόνησις, but yet this way of speaking is quite Aristotelian. The ὀρθὸς λόγος of health is ἱατρικὴ, and so the ὀρθὸς λόγος of action may be regarded as the form of goodness existing in the soul of the φρόνιμος, and identical with the φρόνησις of the man who 'has the λόγος.' Cf. 1138 b, 31 n.

ἡμεῖς δὲ, opp. to οἱ νῦν above.

οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ
 ἕκαστον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος
 ἡ λύσις ἂν, ᾧ διαλεχθεῖη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλ-
 λον αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφύεστατος πρὸς ἀπά-
 ῳστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὐπω εἰληφώς ἔσται· τοῦτο 35
 κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς
 ἱπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ 1145^a
 ἡσέει μιᾷ οὕτῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν
 ἡ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου
 ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ
 ἡσέως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ 5
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία
 ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
 ὑγίειας ἡ ἰατρικὴ· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ
 ὅτι γίνονται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη.
 ὁμοίον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν 10
 ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ὁ λόγος... ᾧ διαλεχθεῖη τις ἂν,
 dialectical argument that might
 be used to show—.

χωρίζονται... αἱ ἀρεταί. The
 point here indicated is that of the
 division of the virtues, as it was
 treated later in the school. Alexander
 of Aphrodisias wrote a special treatise
 on this (Scripta minora, ed. Bruns
 1933 sqq.), in which he quotes
 Theophrastus οὐδὲ γὰρ βῆδον
 ἀρετῶν τὰς διαφορὰς οὕτω λαβεῖν
 κατὰ τι κοινῶν αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις,
 αἱ δ' αὐταῖς αἱ προσηγορίαι κατὰ
 τὸν εἶδος (Heylbut in Arch. 1,
 1933). The doctrine of the ἀντακο-
 ρύων ἀρετῶν was fully worked
 out by Plato, though the term is
 Aristotelian.

11. Bywater reads ὑπαρχούση
 K^b.

§ 7. δῆλον δὲ κ.τ.λ., a resumption
 of the first λύσις.

§ 8. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. The λύσις
 of the ἀπορία stated 1143 b, 33. The
 ministering function of φρόνησις is well
 brought out in a fragment of Theo-
 phrastus preserved by the scholiast
 on cod. Vindob. gr. phil. 315 (Heylbut
 loc. cit.) ὁ δὲ γε Θεόφραστος λέγει τὴν
 φρόνησιν <ἔχειν> πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν ὥς
 ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐπιτροπεύοντες δοῦλοι τῶν
 δεσποτῶν πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότες· ἐκεῖνοί
 τε γὰρ πάντα πράσσουσιν ἃ δεῖ γίνεσθαι
 ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἵνα οἱ δεσπότες σχολὴν
 ἔχωσι πρὸς τὰ ἐλευθέρια ἐπιτηδεύματα,
 ἡ τε φρόνησις τὰ πρακτέα τάττει ἵν' ἡ
 σοφία σχολὴν ἔγῃ πρὸς τὴν θεωρίαν
 τῶν τιμιωτάτων. It is significant that
 this illustration has been embodied in
 MM. 1198 b, 9 sqq.

BOOK VII.

WEAKNESS AND BADNESS OF WILL.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We have seen that the efficient cause of human action is Will (*προαίρεσις*) and that Will is the union of an intellectual and an appetitive element. We have seen further that Practical Truth, which gives the standard and measure of all goodness, is the harmony of a true judgment with a right appetite. We know that our task as lawgivers, who aim at creating happiness for the state, will be to produce in the citizens a good will which shall be in harmony with the principles embodied in our laws. But our task will not be complete until we have studied the obstacles in the way of this, and the *ἐκστάσεις* (Phys. 246 a, 17; cf. pp. 70, 71) which thus arise. And this is not quite so simple a matter as might be supposed. We have to deal not only or mainly with the fact of practical falsehood in harmony with a wrong appetite, though that must be considered too. We have a much more serious difficulty to face, namely the fact that the action may be bad, though the will is good. It is the case that the Good Will may be overmastered by Desire, and this fact, to which we give the name of "Weakness" (*ἀκρασία*) or want of self-control, will require careful consideration as well as the more simple case of actual badness (*κακία, ἀκολασία*). We must also take into account the possibility of "portents" (*τέρατα*) of goodness or badness. The occurrence of a superhumanly good person in our state would alter all its arrangements, as he and he alone would be its ideal ruler. Further, the statesman must know something of the failures of nature, her incomplete (*ἀτελεῖς*) or mutilated products (*πηρώσεις*) which are more brutes than men, just as the others are rather divine than human.

The result of our inquiry will be that desire for pleasure is the cause of moral weakness. Are we to say, then, that all pleasure is bad? This *θέσις* has actually been maintained, so the refutation of it, though a digression, will not be misplaced.

Η

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, 15
τῶν περὶ τὰ ἥθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία ἀκρα-
θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν
ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριό-
α μάλιστ' ἂν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν,
ικὴν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ Ἑκτορος 20
οἶκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός

οὐδὲ ἑώκει

ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάς ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῦ.

εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς
ρβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει

§ 1. ἄλλην...ἀρχήν. Aristotle speaks of 'making a fresh' (ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἀρχεσθαι, ποι-
μα, λαβεῖν Bon. Ind. 111 b, 35) to
clearly that a new division of
subject is being approached.

περὶ τὰ ἥθη, i.e. τῶν ἡθῶν. Cf.
s. v. περί.

ωικὴν...καὶ θείαν. The idea of
human goodness and wisdom
nated among the mystics of the
century B.C. (Early Greek Philo-
y, § 33). Plato in his later
s, especially the Statesman, had
ulated on the possibility of a
e ruler, and Aristotle held (Pol.
b, 16) that εἰ μὲν τοῖσιν εἴσαν
τον διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων
τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγοῦμεθα

τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν...δῆλον ὅτι
βέλτιον αἰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀρχεῖν
τοὺς δ' ἀρχεσθαι. This would be the
Rule of the Saints; and if there were
one such transcendent man, we should
have the παμβασιλεῖα.

Ὅμηρος. II. xxiv, 258.

περὶ Ἑκτορος. Bywater writes
περὶ <τοῦ> Ἑκτορος "in accordance
with Fitzgerald's principle," to which
this is the only apparent exception
(Contr. p. 52).

§ 2. ἐξ ἀνθρώπων...θεοί. This idea
was quite foreign to the primitive and
popular religion of the Hellenes, and
also had its origin in the 6th century
mysticism. Rohde's 'Psyche' contains
the best account of these beliefs.

25 ἀντιτιθεμένη ἔξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον³ ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του—"σεῖος ἀνὴρ" φασιν—οὕτω καὶ 30 ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως⁴

ἀντιτιθεμένη. The use of this present participle (omitted in Bon. Ind.) where we should look for ἀντικειμένη can be paralleled from Plato Soph. 257 b τῷ καλῷ ἀντιτιθέμενον. It may be explained on the same principle as ὁ καλούμενος (= κεκλημένος) and the like.

ὥσπερ οὐδὲ...οὕτως οὐδὲ... For the repetition of οὐδὲ in both clauses of the comparison, cf. the note on καὶ below. The idea that Man is intermediate between Beast and God is another survival of 6th century mysticism which strongly influenced both Plato and Aristotle. Cf. the well known passage Pol. 1253 a, 27 ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς. The best commentary is 1101 b, 18 sqq.

ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας, 'a different genus from badness.' Note the hyperbaton; κακίας is governed by ἕτερον, not by γένος.

§ 3. **ἐπεὶ...καὶ...οὕτω καὶ...** The repetition of καὶ in both clauses of a comparison is frequent in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 357 b, 24). For οὕτως after ἐπεὶ cf. Bon. Ind. 546 b, 22.

καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες. This is from Plato, Meno 99 d καὶ αἱ γὰρ γυναῖκες δῆπου, ὡς Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας θεοῦς καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος

(σεῖος Casaubon) ἀνὴρ, φασιν, οὕτω. Bywater inserts οἱ before ὅταν and Susemihl (after Coraes) adds οὕτω from Plato after φασιν. Both corrections are of the probable kind, but Aristotle is very abrupt in his way of quoting. It is characteristic that the old Homeric way of speaking should survive on the lips of women and in aristocratic Sparta. In democratic Athens θεῖος was ironical. Cf. Blass in Müller's Handbuch I, p. 184.

διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις. For the meaning of πῆρωσις ('stunted growth' or 'arrested development') in Aristotle's biology cf. 1099 b, 18 n. Bestiality is found in human beings who are either 'morbid' (διὰ νόσους) or mangy (ἀρελεῖς), Nature's failures.

καὶ τοὺς...δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is merely an illustrative remark; it does not give another species of bestiality.

ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. This seems to be a ἀπαξ εἰρημένον. The verb δυσφημεῖν means 'to give a bad name to,' to use the opposite of a 'euphemism' (εὐφήμια has this sense already in Dem. F. L. §§ 48, 50), and the ἐπι- has the same force as in ἐπικαλεῖν. The meaning is that we sometimes call the extreme (ὑπερβολή) of human badness by a worse name than is really appropriate to it, the opposite exaggeration to the use of θεῖος for σφόδρα ἀγαθός (cf. δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν).

τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας
 ται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυ- 35
 λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ
 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκα- 1145^b
 ν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὐθ' ὥς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δ',
 περ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶ-
 διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ
 ἑξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλείστα καὶ 5
 ῥώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κατα-
 τηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

Δοκεῖ δὴ ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων
 ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν
 λων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικός 10

κ. εἴρηται πρότερον, i.e. in the
 ssion of ἠθικῇ ἀρετῇ.

πρὶ...ἔξεων...ἕτερον γένος. When
 αμβάνειν is qualified by an ad-
 it takes περὶ c. gen., otherwise
 es a double accusative (Bon. Ind.
 b, 50 sqq.). We may say either
 ν γένος ὑποληπτέον or ὥς περὶ
 ν γένους ὑποληπτέον. Here we
 a mixture of the two con-
 tions. There is no difficulty in
 singular ἑκατέραν, for μαλακία
 ρυφή are subordinate to ἀκρασία,
 ρία to ἐγκράτεια. The point is
 ἀκρασία and κακία (μοχθηρία),
 ἀτεια and ἀρετῇ, which are all
 ically human, differ εἶδει only;
 γένει, as divine goodness and
 ality differ from them (1145 a,

ταῦτα τὰ πάθη. The word πάθος
 is loosely used here of all states of
 soul as in De An. i, 1. Really they
 are ἔξεις.

τὰ δυσχερῆ are identical with αὐ
 ἀπορία, cf. Phys. 225 a, 30 ταῦτά τε
 δὴ συμβαίνει δυσχερῆ. Elsewhere
 they are called δυσκολαί as in Phys.
 211 a, 7 δεῖ δὲ πειρᾶσθαι τὴν σκέψιν
 οὕτω ποιείσθαι,...ὥστε τὰ τε ἀπορού-
 μενα λύεσθαι καὶ (ὅπως) τὰ δοκοῦντα ὑπ-
 ἀρχεῖν...ὑπάρχοντα ἔσται, καὶ ἐτι τὸ
 τῆς δυσκολίας αἰτιον (cf. 1154 a, 23 τὸ
 αἰτιον τοῦ ψεύδους) καὶ τῶν ἀπορημάτων
 ἔσται φανερόν.

§ 6. Δοκεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ. A string of
 δοκοῦντα follows.

ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια...τῶν σπουδαίων
 κ.τ.λ. This needs no illustration.
 Though obvious, it is not, however,
 stated for nothing. We shall see that
 several of the ἀπορίαι arise from an
 apparent contradiction between this
 and other δοκοῦντα.

ἐμμενετικός τῷ λογισμῷ. [Plato],
 Def. 567 b ἐγκρατεία...ἀκολούθησις τῷ
 ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ· δύναμις ἀνυπερβλήτος
 τοῦ ὑποληφθέντος ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ. ib.
 415 d ἐγκρατὴς ὁ κρατῶν ἀντιτείνον-
 των τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων τῷ ὀρθῷ

δ. δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. A
 sketch of the dialectical method
 ws, cf. Intro. § 25. Here τὰ
 ῥόμενα are equivalent to τὰ ἔνδοξα
 w (cf. An. Pr. 24 b, 11 λῆψις τοῦ
 ομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου), though pro-
 speaking the term has a wider
 c. Not all φαινόμενα are ἐνδοξα,
 only τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς and τὰ τοῖς
 ἴς φαινόμενα.

Letter to Hierodotus 538 quote
 giving καὶ εἰδῶς for καὶ πρῶτον

τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατῆς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σῶφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ
 15 καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σῶφρονα οἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ' ἐτέρους εἶναι φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὅτε δ' ἐπίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινούς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ
 20 θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

II. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὁρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασὶ τινες οἶόν τε

λογισμῷ, 416 a ἀκρασία ξὺς βιαστικὴ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λογισμὸν πρὸς τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡδέα εἶναι. We are here, then, on Academic ground. Cf. also Isokr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 221 ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὰς ἀκρασίας οὐκ ἐμμένουσι τοῖς λογισμοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσαντες τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὁρμῶσιν.

ἐκστατικὸς in this sense comes from ἐξίστασθαι used as we find it in Thuc. ii, 61 ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι (sc. τῇ γνώμῃ) καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι. So Rhet. ad Alex. 1429 a, 16 τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάθη, δι' ὧν ἐξιστάμεθα τοῦ λογισμοῦ.

εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα. This is really implied in the phrases αὐτοῦ κρατεῖν, κρείττων εἶναι (ἡττᾶσθαι, ἡττων εἶναι); for they imply a struggle in which our 'better knowledge' is victorious or vanquished. It is then the proper etymological sense of the word.

καὶ τὸν σῶφρονα κ.τ.λ. In the σῶφρον and the ἀκόλαστος there is properly speaking no struggle; the one is bad as the other is good, without an effort. But common language often used the word promiscuously (συγκεχυμένως). Even Plato does so,

cf. e.g. Rep. 430 e κόσμος ποῦ τι ἢ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τιμῶν καὶ λυπῶν ἐγκράτεια.

πάντα σῶφρονα, 'in all respects σῶφρον,' 'in full possession of σωφροσύνη,' for ἐγκράτεια might be regarded as partial σωφροσύνη.

§ 7. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ. We get a hint of the λύσις from the addition of the words καὶ δεινούς (cf. 1144 a, 27).

ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς κ.τ.λ. We find ἀκρατεῖς θυμοῦ in Plato, Laws 869 a, and Isokrates, Demon. § 21, speaks of ἐγκράτεια...κέρδους, ὀργῆς. In fact, ἀκρατής may be used wherever ἡττων εἶναι, c. γεν., 'to have a weakness for,' 'to be incapable of resisting' may be used. Cf. e.g. ἡττων τοῦ γελοίου 1128 a, 34.

II. § 1. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία relates to the ἐνδοξον that ὁ ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει.

ὑπολαμβάνων. This word is substituted for εἰδὼς because it will cover φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη and δόξα, all of which are discussed in the present passage.

ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first form of ὑπόληψις, ἐπιστήμη.

δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. αὐτῆς μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ ἀκрасίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοϊαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος σβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δεῖν ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ δι' ἄγνοϊαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεταί τῆς ἄγνοιας— γὰρ οὐκ οἶεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει εἶναι, φανερόν. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι οὐ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμο-

μετο Σωκράτης. This is from Protag. 352 b δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς ἐπεὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι· οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιοῦτου ὄντος διαφέρει, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀντιπρὸς ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχεῖν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, τοτὲ δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, καὶ διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδράποδου περιεργίζονται ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. The passage compared with 1147 b, which sufficiently justifies the K^b reading (αὐτόν vulg.) in the next line. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 4 προσερωτώμενος δὲ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, καὶ ἅς δὲ τὰναντία, σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀσοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας αὖτε προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐννοημάτων ἃ ἂν οἴωνται συμφερόντα εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν.

ὑπολαμβάνοντα, sc. πράττειν παρὰ βέλτιστον, a characteristic brachy-

στυλιζόμενον ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις. It comes a θέσις (cf. 1096 a, 2 n.), the celebrity of Sokrates still it necessary for us to discuss ἐμβλημα it involves. But for might let it alone; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηνά-

μένου φροντίζειν εὐθεῖας (Top. 104 b, 23). For the phraseology cf. Phys. 253 b, 29 τὸ φάναι συνεχῶς ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· λίαν ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἀμφισβητεῖν. 254 a, 8 μάχεται τοῖς φανεροῖς ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, Met. 1091 a, 6 μάχεται... τοῖς εὐλόγοις.

δεῖν can hardly stand for δεῖν ἐστὶ, cf. 1107 a, 32 n. Bonitz, therefore, deletes καί, taking δεῖν as accusative absolute, while Bywater suggests the transposition of γίνεταί from the next clause where it is not really wanted. I suspect, however, that Aristotle really meant to say δεῖν ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ., λίαν ἀπλῶς ἔλεγεν, or something of the sort, but that the sentence was never finished owing to the parenthesis ὅτι... φανερόν.

τίς ὁ τρόπος κ.τ.λ., equivalent to πῶς ἀγνοῶν ἀκρατεῖται τις. Cf. Gen. An. 740 b, 22 τὸν δὲ τρόπον λέγω τὸ ὡς καὶ ὅτε. Sokrates went wrong, then, because he spoke λίαν ἀπλῶς (cf. Bon. Ind. 77 b, 5).

οὐκ οἰεταί γε, sc. δεῖν πράττειν ἃ πράττει, cf. 1136 b, 8 ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἰεταί δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. The logic of the sentence requires οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, but the phrase οἰεταί δεῖν was so common in the discussion of this subject that it easily slips in, even in an elliptical form. Cf. also 1152 a, 5.

§ 3. εἰσὶ δέ τινες κ.τ.λ. The notes will show that these are Plato's followers rather than Plato himself.

λογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον
οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασιν οὐκ ἐπι-
35 στήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπό-4
1146^a ληψις ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἡρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς δι-
στάζουσιν, συγγνώμη τῇ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυ-
μίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν
ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης; 5
5 αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς
ἄμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φρονίμον
εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις

παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον. The aorist participle has its full temporal force. It would not be admitted that a man could act παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν βέλτιον.

§ 4. Ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις...ἡρεμαία. It is certainly not an adequate account of Plato's distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα to say that the one is 'strong' and the other 'mild.' The present discussion will therefore be unintelligible unless we suppose that the Academy had already come to make this purely psychological distinction between them. But there is, fortunately, sufficient evidence to justify us in saying that the Academy did now regard ἐπιστήμη as differing from δόξα mainly in the strength of the πίστις which it implies, and its consequent power of resistance. Cf. [Plato] Def. 414 b ἐπιστήμη ὑπόληψις ψυχῆς ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου,—δόξα ὑπόληψις μετὰπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου, definitions of which the authenticity is guaranteed by Ar. Top. 139 b, 32 οὖον εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀμετάπτωτον εἴρηκεν, 130 b, 16 (et passim) ὁ θεὸς ἐπιστήμης ἰδίων ὑπόληψιν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. Now in Top. 126 b, 15 Aristotle criticises a definition of πίστις as σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως and, since ἡρέμα is the opposite of σφόδρα, a ὑπόληψις

εὐμετάπειστος (i.e. deficient in πίστις) will be an ἡρεμαία ὑπόληψις.

ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα, a Platonic word, cf. 1102 b, 18 n. and the Academic definition of the ἐγκρατής given above 1145 b, 10 n.

ἐν τοῖς διατάζουσιν. This confirms the view that the Academy distinguished δόξα from ἐπιστήμη by the absence of πίστις, which is defined as [Plat.] Def. 412 a ὑπόληψις ὁρθὴ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς αὐτῷ φαίνεται.

ἐν αὐταῖς, sc. τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει.

τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ. This word usually means ἀκολασία as opposed to ἀκρασία, hence the addition of the words οἷδα τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ.

§ 5. φρονήσεως ἄρα κ.τ.λ. This must depend on the διαίρεσις which is given in De An. 427 b, 24 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τὰναντία τούτων. We have seen φρόνησις called a ὑπόληψις above, 1142 b, 33. This leads us to the ἀπορία raised by the contradictory δοκοῦντα that the φρόνιμος cannot be ἀκρατής and that some φρόνιμοι are ἀκρατεῖς.

ἰσχυρότατον. Cf. EE. 1246 b, 34 ὁρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως.

δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.

5 "Ἐτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυράς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἰο ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατής οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατής σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρωνος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἔξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαῖον· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' 15 εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα.

"Ἐτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστα- τικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεο- πτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς 20 ἐπέισθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.

3 "Ἐτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία—διὰ γὰρ

δέδεικται πρότερον, 1141 b, 14 sqq. 1142 a, 23 sqq. 1144 b, 30 sqq.

§ 6. "Ἐτι εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορία raised by the contradiction between the *ἐνδοξα* that ἐγκράτεια is good, and that the ἐγκρατής is the σώφρων.

ἐν τῷ...ἔχειν. Cf. Pol. 1255 b, 31 ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δοῦλους, 'what makes a master a master is not owning slaves.'

τὸ ἄγαν, sc. ἐπιθυμεῖν. This is substituted for τὸ ἰσχυράς ἔχειν, probably from a reminiscence of τὸ Χιλό- νειον, μηδὲν ἄγαν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε, sc. ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν φαύλας καὶ ἰσχυράς τὸν ἐγκρατῆ. Otherwise ἐγκράτεια would not be τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἐπαινετῶν (1145 b, 8).

οὐ πᾶσα. This is all that is required for the ἀνασκευή of a universal affirmative πρότασις.

§ 7. "Ἐτι εἰ πάσῃ κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία arises from the contradiction between ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῶν σπουδαίων and ὁ ἐγκρατής ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ and of their respective ἀντιθέσεις.

ἐκστατικόν, sc. ποιεῖ.

ἔσται τις. This is all that is required for the ἀνασκευή of the universal affirmative πρότασις, ἡ ἀκρασία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν.

ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ. "But Odysseus knew that Philoctetes would not listen to him, and would be too proud to return after such treatment. Therefore he had recourse to guile, and persuaded Neoptolemus to second him by false pretences. The interest of the drama lies in the gradual effect produced upon the heart of the boy by the sufferings of Philoctetes, by his frank belief in the fictitious tale, by his open-hearted friendship, and by his unbounded trust in one who is deceiving him; until at length, in spite of the strongest motives, it becomes a moral impossibility for Neoptolemus to persevere in his attempt." L. Campbell.

§ 8. "Ἐτι κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία results from an artificial contradiction between the views that the ἀκρατής acts εἰδώς (or ὑπολαμβάνων) ὅτι φαῦλα and the view that ἡ ἀκρασία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν.

τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γινόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται
 25 γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν
 τὸ συμπερανθέν, προΐεναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λύσαι μὴ
 ἔχειν τὸν λόγον—συμβαίνει δ' ἕκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη⁹
 μετ' ἀκрасίας ἀρετῇ· τάναντία γὰρ πράττει ὢν ὑπο-
 λαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκрасίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ
 30 εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ
 πράξει.

Ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ 10
 προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ
 δι' ἀκрасίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. ὁ
 35 δ' ἀκρατὴς ἐνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ φαμεν “ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ

ψευδόμενος was rightly bracketed by Coraes as a mere dittography of ψευδόμενος above. There can be no reference to the *Mentiens* of Euboulides (Ritter and Preller § 233). “What follows this is a digression suggested by the word *ἀπορία*.” Bywater, *Contr.* p. 53.

παράδοξα...ἐλέγχειν. We must take παράδοξα as internal accusative. They desire to frame σοφιστικοὶ ἐλεγχοὶ of a paradoxical kind, i.e. opposed to τὰ ἐνδοξα. An ἐλεγχος is a συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως, i.e. a syllogistic proof of the contradictory, in the present case the contradictory of our ἐνδοξα. Note the word βούλεσθαι, it is the προαίρεσις and not the δύναμις that makes the sophist. Cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ‘when they succeed,’ does not seem very pointed. Should we not read ἐντύχωσιν? The proper word for a dialectical ‘encounter’ is ἐντευξις, cf. *Top.* 101 a, 27 (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ χρήσιμος) πρὸς τὰς ἐντευξεις.

δέδεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Met.* 995 a, 31 ἢ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ (ἢ διάνοια), ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδμεμένοις.

ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. This is still a note explaining the meaning of ἀπορία and λύσις.

§ 9. ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκрасίας ἀρετῇ. In the *Topics* (150 b, 27 sqq.) Aristotle discusses at length this type of definition, which he calls τὸδε μετὰ τοῦδε. The example there given is that of ἀνδρεία as τόλμα μετὰ διανοίας ὀρθῆς. It is worth noting that there are two or three definitions of this type in the Platonic *Ὅροι*. So 411, ε χρηστότης ἥθους ἀπλαστία μετ' εὐλογιστίας, ib. φιλανθρωπία...μνήμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας.

ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. διὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην.

§ 10. Ἔτι κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία arises from the contradiction between the identification of the ἀκρατὴς with the ἀκόλαστος and the view that the ἀκρατὴς acts διὰ πάθος, παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν.

τῷ πεπεισθαι, ‘from conviction’ (πίστις).

τῇ παροιμίᾳ. This proverb does not seem to be found elsewhere, but its application is obvious. You cannot cure the ἀκρατὴς by giving him

1, τί δέϊ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἂ πράττει, 1146^b
 τεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ [πεπεισμένος] οὐδὲν ἤττον
 πράττει.

ἵτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ
 ἰς ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας,
 ν δ' εἶναι τινὰς ἀπλῶς. 5

ἵ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαὶ τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων
 μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς
 ἰας εὐρεσίς ἐστιν.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ
 εἰδότες· εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ
 ν, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περὶ 10
 ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν,
 ἵον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ν ὅσα συγγενῇ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχῇ

conviction, for he has it al-

ιστο, sc. δὲν πράττειν. Bek-
 ds μὴ ἐπέπειστο with L^b, but
 t note.

ισμένος...ἄλλα πράττει. Ram-
 dds ἄλλα before πεπεισμένος, a
 are adopted by Bywater, who
 s ἄλλα before πράττει, thus
 the corruption, if there is one,
 le transposition. The Versio
 n *suavis*, οὐ πεπεισμένος. I
 t simpler to bracket πεπεισ-
 The meaning is sufficiently
 y νῦν δέ, 'as it is.'

Ἔτι εἰ κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορία
 by the use of expressions like
 θυμοῦ, τιμῆς, κέρδους.

ς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We do, as a
 of fact, speak of ἀκρατεῖς with-
 qualifying restriction (ἀπλῶς).
 cannot mean by this ἀκρατεῖς
 there must be a proper ap-
 n of the word to a special class
 ts.

τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν κ.τ.λ. The
 g is more fully expressed above

1145 b, 6. The λύσις of the ἀπορία
 will leave us with the ἐνδοξα stripped
 of their difficulties.

III. § 1. Πρῶτον μὲν...εἴτα....

This section gives the two divisions of
 the following discussion. The *first* is
 the discussion of the question πότερον
 εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες (cf.
 1145 b, 29 τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀγνοίας).
 This extends from 1146 b, 24 to
 1147 b, 19. The *second* is the dis-
 cussion περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ...θετέον
 κ.τ.λ. with a number of kindred
 questions (ὅσα συγγενῇ). This ex-
 tends from 1147 b, 20 to 1152 a, 36.
 It is important to observe that the
 twofold character of this division is
 clearly marked by the language, see
 next note.

§ 2. ἔστι δ' ἀρχῇ κ.τ.λ. This has
 been regarded as a duplicate of the
 preceding section, and it has been
 said that it outlines a discussion
 which does not exist. This view
 overlooks the fact of the twofold
 division made in the last section and
 the natural reference of this section to

15 τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰσι τῷ περὶ
 ἂ ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ
 ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὐ
 ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ
 ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρα-
 20 τὴς, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα
 ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν ᾖ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ
 ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων αἰ
 δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢ δὲ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, διώκει
 δέ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι 3
 25 παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἐνιοὶ
 γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἶονται ἀκριβῶς
 εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξαζόντες μᾶλλον 4

the second part of it only (εἶτα περὶ ποῖα κ.τ.λ.). We have first to deal with the great ἀπορία, πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ; and then we can take all the rest together. As, however, they seem at first somewhat miscellaneous, it is important to find a 'starting-point for the discussion' (ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως), a point of vantage (τόπος) from which we can attack them all. This Aristotle finds in the fact that the states now under discussion are ἐξεις and must be discussed as such (see next note).

πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς κ.τ.λ. We are already familiar from the discussion of the ἀρεταί with this division of the discussion into (1) περὶ ποῖα; and (2) πῶς; Cf. 1115 a, 5 n. We know that it is the proper way to discuss any ἐξίς. I have retained the MS. reading τῷ πῶς (Bywater writes τῷ ὥς) because I hold that the word to be supplied is ἔχειν, and that τῷ ὥς (sc. εἶναι) below is different. The ellipse of ἔχειν with πῶς is common.

εἰσι...ἔχοντες. Cf. 1144 a, 32 ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσι.

ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.

If we find that the διαφορά of ἀκρασία is τὸ πῶς ἔχειν and not τὸ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι, we must still go on to ask the question περὶ ποῖα, since ἀκρασία has to be differentiated, not only from ἀκολασία, but from other ψεκτά. The answer to the question is indicated at once. It differs from ἀκολασία τῷ πῶς, i.e. by the absence of προαίρεσις, and from other bad ἐξεις by being limited to the same objects as ἀκολασία.

§ 3. Περὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We now begin the discussion of the first main point, πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ. But first we must clear the ground by finding the λύσις of the ἀπορία about δόξα given 1145 b, 36. It is not true to say that δόξα is an ἡρεμαία ὑπόληψις, and so the substitution of δόξα for ἐπιστήμη makes no difference. Observe that Aristotle himself would not call it ἐπιστήμη, but he is here adopting the Academic standpoint for the sake of argument.

οὐ διστάζουσιν, cf. 1146 a, 1 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσιν.

§ 4. εἰ οὖν...πράξουσιν. Note the future, 'If we are going to say

ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν
 εἰ ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἐνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἦττον
 οὔξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. 30
 Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων
 οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται
 τασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ
 θεωροῦντα ἂ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν [τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα].
 οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. 35
 Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφο-

is from the mildness of their
 tion that they act etc.'

ν διοίσει κ.τ.λ. 'we shall find
 (pealing to experience) that ἐπι-
 is no better than δόξα in respect
 τις (σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως).' It
 ortant to notice that διοίσει here
 'will surpass.'

οὐ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. One nega-
 stance is enough for the ἀνασκευή
 definition ἡ δόξα ἡρεμὰ ὑπό-

The Academy will not say
 Herakleitos had ἐπιστήμη, and
 had 'conviction' (πίστις σφοδ-
 ὑπολήψεως) in the highest degree.
 ie oracular style of Herakleitos,
 y Early Greek Philosophy p.

'Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. These words
 uce the first of four distinct λύσεις
 to each other by ἐτι as usual.
 first three are dialectical and
 upon the theory of 'potential
 edge' which was first worked
 Plato in the Theaitetos. The
 is the real λύσις and is of a
 y psychological character. We
 ot expect to find the three first
 consistent with each other or
 the fourth. Aristotle is only
 med in the first instance to show
 cademy how they may keep to
 ἡμῃ and yet account for ἀκρασία
 ir own principles. If we com-
 the successive λύσεις with the

successive definitions of Knowledge
 in the Theaitetos, we shall see how
 fundamental and essential a thing τὸ
 διαλέγεσθαι is in Greek philosophy.

ἔχων...χρώμενος. The distinction
 between knowledge potential and
 actual originates in the Theaitetos,
 197 b sqq., where, however, ἔχειν is
 equivalent to χρῆσθαι here, and what
 is here called ἔχειν is called κτᾶσθαι.
 For the opposition of χρῆσις (= ἐνέρ-
 γεια) to ἔξις, cf. 1098 b, 33 n. We very
 commonly find τὸ θεωρεῖν described
 as the ἐνέργεια of ἐπιστήμη, as in the
 present passage. Cf. Phys. 255 b, 2
 ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ
 δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων. Met. 1048 a,
 32 λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει...ἐπιστήμονα καὶ
 τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἐὰν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρεῖν.
 de An. 412 a, 22 λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν
 ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δὲ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν.

τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. For
 the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 6. Ἐτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. The second
 λύσις goes a little deeper. A man
 may know the major premiss actually
 and the minor premiss only potentially.
 For the two kinds of προτάσεις see
 1143 b, 3 n. It is no valid objection
 to Aristotle's argument here to say
 that in the case supposed the act
 would be ἀκούσιον. We are only
 considering whether it is possible to
 act παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, not whether
 we are responsible for it if we do.

τέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενοι μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' 5 ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τότε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ 10 θαυμαστόν.

Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν

πρακτὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The particular makes its first appearance in the minor premiss; acts are necessarily particular, and therefore there can be no act unless the minor premiss is actual.

διαφέρει...τὸ καθόλου. By τὸ καθόλου (not ἡ καθόλου) is meant the universal which forms the middle term. The general rule παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά contains two universals and therefore requires two minor premisses to connect it with a particular agent and a particular act. The first of these takes as middle term the universal which is predicated of the agent (ἐφ' αὐτοῦ). This minor premiss is obvious and does not detain us, cf. de Mot. An. 701 a, 25 ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτῶντων ἐνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δὴλην οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐφιστάσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. But the other universal (τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος) is of a different character. Ἐπιστήμη takes us no further than ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε, and this can yield only the conclusion ἐμοὶ συμφέρει τὸ τοιόνδε, not an act. We are in that case left in the position of the doctor who only knows that light food is digestible without knowing what food is light (1141 b, 19 n.). This is a case, then, when a man acts wrongly, though he has ἐπιστήμη of what is right. Of

course Aristotle himself would say such an act was ἀκούσιον and not ἀκρασία, but that is not the question at present. We are only showing how it is possible to act παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, and ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε is ἐπιστήμη while τότε τοιόνδε is not. Even if the man does 'use' the minor premiss, that will not be enough to make him act rightly.

ἢ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'or (the universal may be predicated of the thing, e.g.) ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε.' This is, of course, a minor premiss. The conjunction ἢ introduces the other species of καθόλου. εἰδέναι, sc. τὸν ἀκρατῆ.

§ 7. Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. The third λύσις, which goes a little deeper by recognising two kinds of potential knowledge. When we say a man has knowledge potentially we may mean either that he 'has' it but does not 'use' it, or merely that he is capable of having it (as δεκτικὸν ἐπιστήμης) but does not actually 'have' it at the time. This distinction is best brought out in Gen. An. 735 a, 9 ἐγγυτέρω δὲ καὶ πορρωτέρω (τῆς ἐνεργείας) αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι δυνάμει, ὥσπερ ὁ καθεύδων γεωμέτρης ἐγγρηγόρτος πορρωτέρω, καὶ οὗτος τοῦ θεωροῦντος. The case considered in this section is parallel to that of 'the sleeping geometer' (cf. οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα), that considered in the two preceding sections was that of

ρήθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν
μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ
ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινό-
μενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ γε ἐν
τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων 15
καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσιν,
ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν
8 λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς
ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι
τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, 20
καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθάνοντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι
δ' οὕτω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τούτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε
καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ
τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους.

9 Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψῃε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ

the geometer ἐγγηγορῶς μὲν μὴ θεωρῶν
δέ. Cf. also above 1098 b, 33.

καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσιν. Cf. Mot.
An. 701 b, 29 ὅταν γένηται ἀλλοίωσις
περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ... πολλὴν ποιεῖ τοῦ
σώματος διαφορὰν ἐρυθήμασι καὶ ὠχρό-
τησι καὶ φρίκαις καὶ τρώμοις καὶ τοῖς
τούτων ἐναντίοις. This brings us to
the verge of Aristotle's own physio-
logical λύσις. See the whole passage
in App. B.

§ 8. οὐδὲν σημεῖον, sc. τοῦ ἔχειν
(in the sense previously given to
the word). Τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως are
generally speaking σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεως,
but the ἕξις may be a *mere* δύναμις.
The geometer may be talking in his
sleep. The ἀποδείξεις here mentioned
are probably to be understood as geo-
metrical; for Aristotle cannot mean us
to take the word with Ἐμπεδοκλέους.
The ἔπη Ἐμπεδοκλέους are just about
the last thing Aristotle would call
ἀποδείξεις.

καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθάνοντες κ.τ.λ.
This is another way in which Aristotle
more than once describes *merely* po-
tential knowledge. Cf. Phys. 255 a,

33 ἔστι δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλως ὁ μαθάνων
ἐπιστήμων καὶ ὁ ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ θεωρῶν
... ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ
δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ
ὥς καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν, de An. 429 b, 8
δυνάμει πως (sc. ἐπιστήμων), οὐ μὴν
ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὐρεῖν.
Thurot's conjecture μαθάνοντες for
μαθόντες seems to me certain. We
can hardly identify οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες
with οἱ μαθάνοντες πρὶν μαθεῖν.

τούτο...δεῖται. For the reading cf.
Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 9. Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε κ.τ.λ. The
fourth and real λύσις. We now drop
'potential knowledge' altogether, and
the explanation is in perfect harmony
with that given in the de Mot. An.
(cf. App. B). It should be observed,
however, that the three previous λύσεις,
though provisional, have gradually
prepared us for this one.

φυσικῶς. This word alone im-
plies that the preceding λύσεις are
διαλεκτικώτεροι. To consider a thing
φυσικῶς is to consider it in the light
of its οἰκείαι ἀρχαί, i.e. of φυσικαὶ
προτάσεις (Top. 105 b, 21), in the

25 μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἶον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος

present case, of course, from a psychological point of view. Hence φυσικῶς is regularly opposed to λογικῶς (= διαλεκτικῶς). Cf. Phys. 204 b, 4 λογικῶς μὲν οὖν σκοποῦμενοις ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε δόξειεν ἂν οὐκ εἶναι (τὸ ἀπειρον)... b, 10 φυσικῶς δὲ μᾶλλον θεωροῦσιν ἐκ τῶνδε. Gen. Corr. 316 a, 10 ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες.

ἡ... καθόλου, sc. πρότασις. The major premiss is not ἐπιστήμη, but the other form of ὑπόληψις called δόξα, which is περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, and may be true or false. We have seen already, however, that this does not imply that it is a mere ἡρεμάτα ὑπόληψις.

ἡ δ' ἑτέρα, sc. πρότασις, cf. 1143 b, 3 n. In a real practical syllogism, the minor premiss cannot be of the form ξηρὸν τὸ τοιῶνδε, which is all that ἐπιστήμη could give us. It must be of the form ξηρὸν τόδε, and that is a matter for αἰσθησις.

ἔνθα μὲν, i.e. ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς προτάσεσιν.

ἐν ταῖς ποιητικαῖς. The simplest way of taking this is to supply προτάσεσι as above (προτάσεις are the subject of the sentence) and to translate 'in the case of practical premisses,' cf. de Mot. An. 701 a, 23 αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ κ.τ.λ. There might, of course, be θεωρητικαὶ προτάσεις, the major a δόξα such as 'The east wind brings rain,' and the minor an αἰσθησις, 'The wind is in the east.' The conclusion is 'It will rain.' Or we may have 'It is bad for a man to get wet,' 'It is raining,' the conclusion of which is that I put on my cloak.

εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος κ.τ.λ. This is an illustration of a case where there is no impediment or conflict. We have a practical major premiss παντὸς γλυκέος γέεσθαι δεῖ. As a δόξα, this may be true or false, but it is a universal imperative, just as much as παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά. We have to ask, then, (1) whence it derives its universality, (2) whence it derives its epitactic form. Its universality must be due, as universality always is, to the action of νοῦς. It is νοῦς that generalises particular desires for sweet wine into the universal proposition (καθόλου δόξα, λόγος) πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ. It makes explicit the universal implicit in particular ὁρέξαι exactly in the same way as it makes explicit the universal implicit in particular αἰσθῆσεις. But this is not all. The verb δεῖ means ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ, and the epitactic character of the proposition can only be due to its presentation by νοῦς (or φαντασία) to βούλησις as its ὁρεκτόν. This further implies that the person who has such a major premiss is one whose φανόμενον ἀγαθόν is τὸ ἡδύ. In other words, this is the major premiss of ἀκολασία. If this καθόλου δόξα is in the soul, and a minor premiss τοῦτ' ἡδύ is supplied by αἰσθησις, the act of tasting necessarily follows as a conclusion. We see, then, that a bad act may be produced by a practical syllogism as well as a good one. The problem of ἀκρασία therefore assumes this form: 'Is it possible for a syllogism the conclusion of which is a bad act to exist side by side with the knowledge of the major premiss or

ἅλαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὥς ἔν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, 30
 ἢ τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλύμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ
 εἶναι. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι,
 ἵτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ),
 δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ'
 ἡμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· 35
 τυμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεῦσθαι, οὐκ 1147^b

the principle which that act
 27

ὅταν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The answer to the problem proposed at the end of the note is that it is impossible if the major premiss of the bad act and the minor premiss which it violates are contradictory. No one can have both at one and the same time. In the positions παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι and οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα, the latter is present, the truth of the bad act will depend on whether it can result from some major premiss. Now the premiss πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ is not *per se* contradictory to οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα, may quite well coexist. The question, then, is whether the bad act can follow from πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ as well as from παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι.

δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, in the sense explained by the *third* λύσις. The point is really that of ἐπιθυμία, as we see.

δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, 'and desire (for pleasure) is present time,' not βούλησις or ὁρεξις.

It all depends, then, on the ὁρεξις at the moment.

λέγει φεύγειν. The syllogism οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ οὐ συμφέρει τουτὶ may even be true; but, in the absence of the desire to which it can present itself, nothing happens. For διάνοια ἐν κινεῖ.

ἐπιθυμία ἄγει. The presence

of ἐπιθυμία is enough to replace the absence of the epitactic element in πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ. The way in which this happens is explained in de Mot. An. 701 a, 31 (App. B) ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἢ τῆς ὁρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. In itself (καθ' αὐτό) πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ, τουτὶ ἡδύ is quite compatible with the other syllogism; but for ἐπιθυμία it has a different meaning. The object of ἐπιθυμία is just τὸ ἡδύ and so it moves it at once. As it is put in the de Mot. An. (loc. cit.), "Ποτέον μοι, says desire. Τοῦ δὲ ποτόν, says αἰσθησις or φαντασία or νοῦς. Εὐθὺς πίνει."

κινεῖν γὰρ δύναται. As an ὁρεξις (which is κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν) it can set in motion the body (which is κινούμενον and not κινοῦν). This does not mean, of course, that ἐπιθυμία has this power more than any other form of ὁρεξις. The point is that νοῦς cannot move the body except through ὁρεξις. A judgment that something is good cannot move the body unless βούλησις τάγαθού is present, but the case supposed is one where ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος occupies the soul.

ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης. This is really Aristotle's great contribution to moral psychology. There is an intellectual element in badness as well as in goodness. The bad man and the morally weak man have major premisses as well as the good. The bad man has only one major premiss which is the contradictory of the good man's. The morally weak man has



ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ 11
ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου
5 ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.

Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ 12
ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδον-
τος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιο-
λόγων ἀκούειν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ 13

two. These cannot be contradictory in themselves (καθ' αὐτό), but only κατὰ συμβεβηκός, i.e. ἡ συμβαίνει τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐπιθυμητῷ εἶναι.

§ 11. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο. We have seen already that the lower animals are incapable of goodness or badness just because they have not νοῦς (1139 a, 20). They cannot get beyond an image in the soul of something once felt as sweet (φαντασία) or an association of something now perceived with such an image (μνήμη). Memory is not an intellectual act, but belongs to the same 'part' of the soul as Imagination (φαντασία), i.e. the πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν, διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζώων (sc. ὅσα χρόνον αἰσθάνεται), καὶ οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἢ φρόνησιν (de Mem. 449 b, 1—450 a, 22). The ὀρεκτόν can only move the lower animals τῷ φαντασθῆναι, not τῷ νοηθῆναι.

§ 12. Πῶς δὲ λύεται κ.τ.λ. This is put in the popular form as the word ἄγνοια shows. The meaning must be 'How does ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος give place to βούλησις τάγαθοῦ?' For an explanation we are referred to 'the physiologists' and their account of drunkenness and sleep. The drunken man who recites Empedokles gets sober; the sleeping geometer wakes. This is how Aristotle dismisses a question which is φυσικώτερον and goes beyond πολιτική. To us, of

course, it is just the fundamental question; for the answer to it must explain why the ordinary man who is neither good nor bad sometimes does right and sometimes wrong. Now, if we take Aristotle's hint and go to the de Somno for an explanation, we find that the alternation of sleeping and waking is due to the fact that no animal is able συνεχῶς ενεργεῖν. Physiologically speaking, what happens is that the warm ἀναθυμίασις from food rises into the head, which it therefore makes heavy. It is then cooled in the brain, whence it returns to the heart. The consequent cooling of the heart produces unconsciousness; for the heart is the πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν. So too μέθη arises τῶν ἀνω θερμότητων (Probl. 843 a, 1). The analysis of pleasure will show us that ἐπιθυμία too has a physiological basis. It is caused by the pain produced by ἐνδεια and it ceases with the pleasure produced by ἀναπλήρωσις, both these being σωματικά. Cf. also Phys. 247 b, 13 sqq.

§ 13. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ κ.τ.λ. This section is intended to bring out the truth underlying the paradox of Sokrates. I read ταύτην <δ'> with Ramsauer and make the apodosis go down to ἐσχατον δρον.

δόξα αἰσθητοῦ, 'a belief as to an object of perception.' The formula of the minor premiss (τελευταία πρότασις)

κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην <δ'> ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὧν, 10
 ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὥς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν
 ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου
 μὴδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν
 14 ἔσχατον ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐξήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ
 γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται 15
 τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλλεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς
 αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μὴ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα
 ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεῦσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

IV. Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ 20
 μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖα ἔστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν
 οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρ-
 2 τερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ

is e.g. *τουτί γλυκύ* (1147 a, 29), and this differentiates it from the minor premiss of a scientific syllogism such as *ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε* (1147 a, 6).

ὥς οὐκ ἦν. For the imperfect cf. Ind. s.v. ἦν.

τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον, i.e. the *τὸδε* or *τουτί* which is ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ὧν αἰσθησις ἡδὴ κυρία. This is not καθόλου and therefore not ἐπιστημονικόν, for there can be no ἐπιστήμη of τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

§ 14. τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης, 'ἐπιστήμη in the proper sense,' all the terms of which are necessarily καθόλου.

παρούσης. The text is sufficiently guaranteed by ἐνούσης 1145 b, 23, which also settles the meaning here. Stewart's very ingenious *περιγίνεται τὸ πάθος* is quite unnecessary if the interpretation given above is correct. There can be no κυρίως ἐπιστήμη where the major premiss is given by δόξα and the minor by αἰσθησις.

ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, sc. ἐπιστήμης. This is a new name for the αἰσθησις τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα by which we apprehend the minor premiss ἐγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε καὶ τὸδε τοιόνδε. The phrase

is probably used with some reference to the ἐπιστημονικὴ αἰσθησις of Speusippos (cf. Ritter and Preller § 286). That was a doctrine intended to bridge over the gulf between the particular and the universal, much of the same nature as Aristotle's own doctrine that, though we only perceive a particular, yet it is only the universal element in it, the form, that really enters into perception.

—IV. § 1. Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. We now come to the second division περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατὴ θετέον (1146 b, 9).

§ 2. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., 'whereas—.' The apodosis is not reached till 1147 b, 31 τοὺς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not meant to be a complete classification of the objects of desire, as we can see at once from the omission of pleasures intrinsically bad. It is only a preliminary statement as to two classes of pleasures, which is sufficient for the purpose immediately in hand, namely the ascertainment of the proper objects of ἀκρασία in its literal sense.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν
 25 καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωμα-
 τικά—λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ
 τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμα-
 τικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην—
 30 τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ—λέγω δ'
 οἷον νίκην τιμὴν πλούτου καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
 ἡδέων—τούς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
 ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρα-
 τεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ [τὸ] χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους
 καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ὥς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ'
 35 ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ Ἀνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα κ.τ.λ. The use of this name for the bodily pleasures arises from such phrases as ἀναγκαῖα τροφή. Plato, Rep. 558 a sqq., speaks in this sense of ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι, and in Phileb. 62 e ἀναγκαῖαι ἡδοναί are mentioned as a recognised class. The present classification is not, however, to be found in Plato.

αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά. These will be the 'higher pleasures,' since τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν is always the best.

ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, 'but admitting of excess.' For this sense of ἔχειν cf. Ind. s.v. The excess of these pleasures will be φευκτόν, but only κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ἔθεμεν, 1117 b, 27 sqq.

τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς. It is necessary to add this; for, unless they had the ὀρθὸς λόγος 'in themselves,' there would be no ὁμοιότης or analogy between the κατὰ τι ἀκρατεῖς and the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς. The ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ etc. must have a true δόξα with regard to the object of θυμός, as well as a false one.

προστιθέντες...ἀπλῶς. For the opposition of ἀπλῶς to κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, cf. 1095 a, 2 n., and for the omission of

τό, Bywater, Contr. p. 55. It enables us to take προστιθέντες as 'absolutely,' καθ' ὁμοιότητα, cf. Ind. s.v. ὁμοιότης.

ὥσπερ Ἀνθρωπος κ.τ.λ. The imperfects διέφερον and ἦν show that this refers to some previous ἀκράσις or discussion (cf. Ind. s.v. ἦν). All the Greek commentators except Heliodorus tell us that there was an Olympic victor called Ἀνθρωπος, and this view goes back to no less an authority than Alexander, who says in his exegesis of the Topics (p. 114, 8 Wallies) ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἰδιον ὄνομα τοῦ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιονίκου πύκτου οὐ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς μνημονεύει. This statement is repeated by Alexander on other occasions (see the Index in Wallies) and has just received most remarkable confirmation from a statement made in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus communicated to the Classical Review for July 1899 by Messrs Grenfell and Hunt, "This is a fragment of a list of Olympian victors, written in the third century A.D., and referring, with some lacunae, to a period of about thirty years in the first half of the fifth century B.C. According to this list,

γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν, 1148^a
 ὁμῶς ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία
 αἰ οὐχ ὡς ἀμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις
 ὡς οὐσα ἢ κατὰ τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐδεὶς. τῶν δὲ
 τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν 5
 να καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε
 διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων,
 καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν

eral trustworthiness of which
 and by its agreement with Pau-
 and other authorities, the name
 winner of the boxing-match at
 a in the year 456 B.C. was
 os. It was doubtless on the
 e of a similar list that Alex-
 aphrodisiensis made his state-
 ment "Ἀνθρωπος was a πύκτης."
 meaning, then, is 'just as we
 t the Olympic victor was both
 os and an ἄνθρωπος.' The
 of K^b is much more idiomatic
 e vulgate νενικηκώς.

νὸς λόγος. The definition of
 is ὡν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ
 ὄνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος,
 ὡς τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμ-
 τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν,
 τὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας
 ἄν γὰρ τις ἀποδιδῶ τί ἐστιν
 ἐκατέρῳ τὸ ζῶν εἶναι, ἴδιον
 ὁ λόγον ἀποδώσει. In the
 case if we give the λόγος
 onding to the κοινὸν ὄνομα
 os, namely τί ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἄν-
 εἶναι, it will not be quite the
 s the λόγος corresponding to
 ὁ ὄνομα, namely τί ἐστιν αὐτῷ
 τῷ εἶναι. In the former case,
 adopt the Platonic method of
 on, the λόγος will be ζῶν
 ὑπόπουν διπουν ἄπτερον, in the
 e shall have to make a πρόθε-
 as 'Ὀλομπιονίκης πύκτης. Note
 this is strictly Academic. It
 y impossible to define the in-

dividual "Ἀνθρωπος.

σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. The σημείον
 amounts to this, that ἀκρασία, whether
 it has to do with bodily pleasures
 simpliciter or with some particular
 bodily pleasures, belongs to the same
 γένος as κακία (cf. οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος
 1145 b, 2), while ἀκρασία θυμοῦ etc.
 belong to a different genus altogether,
 which is only called κακία καθ' ὁμοί-
 τητα, as we speak of a 'bad doctor'
 (1148 b, 7).

§ 3. περὶ ἃς λέγομεν κ.τ.λ. 1117 b,
 28 sqq.

μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι. This gives us
 the differentia. It is quite consistent
 with the preceding account; for προαι-
 ρεσις implies ὄρεξις τοῦ φαινομένου
 ἀγαθοῦ (βούλησις) as well as βούλευσις,
 while ἀκρασία is caused by ἐπιθυμία,
 i.e. ὄρεξις τοῦ φαινομένου ἡδέος, and
 excludes βούλευσις.

καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, sc. τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς. It is only the ὑπερβολή
 of warmth (for instance) that causes
 pain, i.e. τὸ μᾶλλον αἰσθησιν ἐμποιοῦν
 ἐν τῷ θιγγάνειν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐὰν μετὰ
 λύπης (Part. An. 648 b, 15).

ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους. It has been
 argued that this is inconsistent with
 the doctrine of Book III that the
 pains shunned by the ἀκόλαστος (and
 therefore the ἀκρατής) are always those
 of unsatisfied pleasure, so that τὴν
 λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή (1118 b, 32). But,
 as a matter of fact, the pleasures of
 warmth and coolness are to Aristotle

περὶ ἀφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν
 10 διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ
 τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· 4
 καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ'
 οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταὐτὸν τὸν ἀκρατὴ καὶ τὸν ἀκό-
 λαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατὴ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων
 15 οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι·
 οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταυτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσὶν, ἀλλ'
 οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκό-

pleasures belonging to the sense of touch, and stand exactly on the same footing as the pleasures of nutrition and reproduction. To look at the matter φυσικώτερον, this is because ὕγρον καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὅλη τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν (Part. An. 646 a, 16). We find also that τὸ θερμὸν has the most intimate connexion with τροφή, since digestion depends upon it. The pains of hunger, thirst, warmth and cold are therefore exactly the four we should expect to find mentioned. Another sure sign that ἀλεία and ψύχη are pleasures of this class is that they are of those ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνοῦν. Even oysters and molluscs live at the mouths of rivers; for they seek ἅμα τὴν τ' ἀλέαν καὶ τὴν τροφήν (Gen. An. 761 b, 7), and fish change about from the deep sea to the shore φεύγοντες τὰς ὑπερβολὰς (observe the phrase) τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἀλέας. Lastly, it is only if we suppose that some warmth may be the object of ἀκολασία, that we can see any point in the exception of θερμασία produced by gymnastics (1118 b, 6). We may remember, too, that Philoxenos was κάμνος οὐκ ἀνθρώπος.

παρὰ...τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. contrary to the λόγος ὃ ἐνεκά του which διάνοια has affirmed in harmony with βούλησις.

κατὰ πρόσθεσιν...ἀπλῶς. Cf. Ind. s.vv.

καθάπερ ὀργῆς. Cf. Thuc. iii, 84, 2 ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις...ἀσμένῃ ἐδῆλασεν ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὖσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου.

§ 4. σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. We cannot say that this is inconsistent with the account of μαλακία given later, as it merely states a fact of language which Aristotle regarded as significant. And it surely is a fact that the word μαλακία is not used of the ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ etc. See Stewart's note.

εἰς ταὐτόν...τίθεμεν. The phrase εἰς γένος (ἐν γένει) τίθεναι is frequent, especially in the Topics.

οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται. The question has been raised how the ἀκόλαστοι can have προαίρεσις since his aim is the pleasure of the moment. The answer is that προαίρεσις is not necessarily a σπουδαία προαίρεσις, and the object of βούλησις is τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, which is only the true good to the good man. The difference between the ἀκρατὴς and the ἀκόλαστος is just this, that to the former pleasure appears in its true character, simply as the object of ἐπιθυμία, while to the latter the pursuit of pleasure presents itself as τὸ ἀγαθόν, the object of βούλησις. The major premiss παντὶ γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, which is that of the ἀκόλαστος, is equivalent to τὸν

ον ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα διώκει τὰς
 βολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ
 θυμῶν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσ- 20
 το ἐπιθυμία νεανική καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐν-
 λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδο-
 μί μὲν εἰσι <τῶν> τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων—τῶν
 ἡδέων ἕνα φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ
 ζῦ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον—οἷον χρήματα καὶ 25
 ς καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή, πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ φιλεῖν
 νται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ

ἀγαθόν, not to πᾶν γλυκὺ

ἄλλον κ.τ.λ. Stewart is plainly
 taking μάλλον with ἂν εἴποιμεν
 t with ἀκόλαστον. There is no
 n of degrees of ἀκολασία. Tr.
 ould rather give the name of
 tos to the man who etc.' By

ὅστις κ.τ.λ. is meant some
 whom we are in doubt whether
 κρατῆς or ἀκόλαστος, and whom
 cide to be only ἀκρατῆς. It
 ily impossible to mistake the
 nd psychology of making the
 tos a man of mild desires.
 him pleasure has become the
 of βούλησις, the φαινόμενον
 , and he pursues it as a 'cool
 ist.'

φεύγει μετρίας λύπας. The
 s only shunned τῶν λυπηρῶν
 ερβολὰς (1148 a, 7); for they
 are strong enough to produce
 ent desire for the opposite
 es. The ἀκόλαστος shuns all
 on principle.

ἰσχυρά, i.e. a ὑπερβολή such
 ts the ἀκρατῆς.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This section
 ere duplicate of 1147 b, 23
 (see note), but the necessary
 ction to the discussion of the
 r, incidentally recapitulating

and putting in a clearer light what
 has been said already. We now
 have for the first time a complete
 classification of desires into (1) those
 of things τῷ γένει καλὰ, φύσει αἰρετά,
 (2) of τὰ ἐναντία τούτων, i.e. those of
 things τῷ γένει αἰσχυρά, φύσει φευκτά,
 not previously mentioned, (3) of τὰ με-
 ταξὺ, i.e. τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (τὰ σωματικά).
 These last are properly described as
 'intermediate' between τὰ καλὰ and
 τὰ αἰσχυρά, for they are ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
 ἀναγκαῖα, the pleasures of τὸ ζῆν,
 not of τὸ εὖ ζῆν. They are therefore
 indifferent in themselves, but become
 good when sought τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.
 For the punctuation see Stewart's
 note. The apodosis to the long
 protasis is not reached till 1148 b, 2
 μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., being delayed
 by the enormous parenthesis 1148 a,
 28 διὸ ὅσοι...b, 2 μωραίνειν.

οἷον χρήματα κ.τ.λ. These are
 φύσει αἰρετά, ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν.

τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν, 'for doing
 so in a certain way, i.e. in excess.'

διὸ ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. There is no verb for
 this nominative, the construction being
 forgotten owing to the parenthesis
 within a parenthesis καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα...
 σπουδάζοντες. The thought requires
 us to supply μοχθηροὶ οὐκ εἰσίν, the
 place of which is taken by the re-

τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν
 30 καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες
 ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
 ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες—ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι
 τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μά-
 χοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλο-
 1148^b πάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει
 μωραίνειν)—μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ
 τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό,
 φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσιν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. ὁμοίως 6
 5 δ' οὐδ' ἀκρασία· ἢ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν· δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσ-
 επιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν
 ἱατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν

sumptive apodosis **μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.**

ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη, an instance of ὑπερβολὴ περὶ τέκνα.

ὥσπερ Σάτυρος, an instance of ὑπερβολὴ περὶ γονεῖς, Aspasios (158, 16 Heylbut) says Σάτυρος...ὅς οὐδὲ ζῆν εἴλετο ἀποθανόντος τοῦ πατρὸς. The Anonymus (p. 426, 23) says οὗτος γὰρ ἐρῶν τινος κόρης καὶ πρὸς τὴν μοιχείαν εὐρίων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα Σώστρατον συνεργοῦντα, τοσοῦτον ἔκτοτε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα ἐφίλησεν, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τελευτήσαντος ἑαυτὸν κατεκρήμνισε καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀπεστέρησε. (This sounds like a reminiscence from the New Comedy.) Heliodoros on the other hand has ὁ Σάτυρος ὡς θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενος τὸν πατέρα, as if his text did not contain **περί**. It seems just possible that this may be right. As Stewart reminds us, the kings of Bosphoros during the 4th century were called Satyros. I would add that Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ looks very like a royal title, and if the reference were to the deification of a dead king by

his son, the parallel to the case of a Niobe would be striking. For ἐπι-καλεῖσθαι, *invocare*, cf. EE. 1245 b, 33 ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους.

μοχθηρία, i.e. ἀκολασία, κακία.

φαῦλαι δὲ κ.τ.λ., cf. 1147 b, 15 ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν.

§ 6. **τῶν ψεκτῶν**. There seems to be a slight inconsistency between this and 1148 a, 28 ψέγονται...τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. The explanation is to be found above 1148 a, 3. We may say that τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς in such matters ψέγεται ὡς ἀμαρτία but not ὡς κακία. It is thus not really τῶν ψεκτῶν.

προσ επιτιθέντες κ.τ.λ., 'they call it ἀκρασία with the additional qualification περὶ ἕκαστον, *in a given thing*.' Here again περὶ ἕκαστον is virtually = ἐκάστων.

οἷον κακὸν ἱατρὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. El. 177 b, 13 ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ὅντα σκυτεῖα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; εἴη δ' ἂν τι ἀγαθὸς ὢν σκυτεὺς μοχθηρὸς· ὥστ' ἔσται ἀγαθὸς σκυτεὺς μοχθηρὸς.

κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἐκάστην αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι 10 κακεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμοῦ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῇ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

V. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἓνα μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ 15 μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθνη γίνονται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων 2 ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἔξεις· λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἀνθρωπιν ἢν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσιν τὰ 20 παῖδια κατεσθίειν, ἢ οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παῖδια δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐ- 3 χίαν, ἣ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὐταὶ μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ 25

ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ'...οὕτω κακεῖ. Cf. 1145 a, 25 n.

ἐκάστην, sc. τὴν τοῦ ἱατροῦ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὑποκριτοῦ κακίαν.

τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν. The ἀναλογία is e.g. as the ἀκρατής is to the ἀκόλαστος so is the ἀκρατής θυμοῦ to the ὀργίλος, the ἀκρατής τιμῆς to the φιλότιμος (in the bad sense), the ἀκρατής κέρδους to the ἀνελεύθερος.

V. § 1. ἡδέα φύσει, the φύσει αἰρετά of 1148 a, 24.

τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, i.e. the ἐναντία τούτων of 1148 a, 24. We now see why these were added to the list.

τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις κ.τ.λ. The division is not very clear; but the chief distinction is clearly between 'bestial' people, who have unnatural desires 'by nature,' or 'habit,' and 'morbid' people who have unnatural desires from disease, mental or bodily.

παραπλησίας, sc. unnatural.

§ 2. τὴν ἀνθρωπιν, 'the female.'

It seems very doubtful, as Fritzsche says, whether this can be the Lamia of folk-lore.

τῶν...περὶ τὸν Πόντον. Cf. Pol. 1338 b, 19 πολλὰ δ' ἔστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφάγαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι κ.τ.λ. Herod. iv, 18, 106 ἀνδροφάγοι δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι ἥθεα, οὐτε δίκην νομίζοντες οὐτε νόμῳ οὐδενὶ χρεόμενοι.

τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν. This must surely refer to the bull. See 1149 a, 14 n.

§ 3. αὐταὶ μὲν...αἱ δὲ... We pass here from the strictly 'bestial' to the 'morbid.' The instances given seem to be familiar. They probably come from the collections made by the school.

τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου
 τὲ ἦπαρ) αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλ-
 σεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ
 τούτοις ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει
 30 τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ
 παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἀν-
 εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύου-
 σιν ἀλλ' ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως
 ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν 5
 1149^a ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸ δ'
 ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἀπλή ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ
 καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα
 5 γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολα-
 σία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις
 εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν δ
 ψοφήσῃ μὺς, θηριώδῃ δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδε-
 δίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλό-
 10 γιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια

αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους.
 This seems to be a third class which
 may arise either from disease, or habit,
 which is a second nature.

τριχῶν τίλσεις. Victorius says
 'huic vitio virgines non paucae affines
 sunt, quae inde nullo pacto absterreri
 possunt.' Aristotle is possibly allud-
 ing to the morbid appetites connected
 with puberty and pregnancy.

§ 4. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. These
 are cases of *πήρωσις*. What follows
 is quite in accordance with Aristotle's
 view of the distinction between the
 sexes. Cf. Gen. An. 737 a, 27 τὸ
 θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον,
 775 a, 15 δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὥσπερ
 ἀναπληρὰ εἶναι τὴν θηλυότητα φυσικῇν.

§ 5. ἀκρασία. We expect καὶ
 ἐγκράτεια to correspond with κρατεῖν,
 but Aristotle does not care for formal
 symmetry.

τοῦ πάθους, i.e. θυμοῦ, sc. ἀκρατῇ
 λεκτέον, ἀκρατῇ δ' ἀπλῶς οὐ λεκτέον,
 'We must call him *ἀκρατής* of the
feeling, not *ἀκρατής simpliciter*.'

πᾶσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is the case
 where we apply the word *θηριότης* to
 excess of badness (*ἐπιδυσφημοῦντες*).
 Cf. 1145 a, 33.

§ 6. κἂν ψοφήσῃ μὺς. Cf. Pol.
 1323 a, 29 *δεδιότα τὰς παραπετομένας*
μύας. The *ψοφοδεής* has the kind of
 fear we find in certain beasts. Soph.
 fr. 58 *ἅπαντα γὰρ τοι τῷ φοβουμένῳ*
ψοφεῖ.

ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν κ.τ.λ. This is
 'morbid,' not 'natural' like the fear
 of the *ψοφοδεής*. The reference is to
 morbid 'antipathies' to certain ani-
 mals. Stewart quotes a fragment of
 Plutarch, *εἰ ἔνιοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες ὁμῶς*
φοβοῦνται φαῦλα ἄττα, οἷον γαλῆν ἢ
ἀλεκτρυόνα ἅπ' οὐδεμιᾶς φανεράς αἰτίας.

τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπι-
 κᾶς, ἢ μαϊνίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν
 ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ
 αῖς] κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἄφρο-
 ν ἄτοπον ἡδονήν* ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον 15
 * ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἢ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἀπλῶς
 αἰ μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ
 ματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ
 τία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης ἢ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς
 κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.

20

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ
 ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δηλόν. VI. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἦττον αἰσχυρά
 τία ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε 25
 θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ
 χεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον
 οὐσιν, εἴτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες,

πόρρω βαρβάρων, e.g. the
 Cf. 1115 b, 28.

τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν κ.τ.λ.
 e still discussing περὶ ποῖα ὁ
 s;

Φάλαρις] κατεῖχεν. I have
 ted Φάλαρις on the ground that
 ow no such stories about him.
 me that a copyist did not
 and the use of κατεῖχεν without
 pressed subject and took the
 name from 1148 b, 24.

ὥσπερ οὖν κ.τ.λ. For the
 g cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 56.
 onclusion is that the ἀκρατής
 is (1) περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ μοχθηρῷ
 σολάστῳ), and therefore (2) only
 κατ' ἄνθρωπον. This gives us
 a form of ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσ-
 viz. ἢ θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης.
 is only ἀκρασία καθ' ὁμοίότητα.
 ἐν μοχθηρία... ἢ δὲ... For the
 old use of the article' cf. 1117 a.
 The predicate of the second

clause is κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μοχθηρία
 λέγεται. For the partitive genitive in
 the singular cf. 1141 b, 24 n.

§ 9. περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, sc. (1) περὶ τὰ
 φύσει αἰρετά, (2) περὶ τὰ θηριώδη καὶ
 νοσηματώδη.

VI. § 1. ὅτι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This
 section contrasts ἀκρασία in the strict
 sense (ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν) with ἢ τοῦ
 θυμοῦ. The latter requires special
 consideration; for, while it is only
 called ἀκρασία καθ' ὁμοίότητα, yet
 θυμός is a form of ὁρεῖς coordinate
 with ἐπιθυμία, and therefore we must
 note the points of likeness and un-
 likeness. Four reasons are given to
 show that ἀκρασία θυμοῦ is the less
 disgraceful.

παρακούειν. This word (omitted
 in Bon. Ind.) is explained in de Som-
 no 458 b, 31 τὸ γὰρ παρορᾶν ἢ παρ-
 ακοῦειν ὁρῶντος ἀληθές τι καὶ ἀκούοντος,
 οὐ μέντοι τοῦτο δ ὁλεται.

πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὕλακτοῦσιν·
 30 οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως
 ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὴν
 τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλι-
 γωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ
 τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἔαν
 35 μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὴν
 1149^b ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἢ
 δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς
 τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.

ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, 'if there is only a knock at the door,' *si fores crepuerint*. It seems plain that ψοφεῖν is here used impersonally and that it is used in the sense which properly belongs to κόπτω.

οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας. We see, then, that its παρακούειν consists in its hearing something real, namely a judgment that so-and-so is an insult, but not what it thinks it hears, namely an order.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος...ἐδήλωσεν. Cf. Probl. 949 b, 13 διὰ τί ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μόνον, οὐσης τῆς ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργήν; ἢ ὅτι ἀκρατῆς μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τι πράττων, καὶ ἀκρασία ἡ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἀγωγή, εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπιθυμιαίαι ὡς ἐπίπαν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὸν λόγον, αἱ δ' ὀργαὶ μετὰ λόγον, οὐχ ὡς κελεύσαντος τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὡς δηλώσαντος τὸν προσηλακισμὸν ἢ τὴν αἰτίαν.

ἢ ἡ φαντασία. Cf. Rhet. 1378 a, 31 ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ θρεξίς μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν. Like all other ὀρεκτά, τιμωρία can only move τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι. The difference between it and τὸ ἡδύ is that it implies also a φαντασία of the αἰτία which must be some form of ὀλιγωρία (καταφρόνησις, ἐπηρεασμός, ὕβρις all described Rhet. 1378 b, 14 sqq.). Now it is just here that the dependence of θυμός on τὸ

λογιστικόν comes in. 'Ολιγωρία is defined as ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἀξίον φαινόμενον, and that is μηδενὸς ἀξίον which is not good and contributes little or nothing to what is good (Rhet. 1378 b, 12). All this θυμός must get from νοῦς. The premiss πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ is merely a generalisation of particular desires for sweet things; the premiss 'such conduct is ὕβρις' is no mere generalisation from particular feelings of resentment, but the result of deliberation. But such a premiss is not enough to justify anger. It may be that the man is beneath contempt, or that for some other reason the ὀρθὸς λόγος would prescribe the exercise of πρᾶτης, and this is a matter for further deliberation. What we may call ἀκρασία θυμοῦ consists in not waiting for this; for the φαντασία of ὀλιγωρία is sufficient to move θυμός, and θυμός can move the body. Still the φαντασία which moves θυμός is the result of deliberation, though incomplete.

ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις. There is no contradiction in saying that a λόγος may furnish the motive of ἐπιθυμία. The example already given, πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, shows this. But it is not *the* λόγος, i.e. ὀρθὸς λόγος, which is the sense in which the word is used elsewhere in this passage.

- 2 ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ 5
 πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ
 ἢ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν
 μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα
 τύπτει "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος" ἔφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κάκεινος τὸν ἄνω-
 θεν," καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας "καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ" ἔφη "ὅταν ἀνὴρ 10
 γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν." καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νιοῦ
 παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύ-
 3 σαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβου-
 λότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμῶδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμὸς,
 ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην 15
 φασίν· "δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·" καὶ τὸν "κεστὸν
 ἱμάντα" Ὀμηρος· "πάρφασις, ἣ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ
 φρονέοντος." ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἢ ἀκρασία
 αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ

§ 2. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς κ.τ.λ. The *second* reason.

ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Even among desires the most universal are the most excusable. For the distinction between *κοινὰ ἐπιθυμῆαι* and *ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι*, cf. 1118 b, 8 sqq.

τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς, sc. τῶν ἀναγκαίων. The words *καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων* merely explain this. I do not think that they refer to τὰ φύσει αἰρετά.

ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος κ.τ.λ. The writer of MM. seems to have taken this illustration seriously; for he adds that the plea 'It runs in the family' was admitted, καὶ ἀποφυγεῖν δὴ δοκεῖν γὰρ τοῖς δικασταῖς φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος κ.τ.λ. Zell says that the same story occurs in a German Volkslied and refers to 'Des Knaben Wunderhorn' vol. ii, p. 269. Clearly, then, Aristotle is drawing on folk-lore for his illustrations, the stuff

of which Märchen and Fabliaux are made.

§ 3. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι κ.τ.λ. The *third* reason.

δολοπλόκου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The author of this lyrical fragment is unknown. Zell compares Sappho's Ποικιλόθρον' ἀθάνατ' Ἀφρόδιτα | παῖ Δίος δολόπλοκε, λίσσομαί σε. The quotations are given in the usual scrappy and abrupt way.

κεστὸν ἱμάντα. Il. xiv, 214—
 ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κεστὸν ἱμάντα,

ποικίλον, ἐνθα δέ οἱ θελκτήρια πάντα τέτυκτο·

ἐνθ' ἐνὶ μὲν φιλότῃς, ἐν δ' ἡμερος, ἐν δ' ὀδυσσέως

πάρφασις, ἣ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντων.

περὶ τὸν θυμόν, i.e. τοῦ θυμοῦ. Cf. Ind. s.v. περὶ.

καὶ κακία πως. This is the point to which the whole discussion is meant to lead up. It is not κακία ἀπλῶς because it is ἀνεν προαιρέσεως.

20 κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν 4
 πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς
 ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρα-
 σία ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὥς μὲν 5
 τοῖνυν αἰσχύων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυ-
 25 μόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυ-
 μίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικὰς, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς 6
 διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ
 μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ
 μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσή-
 30 ματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολα-
 σία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σῶφρονα οὔτ' ἀκό-
 λαστα λέγομεν ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τι ὅλως
 ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σι-

§ 4. ἔτι οὐδεὶς κ.τ.λ. The *fourth* reason. The argument requires that ὕβρις should be an instance of ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, but it is absurd to suppose that ὑβρίζει here means *μολχεύει*, as the old commentators do. The explanation is to be found in Rhet. 1380 a, 34 καὶ τοῖς δι' ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἤττον ὀργίζονται· οὐ γὰρ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πρᾶξαι, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἀλυπον, ἡ δ' ὀργή μετὰ λύπης. Now ὕβρις, 'unprovoked insult,' is a species of ὀλιγωρία, the others being καταφρόνησις and ἐπηρεασμός, and, if we substitute ὕβρις for ὀλιγωρία in the above sentence, we get the same statement as that in the text. That ὕβρις arises from ἐπιθυμία appears from another passage (Rhet. 1378 b, 23) ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχειν, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡσθῇ. The ὀρεκτόν, then, is the *pleasure* of humiliating another, and therefore the *δρεξις* is ἐπιθυμία. It is true, of course, as Aristotle says (Rhet. 1378 b, 1) that all anger is accompanied by

the pleasure of hope; but men do not get angry for the sake of that.

εἰ οὖν οἷς κ.τ.λ. For the argument cf. 1119 a, 21 sqq.

§ 6. κατ' ἀρχάς, 1145 a, 15 sqq. καὶ τῷ μεγέθει. This is added because we call men 'brutal' (ἐπιδυσφημοῦντες 1149 a, 4) though their desires are not generically (γένει) different from those of normal human beings, but only different in scale (μεγέθει), i.e. τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν.

τὰς πρώτας, sc. τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας καὶ φυσικὰς.

εἴ τι is Bywater's certain correction of MS. εἰ τι. Aristotle means that we speak of certain kinds of animals as ἀκόλαστα by analogy, i.e. if their desires are related to normal animal desires as those of the ἀκόλαστος are to normal human desires. This is sufficiently illustrated by the opening chapters of the *de Gen. An.*, where we read of the physiological characteristics of animals ἀ δεῖ σωφρονέστερα εἶναι (717 b, 27).

ὕβρει. Aristotle is doubtless thinking of asses. The phrase τῶν θηρῶν ὕβριστοτερον was proverbial.

ρία καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι—οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν
 λογισμὸν—ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαι- 35
 οὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβε- 1150*

μωρία. The verb *συναμωρεῖν* 'to lay waste' in Herodotus. He is probably thinking of the which is described as *ἐκστατικός* *κώδης* in Part. An. 651 a, 4.

παμφάγον εἶναι, especially the which is *εὐχερεστάτη πρὸς πᾶσαν* *τῶν ζῴων*. Hist. An. 596 a,

γὰρ ἔχει...λογισμὸν. This abarenthesis adds, as by an after- it, a reason for the statement e do not call the brutes *σώφρονα* *λαστα*. It breaks the sentence extraordinary way, but it is teristic of the lecture-style. He cannot mean to speak only eceptional brutes under dis-

ἐξέστηκε κ.τ.λ. This goes with *εἰ τι ὅλως διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.* The negative sense of *διαφέρει* justifies

The meaning is that excep- y lascivious, destructive and orous *γένη* are *παρὰ φύσιν* or u. For the phrase *ἐξίστασθαι* *σεως* in this sense, cf. Hist. An. , 19 *γενναῖον τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον αὐτοῦ φύσεως*, Rhet. 1390 b, 28 *ταὶ τὰ εὐφυνά γένη εἰς μανικώτερα*. Aristotle is thinking, then, of ls that have 'run wild' or de- tuted. He cannot mean to say ll brutes *ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως*, as rt says.

ἐλαττον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This sen- is little more than a series of s, and we must supply the g links as best we may. In the lace, *ἐλαττον* seems to mean w *κακόν* as the old commentators 'Brutality is a less evil than ss, though in a man it is more e than in a beast; for in a (the words *ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀν-*

θρώπῳ imply that τὸ *θηρίον* is the subject of *ἔχει*) the 'better part,' i.e. *νοῦς*, is not depraved but wholly absent. It is the presence of a depraved *νοῦς* that makes the brutality of man so much more terrible and destructive than that of animals, just as a living thing, which has its *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* in itself, is more hurtful than an inanimate thing. It only remains to explain the obscure remark *παρὰ- πλῆσιον οὖν...ἐκάτερον κακίον*. The key to this is to be found in Top. 116 a, 23 *ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ ὅπερ τόδε τι* (cf. 1140 a, 7 n.) *τοῦ μὴ ἐν γένει (sc. ἀρετώτερον) ὁλοῦ ἢ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου*: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν γένει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τὸ δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' οὐ· οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεται ὅπερ τὸ γένος δ μὴ τυγχάνει ἐν τῷ γένει ὄν, ὅλον δ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ χρώμα. Therefore, *per contra*, *ἀδικία* will be worse than ὁ *ἀδικος ἄνθρωπος*, for *ἀδικία* is *ὅπερ κακόν τι*, while the man is only *ἀδικος κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. In the same way *θηριότης* (which is *ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας* 1145 a, 27) is less bad than *κακία* which is *ὅπερ κακόν τι*. But we may look at the thing from the standpoint of another *τόπος* also; for the *ποιητικὸν ἀγαθόν* is better than τὸ μὴ *ποιητικόν*, and therefore τὸ *ποιητικὸν κακόν* is worse than τὸ μὴ *ποιητικόν*. Looked at in this way ὁ *ἀδικος* is worse than *ἀδικία*, for that which has its *ἀρχή* in itself is *ποιητικώτερον*. In the same sense *θηριότης* is 'worse' than *κακία*, for a beast can do much harm and a brutal man infinitely more. There are in fact two senses of 'worse.' The first is 'worse *per se*' and in this sense badness is worse than brutality; the second is 'worse *per accidens*' and in this sense brutality is worse than

μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια
 ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκρά-
 1150^b τεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ 5
 ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ
 γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τίς ἐστίν· ὅς ἐλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα
 μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰρεῖν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν
 5 κάμνοντα οὐκ οἶεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίφ' ὅμοιος ὢν. ὁμοίως δ'
 ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἰ τις
 ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν,
 θαυμαστόν—ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ
 Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ

to pain on the part of the ἀκρατής. But surely pains due to the desire for excessive pleasures are not the only pains. There is a pain of hunger as well as a pain which arises from the unfulfilled desire of eating to excess. It is with this pain, accordingly, that καρτερία and μαλακία have to do. The ἐγκρατής is the man who gets the better of a desire for a positive excess of pleasure, the καρτερικός resists the desire for the absence of a positive pain when it is right to do so. It is strong desire for the excess of a particular pleasant drink (πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τοῦτ' δὲ γλυκὺ) that overcomes the ἀκρατής, while it is ἡ τυχούσα δίψα, as Aspasios rightly says, that proves too much for the μαλακός.

§ 6. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων κ.τ.λ. The object of this section is to show that τρυφή is a form of μαλακία, contrary to the general opinion which represents it as something grand (νεανικόν).

ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, 'lets his cloak l,' a recognised sign of τρυφή. Plato Alc. I 122 b, εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλεις γλοῦτους ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφᾶς καὶ ἡρας ἱματίων θ' ἔλξεις κ.τ.λ. Dem. L. § 361 διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς πορεύεται

θοιμάτιον καθὲς ἀχρι τῶν σφύρων. Academic gowns are sometimes worn so now for similar reasons.

§ 6. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει, i.e. the standard here too is that of οἱ πολλοί. οὐ γὰρ εἰ τις κ.τ.λ. The apodosis does not begin till 1150 b, 12 ἀλλ' εἰ τις κ.τ.λ.

ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικόν. For ἀλλὰ introducing a parenthesis followed by ἀλλὰ introducing the main statement, cf. 1137 a, 11 n. The examples which follow are not examples of μαλακία, for the pains are such that οἱ πολλοί would not resist them.

εἰ ἀντιτείνων, sc. ἡττᾶται.

ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης. Theodectes of Phaselis, rhetor and tragedian, belonged to Aristotle's own circle, and is often referred to. Like other tragedians of his time, he came from the school of Isokrates, and his chief characteristic was the introduction of rhetorical methods into tragedy. Cf. Haigh, Tragic Drama pp. 424-6. The Aldine scholiast tells us that the breakdown of Philoktetes was marked by the words Εὐψατε τὴν ἐμὴν χεῖρα. Cf. Nauck FTG. p. 803².

καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαί- 20
νον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
ὥστ' ἀνιάτος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνιάτος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύ-
γων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἡτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προ-
3 αἵρεσιν.—(τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν 25
ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπι-
θυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χεί-
ρων εἶναι εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν,
ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ
εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὦν; διὸ ὁ ἀκό- 30
λαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.)—τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν
4 μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ

καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν. I read καὶ for
ἢ with Aspasios. For the meaning cf.
1105 a, 31 *ἐπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος,*
καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This justifies
the name ἀκόλαστος (lit. 'incorrigible').
It is the presence of προαίρεσις which
makes him so (*ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαίρεσει*
1150 b, 30).

§ 3. τῶν δὲ μὴ...τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.
This passage breaks the continuity of
the argument, but that is no reason
for its excision. It is a reminder of
what we have been told of the dis-
tinction between the ἀκόλαστος and
the ἀκρατής, such a reminder as often
occurs in lectures. It is suggested
here by the remark *ὥστ' ἀνιάτος*,
which has called to mind the ἀπορία
1146 a, 31 which is now solved.

διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, sc. οἱ προαι-
ρούμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ. The difference is
explained in *παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε κ.τ.λ.*

εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν. Cf. above,
1148 a, 17 sqq.

εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος. This suggests
a sort of ἀκόλασία θυμοῦ (καθ' ὁμοιότητα
of course) leading to ὕβρις.

τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων, above 1150 a,
19. τὸ μὲν, i.e. τὸ φεύγειν τὰς (μετρίας)

λύπας διὰ προαίρεσιν, ὁ δὲ, i.e. ὁ διώκων
τὰς (ὑπερβάλλουσας) ἡδονὰς διὰ προαί-
ρεσιν.

μαλακίας εἶδος. It is not μαλακία
ἀπλῶς, for that is not διὰ προαίρεσιν,
as we shall see. Strictly it is μαλακία
καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

§ 4. ἀντίκειται δὲ κ.τ.λ. To
understand this section we must bear
in mind that the ἐγκρατής and ἀκρατής
are *περὶ ἡδονάς* while the καρτερικός
and the μαλακός are *περὶ λύπας*. It
has been said that there is no value in
the distinction drawn here between
the καρτερικός and the μαλακός, since
to conquer pleasure (κρατεῖν, νικᾶν)
is the same thing as to bear up against
pain (ἀντέχειν, μὴ ἡττάσθαι). But
this criticism assumes that the pain
which the καρτερικός bears up against is
identical with the pain of ἐπιθυμία felt
by the ἐγκρατής, and there is nothing
to justify any such assumption. It is
true that the pain felt by the ἀκόλαστος
and the ἀκρατής is simply caused by
the absence of the pleasure which
they desire (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή
1118 b, 32), and we could not draw
any valid distinction between the vic-
tory over pleasure and the resistance

25 ἂν ἡδὺν ἢ οὐτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

VIII. Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ με-
30 ταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μετα-
μελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνιάτος ὁ δ' ἱατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθη-
ρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία
τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς
35 πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κα-
κίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.
1151^a αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον²
ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττωνος γὰρ πάθους
ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ

Probl. 965 a, 11 διὰ τί αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὐθεὶς γαργαλίζει; ἢ ὅτι καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἦττον ἂν προαίσθηται, μᾶλλον δ' ἂν μὴ ὁρᾷ; ὥσθ' ἥκιστα γαργαλισθήσεται ὅταν μὴ λανθάνῃ τοῦτο πάσχω. The προπετεῖς are like those who are tickled unawares; if they had known the πάθος was coming it would not have affected them.

μελαγχολικοί, 'excitable,' 'hot-headed.' According to early medical theory excitability of this kind was produced by the heating of the 'black bile.' The word μελαγχολᾶν was quite common in the sense of 'to be crazy' (cf. Aristophanes, Birds 14, Plautus 12, 366, 903). Aristotle uses it in the popular sense. The theory of the 'four temperaments,' which makes its appearance first in Galen, in time gave the word a different meaning. Here it corresponds to the 'choleric' and 'sanguine' as opposed to the 'bilious' and 'phlegmatic.' We may gather the explanation of the προπετεία of μελαγχολικοί from de Memor. 453 a, 19 τούτους γὰρ φαντάσματα κινεῖ μάλιστα. Now-a-days we say

'nervous,' but Aristotle had never heard of nerves.

VIII. § 1. Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ. We now pass from the first question περὶ ποῖα ὁ ἀκρατής; to the second question πῶς ἔχων (1115 a, 5 n.). If we take this as the subject of the present chapter, it will be found that the connexion of thought is sufficiently clear.

ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, 1150 a, 21.

ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, 1146 a, 31 sqq. λανθάνει, sc. τὸν ἔχοντα.

§ 2. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, sc. τῶν ἀκρατῶν, to be supplied from ἀκρασία. The connexion is quite straightforward; for the subject of the chapter is πῶς ἔχων ἀκρατεύεται τις.

οἱ ἐκστατικοί, i.e. οἱ προπετεῖς, οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1145 b, 11 n.

οἱ...μὴ ἐμμένοντες, i.e. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς. ἡττῶνται, sc. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς.

ὅμοιος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The ἀσθενής, then, possesses the characteristics of the ἀκρατής in the most distinct form and is the typical ἀκρατής. The προπετής is not the ἀκρατής we are studying just now.

ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ 5 ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως). τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοίον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους "Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ 10 ἀξύνετοι," καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικοῦσι δέ. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεισθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὐ·

1151 a, 11. Cf. EE. 1227 b, 12. τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων, λέγωμεν πότερον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισι, τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. λεκτέον δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν παρέχειν ἢ ἀρετῇ, τοῦτο αἰτιον. ἢ μὲν <γὰρ> ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν δ' ἢ ἐγκράτεια. λέγομεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες. ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον. πότερον δ' ἢ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὔτε γὰρ ἱατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή, οὔτε ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ μή. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τότε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν

§ 3. ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως, cf. κακία πως 1149 b, 20. By πῇ we must understand ἡ πρακτικὴ τῶν κακῶν. ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου. Bergk-Crusius p. 47.— Καὶ τότε Δημοδόκου· Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν· δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι.

§ 4. ὁ μὲν, sc. ὁ ἀκρατής. διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. It is his ἦθος that makes them his φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.

ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν, 'it is, on the contrary, the former that—.' The corrective particles μὲν οὖν mark this as the direct answer to the ἀπορία.

15 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ

νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἢ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτή. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἶη τὸ τέλος ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα. ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τίνος καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἕνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως [οὔ] ἢ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πράττει ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ δὴ τις, ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὃν πράττει μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπρακεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά, τοῦναντίον ποιεῖ, δηλὸν ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγεται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκούσια.

1151 a, 17. EE. 1227 a, 8 περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλευέται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις.

We have only to change the acts of the ἀκρατής and not his character. Therefore he can be cured.

ὥσπερ...αἱ ὑποθέσεις, sc. ἀρχαί. The second interpretation suggested by Professor Stewart, though with some doubt, seems to be certainly right. An ὑπόθεσις in mathematics is certainly the assumption of the thing to be proved or the thing to be done from which an analytical proof starts. Cf. 1112 b, 20 ἀναλύειν... ὥσπερ διάγραμμα and the note there. It should be added that Eudemos (loc. cit.) certainly took the words in

this sense; for he gives as an example εἰ ἐστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰ, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. We have seen already that in the phrase τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπεῖν (1144 a, 24) and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον (1139 b, 23 n.) the ὑπόθεσις is the Q. E. F. of the problem, which has to be analysed till we come to a construction which is in our power. Similarly in a theorem the ὑπόθεσις is the Q. E. D. assumed as true and analysed till we come either to something already demonstrated or to an axiom, or to something contradictory of these ("absurd"), in

ἡ ἔθιστή τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σὺφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ
 5 τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκ- 20
 στατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν
 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦ-
 τον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδο-
 νὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων <ὦν> τοῦ
 ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἀπλῶς· σφύζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, 25
 ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς
 διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. φανερόν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία
 ἔξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

IX. Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ
 ὁποιοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατής δὲ 30
 ὁ ὁποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ
 τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ
 ἡπορήθη πρότερον; ἡ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιοῦν,

which case the contradictory of the hypothesis is proved. This method was first formulated by Plato (Cantor, *Vorlesungen* I p. 189 sq.).

οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Professor Stewart thinks this sentence "may be thought to point the other way," i.e. to favour the interpretation of *ὑπόθεσις* as equivalent to definitions and axioms. But the word *ἀρχή*, 'starting point,' is wide enough to cover the hypothesis of an analytical proof (cf. last note), and such an hypothesis is not based upon any 'ground' (*λόγος*). The figures into which the *διάγραμμα* has to be analysed are given by mathematical intuition (cf. 1142 a, 28 n.).

ἀρετὴ ἡ φυσικὴ ἢ ἔθιστή, grammar requires us to supply *διδασκαλική ἐστι*, but nothing more is really meant than *κυρὰ ἐστίν*. There is nothing unusual in a zeugma like this, and the sentence does not force us to believe that *ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ* is able *διδάσκειν*. As to *φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ* cf. 1144 b, 1 sqq. People are born with a tendency to aim at the right end, the right *ἀρχή*

naturally presents itself to them, but *ἐθισμός* is required to fix *ὁρεξι* in a certain *ἦθος*.

§ 5. ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι...δεῖν. This sums up admirably Aristotle's teaching as to the relation between *ἦθος* and *διάνοια*. It is *ἦθος* (τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι) that makes pleasure the *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* of the *ἀκόλαστος*. Then *διάνοια* formulates this as a *λόγος ἐνεκά τινος, δεῖν τούτου ἐνεκα πάντα πράττειν* (cf. 1140 b, 18).

IX. § 1. Πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. The λύσις of the *ἀπορία* raised 1146 a, 16 sqq.

τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ κ.τ.λ. I have followed Bywater in adopting the reading of L^b. For another view, see Stewart's note.

κατὰ...συμβεβηκός. The *ἐγκρατής* may abide by a *λόγος* which as a matter of fact is false (*ὧ συμβαίνει ψευδεῖ εἶναι*), but only because he thinks it true. He abides by something which happens to be untrue, but only because he thinks it leads to something which he is seeking *καθ' αὐτό*.

καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
 35 ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ
 1151^b αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται,
 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ
 καθ' αὐτό. ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει
 ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ [ὁ] τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ 2
 5 ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον
 δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἱ ὅμοιον μὲν τι ἔχουσι
 τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς
 τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ
 πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει [ὁ ἐγκρατής], ἐπεὶ
 10 εὐπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· οἱ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ
 λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες 3
 καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι'
 ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μετα-
 15 πείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ᾗ ὥσπερ
 ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ εὐόκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγ-
 κρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐδ' 4

εἰ γάρ τις κ.τ.λ. Suppose, for instance, that a man thinks he ought to work a certain number of hours every day, which is really too much for him, are we to call him ἐγκρατής for sticking to his resolution though the λόγος is false? The answer is in the affirmative; for the number of hours he works is merely a means to an end, and it is really the true λόγος of the end that he abides by καθ' αὐτό.

§ 2. ἰσχυρογνώμονας. The word does not occur in earlier literature.

ἐπεὶ εὐπειστος κ.τ.λ. You may change the views of the ἐγκρατής, on occasion, by argument; it is desire that he cannot be changed by. On the contrary, it is just argument that has no effect on the obstinate; to desires and pleasures they are much more susceptible.

§ 3. ἰδιογνώμονες. Cf. Phrynichos

(com.) Μονότροπος fr. 1, Ζῷ δὲ Τίμωνι βίον | ἀγέλαστον, ἀδιάλεκτον, ἰδιογνώμονα.

οἱ ἄγροικοι. Cf. Rhet. 1395 a, 6 οἱ γὰρ ἄγροικοι μάλιστα γνωμοτόποι καὶ βραδίως ἀποφαίνονται.

ἄκυρα... ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα. Cf. e.g. Dem. c. Aristocr. § 92 ἀκέρῃ ἐστι τὸ ψήφισμα· προβούλευμα γὰρ ἐστίν, ὁ νόμος δ' ἐπέτεια κελεύει τὰ τῇ βουλῇ εἶναι ψηφίσματα. In Attic law ἄκυρος means "null and void."

ὥστε μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Obstinance is rather a form of ἀκρασία than of ἐγκράτεια, for the obstinate are those who cannot resist the desire for the pleasure of victory.

§ 4. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες κ.τ.λ. We have seen that there are cases of τὸ ἐμμένειν which are not ἐγκράτεια, we now see that there are cases of τὸ μὴ ἐμμένειν which are not ἀκρασία.

ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκλήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεο-
πτόλεμος· καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὴν· τὸ
γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσ- 20
σέως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων οὐτ'
ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὐτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.

- 5 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σω-
ματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ [τοιοῦτος]
τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρα- 25
τὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ
τὸ ἦττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον με-
ταβάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέ-
ρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνου-
ται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι 30
φανερὰν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον
6 εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ
καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ
σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὃ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατής
οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς 35
ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων 1152^a
φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἡδесθαι
παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἡδесθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες,
ἀμφοτέροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ 5
οἷόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἷόμενος. X. οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ

καίτοι δι' ἡδονήν. We know al-
ready that to the good man αἱ καλὰ
πράξεις are ἡδεῖαι καθ' αὐτάς (1099 a,
7 sqq.); we shall see presently in what
sense the good man may be said to
act δι' ἡδονήν.

§ 5. ὁ [τοιοῦτος] τούτου. On the
reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 57.
The discussion of the question πῶς
ἔχων; ends as usual with an exami-
nation of the relation between the
mean and the extremes (πῶς ἀντι-
κεινται;) Cf. 1108 b, 11 n.

διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι... διὰ τὸ ἦττόν τι,
sc. τοῦ δέοντος τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν.

This new type of character is the man
who knows that he ought to take more
bodily pleasures, but whose desires
are not strong enough. Of course
οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον is the regular Attic
idiom for δι' οὐδέτερον.

διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν κ.τ.λ. For this
αἰτία, cf. 1109 a, 10 n.

§ 6. ἠκολούθηκεν, 'it is a natural
consequence that we speak of the
ἐγκράτεια of the σώφρων.' This is the
λύσις of the ἀπορία raised by the fact
that some use the terms συγκεχυμένως
(1145 b, 16).

X. § 1. οὐδ' ἅμα κ.τ.λ. The

ἀκρατῇ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὦν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον² φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός
 10 —τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῇ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναι τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν—οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεω-
 15 ρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὐ· ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλευέσθαι, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. καὶ
 20 ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἢ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρήται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἡ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένη.⁴
 25 ἔστι δ' ἀκрасία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν

λύσις of the ἀπορία caused by some people using the word φρόνιμος of the ἀκρατὴς (1145 a, 17).

δέδεικται, 1144 b, 30.

§ 2. τῷ πρακτικός, sc. εἶναι.

τὸν δὲ δεινὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 a, 23 sqq. This is one of Aristotle's long parentheses. And yet the parenthesis contains the λύσις.

κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον, 'in definition.' The difference is that the one is a mere δύναμις, while the other implies προαίρεσις. If we define the φρόνιμος in the same way as the δεινός, we lay ourselves open to the ἐνστασις, εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ ἀρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἔθηκεν (Top. 126 b, 4). For δύναμις and προαίρεσις cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

§ 3. οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ., closely with ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός above.

ἐκὼν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has already refused to allow that τὰ δι' ἐπι-

θυμῶν are ἀκούσια.

ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής. Difficulties have been made about this, but really there is none; for προαίρεσις does not mean only an isolated act of choice, but is often used in the sense of ἐξῆς προαιρετική. Now, in this sense, the προαίρεσις of the ἀκρατὴς is good; but it is prevented from becoming an efficient cause of action by the fact that ἐπιθυμία is for the time stronger than βούλησις.

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος. Cf. 1135 b, 20.

ὁ μὲν γάρ, sc. ὁ ἀσθενής, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός, i.e. ὁ προπετής.

χρήται δὲ οὐδέν. This is a standing complaint in the comic poets and Demosthenes. Cf. 1141 b, 27 n.

Ἀναξανδρίδης, fr. incert. 16.

§ 4. τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως, cf. 1118 b, 23 n.

πολλῶν ἔξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἦττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν ἦν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμού ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος 30 χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐήνος λέγει

φήμι πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

5 τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἔξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλ- 35 λήλας, εἴρηται.

XI. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολι- 1152^b τικὴν φιλοσοφούντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς 2 λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ 5 λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλείστοι

τῶν φυσικῶν, i.e. τῶν φύσει, which Ramsauer reads.

τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, cf. de Mem. 452 a, 27 ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἦδη τὸ ἔθος ('habit is a second nature').

Εὐήνος. Cf. Bergk-Crusius p. 134.

XI. § 1. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ. That Eudemos regarded a discussion of pleasure as a necessary supplement to the discussion of ἀκρασία is proved by EE. 1231 b, 2 ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. From this it has been inferred that the present book is 'Eudemian,' but it may also be inferred that Eudemos followed Aristotle's order of treatment. And the latter inference is far more probable; for, as we shall see, the views criticised are distinctly those of Speusippus, which must have lost some of their 'actuality' by the time of Eudemos. The connexion of thought I take to be this: We have found that ἀκρασία

and ἀκολασία are bad, and that they are due to desire for pleasure. Are we to say, then, that pleasure is bad?

τοῦ...φιλοσοφούντος. The discussion opens, however, with a general statement that the political philosopher must consider pleasure and pain. This is quite in Aristotle's way. He is always anxious to show that he is keeping in view the practical end of this ἀκρασία, and discussions which are necessary for other reasons are introduced by a series of remarks as to their practical bearing on statesmanship. A notable instance is the beginning of Book III (where see notes).

ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς. If we say a thing is 'good' *simpliciter*, we mean good in relation to the chief end. If we mean 'good' for anything else, we must 'add' what it is good for. It is then ἀγαθὸν κατὰ πρόσθεσιν.

§ 2. ἔθεμεν, 1104 b, 8 sqq.

μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὀνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι 3 ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι 10 ταύτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔναι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν 4 οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή,

ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, ὅσον ὡς ἂν εἴποις μάλα χαίροντα (Asp. 142, 7). It is quite possible that Aristotle had this etymology in his mind; for it is quite in his style (cf. 1132 a, 32, 1140 b, 11, Bon. Ind. s.v. Etymologica).

§ 3. τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not the Cynic view, as is commonly said. In spite of his catchword *μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν* (RP. 217 A), Antisthenes said *ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τούτῳ πόνους διωκτέον ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων*, and *τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον* (Athen. 513). He would therefore admit that *ἡδονή* might be incidentally good. It was Speusippus who first held pleasure and pain to be two evils opposed to each other and to the good (1108 b, 13 n.). Aulus Gellius ix, 5 'Speusippus vetusque omnis academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese.'

τοῖς δ' ἔναι κ.τ.λ. This second *ἐνδοξον* seems to be meant for that of Plato in the *Philebos*, where 'pure' or 'unmixed' pleasures (i.e. pleasures not implying pain) are distinguished from 'mixed' or 'impure' pleasures.

εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι κ.τ.λ. This is the conclusion to which Aristotle himself comes in Book X, and is in agreement with the conclusion of the *Philebos*. Cf. 1172 b, 28 sqq.

§ 4. ὅλως μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Six arguments (each introduced as usual by ἔτι) for the *first* view, that no pleasure is good. The arguments

cannot be those of Antisthenes; for they are Platonic in character and presuppose the *Philebos*. On the other hand they are not the arguments of the *Philebos* itself. Therefore they must be the arguments of a follower of Plato.

γένεσις...εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή. 'a felt process to a normal state.' Fritzsche's conjecture ('rationem habet alius philosophi, Platonis asseclae cuiusdam (Speusippi?), qui erat hostis voluptatum et non solum res, sed verba etiam multa a Platonis *Philebo* in sua scripta transtulerat') evidently hits the mark. So too Grant: "In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings, of Speusippus are here referred to." Plato did not regard all pleasures as *γενέσεις*, but only the 'impure' or 'mixed.' On the other hand the definition is evidently based on the *πληρώσεις αἰσθητά* of *Phileb.* 51 b. We find the definition given as sufficient for rhetorical purposes in *Rhet.* 1369 b, 33 *ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν*. So too *Probl.* 878 b, 11 *ἢ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδὴ ἐστίν, ἐὰν ᾖ αἰσθητή*.

εἰς φύσιν. The use of *φύσις* in the sense of 'normal state' also points to Speusippus. Cf. *Clem. Strom.* ii, 21 (RP. 288 A) *Σπεύσιππος...τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἔξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν...ἣς δὴ καταστάσεως ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους ὀρεξιν ἔχειν*.

οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενῆς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος 15 τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαι τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία 5 καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπονδαίας, 20 ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχυραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραί·

οὐδεμία γένεσις συγγενῆς κ.τ.λ. This argument is taken from Plato with just such modifications of terminology as we should expect from Speusippos. Cf. Phileb. 53 c ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὥς αἰ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς;... 54 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, ἔπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἐνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται ἄν... τὸ γε μὴν οὐ ἐνεκά τὸ ἐνεκά του γιγνόμενον αἰ γίγνεται ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ (i.e. γένει) ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἐνεκά γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὧς ἀριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

οἷον κ.τ.λ. Cf. the illustration in Phileb. 54 b πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἐνεκά φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἐνεκά ναυπηγίας;

ἔτι ὁ σώφρων κ.τ.λ. That Speusippos used this argument has already been shown to be highly probable (1104 b, 24 n.), and, if he did, the necessity for discussing his view of pleasure at the present stage becomes apparent.

ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος κ.τ.λ. Cf. Clem. Strom. (loc. cit.) Σπεύσιππος φησι... στοχάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας, [Plat.] Def. 412 c ἀλυπία ἐξὶ καθ' ἣν ἀνέμπτωτοί ἐσμεν εἰς λύπας.

ἔτι ἐμπόδιον κ.τ.λ. This really comes from Plato, Phd. 65 a τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ; κ.τ.λ. 66 c (just after ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν.) ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδῶλων

παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπύπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. The similarity of language is too striking to be accidental, and yet in the Phaedo it is not specially pleasure that is ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν, but the body. The natural inference is that a follower of Plato made use of the Phaedo in drawing an indictment against pleasure.

ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. This is just as clearly based on the Gorgias 462 b sqq., where rhetoric and other arts which aim at τὸ ἡδύ instead of τὸ βέλτιστον are declared not to be arts, but merely ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή... χάριτος τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας. Here again a Platonic argument, which has a different purpose in Plato, is used as part of an indictment against pleasure.

ἔτι παιδία κ.τ.λ. Here again we may compare Gorgias 464 d ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παῖσι διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιῶν τε καὶ ἱατρῶν... πότερος ἐπατεῖ περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἱατρός ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἱατρὸν. The general impression, then, which we get from these six arguments is that they are Platonic materials worked up into an indictment against pleasure, and some of the arguments seem safely attributable to Speusippos.

§ 5. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας κ.τ.λ. An argument for the *second* ἐνδοξον.

νοσώδη γὰρ ἓνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταύτ' ἐστίν.

- 25 XII. "Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι
30 τινί δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἶρεται τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον αἶρεται, <ἀπλῶς> δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἔνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἔξις,² κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν ἡδεῖαι

ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον κ.τ.λ. An argument for the *third* *ἐνδοξον*. These two are dismissed shortly; for they do not immediately concern us at present. Our task now is to examine the thesis that all pleasure is bad *per se*.

XII. § 1. "Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. We have now three *ἐνστάσεις* to the *first* argument, οὐδεμία γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσι. As usual, the first two are mainly dialectical, but lead up to the third, which is the real λόσις.

μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον. This is added for dialectical purposes. If the argument fails even to disprove that pleasure is the best, it fails *a priori* to disprove that it is good. This point is taken up 1153 b, 7 sqq., and is the real reason why the *third* *ἐνδοξον* is mentioned at all.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. The position that no pleasure is good because it is a γένεσις and not a τέλος is first attacked by the *τόπος* of τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον. The word 'good' is ambiguous and therefore, even if we are justified in saying 'no pleasure is good' in one sense of the word, we may be wrong if we take the other sense of it. It may be true that no

pleasure is ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, but it does not follow that no pleasure is ἀγαθόν τινί, and even pleasures which are not ἀγαθόν τινί may possibly be ἀγαθόν ποτε.

ἀκολουθήσουσιν, 'it will follow that they also are called good in an ambiguous sense.' If a term is ambiguous, it will be predicated ambiguously of every subject. 'Good' is ambiguous, so therefore will 'good ἔξις' and 'good γένεσις' be.

αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί κ.τ.λ. This is a different point. Certain γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθηταί which are obviously not good are not pleasures at all, though τῷδε (τῷ κάμνοντι) and ποτὲ (ἐν ταῖς νόσοις) they appear to be so.

§ 2. ἔτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. This argument is not so dialectical as the last. It depends upon the view of the good as an ἐνέργεια as opposed to the definition of it by the Academy as a ἔξις (cf. 1098 a, 6 n.). Besides the form of κίνησις which is merely γένεσις (κίνησις εἰς οὐσίαν), there is another, namely ἐνέργεια, which implies that the ἔξις is complete.

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κ.τ.λ. The pleasures which Speusippos takes as typical are only pleasant *per accidens*.

εἰσιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου 35
 ἕξως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν
 ἡδοναί, οἷον ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν [ἐνέργεια], τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς 1153^a
 οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρου-
 μένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας
 μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέεσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις·
 καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ 5
 οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλ-
 3 ληλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. ἔτι οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασι
 τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέ-
 σεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμ- 10
 βαίνουνσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι,
 ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ

αἱ καθιστᾶσαι. This term was used by Speusippos (Clem. Strom. loc. cit. ἥ δὲ καταστάσεως... ὁρεῖν εἶναι) and he took it from Plato, cf. Phileb. 42 d εἰς δὲ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῇται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀποδεξιμέθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξως καὶ φύσεως (i.e. φυσικῆς ἕξως), 'the normal state which remains unimpaired.' The best commentary is the phrase τοῦ ὑπομένου ὀγιού 1154 b, 18. The desires which are gratified by the pleasure of restoration to a normal state are the desires of so much of us as has remained normal.

ἐπεὶ καί, 'for that matter,' 'for the matter of that.' We shall see that there are pleasures which are independent of desire and do not therefore imply pain or a disturbance of the normal state.

ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, sc. ἡδονή. K^b has ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργεια and L^b αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι. But Aspasios says οἷον αἱ θεωρητικαί (sc. ἡδοναί).

§ 3. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ. The third and decisive ἐνστάσις. We must substitute ἐνέργεια for κίνησις. We

need not discuss whether this is or is not 'inconsistent' with Book X, where the ἡδονή is distinguished from the ἐνέργεια which it accompanies. Aristotle is dealing here with the argument of Speusippos, and he only modifies his statement so far as is necessary for his immediate purpose.

ἕτερόν τι... βέλτιον, sc. τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν.

τὸ τέλος, sc. βέλτιον εἶναι.

οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, e.g. αἱ θεωρητικαί. Aristotle does not deny that some pleasures are accompanied by a γένεσις, though he does deny that any pleasure is a γένεσις.

χρωμένων, sc. ἡμῶν. We have seen that χρήσις (opp. ἔξις) is equivalent to ἐνέργεια (cf. 1098 b, 32 n.), and that it was an Academic term.

τῶν... ἀγομένων, i.e. τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν ἀγομένων, 'the pleasures of those who are being led etc.'

τὴν τελέωσιν... τῆς φύσεως. Here again we have the terminology of Speusippos. Cf. Clem. Strom. (loc. cit.) ἔξις τελεία ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι.

οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν,
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως,
 15 ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τισιν
 εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἶονται
 εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἐνια 4
 ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἐνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν.
 ταύτῃ οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο,
 20 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἐμποδίζει 5
 δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἡδονῇ, ἀλλ'

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον. The reasons for altering the genus in the definition of Speusippos have been given in full. We expect, of course, that this will involve a change in the differentia; for there is no reason to suppose that the differentia of the genus ἐνέργεια will be the same as those of the genus γένεσις. No reason, however, is given for the choice of the particular differentia ἀνεμπόδιστος. The word only occurs elsewhere in Pol. 1295 a, 35 εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. Now, as Stewart points out, ἀνεμπόδιστον there is equivalent to τέλειον, and τέλεια and ἀτελής are often used as differentiae of ἐνέργεια. This must have been in Aristotle's mind, but the full meaning of the τελείωσις of an ἐνέργεια is not worked out till Book X.

δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show what a very ambiguous thing the γένεσις argument is. Some, and (if Grant is right in thinking the Cyrenaics are meant) just the very thinkers from whom Plato took the view that ἡδονή is a γένεσις, had asserted it to be a γένεσις just because it was good. The reference of this to the Cyrenaics seems to me certain (cf. also Zeller, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 1, 176). It is in Plato's ironical way to take his argument against pleasure from the hedonist Aristippos, and it is characteristic of Aristotle to insist on the

equivocal nature of the argument. According to the Cyrenaics the good was to be found only in the feeling of the moment, and feeling is motion rising into consciousness (κίνησις εἰς αἰσθησιν ἀναδιδομένη). Since, then, pleasure is the good it must be a κίνησις. But pain is also a κίνησις, so pleasure must be what the Cyrenaics called the λεῖα κίνησις and compared τῷ λεῖω κύματι, τῷ οὐρίῳ ἀνέμῳ. This Plato interprets as κίνησις εἰς φύσιν or κίνησις εἰς οὐσίαν, by the help of the (Megarian) distinction between γένεσις and οὐσία. It is therefore quite correct to say that the Cyrenaics held pleasure to be a γένεσις just because it was the good. Aristotle points out that what they were trying to express was that it is an ἐνέργεια. It is worth noting that Speusippos had written against Aristippos. Cf. D. L. iv, 4 καταλείπει δὲ πάνμπλεστα ὑπομνήματα καὶ διαλόγους πλεονας, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀριστιππον τὸν Κυρηναῖον.

§ 4. τὸ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. The answer to the fourth argument, preceded by a remark of even wider application.

τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'is the same as (to say that wholesome things are bad) because (ὅτι) some wholesome things stand in the way of making money.'

κατὰ γε τοῦτο, 'this does not prove them bad in themselves.'

§ 5. φρονήσα... ἕξει. These words are of course used in the sense given

τριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μαθάνειν μᾶλλον
 ἴσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μαθάνειν. τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι
 δονήν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλ-
 ργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· 25
 καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδο-
 μι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον
 τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὰ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώ-
 αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ
 καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας 30
 θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἄλυπIAN
 μος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωμα-
 τισαῖται γὰρ αὐταί, καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ'
 τόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας,
 ἢ ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρωνος. XIII. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ 1153^b
 κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς
 ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστικὴ. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον

y the Academy. Writing in
 person Aristotle would have
 ἡ σοφία... ἐνέργεια.

τὸ δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ. The
 o the *fifth* argument. No
 ces an *ἐνέργεια* but only a
 The art of medicine makes
 le to heal, but it does not
 e act of healing. For that
 also is required. Cf. MM.
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλη ἐπιστήμη
 ἢ χρῆσιν παραδίδωσιν ἀλλὰ
 For the relation of *δύναμις*
 sis in art, cf. 1127 b, 14 n.
 (yourite *τόπος* in dialectical
 s, which this is shown to be
 rds εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν (cf.
 n.).

κ.τ.λ. Aristotle too remem-
 assage in the *Gorgias*. Cf.
 3 n.

τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα κ.τ.λ.
 ai raised by the *second, third*
 arguments are all solved by
 ὁμοίαι, namely our distinction
 pleasures good in themselves

and pleasures which are not so. It is
 the excess of the latter alone to which
 the statements in question really
 apply.

εἴρηται, above 1148 a, 22 sq.

XIII. § 1. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. The
 main position of Speusippus is now
 attacked from the *τόπος* of τὸ ἐναντίον.
 The position is thus stated in Aulus
 Gellius ix, 5 'Speusippus...voluptatem
 et dolorem duo mala esse...opposita
 inter sese, bonum autem esse quod
 utriusque medium foret.' It is ad-
 mitted, then, that pain is an evil.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. All pain
 is ἀπλῶς κακόν, though some pain may
 be ἀγαθόν τι, e.g. the pain of a
 surgical operation. Even that, how-
 ever, though incidentally good, is bad
 τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστικὴ (sc. εἶναι), i.e. κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός.

τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ κ.τ.λ. The argument
 is based on the rule given in Top.
 123 b, 5 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι
 ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει, ἅπτερ ἢ ἐναντίον
 τι τῷ γένει. Now κακόν is a genus,

ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν
5 ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ
λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ
γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

Τᾶριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἐνταῦθα
φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων

and it has a genus opposite to it, namely ἀγαθόν (see next note), therefore the opposite of every κακόν τι will be ἀγαθόν τι.

ἢ φευκτόν τι κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to add this; for of course both pleasure and pain are opposite to ἀλυσία as στέρησις and ἔξις (see next note), but that means merely that ἢ πάθη they are opposed to ἀπάθεια.

ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν κ.τ.λ. This λύσις, though without the name of Speusippos, is more fully stated in Book X (1173 a, 6 sqq.).

ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον κ.τ.λ. This illustration is inapplicable because τὸ μείζον, τὸ ἴσον and τὸ ἐλάττω are not instances of ἐναντία in the strict sense. They are not contraries, but 'relative opposites' (ἀντικείμενα ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι), i.e. αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων λέγεται (Cat. 6 a, 36). Thus τὸ μείζον is μείζον τοῦ ἐλάττωτος and τὸ ἐλάττω is ἐλάττω τοῦ μείζοντος, and it is only in that sense that they are opposites. The opposition of the greater or less to the equal is of another kind still. Together they make up τὸ ἀνισόν and are opposed as ἔξις and στέρησις (on the whole subject, see Met. x, 5). It is in this way that badness is opposed to badness and also to goodness (cf. 1108b, 11 n.); but pointing to cases like this does not get us out of the difficulty; for they do not show that the same thing can have more than one opposite κατὰ ταῦτόν, i.e. ἢ φευκτόν τι ἢ κακόν as in the present case.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη κ.τ.λ. To make his λύσις complete, he would have to say that τὸ κακόν was predicated of

pleasure ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι (on ὅπερ... τι cf. 1140 a, 7 n.), i.e. that it was its genus. For pleasure cannot be in contrary opposition to the good unless it is either (1) ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, (2) ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει, (3) αὐτὸ γένος. The second possibility is alone in question here, and so unless pleasure is a species of τὸ κακόν it cannot be the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν. But Speusippos will not say this; for he would then have to say also that pain is ὅπερ ἀγαθόν τι. Further Speusippos himself gives γένεσις as the genus of pleasure, and the same species cannot be in two genera neither of which contains or is contained in the other (cf. 1140 a, 5 n.). To make κακόν the genus either of pleasure or pain would be to take the διαφορά for the γένος.

§ 2. Τᾶριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 58. This is an argument *a fortiori* and is strictly *ad hominem*. So far from the definition of ἡδονή as a γένεσις proving that it is not good, it fails even to prove that it is not the highest good. Indeed if we substitute, as we must, ἐνέργεια for γένεσις, it will be hard to resist the inference that pleasure is the highest good. We shall find Aristotle's own teaching about this in Book X. At present we are only getting rid of the idea, which the account given of ἀκρασία might suggest, that all pleasure is bad.

ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'just as there is nothing to prevent some form of knowledge being the highest good.' The Platonists say that the highest

ι. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν 10
 μαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαι-
 εῖτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἡ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην
 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονή τὸ
 ον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν,
 ς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἶονται βίον 15
 καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως·
 ἵα γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία
 τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι
 ὄν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζεται
 .. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλας 20

a kind of knowledge, though
 mit that some kinds of ἐπι-
 er bad. This is distinctly *ad*
 n; for Aristotle would not
 hat any ἐπιστήμη as such is
 As a δύναμις, it is of course
 ντίων, but the προαίρεσις must
 n into account. In itself (καθ'
 πιστήμη is always of the good
 , i n.), and only of the bad
 μβεβηκός.

δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. The
 gument. Εὐδαιμονία is some
 'unimpeded activity, all plea-
 unimpeded activity, therefore
 ia is some form of pleasure.
 rpose of this argument is to
 hat, if we substitute ἐνέργεια
 in the Academic definition of
 ia, as we must (cf. 1098 a, 5
 nd also substitute ἐνέργεια for
 in the definition of pleasure (cf.
 113 sqq.), we shall be driven to
 clusion that εὐδαιμονία is ἡδονή
 he clause εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν...εἴτε ἡ
 ἡτῶν is added to show that the
 ion is necessary even if we
 εὐδαιμονία as the ἐνέργεια of
 e ἕξις, i.e. as ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν (1098 a, 17).

χεν, 'if you like.' Cf. 1113 a,

καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. The *second*

A.

argument. Εὐδαιμονία is a τέλειος
 ἐνέργεια, τέλειος ἐνέργεια is ἀνεμπό-
 διστος ἐνέργεια, therefore εὐδαιμονία
 is ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια, i.e. ἡδονή. It
 is just for this reason that external
 goods are necessary to happiness; for
 they insure that the activity will be
 'unimpeded.'

πάντες...οἶονται. Cf. 1099 a, 7 sqq.
 ἐμπλέκουσι. This word is only
 used here in Aristotle, though συμπλέ-
 κειν is common (1119 b, 30 n.).

εὐλόγως, cf. Ind. s. v.

τῶν τελείων. Cf. 1097 a, 28 sqq.

προσδεῖται, cf. 1099 a, 15 n.

ταῦτα, accusative, 'that he may not
 be impeded in these ways.' Cf. for
 the internal accusative Ar. 'Wasps'
 333 τίς γάρ ἐσθ' ὁ ταῦτά σ' ἐργων;

§ 3. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον κ.τ.λ.
 We do not know who proposed this
 θέσις. Cicero (Tusc. v, 9) tells us
 that Theophrastos in his work *de vita*
beata (i.e. *περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*) 'multa
 disputat quamobrem is qui torquatur,
 qui crucietur, beatus esse non potest.
 in eo etiam putatur dicere *in rotam*
beatam vitam non descendere; non
 usquam id dicit omnino, sed quae
 dicit idem valent.' This probably
 went with the story of Perikles quoted
 on 1100 b, 29 n. We may reasonably
 assume that it was a Cynic paradox.

περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾗ ἀγαθός, ἢ
ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς 4
τύχης δοκεῖ τισι ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ
οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως
25 οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώ- 5
πους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημειῖον τι τοῦ εἶναι πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·

φήμη δ' οὔτις πάνπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἣν τινα λαοὶ
πολλοὶ . . .

30 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἔξις ἢ ἀρίστη οὐτ' ἔστιν 6
οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν
μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἶονται οὐδ' ἣν
ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον.
ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ
35 ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ
πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι
1154^a ταύτας μόνας οἶονται εἶναι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ 7

The τροχός is often mentioned in Aristophanes and the Orators (ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἀναβῆναι, ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ στρεβλοῦσθαι).

§ 4. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. note on ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται κ.τ.λ (1099 b, 9).

ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. On the meaning of ὅρος cf. above 1138 b, 23 n. The standard by which we determine whether τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ really constitute εὐτυχία is their relation to εὐδαιμονία.

§ 5. καὶ τὸ διώκειν κ.τ.λ. This is the argument of Eudoxos, as we shall see in Book X.

πως. Aristotle himself might allow that pleasure was τὸ ἄριστόν πως. Exactly how, we shall see in Book X.

φήμη δ' οὔτις κ.τ.λ. Hesiod, Works and Days 763. The end of the second line is φημίζουσι· θεὸς νύ τις ἐστι καὶ αὐτή. The verse expresses one of Aristotle's deepest convictions. Cf. 1098 b, 28.

§ 6. φύσις...ἔξις ἀρίστη. Observe that these are treated as equivalents, as they are in Academic terminology.

ἔχει τι θεῖον. This is a Platonic idea. Cf. Laws 950 b θεῖον δὲ τι καὶ εὐστοχον ἐνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς. Cf. also below 1173 a, 4.

τὴν...κληρονομίαν. On the metaphor here implied, cf. 1125 b, 17 n.

παραβάλλειν. This verb was originally a nautical metaphor, παραβάλλειν (sc. τὴν ναῦν) 'to heave to,' 'come alongside.' Bodily pleasures are the port for which most men steer.

§ 7. φανερόν δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The main point of this argument is as follows. It is admitted that the εὐδαιμων βίος is pleasant; but, if pleasure is not good, it is not a necessary part of εὐδαιμονία. It is also admitted that the wise man seeks ἀλνπία, i.e. that he shuns pain. But if pleasure is not good, pain is not bad, so why should he shun it?

καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα—
 γὰρ ἔνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν;—ἀλλὰ
 πηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν. οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ
 εἴπερ μὴδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ 5
 ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι

V. Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον
 ἔχουσιν ὅτι ἐνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ
 ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος, διὰ τί 10
 ἐναντία λῦται μοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον.
 ὅτι ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν
 ἡ μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔξεων καὶ κινήσεων
 ἡ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων
 , καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν 15
 ἡ, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῶ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἔστιν,

ἐνέργεια, sc. ἡ ἀνεμπόδιστος.
 ἃς are explanatory of ἡδονή.
 γὰρ...ἀγαθόν; I take these
 ; parenthetical. If pleasure
 od, what good will it be to
 y man? Then with ἐνδέχεται
 must supply τὸν εὐδαίμονα.

§ 1. Περὶ δὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. We
 w to the view that, though
 easures are good (the 'un-
 pleasures), yet most (i.e. the
 or 'necessary' pleasures) are
 2 b, 10).

οὖν κ.τ.λ., closely with
 τον (see Stewart's note).
 ho say that bodily pleasures
 simpliciter must explain the
 their opposite pains are bad.
 pleasure of eating is bad as
 w can we account for hunger
 d too?

γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. Cf.
 sqq.

ὅτι ἀγαθαὶ κ.τ.λ. Two λύσεις
 ested, (1) that the opposition
 bodily pains and bodily
 may be merely that of
 and κατάφασιν, in which

case we may call bodily pleasures
 'good' in the sense of 'not bad,' and
 (2) that bodily pleasures are *positively*
 good up to a certain point, and only
 become bad beyond that point. The
 second alternative is as usual the one
 that Aristotle adopts; but the first
 contributes an important element to
 the solution.

τῶν...ἔξεων καὶ κινήσεων. The
 terminology is Academic, but Aris-
 totle's meaning is clear. No ἔξις ἐν
 μεσότητι οὐσα can admit of excess;
 for it is something τέλειον. There
 cannot be excess, mean and defect in
 the mean itself (1107 a, 20 sqq.). From
 this it follows that no κινήσεις which
 belong to such a ἔξις, i.e. the ἐνέργειαι
 which are ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως, can admit of
 excess either. We cannot exceed
 what is good in performing e.g. just
 acts, and therefore the pleasure of
 performing just acts cannot be ex-
 cessive. We can eat too much, and
 therefore the pleasure of eating may
 be excessive.

ὁ φαῦλος τῶ διώκειν...ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.
 * It is not the pursuit of necessary

ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίαις· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις
καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ'
ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως·
20 οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ διώκοντι
τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον 3
τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν—
ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὄν
25 ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον—ὥστε λεκτέον
διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἰρετώτεραι. πρῶτον 4

pleasures that makes a bad man, but the pursuit of them in excess.'

ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης κ.τ.λ.

This important doctrine is stated very briefly here, but its real meaning comes out more and more in the sequel. The opposite of excessive bodily pleasure is not positive pain, but merely the negative pain of the absence of that excess (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή 1118 b, 32), which is not pain at all to any one else. We can now solve the difficulty about the opposition between bodily pleasure and bodily pain stated above (1154 a, 10) by the help of the two λύσεις there given. In the case of the normal man the pain which is opposite to the right amount of bodily pleasure is positively bad, and the pleasure is positively good. In the case of the bad man, the excess of positive pleasure which he seeks is positively bad, and the opposite pain which he shuns is only the negation of that pleasure and therefore not positively bad.

§ 3. Ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a slight anacolouthon in this sentence. The long parenthesis (τοῦτο γὰρ... μᾶλλον) breaks the construction, which is resumed by ὥστε λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. as if ἐπεὶ had not preceded.

οὐ μόνον δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The necessity of showing the cause of error is especially cogent for Aristotle in view

of the conviction which he has just expressed as to the value of popular opinion (so EE. 1216 b, 30 *ἔχει ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν*). Cf. Eucken, *Methode der Ar. Forschung* p. 10.

ὥστε λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. I take it that the ψῆδος of which we have to discover the αἴτιον must be the view that *all* pleasure is bad, and I think that this is borne out by the sequel. We have done for the present with the view that some pleasures are good while others are bad, and return to the main subject of discussion, namely the θέσις of Speusippos that *all* pleasure is bad. Now we have seen already that this view is only made plausible by restricting the inquiry to bodily pleasures (1152 b, 33 sqq.), and that again is only possible because most people know no other (1153 b, 33 sqq.). Therefore, in order to explain the origin of the error, we must first show what makes most people give this preeminence to bodily pleasures. Two reasons are given for this, (1) that they are *λατρεῖαι* of pain and therefore appear strong by contrast, (2) that, if the pain is excessive, the *λατρεία* has to be excessive too.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The *first* reason is simply that they remove pain, which the 'unmixed pleasures'

μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὐσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουνσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσιν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατροίαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον 30 φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις (ἡ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἡ δὲ ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δ' ἰατροίαι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουνσι τελευτούμενων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 1154^b 5 οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς 5

do not, seeing they do not imply a previous pain. The mere contrast with the opposite pain makes them appear stronger than they really are; for we estimate their strength by their distance from the opposite pain and not by their distance from the neutral state.

ἐκκρούει, cf. 1119 b, 10 n.

καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κ.τ.λ. This is the *second* reason. The first merely explains why bodily pleasures seem stronger than others; this is the reason why the excess of bodily pleasures seems good. It is because they are regarded as *ιατροίαι*, and it is the practice of some doctors to cure one excess by its opposite. Cf. Probl. 358 a, 2 ὅταν πολὺ ἐκστῇ τις... ἐνίων ἰατρῶν τοιαύτη ἡ τέχνη· ὑπερβολαῖς γὰρ ἰώνται οἶνον ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἄλης ἢ σίτου ἢ λιμοῦ. This is fallacious, as we know, but it accounts for the popular error.

ὡς οὐσης ἰατρείας, sc. τῆς ἡδονῆς.

διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον κ.τ.λ., 'from being seen in contrast with the opposite.'

καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ κ.τ.λ. We see here that the real question is how

all pleasure has come to be thought bad. It is because bodily pleasures, and bodily pleasures in excess, are commonly supposed to be the only pleasures. Now (1) *ὑπερβολαί* show a *φαῦλη φύσις* and are therefore bad altogether, while (2) *ιατροίαι* show an *ἐνδεὲς φύσις* and are therefore bad in themselves, even though they may be regarded as good κατὰ συμβεβηκός. They are *ἀγαθὰ τινα*, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ. On the reading and interpretation see Bywater, Contr. p. 56.

ἐκ γενετῆς, the case of *θηριότης*. The 'morbid' nature is here omitted.

δι' ἔθος, the case of *ἀκολασία*.

αἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Bywater loc. cit.

§ 5. ἔτι διώκονται κ.τ.λ. Another reason why bodily pleasures are supposed to be the only ones, and all pleasure is therefore supposed to be bad.

δίψας. I see no reason for taking this metaphorically. As Aspasios suggests, a thirst acquired by eating salt fish is *βλαβερά*, while one acquired by bodily exercise is *ἀβλαβής*. For 'innocuous pleasures,' cf. Plato, Rep. 357 b αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς. Pol. 1339 b, 25 ὅσα ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων.

χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρόν διὰ τὴν φύσιν.
 αἰεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρ-
 τυροῦσι, τὸ ὄραν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν·
 ἀλλ' ἡδὴ συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὥς φασιν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ 6
 10 νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ
 ἡδὺν ἢ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται αἰεὶ
 ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν
 κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσιν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ
 λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ἡ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ
 15 ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν 7
 οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὗται δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ
 μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα
 τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπο-
 μένοντος ὑγιоῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺν δοκεῖ εἶναι·
 20 φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πράξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. οὐκ 8

τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον κ.τ.λ. The neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain, though merely negative, appears to many as positive pain. Cf. 1150a, 32n.

αἰεὶ...πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον. Aspasios says ὁ γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρας ἔλεγεν αἰεὶ πονεῖν τὸ ζῶον διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, and the reference to Anaxagoras is confirmed by Theophrastos, de Sensibus § 29 (Diels, Dox. p. 507, 21) ἅπασαν δ' αἰσθησιν μετὰ λύπης ('Αναξαγόρας φησὶν). This is a very interesting anticipation of modern views as to the sub-conscious. All vital processes involve πόνος, but in a well-regulated organism this does not rise above the 'threshold of consciousness' as λύπη.

§ 6. ὁμοίως...ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι. We have seen already that μέθη arises τῶν ἄνω θερμανθέντων (cf. 1147 b, 8n.), and the 'sanguine temperament' of youth is also due to its 'hot-headedness.' Cf. Probl. 954 b, 39 τὸ δὲ θερμόν τὸ περί τὸν τόπον ψφρονοῦμεν καὶ ἐλπίζομεν ποιεῖ εὐθύμους καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθυμίαν, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολλὸς εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας.

ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι,—opposed to οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοί...αἰεὶ.

οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1150 b, 25 n.

ἐξελαύνει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aspasios quotes from the Ἡθικά of Theophrastos ἐξελαύνει ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ γε (surely τὴ) ἐναντία, ὅλον ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ διψῆν, καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, τοιούτῳ ἡτισοῦν ἂν εἴη ἰσχυρά, ὥστε ἐνίοτε πείναν ἐξελαύνει καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅταν ᾄσματος ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀκούσμασι διαφερόντως χαίρωμεν. This shows that Aristotle either wrote this passage or something uncommonly like it. Cf. Introd. § 4, n. 5.

§ 7. τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιоῦς. Cf. above 1152 b, 35 τῆς ὑπολοίπου φύσεως καὶ ἔξεως. It is the unimpaired part that πράττει and therefore feels the pleasure; but, as the ἰατρεία is going on at the same time, we think that it is pleasant.

ἃ ποιεῖ πράξιν κ.τ.λ. Things which stimulate the activity of a given ἔξις (or φύσις) are pleasant by nature, e.g. music is naturally pleasant to a musical nature.

ἀεὶ δ' οὐθέν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναι τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὼς φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττη, τοῦτο τῇ ἐτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἀπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. 25 διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιος, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη 30 μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.

- 9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακὰ· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, 'when the two elements are equally balanced.'

διὸ ὁ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. 1072 b,

15 διαγωγὴ δὲ ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῶν.

μεταβολὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eur. Or. 234.

BOOKS VIII—IX.

FRIENDSHIP.

Introductory Note.

As usual, several good reasons are given why a discussion of *φιλία* should form part of a course on *πολιτική*, but we are left to guess why it should come between the discussion of Will and Desire and the final account of the Good for Man. That this is characteristic of the method we have seen already (cf. Book III. Introductory Note p. 108, 1152 b, 1 n.); otherwise we might be tempted to think that the proper place for the treatment of *φιλία* was just after that of *δικαιοσύνη*, with which it has so many points of contact, and it might be urged that a transposition of VI—VII and VIII—IX would have the further advantage of bringing the two discussions of Pleasure together. The hypothesis, however, is excluded by the fact that *φιλία* was taken up at the same point of the course by Eudemos. This shows that the present arrangement is not due to any accident of editing, so there must be some connexion of thought, other than that given in the text, which made this the right place for the discussion. Following a hint of Teichmüller's (*Neue Studien* III, p. 129), we may, I think, give the following account of the matter. According to Aristotle, the growth of *φιλία* keeps pace with the growth of *φρόνησις*. The lowest animals care for their young at least at the time of birth, and the higher we rise in the scale of animal *φρόνησις* (cf. 1140 a, 27 n.) the wider and more permanent does *φιλία* become, till at last in man it appears as the feeling of union with his kind upon which the family, the state, and all other human associations rest. Cf. *Gen. An.* 753 a, 7 *ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις βούλεσθαι τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἰσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ (1) τοῖς μὲν χείροσιν*

οὐτ' ἐμποιεῖ μέχρι τοῦ τεκεῖν μόνον, (2) τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελείωσιν, 3) ὅσα δὲ φρονιμώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφὴν, (4) τοῖς δὲ δὴ ἰάλιστα κοινωνοῦσι φρονήσεως καὶ πρὸς τελεωθέντα γίνεται συνήθεια αἱ φιλία, καθάπερ τοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν τετραπόδων ἐνίοις, τοῖς ὄρνισι μέχρι τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ ἐκθρέψαι· διόπερ καὶ μὴ ἐπφάζουσαι ἰθιγῆσαι ὅταν τέκωσι, διατίθενται χεῖρον ὥσπερ ἐνός τινος στερισκόμεναι τῶν συμφύτων. Here we have the different stages of φιλία clearly traced, and these stages are made to depend upon the degree of φρόνησις, or knowledge of the good for one's own kind, which is present at each. In fact φιλία is, we may say, the altruistic use of φρόνησις, a use which is its 'natural' use in spite of public opinion to the contrary (cf. 1141 b, 29 sqq.). We can see, then, how the treatment of φιλία is quite in its right place here, and we shall see later how it leads us naturally through the stages of love for the good as such, and love for our own 'best self,' to its highest manifestation, the *amor dei intellectualis*. It is, in fact, *φιλοσοφία* and φιλία alone that can bridge the gulf between φρόνησις and σοφία, the practical and the theoretic life.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον. ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας

1155 a, 3. EE. 1234 b, 18 Περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστι καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ τίς ὁ φίλος, καὶ πότερον ἢ φιλία μοναχῶς λέγεται ἢ πλεοναχῶς, καὶ

I. § 1. ἔστι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reasons given for discussing φιλία are (1) that it is καλόν, (2) that it is ἀναγκαῖον. This is the literary form of the distinction between τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν, τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα and the *conditio sine qua non*, οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὔ. The distinction between καλὰ and ἀναγκαῖαι πράξεις plays a great part in the Politics, and is derived from Plato, cf. Rep. 493 c τὰναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοὶ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακῶς εἶη μήτε ἄλλω δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. To say φιλία is an ἀρετή is equivalent to saying it is καλόν. The two points are then taken in the reverse order: (1) τὸ ἀναγκαῖον §§ 1—4, (2) τὸ καλόν § 5.

ἀρετὴ τις. There is an ἀρετή which, for want of a better name, we called φιλία, but that is not what we are going to speak of now. It was not based on feeling (πάθος) or affection (τὸ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ), and

we are now going to discuss φιλία as a feeling (cf. 1126 b, 19 sqq.). In this sense it may or may not be strictly an ἀρετή itself; it is certainly μετ' ἀρετῆς, for in its truest form it can exist, we shall see, only between the good.

ἀναγκαιότατον. The proofs that φιλία is (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖον to the good life may be reduced to three: (1) it is necessary as supplying its ὅλη and also its ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ, (2) it is necessary because it is natural, and 'nature makes nothing in vain,' (3) it rather than justice is the bond of the state, and the good life is possible only in the state.

ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων κ.τ.λ. It supplies the ὅλη (the ἐν οἷς) for good activities.

καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι κ.τ.λ. These are taken as examples because they can choose freely (cf. 1095 b, 21 n.). If we find, then, that they would not choose to live without friends to benefit, we get a strong ἐνδοξον.

κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστα εἶναι χρεῖα· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἢ γίνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθεῖ καὶ σφύζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπίσφα- 10
2 λεστέρα. ἐν πενία τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθείας, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· “σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένῳ.” καὶ γὰρ 15
3 νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι

εἰ πλεοναχῶς, πόσα ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πῶς χρηστέον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν, ἐπισκεπτέον οὐθενὸς ἦττον τῶν περὶ τὰ ἡθῆ καλῶν καὶ αἰρετῶν. τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχασθαι φίλους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἔτι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φίλῳ ἡθικῇ τις εἶναι ἕξις. καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ποιῆσαι ὥστε μὴ ἀδικεῖν, † ἀλλ' εἰς (ἐλῖς Jackson) φίλους ποιῆσαι· οἱ γὰρ ἀληθινοὶ φίλοι οὐκ ἀδικοῦσιν.

εὐετηρίας. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n.

ἢ πῶς ἂν κ.τ.λ. We pass from the ὦν οὐκ ἄνευ as ἐν οἷς, to the ὦν οὐκ ἄνευ as ποιητικά καὶ φυλακτικά.

§ 2. πρὸς θεραπείαν κ.τ.λ. This clause is obscure owing to the fact that πρὸς has to do duty twice over by a sort of brachylogy. The full construction would be πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ πρὸς βοηθείας πρὸς τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως. For the plural βοηθῆται and for βοηθεῖα πρὸς τι see Bon. Ind. 139 a, 2 sqq. The old editors took βοηθείας as gen. sing. (ob infirmitatem auxilii Zell), Bekker reads βοηθεῖ on inferior authority, Sussemihl and Bywater both restore the reading of the best mss. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii, 4, 6

ὁ ἀγαθὸς φίλος ἑαυτὸν τάττει πρὸς πᾶν τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῷ φίλῳ.

σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένῳ. The first words of the famous passage, II. x, 224—

σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένῳ, καὶ τε πρὸ δ τοῦ ἐνόησεν,
ὅπως κέρδος ἔη· μῶνος δ' εἶπερ τε νοῆσθι,
ἀλλὰ τέ οἱ βράσσων τε νόοι, λεπτή δέ τε μῆτις.

Plato also refers to this passage by its first words only (Symp. 174 d, etc.), so it was already proverbial.

§ 3. φύσει κ.τ.λ. If a thing exists φύσει, it must be ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον, for nature aims at the good and οὐδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ. The fact that the

καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμογενέσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλῳ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἢ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἢ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοῖόν τι τῇ 25 φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστα ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στήσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελεύουσιν· καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον 5 δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐὰν δίκαιοι ᾖσιν, οὐκ ἀδικήσουσιν· ἢ ταῦτόν ἄρα ἡ ἐγγὺς τι ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φιλία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν τὸν φίλον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν δεινότατον, ὅτι ὁ βίος ἅπας καὶ ἡ ἐκούσιος ὁμιλία μετὰ τούτων· μετ' οἰκεῖων γὰρ ἢ μετὰ συγγενῶν ἢ μετ' ἐταίρων συνδιμερεύομεν, ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός. καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους νενομοθέτῃται, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

hen-bird is uneasy if not allowed to sit (cf. Gen. An. quoted on p. 345) is already a sign that *philia* is a necessary condition of the good life.

τοῖς ὁμογενέσι, 'animals of the same race.' Eudemos says *ὁμογενέσι* (p. 380). Cf. Rhet. 1371 b, 12 ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδέυ, τὰ συγγενῇ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῇ καὶ ὁμοία ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἷον ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέῳ. Fritzsche quotes Theokr. ix, 31 τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, | ἱρῆες δ' ἱρῆξιν· ἐμὴν δ' ἂ μάσσα καὶ ψάδ.

ἐν ταῖς πλάναις. This is one of the few places in Aristotle where we see a sign of the coming cosmopolitanism. He was himself an *ἀπολις*.

οἰκεῖον, opp. ἀλλότριον. Cf. below 1171 a, 16 οἰκεῖος ἐντυγχάνειν.

§ 4. ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. The good life is impossible without the *πόλις*,

philia is the bond of the *πόλις*, therefore *philia* is ἀναγκαῖον.

οἱ νομοθέται, cf. 1103 a, 3 n.

ὁμόνοια. Cf. below 1167 a, 22 sqq. Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 16 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι.

τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα, sc. δίκαιον, 'justice in the fullest sense.' I do not think there is any reference to special forms of justice, either τὸ ἐπιεικές (Zwinger) or τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον (Aspasios), but simply to the general principle αἰεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (1160 a, 7).

§ 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν. For the opposition between τὸ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖον and τὸ καλόν, cf. 1120 b, 1 n. Friendship is not only a means but an end.

τοὺς φιλοφίλους. Cf. Rhet. 1381 b, 26 φιλοῦσι τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας.

οἰόμεν, ἥ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν εἶναι· 30
 τι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.
 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
 τητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους,
 'τὸν ὁμοῖον' φασιν 'ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον,' καὶ 'κολοῖον ποτὶ
 ὄν,' καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας 'κεραμεῖς' πάντας 35

55 a, 32. EE. 1235 a, 4 ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς
 ἰ, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οἱ ἐξῶθεν περιλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλεόν
 τες· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὅθεν
 α

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἀγεί θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον·

καὶ γὰρ κολοῖος παρὰ κολοῖον·

ἐγὼ δὲ φῶρ τε φῶρα, καὶ λύκος λύκον.

φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσμοῦσιν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὸ

ται. The reference is probably
 provisional result reached in
 Lysis 214 e,—a passage which,
 shall see, Aristotle had before
 a composing this part of his
 —"Ἐχομεν ἄρα ἤδη τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ
 ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οἱ
 ἀγαθοί.

Διαμφισβητεῖται κ.τ.λ. The
 το ἐνδοξα are taken from Plato's
 214 a sqq. and together form a
 ἱκανὸν πρόβλημα. The first is
 ὁμοία is of the like, cf. Lysis l.c.
 αὐτῶν δὲ (οἱ ποιεῖται)... "αἰεὶ τοι τὸν
 ἀγεί θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον" καὶ
 γινώσκον. ἢ οὐκ ἐντετύχκας
 τοῖς ἐπεσιν; Ἐγωγε, ἔφη.
 καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγ-
 γράμματα ἐντετύχκας ταῦτα αὐτὰ
 ἔστιν, ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ
 εἶναι φίλον εἶναι; εἰσὶ δὲ που
 καὶ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου
 ὁμοῖοι καὶ γράφοντες. The
 ἐνδοξον is that φιλία is of the
 cf. Lysis 215 c, ἤδη ποτὲ του
 λέγοντος... ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ
 καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολε-
 οῖοι εἶεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον

ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὡς ἄρα "καὶ
 κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ αἰδοῖ
 αἰδοῖ, | καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ κ.τ.λ.

τὸν ὁμοῖον φασιν κ.τ.λ. Od. xvii,
 218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἀγεί θεὸς ὡς τὸν
 ὁμοῖον, quoted by Plato l.c. with a
 slight verbal difference. Theophr.
 Char. xxix, καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς
 παροιμίας τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸν ὅμοιον
 πορεύεσθαι.

κολοῖον ποτὶ κολοῖον. MM. 1208 b,
 9 κολοῖος παρὰ κολοῖον ἰξάνει. Rhet.
 1371 b, 15 ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἰρηται,
 ὡς "ἡλιξ ἡλικὰ τέρπει" (cf. 1161 b, 34)
 καὶ "ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον," καὶ "ἐγὼ δὲ
 θῆρ θῆρα" καὶ "αἰεὶ κολοῖος παρὰ
 κολοῖον," καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Here
 Aristotle seems to be quoting from
 Doric source (Epicharmos?).

κεραμεῖς. From Hesiod, Works
 and Days, 25
 καὶ κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι
 τέκτων,
 καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ αἰδοῖ
 αἰδοῖ.

also quoted in the Lysis l.c. with
 verbal differences.

1155^b τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀλλήλοισι φασὶν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων "ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν" ξηρανθεῖσαν, "ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν," καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ 5 "ἀντίξουν" συμφέρον καὶ "ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην

τὸ ὅμοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, διὸ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κύν' ἔφη καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κεραμίδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλείστον ὅμοιον. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω τὸ φίλον λέγουσιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φασὶν εἶναι φίλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν πᾶσιν εἶναι φίλον, ἐπιθυμῇ δὲ οὐ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ, ἀλλ' ὑγροῦ, ὅθεν εἴρηται

ἐρᾶ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖα

καὶ τὸ

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ εἰς τοῦναντίον. τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἐχθρὸν τῷ ὁμοίῳ· καὶ γὰρ

κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει,

καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενα πολέμια ἀλλήλοισι ζῶα. αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ὑπολήψεις τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον πολέμιον,

τῷ πλέονι δ' αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται

τοῦλασσον, ἐχθρᾶς θ' ἡμέρας κατάρχεται,

ἀνώτερον, sc. 'in serie causarum' (Bon. Ind. 68 b, 47); for φυσική is ἡ ἀνω ἐπιστήμη with regard to πολιτική, just as ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία is with regard to φυσική (Met. 1005 a, 33 ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦ φυσικοῦ τις ἀνωτέρω). They take φυσικά instead of ἡθικά προτάσεις (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.). This explains the use of ἀνωθεν above 1144 a, 12.

Εὐριπίδης μὲν κ.τ.λ., fr. 898 Nauck, beginning Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὀρεῖς ὅση θεός; The lines more immediately referred to here are—

ἐρᾶ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖ', ὅτε ξηρὸν πέδον ἀκαρπὸν αἰχμῇ νοτίδος ἐνδεῶς ἔχῃ· ἐρᾶ δ' ὁ σεμνὸς οὐρανὸς πληρούμενος ὄμβρου πεσεῖν εἰς γαῖαν Ἀφροδίτης ὕπο.

καὶ Ἡράκλειτος κ.τ.λ. Cf. 'Early Greek Philosophy' pp. 158 sqq. In

the Lysis 215 e Plato quotes some sayings which are clearly of Herakleitean origin (Kratylos?) ἐπιθυμῶν γὰρ τοῦ τοιοῦτου (τοῦ ἐναντίου) ἕκαστον ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκέος, τὸ δὲ ὀξὺ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλήρες δὲ κενώσεως... τροφήν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν ἂν ἀπολαύσαι.

τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον κ.τ.λ., fr. 46 Bywater. It seems to be fairly well made out (Zeller 1, p. 657 n. 1 ed. 5) that the primary reference of this fragment was to pieces of wood used in building and supporting each other by leaning in opposite directions. The stability of the building is due to opposite strains or, as Chrysippos

ἁρμονίαν" καὶ "πάντα κατ' ἔριν" γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ
τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου
7 ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ
γὰρ οἰκεία τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ
καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον 10
πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷον τε μοχθηροὺς
ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν

ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ δὲ φιλία δοκεῖ
συνάγειν· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ
ποιήσαντι

ὥς ἕρις ἐκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶα ἄνευ
θῆλειος καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων.

1155 b, 8. EE. 1235 a, 29 δύο μὲν αὐται δόξαι περὶ φιλίας
εἰσὶ, λίαν τε καθόλου <καὶ> κεχωρισμέναι τοσούτον· ἄλλαι δὲ ἤδη
ἐγγυτέρω καὶ οἰκείαι τῶν φαινομένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι
δοκεῖ τοὺς φαίλους εἶναι φίλους, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· τοῖς δ'
ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ φιλοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες τὰ τέκνα (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
θηρίοις ἐνοῦσα φιλία· προαποθνήσκων γούνη αἰρούνται τῶν τέκνων)·
τοῖς δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι μόνον. σημειῶν δ' ὅτι καὶ
διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἀποβάλλουσιν·
ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς
ὄνυχας παραβάλλον, καὶ τὰ μόρια ὅτι ῥίπτουμιν τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος

puts it (ap. Aul. Gell. vii, 1, 2)
'opposita inter se et quasi mutuo
adverso quaeque fulta nixu consistere.'
But in any case the point lies in the
pun 'The hostile is good for us,'
'what disagrees with us agrees with
us.'

ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων κ.τ.λ. This is
the παλίντονος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τῶρου
καὶ λύρης (fr. 46, 56) on which see
'Early Greek Philosophy' pp. 158,
159. Cf. fr. 48 ἁρμονίη ἀφανῆς φανε-
ρῆς κρέσσω.

πάντα κατ' ἔριν. Cf. fr. 44 πόλεμος
πάντων μὲν πατήρ κ.τ.λ., and especially
fr. 43 quoted in EE. 1235 a, 26 (above).
Early Greek Philosophy p. 162.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. For the meaning of
his doctrine of "like to like," cf.
Early Greek Philosophy, p. 245 sqq.

§ 7. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. These
φυσικαὶ προτάσεις are not relevant to
the present enquiry; we shall confine
ourselves to ἀπορίαι raised by ἡθικαὶ
προτάσεις.

οἷον πότερον κ.τ.λ. This also
comes from Lysis 214 d τοῦτο τοῖνυν
αἰνίττονται, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὧ ἐταῖρε,
οἱ τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες,
ὥς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ
φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὐτ' ἀγαθῷ οὐτε
κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρ-
χεται.

πότερον ἐν εἶδος κ.τ.λ. We shall

ἡ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἴομενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπιστεύκασι σημεῖω· δέχεται γὰρ

τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ· ἄχρηστος γὰρ ὁ νεκρός. οἷς δὲ χρήσιμον, φυλάττουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα δοκεῖ μὲν ὑπενατία ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. τό τε γὰρ <ὁμοιον> ἄχρηστον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ ἐνατιότης ὁμοιότητος ἀπέχει πλείστον, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀχρηστότατον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· φθαρτικὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον. ἔτι δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν ῥᾶδιον τὸ κτήσασθαι φίλον· τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γινῶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄνευ ἀτυχίας (τοῖς γὰρ εὖ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες

find that the answer to this πρόβλημα will furnish the λύσις of all the ἀπορίαι.

ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται κ.τ.λ. The question at issue here is whether difference in degree excludes specific difference. According to Plato, Phileb. 24 e ὅπου ἂν ἡμῶν φαίνηται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γυγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ἥρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπειρου γένους ὡς εἰς ἐν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι. This doctrine Aristotle fully accepts, and it follows from it that difference in degree can never constitute specific difference, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον is not εἰδοποιόν, cf. Pol. 1259 b, 36 οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἷον τε διαφέρειν... 38 τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδὲν (sc. εἶδει διαφέρει). But it does not follow from this that difference in degree will exclude specific difference, though it may exclude generic, cf. Part. An. 644 a, 18 ὅσα διαφέρει... κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, ταῦτα ὑπέφευκται ἐνὶ γένει. If anything can be 'more or less' something, it must be that thing, but there is nothing to prevent the 'more' being a different species from the 'less' under certain conditions.

δέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον cannot be εἰδοποιόν, this can only be in cases where, as Plato would say, τὸ πέρας is 'mixed' with

τὸ ἀπειρον, i.e. where there is some λόγος or determinate ratio constituting a 'form' (εἶδος). The most instructive example of this is furnished by musical 'intervals.' It is true that the genus φθόγγος admits of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, and we might conclude from this that it can have no specific differences. But this is to leave out of account the fact that αἰσθησις, the δύναμις κραιτέη, cannot distinguish any interval less than the διεσις. The μεσότης of ὀξύ and βαρύ may be a little 'more' or 'less,' the note may be slightly 'flat' or 'sharp'; but it remains specifically the same note. So too with colours. They are all generically one, and their genus has the ἐναντιώσεις white and black corresponding to ὀξύ and βαρύ in the musical scale. But αἰσθησις cannot distinguish an infinite number of colours between white and black. There are a certain definite number of λόγοι or proportions of white and black which sight can distinguish, and mixtures a little more or a little less are referred to these λόγοι, which therefore constitute the εἶδη χρωμάτων. Red is specifically different from green, in spite of the fact that it is whiter. In de Sens. 446 a, 1 Aristotle illustrates this by the old puzzle of the grain of millet. We do not hear the fall of one grain, nor does it make the sound louder if we add one grain to a bushel.

τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. εἴρηται δ' 15
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

II. Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γνωρισθέντος
τοῦ φιλητοῦ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν,
τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε δ' ἂν χρή-
σιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ 20
2 ἂν εἴη τὰγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τὰγαθόν

δοκεῖν φίλοι εἶναι)· οἱ δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς συνδιαμένουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις
ἀξιοῦσι πιστεῦν, ὡς ἐξαπατῶντας καὶ προσποιουμένους, ἵνα κτήσωνται
διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτυχούντων ὀμιλίας πάλιν εὐτυχούντων φίλιαν.

1155 b, 17. EE. 1235 b, 13. ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν
ἅμα τὰ τε δοκούντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας
λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνεται τὰ
ἐναντία δοκούντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος
τοῖς φαινομένοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι <μὲν>
ὡς ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον
τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἔστι τὸ φιλούμενον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλούμεν οὐ
ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον—οὐθεὶς γὰρ

ἐραστής ὅστις οὐκ αἰεὶ φιλεῖ—

ἢ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτῃ μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδὺ, εἰ δὲ ὁ
βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

τῷ εἶδει. Things *γένοι* *ἕτερα* do not.
ἔμπροσθεν. It is vain to ask
where.

II. § 1. *περὶ αὐτῶν*, quite general.
'The subject may be cleared up.'

γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ. So
προαίρεσις was defined after an en-
quiry into τὸ *προαιρετόν*, *βούλευσις*
and *βούλησις* after an enquiry into
τὸ *βουλευτόν* and τὸ *βουλητόν*. This
dialectical method is *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν*
πτώσεων, and is here applied to
the *πρόβλημα*, πότερον πολλαχῶς ἢ
μοναχῶς τῷ εἶδει λέγεται; (Top. 106 a,
9), the rule being *ὅταν αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς*
λέγεται, καὶ ἢ *πτῶσις* ἢ *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*
πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται, καὶ εἰ ἢ *πτῶσις*,
καὶ αὐτό (ib. b, 38). It is more
obvious that τὸ *φιλητόν* has different

species than that *φιλία* has; for τὰ
φιλητά have actually different names
(τοῖς ὀνόμασι *διαφωρεῖ*), and this makes
it clear that *φιλία* is not specifically
one.

ἀγαθόν ... ἡδὺ ... χρήσιμον. Cf.
1104 b, 30 *τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς*
τὰς αἰρέσεις...καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος.
δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ., for τὸ *χρήσιμον*
is always ἄλλου χάριν (1096 a, 7).

§ 2. *πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Cf. the
precisely similar question about *βούλη-*
σις above 1113 a, 15 sqq. There we saw
that the object of *βούλησις* was always
τὸ *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*, but that in the
case of the good man this coincides
with τὸ *φύσει* or κατ' ἀλήθειαν *ἀγαθόν*.
The solution in the present case would
be the same: we always love τὸ *φαι-*

φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ
 25 τὸ ἐκάστῳ· φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὄν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύ-
 3 χων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ—γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλε-

περὶ δὴ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν τούτοις πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε. τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητόν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδύ ὀρεκτόν· φαινόμενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ. σὲ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. ὅτι μέντοι φίλον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, δῆλον.

τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐ. καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδέα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι φαινομένῳ σώματι συμφέροντα ἀπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὐ, οἷον φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἀπλῶς σώματι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι καὶ ὀλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ὄραν καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐν τῷ σκοτεινῷ· καίτοι τῷ ὀφθαλμῶντι ἐναντίως. καὶ οἶνος ἡδίων οὐχ ὁ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ τὴν γλῶτταν ὑπὸ οἶνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ οὕτε ὄξος παρεγχεόουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθήσει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἃ τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀλλ' ἃ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν. ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν μεμνημένοι

νόμον φιλητόν, but this does not affect our inference from different species of φιλητά to different species of φίλα. For, if we say φαινόμενον φιλητόν instead of φιλητόν, to allow for all cases where τὸ ἀγαθόν or τὸ ἡδύ is not the really good or pleasant, we still keep the πτώσις required for the argument. Eudemos works this out with reference to health as a normal state, cf. above 1113 a, 22 sqq. with the notes.

§ 3. ἐπὶ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Three characteristics of φίλα are inferred from the use of the word in current language. Though we use the verb φιλεῖν of our

feeling towards inanimate objects (it is a φίλησις), yet we do not call that feeling φίλια. This is because φίλια is (1) βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ, (2) ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι, to which we must add, (3) μὴ λανθάνουσα.

ἀντιφίλησις, cf. ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι below.

ἐκείνῳ. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 59.

τῷ οἴνῳ. The illustration is suggested by the word φίλοις in Plato, Lys. 212 d οὐδ' ἀρα φίλοις εἰσιν οἱ ἐν οἷς ἱπποὶ μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φίλοισι γὰρ, οὐδ' αὖ φίλοισι γὰρ καὶ φίλοις. The problem here is not so

σθαι τὰγαθὰ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σφύζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς 30
 ἔχῃ—τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
 τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ
 ταῦτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὖνοϊαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι
 4 φιλίαν εἶναι. ἡ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσιν; πολλοὶ γάρ
 εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπεικειῖς 35
 εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνων τις πάθοι 1156^a
 πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φί-
 λους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ
 ἄρα εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας
 δι' ἐν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

5

ταῦθ' αἰρούμεθα. ὥς δ' ἔχει παιδίον καὶ θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθ-
 εστῶτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπικεῖν καὶ φρόνιμον.
 τούτοις δὲ ἡδέα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἑξεις· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ.

1155 b, 27. EE. 1236 a, 7 sqq. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς
 (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιόνδ' εἶναι λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὠφέλιμον καὶ
 χρήσιμον), ἐτι δὲ τὸ ἡδὺν τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινὶ καὶ
 φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων δι' ἕκαστον τούτων
 ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖσθαι τι καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπον. τὸν μὲν
 γὰρ <τῷ> τοιόνδε καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν, τὸν δ' ὅτι ὠφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν
 δ' ὅτι ἡδὺς καὶ δι' ἡδονήν. φίλος δὴ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος ἀντιφίλῃ,
 καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτούς.

obvious to us because we have the
 verb 'to like' for this sort of *φίλησις*.
 Cf. French *aimer le vin*, but not *une*
amitié pour le vin.

εἴπερ, 'if at all.'

ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. This is merely a
 popular belief the mention of which
 is suggested by the problem of the
φίλοις. We must not press it or
 make it part of the definition; for, as
 we shall see, it does not strictly hold
 of all or indeed any species of *φίλια*.
 The truth which underlies this *ἐνδοξον*
 is otherwise expressed by Aristotle.

εὖνους. On *εὖνοια* see below
 1166 b, 30. Here it is defined as
βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, but
 something more is required to differ-
 entiate *φίλια* from it.

ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι, i.e. ἐν ἀντιφι-
 λοῦσι. Here, as in commercial ex-
 change, supply and demand, action
 and reaction (τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχω,
 cf. 1133 a, 15 n.) must be equal.

§ 4. μὴ λανθάνουσιν. This is added
 to meet the possibility even of re-
 ciprocal and disinterested well-wishing
 which is unknown to *both* parties. If
 A may entertain such a feeling towards
 B without B's knowledge, it is equally
 possible that B may be entertaining it
 towards A without A's knowledge.
 This may be common enough, for
 instance, between writers of different
 nationalities.

δι' ἐν τι τῶν εἰρημένων, sc. τὸ
ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον. Cf.
 the definition in *Rhet.* 1380 b, 35

III. Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὲ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις
 10 ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιοῦς τινὰς εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδέϊς

1156 a, 6. Cf. EE. 1236 a, 16 sqq. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἓν ἀπάσας μὴδ' ὡς εἶδη ἐνὸς γένους, μήτε πάντας λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. πρὸς μίαν γὰρ τινὰ λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἱατρικόν. καὶ <γὰρ> ψυχὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ' οὐ λόγος ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. οἷον ὄργανον ἱατρικόν, ὃ ἂν ὁ ἱατρός χρήσαιτο· ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἱατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ὁργάνου. ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον· διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι [τὸ] πρῶτον λαμβάνουσιν καὶ πρῶτον καθόλου, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ δύνανται πάντ' ἀποδιδόναι τὰ φαινόμενα. οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόττοντος ἐνὸς λόγου οὐκ

ἔστω δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαι τινι ἃ οἰεταὶ ἀγαθὰ, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλοῦμενος. οἰονταὶ δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

III. § 1. ταῦτα, sc. τὰ φιλητά, i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ χρήσιμον. The inference from the πτώσις is marked by the particles ἄρα, δὴ.

οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the different species of φιλητά furnish us with a διαφορά of the genus βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐν ἀντιπεπονητοῖς μὴ λανθάνουσα. There cannot be three εἶδη φιλίας unless they are differentiated by διαφοραὶ which are διαφοραὶ of this γένος. So Aristotle proceeds to show that each species of φιλία is βούλησις τις ἀγαθοῦ etc.

ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν, i.e. the φιλία

which has τὸ ἡδύ for its object is, if we may coin the phrase, βούλησις τῶν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀγαθῶν. On the other hand, if the φιλητόν is τὸ ἀγαθόν, it will be βούλησις τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀγαθῶν.

οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς is explained by κατὰ συμβεβηκός below. We wish such a friend to be rich, for instance, not because we believe such riches to be a necessary χορηγία for the full development of his nature, but for what we hope to get out of him.

οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιοῦς τινὰς εἶναι κ.τ.λ. We must supply οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες as subject to ἀγαπῶσι, for it would be quite possible to love witty people διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Wit is an ἀρετή, a part of καλοκάγαθια, and might therefore be *pro tanto* φιλητόν ἢ ἀγαθόν. In that case we should love the wit τῷ ποίῳ τινὰ εἶναι.

ἴς. οἷ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς
 ὄν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ 15
 ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ
 βεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταῖ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἔστιν ὅς-
 ἔστιν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ πορίζουσιν
 ἐν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. εὐδιάλυτοι δὲ αἱ τοιαυταῖ
 μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς 20
 ἡσισμοὶ ὥσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ
 ἐνεῖ, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ

α <τὰς> ἄλλας φιλίας εἶναι· αἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσιν·
 ὅταν ἢ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμότῃ, ὡς οὐσαν καθόλου ἂν, εἴπερ ἦν
 ἢ, οὐδ' εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἄλλας φασίν· ἔστι δὲ πολλὰ εἶδη φιλίας.
 ἀρ ῥηθέντων ἦν ἡδὴ, ἐπειδὴ διώρισται τριχῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν.
 γὰρ διώρισται δι' ἀρετὴν, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.
 πύτων ἢ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἢ [διὰ] τῶν πλείστων φιλία
 γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμοι εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ μέχρι τούτου,
 ὃ ἢ παροιμία

Γλαῦκ', ἐπικούρος ἀνὴρ τόσον φίλος ἔσκε μάχεται,

οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρήας—

δι' ἡδονὴν τῶν νέων—τούτου γὰρ αἰσθησιν ἔχουσιν· διὸ εὐμετά-
 φιλία ἢ τῶν νέων· μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὰ ἦθη κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας
 ἁλλαι καὶ τὸ ἡδύ—ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῶν βελτίστων.

ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν. Bywater
 p. 59) thinks the article,
 is omitted in K^b "would be
 away" and refers to EE 1237 a,
 363). But that passage simply
 that τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν
 pecially τὸ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν) τὸ
 ἐνὸν ἔστι χρῆσθαι ἢ φιλούμενον,
 λος φιλούμενον τῷ φίλῳ ἢ φίλος,
 is another point. The reading
 ὁ μόνος ἔστι would surely be
 lent to ἢ φιλεῖται, and we have
 en told that all friends βούλονται
 ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. The mean-
 ist be the same as that of ἢ ἔστιν
 ἔστιν ὁ φιλούμενος just below,

that is, practically equivalent to τῷ
 ποιούς τινας εἶναι above. But there is
 no need to read ἔστιν <ὅπερ ἔστιν>
 here with Bonitz; for ἢ...ἔστιν can
 very well mean "on the ground of
 what he is," in accordance with the
 principle of abbreviating subordinate
 relative clauses illustrated in Kühner
 § 557. When φιλία is διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
 we love our friend "for what he is,"
 not for his usefulness or agreeableness
 to ourselves.

§ 3. δ' ὁ, i.e. τοῦ δι' ὁ, cf. 1117 b,
 30 n. This abbreviation is really
 similar in principle to that of ἢ ex-
 -plained in the last note.

φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δο-
 25 κεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ᾖσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
 30 γὰρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα

φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐστὶ ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένῳ καὶ ἀντιφίλων. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνον ὑπάρχει φιλία—μόνον γὰρ αἰσθάνεται προαιρέσεως—αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι φαίνεται ἐνυπάρχον καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα, οἷον τὸν τροχίλον φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος τῷ κροκοδείλῳ, καὶ ὡς οἱ μάταιες τὰς συνεδρείας καὶ διεδρείας λέγουσιν. καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἂν εἴεν φίλοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. οἱ δ' ὅτι ἡ πρώτη οὐχ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, οὐ φασι φίλους εἶναι· ἀδικήσει γὰρ ὁ γε φαῦλος τὸν φαῦλον, οἱ δ' ἀδικούμενοι οὐ φιλοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦσι μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ τὰς γε ἐτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει. δι'

§ 4. ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις, cf. Rhet. 1389 b, 36 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν μάλλον ἢ δεῖ διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοί εἶναι, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. The ἡθοποιῖα here reminds us once more of the New Comedy with its typical old men and young men.

οὐ πάνυ...συζῶσι, 'are not much given to συμβίωσις.' Cf. Ind. s. v. οὐ πάνυ.

τὴν ξενικὴν. A merchant will not necessarily introduce his 'correspondent' from a foreign country to his family or his club. A Hellene called his ξένοι by the name of φίλοι, but clearly this is διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον.

§ 5. τῶν νέων. For the ἦθοι cf. Rhet. 1389 a, 2 οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἥθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοὶ καὶ οἱοὶ ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀψήκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὀρεῖται γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ πείναι...καὶ μάλλον αἰροῦνται πράττειν τὰ κατὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἦθει ζῶσι μάλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ...καὶ φιλόφειλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μάλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδὲν, ὥστε μὴ τοὺς φίλους.

διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπί- 35 πτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχέια ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἔρω- 1156^b τικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολ- λάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν 5 φιλίαν οὕτως.

Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ

ἡδονὴν γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλήλους βλαπτόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὦσιν ἀκρατεῖς· οὐ δοκοῦσι δ' οὐδ' οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους φίλοι εἶναι, ὅταν κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ζητῶσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ πρώτη. ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ βέβαιος, αὕτη δὲ ἀβέβαιος. ἡ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δέ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν τὸν φίλον βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστι, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καθ' ἓνα δὲ λόγον πάσας ἀδύνατον. λείπεται τοίνυν οὕτως, ὅτι ἐστι μὲν ὡς μόνη <ἡ> πρώτη φιλία, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς πᾶσαι, οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχον ἔχουσιν πρὸς ἑαυτάς, οὔτε καθ' ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἓν.

1156 b, 7. EE. 1236 b, 27 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἅμα, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίζῃ, ὃ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ πρῶτός ἐστιν, ἐστὶ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς αἰρετός (ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον· ὡς γὰρ βούλεται τις δι' αὐτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθὰ, ἀνάγκη καὶ

§ 6. Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. The friendship of the good is distinguished from the other two by being *τελεῖον* τι. We have seen that *φιλία* exists *φύσει* (1155 a, 16 n.) and is therefore capable of growth or evolution. By calling the friendship of the good *τελεία*, Aristotle means to say, in accordance with the strict use of the word, that the growth is complete and that the 'form' (*εἶδος*) of *φιλία* is realised in it so that none of it is left out (τὸ τέλειον = οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω). It is, in fact, 'full-grown' *φιλία*, as a *τέλειος ἀνὴρ* is a 'full-grown' man. We can

now see why the *ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι* were shown at length to be characteristic of youth and age; the one is undeveloped, the other is past its prime. Eudemos has worked out this point more fully. Cf. 1236 a, 16 sqq., quoted on p. 356.

καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. As *φιλία* is *ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι* (1155 b, 33), it is necessary to make it clear that the *τελεία φιλία* implies the goodness of both parties. It is only then that the *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν* can be reciprocal.

ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ
 10 τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὐτούς γὰρ
 οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἰ' τούτων
 φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾦσιν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν
 ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

αὐτὸν αἰρεῖσθαι εἶναι), ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἡδὺς ἔστιν ἀπλῶς· διὸ
 δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὅπως οὖν φίλος ἡδὺς. ἔτι δὲ διοριστέον περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον·
 ἔχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν πότερον τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν φίλον,
 καὶ πότερον τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ φιλητὸν
 ἡδύ, ἢ οὐ. ἄμφω γὰρ εἰς ταῦτό συνακτέον· τὰ τε γὰρ μὴ ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἀπλῶς <ἂν> τύχῃ φευκτά· καὶ τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν
 οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ζητεῖται, τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως
 εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἔστι γὰρ αἰρετὸν μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ
 ἀγαθόν· ἃ δὲ συμφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ
 ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μῆπω ἐστὶ γέννηται. * * εὐθέως δὲ καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ
 ἀνθρωπος ὢν (φύσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐφύνης ἀφουῶς, διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἢ ὁδός· ἀνάγκη

καθ' αὐτούς, 'essentially,' not merely κατὰ συμβεβηκός or in so far as they may be 'some good' to one another. The disinterested character (ἐκείνου ἕνεκα 1155 b, 31) of true φιλία depends upon the φιλητὸν being something which belongs to the φιλούμενος, not in relation to the φιλῶν (τῷ φιλοῦντι), but καθ' αὐτόν, for βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν (1156 a, 9).

δι' αὐτούς, here as often a *reciprocal* reflexive pronoun, more emphatic than δι' ἀλλήλους. They love (οὕτως ἔχουσι i.e. φιλοῦσι) 'for each others' own selves,' in other words each loves ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστι, 'for what the object of his love is' (1156 a, 16).

διαμένει οὖν κ.τ.λ. A thing cannot be 'complete' unless it has sufficient time to develop fully (cf. ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ 1098 a, 18 n.); for all κίνησις is in time. We now see why it was shown above that the ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι are

εὐδιάλυτοι (1156 a, 19). That which is really τέλειον must be τέλειον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον (1156 b, 33).

ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. Cf. 1100 b, 11 sqq., and contrast 1156 a, 21 τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται, a, 34 τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα.

καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This continues the proof that such φιλία is 'complete.' Since τὸ τέλειον is οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω, 'complete' φιλία must include the incomplete or undeveloped forms of φιλία. The good, therefore, must be (1) good, (2) good for one another, (3) pleasant, (4) pleasant to one another.

καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι, i.e. (2) good for one another. This φιλία therefore includes the advantages of φιλία διὰ τὸ συμφέρον.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, i.e. both (3) ἀπλῶς and (4) τῷ φίλῳ.

ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστω 15
γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκείαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,
τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία
μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα
τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστιν
ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά 20

εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο διαφωνῇ, οὕτω σπουδαῖον τελέως·
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκрасίαν· τῷ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν τὰγαθὸν τῷ
ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκрасία ἐστίν.

1156 b, 17. EE. 1237 a, 10 ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ πρώτη φιλία κατ'
ἀρετὴν, ἔσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοί. τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ὅτι χρήσιμοι,
ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον· διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ τῷδὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν.
καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξεων. ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ
ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμον καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον <οἶον τὸ> γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς
τὸ φαρμακεύεσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετῇ <ἐστίν>. ἔστω
γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου
ἀρετῇ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκείνῳ. ὁμοίως δὴ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ.
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιστατέον καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν ἐστιν αἶεν ἡδονῆς φιλία, καὶ

καθ' ἡδονήν, equivalent to ἡδεῖαι, more often πρὸς ἡδονήν.

αἱ οἰκείαι...καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, 'his own acts, and (therefore) acts like them.' If a colour is pleasant, it will be pleasant when reflected in a mirror.

αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. The acts of one good man are 'the same as or similar to' those of another, and therefore pleasant to him. This friendship, then, includes the advantages of φιλία διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.

§ 7. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ κ.τ.λ. If I am right in my interpretation of this section, it is not a duplicate of the last. It puts the whole matter in a more scientific form and shows that all four advantages of friendship not only belong to the friendship of the good, but belong to it καθ' αὐτήν, and that this is the reason of its permanence.

συνάπτει, intrans. 'join,' 'meet,' cf. 1157 a, 34.

πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία κ.τ.λ. It is not necessary to mention τὸ χρήσιμον, for it is not φιλητὸν ὡς τέλος. It is sufficiently provided for by the qualification τῷ φιλοῦντι.

ἡ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα, 'either for pleasure simply or for pleasure to the lover, i.e. pleasure depending on a similarity.' I delete the comma after φιλοῦντι with Grant, though I do not adopt with him the interpretation of Aspasios. The meaning, I think, is that friendship is either δι' ἡδονήν ἀπλῶς, as for instance the friendship of kings for εὐτράπελοι (cf. 1156 a, 13 n.), or it may be δι' ἡδονήν τινα, i.e. it may be based on the fact that activities 'the same as or similar to' our own are pleasant, for instance the friendship of bad men who 'rejoice in each other's badness' (cf. 1159 b, 10). The first kind is based upon pleasure as such, and may exist between the most unlike persons; the

τινα· ταύτη δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς· ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοιοι, καὶ τὰ λοιπά—τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς—ἔστιν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φίλα ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ' 8

τί διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ φιλεῖν, [καὶ] πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθός, καὶ ἐν μὴ ἡδύς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τούτο, διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φαίνεται. δῆλον δ' ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωρίαι καὶ μαθήσεις αἰσθηταὶ μάλιστα τῷ ἡδεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν. φύσει γοῦν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς, καὶ οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ. διὸ εὐθὺς τὰ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις χαίρει, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡδιστον ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθέντι· ὁ δὲ σπονδαῖος τέλειος. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων γνωρίσεως, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁλως

second is based on a pleasure which can only be felt by a like person on recognising acts like his own. Aspasios, followed by Grant, takes καθ' ὁμοιότητα in the sense of 'metaphorically,' 'by analogy' (cf. Ind. s.v. ὁμοιότης), but this would imply the doctrine that friendship δι' ἡδονῆν ἀπλῶς was true friendship, whereas from 1158 b, 6 we see that *all* friendship based on pleasure is only φίλα καθ' ὁμοιότητα. On the other hand, to put a comma after φιλοῦντι with the other editors would make Aristotle say that *all* friendship is based on similarity, which would be to prejudge the λύσις of the ἀπορία stated 1155 a, 32 sqq., and that in a manner inconsistent with the λύσις actually given below.

ταύτη... καθ' αὐτούς. Strict grammar would require either ταύτη... καθ' αὐτήν or τούτοις... καθ' αὐτούς, but the change from the abstract to the personal is in complete accordance with Greek idiom, being in principle the same as the use of αὐτοί in reference to the name of a town. All the four advantages belong to this φίλα, and

that too essentially and therefore permanently.

ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοιοι, sc. ἡ ἀγαθὴ. Both being good they will be ἀγαθὴ ἀλλήλοις, as shown above. The reading I have adopted has far the highest authority (K^b Γ Asp.), and makes excellent sense if we only put a comma after it. The other reading ταύτη δι' ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά ('and the remaining εἶδη φίλας are like it') is mentioned by Aspasios and is plainly accommodated to his erroneous interpretation of καθ' ὁμοιότητα above. For the sense given to ταύτη ὅμοιοι, cf. 1157 b, 2 where it can hardly mean anything else.

καὶ τὰ λοιπά, 'the remaining two' of the four advantages enumerated above, explained by τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς. Hitherto καὶ τὰ λοιπά has been taken either as an accusative limiting ὅμοιοι, or as the subject of ὅμοια.

ἔστιν. My interpretation of course makes it necessary to give ἔστιν the full force of ἐνεστιν or ὑπάρχει. This is quite in accordance with Greek idiom, which repeats a compound verb by the corresponding simple one.

εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ 25
προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ
οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας συνα-
ναλῶσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους,
9 πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ
δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν 30
φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰς δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν·
βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὐ.

IV. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ
λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὁμοία

ἡ φιλία ἢ πρώτη ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων, ὅτι
ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἡ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις.
τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια, αὕτη δ' οὐκ ἔξω ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ
φιλοῦντι, δυνάμει δὲ πάσης ἔξω· ἡ γὰρ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢ <ἡ> ἑτερον. διὸ
τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι
φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν
ἀψύχῳ· φιλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἀψυχα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν
τὸ φιλούμενον [δ] ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι ἢ φιλούμενον, ὃ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον
τῷ φίλῳ ἢ φίλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἢ μουσικὸς ἢ ἰατρικὸς· ἡδονὴν τοίνυν ἢ ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ, ἢ αὐτός, αὕτη φιλική. αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος. ὥστ'
ἂν μὴ χაίρη ἢ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἢ πρώτη φιλία. οὐδὲ δεῖ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθέν
τῶν συμβεβηκότων μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνειν. εἰ γὰρ σφόδρα
δυσωδῆς, λείπεται· ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τῷ εὖνοεῖν, συζῆ δὲ μή.

Cf. Plato, Phd. 59 b, where παρὴν is repeated by ἦν.

§ 8. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Another reason for the rarity of such φιλία. The verb προσδεῖται is properly used of the *conditio sine qua non* which is not itself a part of the thing. Cf. 1099 a, 31 n.

τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας, EE 1238 a, 2 διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθε ὁ μέδιμος τῶν ἄλων. In this precise form the proverb does not seem to occur earlier; but the phrase ἄλας καὶ τράπεζα was commonly used of 'eating one's salt and sharing one's board.'

ἀποδέξασθαι, *probare*, cf. 1157 b, 18. 1165 b, 13. 1169 a, 8.

§ 9. βούλησις...φιλίας, i.e. εὐνοία, cf. 1155 b, 33.

IV. § 1. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. A comparison between the ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι and τελεία φιλία gives the answer to the question whether there are more εἶδη φιλίας than one. Strictly speaking there is only one; the rest are only φιλία καθ' ὁμοιότητα. But, as current language calls these φιλία also, it will be best for us to do so too. There are then three εἶδη φιλίας in the popular sense of the word.

καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ, the remaining ὑπάρχοντα, viz. good and pleasure both *simpliciter* and τῷ φιλοῦντι.

35 ἑκατέρω παρ' ἑατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν. ἡ δὲ
 1157^a διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδέϊς
 ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦ-
 τοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φι-
 λίαί μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον
 5 ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον
 τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονταὶ οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὀρῶν ἐκείνον, ὁ
 δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγοῦσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας
 ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ
 10 ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία). πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμέ-
 νουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἥθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις
 ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ
 χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἥττον φίλοι καὶ δια-
 μένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμ-

καὶ κατὰ πάντα κ.τ.λ., 'and in respect of them all each gets from each the same and similar things.'

ὁμοίωμα... ἔχει, but only in the sense of having ταῦτόν τι, the sense in which παιδίά is said in Pol. 1339b, 35 ὁμοίωμα ἔχειν τῷ τέλει, because both imply pleasure. It is not even a ὁμοίωμα like that between things which are εἶδει ἐν, but admit of τὸ μάλλον καὶ ἥττον (cf. 1155b, 14 n.), they are not 'like' in the sense that white lead is 'like' snow. For we must not infer from Aristotle's mention of εἶδη which admit of τὸ μάλλον καὶ ἥττον that he meant to apply this to φιλία. They were only adduced to show that the argument adduced (by Speusippos?) was insufficient.

καὶ ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν τοῖς καθ' ὁμοιότητα φίλοις.

μένουσι. L^b has διαμένουσι, but the compound is referred to by the simple verb, cf. 1156b, 23 n.

ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται κ.τ.λ. The forms of φιλία in which the two parties do not get the same thing from one

another are discussed in Book IX and there for the first time get the name of ἀνομοειδεῖς φιλίαί (1163b, 32). All the φιλίαί discussed in this book are ὁμοειδεῖς and are further subdivided into φιλίαί (1) ἐν ἰσότητι, (2) καθ' ὑπεροχήν.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The ὁμοίωμα to true φιλία is most complete when there is reciprocity not only of pleasure but of the same pleasure.

ληγοῦσης δὲ κ.τ.λ., suggested by Plato, Symp. 183c πονηρὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνος ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνδημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μάλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνιμός ἐστιν ἅτε οὐδὲ μονίμου ἐρῶν πράγματος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἀνθεὶ λήγοντι, οὐπερ ἦρα, οἴχεται ἀποπτύμενος, πολλοὺς λόγῳ καὶ ὑποσχέσεις κατασχένας. ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἥθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστὴς διὰ βίου μένει ἅτε μονίμῳ σωματικῷ.

§ 2. ἥττον φίλοι, less even than those who exchange different pleasures. Of course ἥττον goes with διαμένοντι as well as φίλοι.

φέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ 15
 τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ
 φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐπικεικίς
 φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιοῦν, δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι
 3 μὴ τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. καὶ μόνῃ δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φι- 20
 λία ἀδιάβλητος ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ
 τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ "πι-
 στεύειν" ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ "μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι," καὶ ὅσα
 ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλία ἀξιούται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐτέραις
 4 οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι 25

1157 a, 16. EE. 1237 b, 8 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἣν
 πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δι' αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ ἀμφισβη-
 τοῦνται. βέβαιον γάρ τι δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία· μόνῃ δ' αὕτη βέβαιος. τὸ γὰρ
 κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μηδὲ ῥαδίως [οὐ] ποιεῖ τὴν

μηδέτερον ὁποιοῦν, 'one who is
 neither good nor bad to a person of
 any character you please.'

ἐαυτοῖς, the reciprocal reflexive, an
 emphatic ἀλλήλοις. Cf. 1156 b, 10 n.

ἀδιάβλητος. The proper meaning
 of διαβάλλειν is 'to set at variance,'
 'to estrange.' The meaning 'to mis-
 represent,' 'slander' is secondary.

τὸ πιστεύειν κ.τ.λ., 'the sayings
 πιστεύω ("I trust him") and οὐδέποτ'
 ἂν ἀδικήσῃ ("He would never do me
 wrong").'

ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

§ 4. ἐπεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'I say ἐν
 ταῖς ἐτέραις (sc. φιλαῖς); for, since
 people call them φιλαί, we may do
 so too,' though strictly speaking only
 the friendship of the good, as τέλει
 φιλία, deserves the name. But, if we
 use the word in this comprehensive
 way, we must allow more εἶδη φιλίας
 than one. Eudemos is at pains to
 point out exactly where the unity of
 these different φιλαί lies. They are
 not καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα or συνώνυμα

as the εἶδη of one γένος, since the
 γένος is only predicated of one of
 them καθ' αὐτό. Nor are they mere
 chance ὁμώνυμα (cf. 1096 b, 27 n.);
 for they are all called φιλία in
 virtue of a common element. They
 are πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, just as the
 ἀρετή of a παῖς is so called πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος (Pol. 1260 a, 32), i.e. in the
 light of what it will be when fully
 developed. Now this relation between
 the ἀτελές and the τέλειον is just τὸ
 ἀνάλογον. For instance the less
 highly developed animals have not
 blood but something 'analogous,' Hist.
 An. 489 a, 21 ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν
 αἷμα καὶ φλέψ, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον
 τούτων· ἐστὶ δ' ἀτελὴ ταῦτα, οἷον τὸ
 μὲν ἐς τὸ δὲ ἔχωρ (for the biological
 theory see Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. Trans.
 ii, 24 sqq.). The different φιλαί are
 therefore τῷ ἀνάλογον ἐν or καθ'
 ὁμοιότητα, for this is the only kind of
 unity that can exist between the
 undeveloped and the developed, just
 as it is the only kind that can exist

λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἔνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς 30 τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὁμοίον τι, ταύτῃ φίλοι·

κρίσιν ὀρθήν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος· ἢ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου. δεῖ γὰρ πείραν λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Θέογνις·

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός,
πρὶν πειραθείης ὥσπερ ὑπόζυγιον.

οὐδ' ἄνευ χρόνου φίλος, ἀλλὰ βούλονται φίλοι, καὶ μάλιστα λαμβάνει ἢ τοιαύτῃ ἕξις ὡς φιλία. ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως ἔχῃσι φίλοι εἶναι, διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ ἀλλήλοις, οἴονται οὐ βούλεσθαι φίλοι, ἀλλ' εἶναι φίλοι. τὸ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας·

between different *γένη*. We see then that Aristotle does not adopt the suggestion he made that the difference is one of *μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον*, for that difference is expressly contrasted with τὸ ἀνάλογον. Cf. *Hist. An.* 588 a, 25 τὰ μὲν γὰρ (sc. ζῷα) τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον...τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει. The true doctrine is that the other *φιλῖαι* are so called because they show in a rudimentary and undeveloped way the characteristics of true *φιλία*, and it is only to avoid unnecessary conflict with current language that we speak of them as *εἶδη φιλίας* at all.

ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις...ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες. People talk of 'friendly states' and of children 'playing with their friends,' and we must respect the *usus loquendi* if possible. Strict grammar would require ὥσπερ τὰς πόλεις...ὥσπερ τοὺς παῖδας (it is quite wrong to supply λέγουσι or ὀνομάζουσι); but Greek idiom can use the nominative after ὥσπερ without regard to the structure of the sentence.

πρώτως καὶ κυρίως, opp. *δεντέρωι* καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μεταφoράν. Cf. Bonitz on *Met.* 1015 b, 11.

ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι, sc. *φιλοῦσι*, to be supplied from *φίλοι*. Τὸ ἡδύ is their *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*, and therefore holds an 'analogous' position in their *φιλία* to that of τὸ ἀγαθόν in true *φιλία*.

καὶ ὁμοίον τι, sc. *φιλοῦσι*. This is another point of 'analogy.' Their *φιλία* is based, like that of the good, on the fact that *ἐκάστω καθ' ἡδονὴν αἱ οἰκείαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται*. The acts of (e.g.) the *εὐτράπελος* are pleasant to the *εὐτράπελος*, just as the acts of the good man are pleasant to the good man. Again, however, we have a variety of interpretations due, as above 1156 b, 20, to the two senses in which τὸ ὅμοιον and ὁμοιότης are used throughout this passage. In L^b πⁱ after ὅμοιον is omitted, and this shows that the passage was understood to mean 'in so far as it is something good and like the good.' But this loses sight of one point in the analogy.

5 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὐται
συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμ- 35
βεβηκός.

6 Εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν 1157^b
φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ
ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί.
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωῖσθαι τούτοις. V. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν 5
οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω

οὐ γὰρ εἰ βούλονται ὑγιαίνειν, ὑγιαίνουσιν, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἰ φίλοι βούλονται,
ἡδὴ καὶ φίλοι εἰσίν. σημεῖον δέ· εὐδιάβλητοι γὰρ οἱ διακείμενοι ἄνευ
πέρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πείραν δεδώκασιν ἀλλήλοις,
οὐκ εὐδιάβλητοι, περὶ ὧν δὲ μή, πεισθεῖεν ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν οἱ
διαβάλλοντες. ἅμα δὲ φανερόν ἐστι οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις αὕτη ἡ φιλία·
ἄπιστος γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ κακοήθης πρὸς πάντας· αὐτῷ γὰρ μετρεῖ τοὺς
ἄλλους. διὸ εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ἂν μὴ διὰ πείραν
ἄπιστώσιν. οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι αἰροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλου,
καὶ οὐθεὶς φιλεῖ μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ πράγματα. ὥστ' οὐ φίλοι, οὐ
γὰρ γίνεται οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων· προσνέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς

§ 5. οὐ πάνυ...συνάπτουσι, 'are not
very apt to coincide.' It is a mistake
to suppose that οὐ πάνυ means 'not at
all' in classical Greek, in spite of
Cobet's contention to that effect.
Where it seems to mean 'not at all,'
it is only by a litotes; just as οὐχ
ἥκιστα may seem to mean μάλιστα.
The friendship of the good is neces-
sarily both pleasant and useful (1156 b,
18), but a friendship for pleasure is
not very likely to be useful, nor a
friendship for use very likely to be
pleasant.

οὐ...πάνυ συνδυάζεται, cf. 1121 a,
16. Pleasure and profit belong to
the friendship of the good essentially,
but there is nothing to bind pleasure
to profit nor profit to pleasure. As
'accidents' they are 'not much found

in combination.' Cf. Met. 1027 a, 11
ὅσον οὐτ' αἰεὶ οὐθ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁ
λευκὸς μουσικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ γίγνεται
ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐσται. The
phrase, then, excludes the συνδυασμός
of pleasure and profit from τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ
τὸ πολὺ.

§ 6. ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, cf. 1156 b,
22 n., and 1157 a, 32 ἦ...ὁμοῖον τι, sc.
φιλοῦσι.

δι' αὐτούς, i.e. δι' ἀλλήλους, cf.
1156 b, 10 n.

τῷ ὁμοιωῖσθαι, i.e. καθ' ὁμοίωσιν.

V. § 1. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν
κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1098 b, 33 τὴν μὲν γὰρ
ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν
ὑπάρχουσαν, ὅσον τῷ καθευδόντι ἢ καὶ
ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκῶτι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν
οὐχ ὅσον τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
εὖ πράξει.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλή-
 λοις καὶ πορίζουσι τὰγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισ-
 μένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ'
 10 ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν
 ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία
 γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
 "πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν." οὐ φαίνονται 1
 δ' οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ
 15 γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεῖν
 τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαί-
 νεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ 3

πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις. οὐ γίνεται ἄρ' ἡ φιλία ἢ
 πρώτη ἐν πολλοῖς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πείραν λαβεῖν· ἐκάστῳ γὰρ ἂν
 ἔδει συζῆσαι. οὐδὲ δὴ αἰρετέον ὁμοίως περὶ ἱματίου καὶ φίλου· καίτοι
 ἐν πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος δυοῖν τὸ βέλτιον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν
 τῷ χεῖρονι πάλαι ἐχρήτο, τῷ βελτίονι δὲ μηδέπω, τοῦθ' αἰρετέον, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου τὸν ἀγνῶτα εἰ βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ
 πείρας οὐδὲ μίας ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἀλλὰ χρόνου δεῖ. διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν
 ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἀλῶν· ἅμα δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοί, εἰ δὴ φίλος ἔσται σοὶ φίλος. ἀγαθὸς μὲν γὰρ
 ἀπλῶς ἔστι τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθός, ἀπλῶς <δ>
 ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτ' ἄμφω, ὥστε ὁ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθόν, τὸ τούτου ἄλλω, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν σπουδαίῳ, ἄλλω δ'
 ἀγαθός, ὅτι χρήσιμος. τὸ δὲ πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι φίλον καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν
 κωλύει· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε ἅμα πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν.

ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν. It is not necessary
 to insert ἂν with Ramsauer and
 Susemihl. Their ἔξις is such as to
 become active at once when brought
 into contact with the object.

τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, sc. τὴν ἔξιν.

πολλὰς δὴ κ.τ.λ. We do not know
 the author of this version of "out of
 sight, out of mind." The word
 ἀπροσηγορία occurs nowhere else in
 classical literature. We expect it to
 mean want of 'affability'; but Aristotle
 seems to take it as simply "lack of

converse" (Peters).

§ 2. οἱ στρυφνοί, 'sour.' The
 εἶδη τῶν χυμῶν are given in de An.
 422 b, 11. They form a series between
 the opposites sweet and bitter, differing
 τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον like sounds and
 colours (cf. 1155 b, 15 n.). In this
 series τὸ στρυφνόν comes between τὸ
 αὐστηρόν, 'dry' (as we say 'dry
 sherry') and τὸ ὀξύ, 'acid.' It is the
 taste of unripe fruit. In its meta-
 phorical use as applied to ἦθος we
 have it in Ar. Wasps 877.

δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὖνοις εἰκόασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὥς τὸ συζῆν — ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ 20 καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἡκιστα προσήκει — συνδιαγίγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδέϊς ὄντας μὴδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ 25

1157 b, 25. EE. 1238 a, 11 ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερόν ὅτι ὁρθῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φιλία τῶν βεβαίων, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων. καὶ ὁρθῶς εἴρηται

ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιον, οὐ τὰ χρήματα.

πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅτι χρόνος λέγεται δεικνύειν τὸν φιλούμενον, καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μᾶλλον τῶν εὐτυχιῶν. τότε γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (οὗτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, αἰρῶνται μᾶλλον ἀνθρωπῶν ἢ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι)· ἡ δὲ ἀτυχία δηλοῖ τοὺς μὴ ὄντως ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόντας. ὁ δὲ χρόνος δηλοῖ ἀμφοτέρους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δηλός, ἀλλ' ὁ ἡδὺς μᾶλλον. πλὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺς ταχύ. ὅμοιοι γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι τοῖς οἶνοις καὶ ἐδέσμασιν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ταχὺ δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως. ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ τῷ τέλει ὀριστέον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὁμολογήσαιεν δ' αἱ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόματος καλοῦσι γλύκιον· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαίνειν οὐχ ἡδὺ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχές, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξαπατᾷ.

§ 3. ἀποδεχόμενοι, *probantes*, cf. above 1156 b, 28.

οἱ μακάριοι, *beati*, as opposed to οἱ ἐνδεεῖς, those who are in need of nothing. It is not necessary, however, to limit the meaning so far as to make it merely equivalent to οἱ πλούσιοι.

μονώταις, cf. 1097 b, 9 n.

ἡ ἐταιρική, sc. φιλία.

§ 4. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The connexion of thought here seems to be this. The distinction just drawn between the *ἔξις* and the *ἐνέργεια* of

φιλία suggests another important distinction which still further brings out the nature of the τελεία φιλία. Although it is true that something more than the *ἔξις* is necessary for it, we must distinguish the *ἐνέργεια* which comes from the formed *ἔξις* and the mere *πάθος* of *φίλησις* which is the material out of which the *ἔξις* is formed. The *ἐνέργεια* of true φιλία is not a *πάθος*, but an *ἐνέργεια* which is ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως and implies *προαίρεσις*. The distinction is just like that between the *κινήσεις* which make up

πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε δ' ἢ μὲν φίλ-
 λησις πάθει, ἢ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἢ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἦπτον
 30 πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
 ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἑξέως· καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς
 φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑξιν.
 καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ
 ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὥς φίλος. ἐκάτερος
 35 οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
 τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ εἶδει· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης, μά-

ἔθισμός and the good activities which arise when the *ἔθισμός* is complete.

τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον, sc. ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ.

δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα, (1) διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς, (2) διὰ τὸ αὐτῷ.

§ 5. ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Three *σημεῖα* are given which show that true *φιλία* is a *ἔξις*, (1) *ἀντιφιλησις* implies *προαίρεσις*, (2) the *βούλησις* ἀγαθοῦ is ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, (3) the *φιλητὸν* is τὸ ἀγαθόν. Ultimately this means that *φιλία* is not an *ἀλλοίωσις* but a *τελείωσις* of the soul. Cf. 1103 a, 25 n.

ἢ γὰρ φίλησις κ.τ.λ. We can now explain why the word *φιλία* has a more restricted application than *φιλησις* (i.e. the verb *φιλεῖν*, cf. above 1155 b, 29 n.). It is just because *ἀντιφιλησις* implies *προαίρεσις* and *προαίρεσις* implies a *ἔξις*. For the presence of *προαίρεσις* as a means of distinguishing *ἔξεις* from *πάθη* cf. 1106 a, 3, where it is given as one of the arguments to show that ἀρετή is not a *πάθος* but a *ἔξις*, that the ἀρεταὶ are *προαιρέσεις τινές ἢ οὐκ ἀνευ προαιρέσεως*. Now it is clear that the reciprocation of *φιλησις* must be 'deliberate' or *μετὰ λόγου*—no mere *ἀλλοίωσις* of τὸ ὁρεκτικόν could amount to reciprocation—and it therefore implies the union of the intellectual with the appetitive, i.e. *προαίρεσις*,

and that implies a *ἔξις*.

καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται κ.τ.λ. The fact that the *βούλησις* is disinterested (ἐκείνων ἔνεκα) also shows that it can be no mere *πάθος*.

καὶ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. The fact that the *βούλησις*, so far as it is self-regarding, is of the true ἀγαθόν also shows it is no mere *πάθος*. It always requires a determinate *ἔξις* to make τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, the object of all *βούλησις*, coincide with τὸ φέσει ἀγαθόν.

τῇ βουλήσει, the *βούλησις* ἀγαθῶν is reciprocal (*ἀνταποδίδωσι*, cf. *ἀντιφιλησις*, ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι above).

καὶ τῷ εἶδει. This *φιλία* is (1) ἐν ἰσότητι, cf. τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι, and also (2) ὁμοειδής as explained below 1158 b, 1 τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἐπ' ἄμφοῦν (cf. 1157 a, 4 n.) καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις as contrasted with the ἀνομοειδεῖς *φιλίαι* in which ἕτερον ἀπ' ἐτέρου καταλλάττονται, ὅλον ἡδονῇ ἀντ' ὠφελείας (1158 b, 2). This point is as important as the other and could hardly be omitted here. The K³ reading καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ seems to me to spoil the argument, though it is no doubt true that they give each other equal pleasure.

φιλότης ἰσότης. This is said to be a Pythagorean formula.

λιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτῃ ὑπάρχει. VI. ἐν δὲ τοῖς 1158^a
στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἦττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῳ
δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἦττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα
γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ
νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβύται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ γί- 5
νονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυ-
φνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται
γὰρ τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ
πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις,
2 ἂ δὴ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον 10
κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν
πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα
πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)· πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν
3 σφόδρα οὐ ῥάδιον, ὥσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμ-
πειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. 15
διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχε-
ται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπη-
4 ρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν

1158 a, 1. EE. 1238 a, 30 ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία, καὶ δι' ἣν αἱ
ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐστὶ, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ

VI. § 1. ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς
κ.τ.λ. This is not a duplicate of
1157 b, 13 sqq. It is true that the
same facts are referred to, but it is
for a different purpose. In the first
passage it is stated that the "sour and
elderly" do not produce the *ἐνέργεια*
of *φιλία*, which is one sign among
others that true *φιλία* is a *τελείωσις*
and therefore, though it cannot suffer
ἀλλοίωσις, it may be lost *ἀλλοιούμενων*
τινῶν (cf. 1103 a, 25 n.). Here we are
speaking of the *κινήσεις* (*ἀλλοιώσεις*,
πάθη) called *φιλήσεις* which are the
ποιητικὰ φιλίας, and it is pointed out
that they too are absent from natures
past their prime.

§ 2. ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ. This is

really another *σημεῖον* that true *φιλία*
is *τελεία*. Like love, it cannot have
many objects, and the reason is that,
like it, it is an *ὑπερβολή*. Now one
of the definitions of *τὸ τέλειον* is *τὸ*
κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ μὴ ἔχον ὑπερ-
βολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος (Met. 1021 b, 15).
οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, sc. πολλοὺς
ῥάδιον.

§ 3. πολλοὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The two
things which make *τελεία φιλία* rare
are (1) the small number of the good,
(2) the time it takes to form.

§ 4. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. The two
ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι are now contrasted with
each other.

ὅταν ταῦτά κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1157 a,
4 sqq.

ταῦτ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς
 20 αὐτοῖς, οἶαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν
 ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων.
 καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ·
 συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονται τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν
 χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ
 25 τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζη-
 τοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς
 οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς
 ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοι φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι
 γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσι χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἅμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ

εἴρηται πρότερον· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἐγγίνονται φιλίαι καὶ ἐν παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις
 καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις. ὅθεν λέγεται, “ἤλιξ ἤλικα τέρπει” καὶ

21 κακὸς κακῷ <δὲ> συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τοὺς φαύλους, οὐχ ἢ φαῦλοι ἢ
 μηδέτεροι, ἀλλ' οἷον ᾠδικοὶ ἅμφω, ἢ ὁ μὲν φιλωδὸς ὁ δ' ᾠδικός ἐστιν,
 καὶ ἢ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταύτῃ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἔτι
 χρήσιμοι ἂν εἴεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν
 προαίρεσιν, ἢ <ἢ> οὐδέτεροι. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φαῦλῳ εἶναι
 φίλον. καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁ μὲν φαῦλος
 πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ πρὸς τὴν
 ὑπάρχουσαν, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ
 ἀγαθὰ, ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἢ πενία

ἐλευθέριον...ἀγοραίων. These words
 are properly contrasted, cf. below
 1162 b, 26.

καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δέ, opp. οἱ ἐνδεεῖς
 1157 b, 20.

οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν. I do not
 know why Grant should doubt that
 Aristotle was capable of meaning this
 as a joke. It may be true that he
 jokes with difficulty, but he was
 certainly not above a little banter of
 the Academy.

τοιοῦτους ὄντας, sc. ἡδεῖς, καὶ ἔτι
 αὐτοῖς, sc. ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἡδεῖς. This
 gives all four ὑπάρχοντα.

§ 5. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. Asp.
 λέγει...τοὺς τυράννους, cf. 1095 b, 21 n.
 The obvious fact that princes and
 potentates have two sets of friends
 confirms our doctrine. They wish to
 have all the advantages that can be
 derived from friendship; but, as οὐ
 πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
 (1159 a, 35 n.), they cannot as a rule find
 pleasant friends who are also useful.
 So they have both 'agreeable people'
 (poets, philosophers, musicians, wits)
 and also 'able henchmen' (men, for
 instance, who can poison a trouble-
 some brother) at their courts. Aristotle

οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους 30
εἰς τὰ καλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφίεμενοι,
τοὺς δὲ δεινούς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν, ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεταί
6 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπου-
δαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεταί ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἐὰν μὴ
καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχῃται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον 35
ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

συμφέρι ἢ νόσος, <καὶ> ταῦτα τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἔνεκα, ὥσπερ καὶ
αὐτὸ τὸ φάρμακον πιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ βούλεται * *, ἀλλὰ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα
βούλεται. ἐτι καθ' οὓς τρόπους καὶ ἀλλήλοις οἱ μὴ σπουδαῖοι εἶεν ἂν
φίλοι. εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἡδὺς οὐχ ἢ φαῦλος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν κοινῶν τινος μετέχει,
οἷον εἰ μουσικός. ἐτι ἢ ἐνι τι πᾶσιν ἐπιεικές· διὸ εἵνοι ὁμιλητικοὶ εἶεν
ἂν καὶ σπουδαῖοι. ἢ ἢ προσαρμόττουσιν ἐκάστῳ· ἔχουσι γάρ τι πάντες
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

knew all about this from personal experience in Macedonia. We may see the same thing in the case of Frederick the Great.

τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους...τοὺς δὲ...
For the "twofold use of the article" cf. 1117 a, 12 n. We must take δεινούς as a secondary predicative object after ζητοῦσι. 'They seek others who shall be skilful at executing orders.' For the predicative object after ζητεῖν cf. 1132 a, 22 n.

§ 6. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This section answers the question 'why do tyrants not avoid the necessity of having two sets of friends by taking good men as their friends?'

ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι κ.τ.λ. 'But such a man (τοιοῦτος=ὁ σπουδαῖος) does not become a friend to one who exceeds him (in power, i.e. τῷ τυραννῇ), unless he (the good man) is exceeded (by the tyrant) in goodness as well as (καὶ) in power. Unless this is so, the good man is not equalised to the tyrant by being exceeded in power (only) in proportion to the amount by which he is exceeded in goodness. Such tyrants

are not found every day' (on οὐ πάνυ see Ind. s.v.). This is how recent editors (Grant, Stewart) take the passage. The old view, according to which ὁ ὑπερέχων and not ὁ σπουδαῖος is the subject of ὑπερέχεται is grammatically improbable and morally absurd. It would make Aristotle say that the good man would find it easier to be the friend of a tyrant the worse the tyrant was! This sentence is really the close of a long debate. Plato had suggested in the 'Laws' that, even if philosophers could not be kings, a philosopher might do something as the friend of a young tyrant. Aristotle, who knew what court life was, renounces the idea. It is better to lecture on πολιτικὴ with the hopes of training a νομοθέτης.

οὐκ ἰσάζει. For ἰσάζειν intransitive cf. 1154 b, 24. 1162 b, 2. Aristotle has not yet explained what he means by ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος, and he has only been led into mentioning it here by the case of the tyrant. We shall see from the next section that the principle is the same as that of Distributive Justice. If the tyrant is

1158^b Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φίλαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ
 αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον
 ἀνθ' ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας·
 ὅτι δ' ἡττόν εἰσιν αὗται φίλαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται
 5 δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταύτου
 εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φίλαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς
 κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φίλαι (ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει
 ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κακείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν
 μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως

1158 b, 1. EE. 1238 b, 15 τρία μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν
 πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις κατ' ἰσότητά πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ οἱ κατ'
 ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητί πως εἰσιν ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἀλλήλοις. ἄλλη δὲ
 διαφορὰ τούτων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολήν, ὥσπερ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων.
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ ὅλως ἀρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου,
 καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον· κατ' ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ' ἀριθμὸν
 δ' οὐκ ἴσον. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης πρὸς
 τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων διαφοραὶ εἰσιν· ἄλλη πατὴρ πρὸς
 υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὕτη μὲν ὡς ἀρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, ἡ
 δὲ εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα. ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἡ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἡ οὐχ
 ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. γελοῖον γὰρ εἰ τις ἐγκαλοῖ τῷ θεῷ ὅτι οὐχ
 ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ ἀρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ.
 φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν, τοῦ ἀρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον. καὶ
 ἡδονὴ διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἢ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κτήματι ἢ παιδί,
 καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ. ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν
 χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δι' ἡδονὴν οἱ μὲν κατ' ἰσότητά εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ
 καθ' ὑπεροχὴν. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνως οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ὁμοίως
 χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. δῆλον δ' ἐν τοῖς

as much better than the philosopher as he is more powerful, there will be a proportionate equality between them, and therefore the possibility of *φιλία*, though not *φιλία* of the kind we have been discussing hitherto, but a *φιλότης* κατ' ἀξίαν in which *γίνεται πως ἰσότης* (1158 b, 27).

§ 7. Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. We now pass from *φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι*, which is ἐν ἀντιπεπονηθόσι and resembles τὸ

διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον, τὸ *φιλία καθ' ὑπεροχὴν*, which is κατ' ἀξίαν and resembles τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον. It is of great help in the interpretation of this Book to keep this analogy in view.

τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται, sc. ἐν ταῖς ὁμοειδέσι, ἢ...καταλλάττονται, sc. ἐν ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσιν.

αὗται, 'the latter,' sc. αἱ ἀνομοειδεῖς.

μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φι- 10
λίας, δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης. VII. ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας
εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσ-
βυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρ-
χοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἀλλήλων·
οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρ- 15
χομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα,
οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα
γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι'
ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίας.
2 ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ 20
ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς
γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος
ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν

ἑρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἷτιον τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις πολλάκις. ἀγνοεῖ
γὰρ ὁ ἑρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν προθυμίαν. διὸ
εἰρηκέναι νεῖκος ὁ (εἴρηκεν Εὐνικός Jackson) “ἑρώμενος τοιαῦτ' ἂν οὐκ
ἑρῶν λέγοι.” οἱ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.

b, 20. EE. 1239 a, 1 ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται, τριῶν ὄντων εἰδὼν φιλίας,
κατ' ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὐταὶ πάλιν διήρηνται
εἰς δύο· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν εἰσιν. φιλίας μὲν
οὖν ἀμφοτέραι, φίλοι δ' οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητά· ἀποπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ
ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος, φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι μὲν
δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, εἰ δὲ φιλῇ, ὀνειδίζεται ὡς ἀνάξιον φιλῶν. τῇ γὰρ
ἀξία τῶν φίλων μετρεῖται καὶ τινι ἴσῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν δι' ἡλικίας ἔλλευσιν
ἀνάξια ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην
τοιαύτην ὑπεροχήν. δεῖ δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἥττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξιούν,
καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησίμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡδέϊ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς
μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται ἀμφισβητήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν
ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλου σταθμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐν χρυσίῳ· ἀλλὰ

VII. § 1. καθ' ὑπεροχήν, in the
mathematical sense of the word,
cf. Ind. s.v.

καὶ ἀλλήλων, as well as from the
φιλίας ἐν ἰσότητι.

§ 2. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Friend-
ship ἐν ἰσότητι may or may not be

ὁμοιεσθῆ, friendship καθ' ὑπεροχήν is
always ἀνομοιεσθῆς.

ἀνάλογον...καὶ τὴν φιλήσιν δεῖ
γίνεσθαι. I do not think we should
press the meaning of καί, as if there
were anything other than the φιλίῳις
which is 'in proportion.' Rather

πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν
25 δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν,
καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως·
ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἢ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεται πως
ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ 3
30 φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον
πρώτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν
δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς 4
ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσιν
35 ἄλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν·
πλείστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ
1159^a καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι
οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ
μηδεὶος ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν 5

τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς κρίνουσιν· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οἰκείον ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ
ἐγγὺς μέγα, τὸ δ' ἀλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν· ὅταν δὲ ὑπερβολὴ ᾖ,
οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὥς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι,
οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν θεόν. φανερόν δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μὲν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ,
τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν δ' ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ φίλου εἶναι.

Aristotle has in his mind two forms of statement (1) καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, (2) ἀνάλογον τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι. Even an English writer might say loosely "if there is excess on either side, the affection must be in proportion as well."

τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, e.g. τὸν ἡδίω.

κατ' ἀξίαν, cf. 1131a, 24 n.

πως ἰσότης, for τὸ ἀνάλογον is ἰσότης λόγων, cf. 1131a, 31 n.

§ 3. Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. In spite of the parallelism between ἡ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλία and τὸ διαμεμη-
τικὸν δίκαιον, there is really a great difference. In the latter the *proportion* is everything and it does not matter how great the excess may be;

in the former *equality* in the strict arithmetical sense is the norm, and if the excess goes beyond a certain limit φιλία ceases altogether. The δίκαιον of a democratic state is only one form of justice among others, the friendship of equals is the typical friendship from which all others are variations. Eudemos (l.c.) goes so far as to say that, though they are φίλοι, you cannot call the parties φίλοι.

§ 4. ἢ τινος ἄλλου, e.g. τοῦ ἡδέος.

§ 5. ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι, sc. φίλοι, 'up to what point friends are still friends.' This is a 'brachylogy' of the type illustrated in Kühner § 597 f. Cf. especially Plato, Meno 89 a οἷς

ορίσμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι
 6 μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ 5
 ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ
 μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι
 ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθὰ· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθὰ. εἰ
 δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ
 ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνος· ἀνθρώπῳ 10
 δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα·
 αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰγαθὰ. VIII. οἱ πολ-
 λοι δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
 φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ
 φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον 15
 φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ

1159 a, 12. EE. 1239 a, 21 δῆλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον
 οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατ' ἰσότητα· ἅμα γὰρ
 ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τὸ τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή. διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρ'
 ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου· ἅμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ
 κολακευομένῳ. μάλιστα δ' οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι· τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι

ἂν εἰεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί, sc. ἀγαθοί.
 I do not therefore think it necessary
 to read ἡ φίλια as Bywater proposes
 (Contr. p. 60). Nor is there any
 difficulty in the singular μένει which
 follows.

ἀφαιρουμένων, 'subtracted' from
 the one party. Aristotle might
 equally well have said προστιθεμένων,
 'added' to the other; for ὑπεροχή
 arises from ἀφαίρεσις and πρόσθεσις.

§ 6. ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ, 'there
 is a difficulty as to whether perhaps...'

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ. The point is
 that in wishing a friend to become a
 god, you are wishing to deprive him
 of something good, namely your own
 friendship.

αὐτῷ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We shall come
 to the question of φιλαυτία presently.

VIII. § 1. οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.
 We have said that φίλια in the
 primary sense is ἐν ἰσότητι, but we

have to account for the fact that the
 mass of men prefer φίλια καθ' ὑπερο-
 χήν. It is because they prefer to be
 loved rather than to love, and this is
 due to their love of esteem. It is
 easy to account for the love of flattery;
 the common run of men like to feel
 their superiority. It may seem more
 strange to say that men seek friend-
 ships in which the other party exceeds
 them, but this also is true. They love
 the friendship of the great because of
 the expectation of favours to come,
 and the friendship of the wise and
 good as a testimony to their own
 worth. In all these cases, however,
 the φίλια is only αἰρετὸν κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκός and not καθ' αὐτό, whereas the
 friendship of equals is αἰρετὸν καθ'
 αὐτό and therefore better.

προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος. Cf. Dem.
 de Cor. § 125 ὅρα μὴ τούτων μὲν
 ἐχθρὸς ᾗς, ἐμὸς δὲ προσποιῇ.

τιμᾶσθαι, οὐ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δὲ αὐτὸ δ' εἰκόσιν²
αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι
γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι
²⁰ διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἶονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν ἂν του
δέωνται· ὥς δὴ σημείω τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ).
οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βε-
βαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι
δὴ, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.
²⁵ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖτ-
τον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ
εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι³
εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔναι
γὰρ διδόασιν τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι,
³⁰ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται,
ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς εἶναι ἐὰν ὀρώσιν εὖ πράττοντας,
καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκείνοι μηδὲν ὦν μητρὶ προσ-

ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι.
φιλητικὸς δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκείνος δὲ
φιλότιμος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι
τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῇ ὁ φιλητικός. ἔστι
γὰρ ἡ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἔστι γὰρ
λανθάνειν φιλούμενον, φιλοῦντα δ' οὐ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ
φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητὸν.
σημεῖον δέ· ἔλοιτ' ἂν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄμφω, γινώ-
σκειν ἢ γινώσκεισθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς αἱ γυναῖκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ
ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἢ Ἀντιφῶντος. καὶ γὰρ εἰκε τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεισθαι
αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν
τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἕνεκα. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν
πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκονται.

§ 2. ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. Cf. 1095 b, 21 n.

βεβαιῶσαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1095 b, 18 sqq.

§ 3. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ. Another reason why φιλία καθ' ὑπεροχὴν is not φιλία in the true sense. Whether we regard the ὑπερέχων or the ὑπερεχό-

μενος, such φιλία is always διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, cf. 1159 a, 12 n.

σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες κ.τ.λ. This σημεῖον derives its force from the fact that φιλία is φύσει. We shall expect to find the characteristics of true φιλία in a rudimentary form (ἔχρη) even in purely instinctive feelings.

- 4 ἡκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας
οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων
ἀρετῇ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, 35
- 5 οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ 1159^b
ἄνισοι μάλιστα εἰεν φίλοι· ἰσάζονται γὰρ ἂν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης
καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, 5
ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μὴτ'
αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μο-
χθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμέ-
νουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι,
- 6 χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς 10

1159 a, 33. EE. 1239 b, 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας, καὶ πόσοι τρόποι, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ φίλοι διαφέρουσιν, οἷ τε κατ' ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, εἴρηται· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φίλον λέγεται καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη, ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν συμπεριλαμβανόντων (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁμοῖον φασιν εἶναι φίλον, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον), λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσι πρὸς τὰς εἰρημένους φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὅμοιος αἰεὶ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἡθος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ ἄφρων οὐθὲν ἔοικεν ἔωθεν καὶ ἐσπέρας. διὸ ἐὰν μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ φαῦλοι, οὐ φίλοι ἐαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ δίστανται· ἡ δ' οὐ βέβαιος φιλία οὐ φιλία. ὥστε οὕτως μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, ὅτι <τὸ> ἀγαθὸν ὅμοιον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις ταῦθ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ

§ 4. τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων. Cf. above 1155 a, 29. This is another σημείον. No one is praised for being loved.

§ 5. οὕτω δ' ἂν, sc. τῷ φιλεῖν (not merely τῷ φιλεῖσθαι) κατ' ἀξίαν or ἀνάλογον. The ὑπερεχόμενος may make up for his inferiority by the strength of his affection.

τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν, sc. ὁμοίων.

μόνιμοι... καθ' αὐτοὺς, virtually

διαμένουσιν ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς, from which it follows that they are permanently ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, their activities being 'the same or similar' 1156 b, 17.

οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς, much less ἀλλήλοις. We cannot be sure that the activities of one bad man will be the same or similar to those of another, as we can in the case of the good. See the fuller account in EE. loc. cit. above.

ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὲς εἰδότη· οὐ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὧν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀν-
 15 τιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ φιλητοὺς οὕτως ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐν-
 20 αντίου καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

φύσει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ καὶ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ ζῆεις καὶ σνιημερεύσεις τοῖς ὁμογενέσιν ἡδίσται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴουσ· καὶ ταύτῃ ἐνδέχεται καὶ τοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν.

κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ.

τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον ὡς τὸ χρήσιμον· αὐτὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ ὅμοιον ἄχρηστον. διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δεῖται καὶ δοῦλος δεσπότου, καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν τὸ ἐναντίον ὡς χρήσιμον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τέλει ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ τύχῃ οὐ ἐπιθυμῇ, ἐν τῷ τέλει μὲν ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀρέγεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ. ἐστὶ δὲ πῶς καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὀρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ μέσον· ὡς σύμβολα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσον. ἔτι κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος ὀρέγονται γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλήλων τὰναντία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέσου. ὑπερψυχθέντες γάρ, εἰς θερμανθῶσιν, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, καὶ ὑπερθερμανθέντες, εἰς ψυχθῶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ μή, αἰὲν ἐπιθυμία, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις. ἀλλὰ χαίρει ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἅνεν ἐπιθυμίας τοῖς φύσει ἡδέσιν, οἱ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξιστάσι τῆς φύσει ἕξεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἐστίν· τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ᾗ ἐπὶ τῶν

§ 6. οἷον πένης, cf. 1157 b, 21 n.

ἀλλοτριώτερα, i. e. φυσικώτερα

§ 7. οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ κ.τ.λ. Cf. the quotation from Euripides 1155 b, 3.

1155 b, 2.

ΙΧ. "Εοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταῦτά καὶ 25
ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἀπάσῃ
γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσ-
αγορεύουσι γοῦν ὥς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρα-
τιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ'
ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ 30
δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων," ὁρθῶς· ἐν κοι-
νωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἐταίροις
πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μάλ-
λον αἱ δ' ἦττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ 35
ταῦτά γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 1160^a
οὐδ' ἐταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων, καὶ
αὐξήσιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρή-
ματα ἀποστερηῆσαι ἐταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ 5

ἐμψύχων. διὸ ἐνίστε ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις
καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥηθύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίστανται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

1159 b, 25. EE. 1241 b, 11 δοκεῖ δὲ τό τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἴσον
τι καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἰσότης [ἡ] φιλότης. αἱ
δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ
τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν, ὥστε ὅσα εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ δικαίου καὶ κοινωνίας,
καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐγγὺς ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς.

ΙΧ. § 1. "Εοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. We
pass now to the discussion of *φιλία ἐν
κοινωνίᾳ*, especially in the state. It
is here that the parallelism of *φιλία*
and *δικαιοσύνη* comes out most clearly.
ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1155 a, 22 sqq.

περὶ ταῦτά, the things which are
its matter, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, the persons
who are its object. Cf. 1111 a, 1 n.
τι δίκαιον. Cf. Plato Rep. 351 b,
sqq.

προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν κ.τ.λ. The
usual confirmation from current lan-
guage necessary to set up an *ἐνδοξος*

πρότασις. So in English, 'My learned
friend,' 'My Right Hon. friend.'

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, often quoted by
Plato. It is said to be a Pythagorean
maxim. Cf. especially Gorg. 507 e
ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἐνι κοινωνίᾳ, φιλία οὐκ ἂν
εἴη.

§ 2. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς κ.τ.λ. This
is an implied criticism of Plato's
Republic.

§ 3. αὐξήσιν λαμβάνει, virtual
passive of αὐξεται. Fritzsche com-
pares ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει Soph. El.
183 b, 21.

βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῶ ἢ ὀθνεῖν, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντιν οὖν ἄλλον. αὖξασθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα. αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις εἰκάσι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπο-
 10 ρεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινὶ συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοί τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρος
 15 τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται. ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασω-
 20 τῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὐταὶ γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας [πᾶσαι δ' αὐταὶ ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκάσιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς

1160 a, 14. EE. 1241 b, 24 αἱ δ' ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι εἰσὶν [ἡ] μῦριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν φρατέρων ἡ τῶν ὀργίων, ἡ αἱ χρηματιστικά ἐτι πολιτεῖαι.

ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, masc. of the persons, ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα = περί ταῦτά 1159 b, 25.

§ 4. τῆς πολιτικῆς, sc. κοινωνίας.

συμπορεύονται, sc. οἱ κοινωνοί, cf. below a, 25, especially οἱ σύμπλοι and the like.

ἐπὶ τινὶ συμφέροντι, 'the condition upon which they make a journey in common is profit of some kind.' For the sense of ἐπὶ cf. 1110 a, 23.

τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν. Pol. 1278 b, 23 sq. τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστω τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. We see from this that τὸ συμφέρον includes τὸ εὖ ζῆν as well as τὸ ζῆν.

φασιν. For the ἐνδοξον cf. Plato,

Rep. 369 c. Ar. Pol. 1279 a, 17. 1282 b, 17.

§ 5. ἡ πόλις, Ramsauer understands this as referring either to exiles trying to recover their city or colonists seeking for a new one. But surely it is more natural to think of a πολιτοκράτεια. For εἴτε...εἴτε...ἢ... cf. 1112 a, 24.

ἔνιαι δὲ...συνουσίας. It is clear that Bywater is right in holding that b, 23 θυσίας τε ποιούντες κ.τ.λ. is continuous with this. I think it safer, however, to assume an interpolation than a dislocation, and b, 21 πᾶσαι... b, 23 βίον is not wanted here. It is repeated in substance at the end of the chapter.

τὸν βίον] θυσίας τε ποιῶντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας
 , τιμὰς <τε> ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀνα-
 πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ 25
 φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκο-
 ῖον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον
 ροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς
 ἥς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίας ταῖς
 ἡς κοινωνίαις.

30

Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἵσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβά-
 νων φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασι-

is, agreeing with κοινωνοί
 κοινωνίαι. Cardwell com-
 ic. iii. 79. Eur. Or. 38.
 151, γ. Cf. also above

κ.τ.λ. They combine the
 the gods (the θυσίαι) with
 relaxation (the σύνοδοι).

σεις πορίζοντες. This is
 ant point, for it shows how
 νίαι are not merely for the
 leisure but for the sake of
 life. That they are for the
 νάπαυσις is proved by the
 the original festivals were
 e time of σχολή after the
 ck of the harvest. On
 see 1127 b, 33 n. Lambinus
 Hor. Epp. ii. 1, 139.

ται γίνεσθαι, i.e. in Aristotle's

Cf. the argument in 'Ath.
 where the relative antiquity
 χοντες is proved from the
 the festivals they managed.
 n must be more recent than
 λέως and the πολέμαρχος
 e only manages τὰ ἐπιθετα.
 ἀρχαῖαι does not mean 'in
 mes' (παλαιαί), but 'coming
 n ancient times,' 'original'
 d to ἐπιθετα.

ἀκολουθήσουσι, cf. above
 8 n.

. Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.
 fications of constitutions, cf.

Plato Rep. 301 a, sqq. 544 c, sqq.
 Ar. Pol. 1279 a, 22 sqq. Rhet.
 1365 b, 29.

παρεκβάσεις, 'deflections.' The
 name is taken from music where
 certain scales were called 'deflected.'
 Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 386. The fullest
 explanation of the meaning is given in
 Pol. 1290 a, 13 sqq., where we are told
 that oligarchy and democracy are
 commonly regarded as the typical
 constitutions, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευ-
 μάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ
 νότια, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις.
 People make aristocracy a kind of
 oligarchy and the πολιτεία a kind of
 democracy just as they make the west
 wind a deflection of the north and the
 east wind of the south. He goes on
 ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας,
 ὥς φασὶ τινες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τίθενται
 εἶδη δύο, τὴν δωριστὶ καὶ τὴν φρυγιστὶ,
 τὰ δ' ἄλλα συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δωρία
 τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν. But the true
 doctrine is δυοῖν ἢ μιᾷ οὐσῃ τῆς
 καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι
 παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης
 ἁρμονίας (the well tempered scale) τὰς
 δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς
 μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικω-
 τέρας, τὰς δ' ἀνείμενας καὶ μαλακὰς
 δημοτικὰς. We shall therefore best
 realise Aristotle's meaning if we think
 of the παρεκβάσεις as 'out of tune,'
 remembering at the same time that

λεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν
 τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκείου φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν
 35 εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ 2
 βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις δὲ βασι-
 1160^b λείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ
 πλείστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ,
 ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς
 ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ
 5 τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ

vulgar people at Athens preferred scales which were not natural, cf. Pol. 1342 a, 22 εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα (see Susemihl and Hicks p. 636). The ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι are based on the natural notes of the scale.

Βασιλεία... ἀριστοκρατία. Pol. 1279 a, 32 καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν, πλείωνων δ' ἑνὸς, ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἣ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς.

ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. Plato calls this ὀλιγαρχία. Rep. 550 c Λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν;—τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣ δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείαν. Isokrates, who only allows three constitutions, speaks (Panath. § 131) of δημοκρατίαν...ἀριστοκρατίαν χρωμένην, ἣν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ χρησιμωτάτην οὖσαν ὥσπερ τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιταῖς ἀριθμοῦσιν.

τιμοκρατικὴν. Plato uses the word in a very different sense (see Rep. 545 b, sqq.). He dissociates it from its natural connexion with τιμήματα and uses it of states like Sparta whose ruling principle is honour.

πολιτείαν. This refers to the πάτ-

ριος πολιτεία which the moderate party tried to restore after the Peloponnesian War. Its ideal was that political power should be confined to οἱ τὰ ὅπλα παρεχόμενοι, and that is why it is here called τιμοκρατική. In the Politics Aristotle calls it πολιτεία simply and says (1279 a, 37) ὅταν τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν δρομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. But he means exactly the same thing as he does here. That he is not thinking of a 'timocratic' state, in which there are several classes based upon a property qualification, is shown by b, 18 ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ τιμῇ.

§ 2. **βελτίστη... βασιλεία.** This is only to be understood, however, of the ideal ruler in the παμβασιλεία, the man of ἡρωικὴ καὶ θεία ἀρετή. The whole question is thoroughly discussed in the Third Book of the Politics.

χειρίστη... τιμοκρατία. The reason is given Pol. 1279 a, 39 ἕνα μὲν διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος κ.τ.λ. Pol. 1279 b, 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος. 1311 a, 2 ἡ δὲ τυραννίς πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς μὲν τυραννικὸς τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν.

ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρω-
 τὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης·
 τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύ-
 τῃς ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ.
 3 μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φανλότης γάρ 10
 ἔστι μοναρχίας ἢ τυραννίς, ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραν-
 νος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν
 ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ
 πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
 αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι 15
 δὴ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ
 τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσιν αὗται·

1160 b, 12. EE. 1241 b, 33 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν
 τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἶδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς
 κοινωνίας. κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ <δημοκρατικὴ> κοινωνία καὶ ἡ
 ἑταιρική φιλία, τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὄρω μετρεῖται· κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ
 ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἀρίστη καὶ βασιλική. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ὀλίγον τῷ
 ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. καὶ ἡ φιλία δὲ
 ὁμοίως πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.

κληρωτὸς... βασιλεύς. Ramsauer
 refers to Plato, Polit. 290 e sqq. καὶ
 δὴ καὶ παρ' ὑμῶν... τῷ λαχόντι βασιλεῖ
 φασὶ τῇδε τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα
 πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσίων ἀποδε-
 δόσθαι. 291 a τοὺτους τε τοῖνυν τοὺς
 κληρωτοὺς βασιλέας ἅμα καὶ ιερέας.
 The reference, then, is primarily to
 the βασιλεὺς at Athens and, as Mr. J.
 Solomon has shown (Cl. Rev. iii,
 294), the meaning is practically 'a
 merely titular king.' Mr Solomon
 quotes two further passages in illus-
 tration (1) Ar. Pol. 1318 a, 2 περι-
 αῖρεσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ
 αἰρετῶν κληρωτοὺς ποιεῖν (as a means
 of reducing a magistracy to insigni-
 ficance) and (2) Plato, Laws 692 a
 οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ (i.e. the
 ἀρχὴ of the Spartan kings) τὴν τῶν
 ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγύς τῆς κληρωτῆς

ἀγαγὼν δυνάμει, which, as he rightly
 says, must practically mean 'reducing
 it to an almost nominal kingship.'

φανερώτερον, sc. ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς τιμο-
 κρατίας (a, 36).

κάκιστον δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the τόπος
 see Top. 117 b, 2. Cf. Pol. 1289 a,
 39 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ
 θειοτάτης πολιτείας παρέκβασιν εἶναι
 χειρίστην.

§ 3. μεταβαίνει, impersonal, 'the
 transition is from—.'

εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. Pol. 1306 b, 25
 ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἀρχοντες,
 οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτ' ὀλίγοι. 1290 b,
 19 ὀλιγαρχία δ' (ἐστίν) ὅταν οἱ πλοῦστοι
 καὶ εὐγενέστεροι (κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν),
 ὀλίγοι ὦντες. 1279 b, 7 ὀλιγαρχία
 πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων (συμφέρον ἐστίν)
 (Fritzsche).

εἰς δημοκρατίαν. Pol. 1290 b, 17

πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ 20 δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουνσιν. ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ πρὸς υἱεὺς κοινωνία βασι- 25 λείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐν τεύθειν δὲ καὶ "Ὀμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννικὴ· χρώνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν. τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ 30 τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀρχεῖ, καὶ

1160 b, 32. EE. 1241 b, 27 αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι ἐν οἰκίαις συννέπρχουσι, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὥστερ

ἐστὶ δημοκρατία ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι, πλείους ὄντες, κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ᾤσιν. 1279 b, 8 ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία (ἐστὶ) πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν ἀπόρων.

σύνοροι, 'conterminous.'

πλήθους... βούλεται... εἶναι. Cf. 1132 a, 21 n. 'The ideal of timocracy too is to be the rule of the majority.' If the *τιμήμα* were so high as to exclude the majority, we should have an oligarchy.

οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι, e.g. the 5000 at Athens, οἱ τὰ τιμήματα παρεχόμενοι. ἥκιστα μοχθηρόν. Cf. Pol. 1289 b, 2 ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειριστὴν οὔσαν πλείστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν..., μετριοτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

τῆς πολιτείας, sc. τῆς τιμοκρατικῆς.

§ 4. τῷ πατρὶ μέλει, so that his *δρος* is τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων συμφέρον. Cf. Pol. 1259 b, 10 ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων

ἀρχὴ βασιλική. Here too Homer's *Zeus patēr* is referred to.

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1132 a, 21 n.

ἐν Πέρσαις κ.τ.λ. This is in striking contrast to Xenophon's ideal picture. αὕτη μὲν οὖν, i.e. the 'tyrannical' relation between master and slave, as opposed to that between son and father.

τῶν διαφερόντων. How they differ we learn from Pol. 1260 a, 9 ἄλλων γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἀρχεῖ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός· καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος δλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν ἀλλ' ἀτέλει.

§ 5. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς, sc. κοινωνία. In Pol. 1259 b, 1 we have γυναικὸς μὲν (sc. ἀρχεῖν) πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς.

περὶ ταῦτα ἂν δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἀρμόζει, ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖ 1161^a οὐσαι· οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικῇ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺν ταῖς ἡλικίαις 5 διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκίσεων (ἐνταῦθα

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις)· βασιλικὴ μὲν ἡ τοῦ γεννησάμενος, ἀριστοκρατικὴ δ' ἡ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς, πολιτεία δ' ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννὶς ὀλιγαρχία δῆμος. καὶ τὰ δίκαια δὴ τοσαῦτα.

ΕΕ. 1242 a, 1 λέγονται δὲ φιλίας συγγενικὴ ἑταιρικὴ κοινωνικὴ ἢ λεγομένη πολιτικὴ. ἔστι μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἔχουσα εἶδη, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀδελφῶν, ἡ δ' ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶν (καὶ γὰρ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ἡ πατρικὴ, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, οἷον ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἑταιρικῆς· ἐπιλαμβάνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρέσβειον)· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ συνέστηκε μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον καὶ μάλιστα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐταρκεῖν δοκοῦσι συνελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ συνῆλθόν γ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ συζῆν χάριν. μόνῃ δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ παρ' αὐτὴν παρέκβασις οὐ μόνον φιλίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καθ' ὑπεροχὴν. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τῇ τῶν χρησίμων φιλίᾳ, διὰ τὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνῆλθον πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕνεκα κοινού τινος (οἷον γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχὴ) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρωμένου ἕνεκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἧς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ τρυπάνον εἶναι διττόν, ὧν τὸ κυριώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ τρύπησις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ εἶδει σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

μεθίστησιν, sc. τὴν κοινωνίαν, i.e. εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν.

ἐπὶ κληροῖ οὐσαι. Cf. the well-known lines of Menander—

"Ὅστις γυναῖκα ἐπὶ κληρον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν

πλουτοῦσαν, ἥτοι μῆνιν ἐκτίνει θεῶν, ἡ βούλετ' ἀτυχεῖν, μακάριος καλούμενος.

§ 6. τῶν οἰκίσεων, 'habitations.' As Stewart points out, the word is often used of the habitations of wild beasts: "Dicuntur autem haud male οἰκήσεις quae non sunt οἰκίαι, nedum οἶκοι," Ramsauer. The word οἰκία implies an organised family, οἰκήσις is a mere place to live in.

γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἐκάστω ἐξουσία.

- 10 XI. Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομὲς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὁμηρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέ-
15 μνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρικὴ, 2 διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευ-
20 μένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται 3 οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς 4 γυναικα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκά-
25 στω· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἐται- 5 ρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιώται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμόηθεις ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὲ
30 καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δι- 6 καιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν

1161 a, 30. EE. 1241 b, 17 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον, τούτων μὲν οὐκ

XI. § 1. Καθ' ἐκάστην κ.τ.λ. We may compare the modern ideas of (1) Loyalty, (2) *Noblesse oblige*, (3) Fraternity.

ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. How far that is is explained above, 1134 a, 26 sqq.

ὥσπερ νομὲς προβάτων. Here again Aristotle is thinking of Plato's *Politikos*.

§ 2. ἡ πατρικὴ, sc. φιλία.

διαφέρει, sc. ὁ πατήρ.

§ 3. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. The son or the subject *ισάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος*.

§ 5. βούλονται...εἶναι. 'The ideal of the *politeia* is that the citizens should be equal and good.' Here *ἐπιεικεῖς* = ἀγαθοί, cf. 1136 a, 35 n.

τῇ χειρίσθη· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς
 γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ
 φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ
 ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελεῖται 35
 μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ 1161 b
 ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ
 βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστίν·
 ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦ-
 7 λος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' 5
 ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς
 πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ
 8 φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς
 τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρα-
 τίαις ἐπὶ πλείστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν. 10

XII. Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ
 εἴρηται. ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν
 ἑταιρικὴν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί,
 καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς εἰκόασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ

ἔστι κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δύο ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἓν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός [οὐδέν].
 οὐδὲ διαίρετον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ἐνός οὐ ἕνεκά
 ἐστιν. τό τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ
 δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόνιον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὥσπερ
 δοῦλος ἄψυχος.

§ 6. δοῦλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον. Cf. Pol. 1253 b, 27 τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἐμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἶαζ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶρεϊς ἐμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζῶν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἐμψυχον.

§ 7. ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος. Cf. Ulpian 'Quod attinet ad ius civile servi pro nullis habentur, non tamen iure naturali; quia, quod ad ius naturale pertinet, omnes homines sunt aequales.' Pol. 1255 b, 12 διὸ καὶ συμφέρον

ἐστὶ τι καὶ φίλα δοῦλῳ καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένοις.

— XII. § 1. ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. 'We might make συγγενική and ἑταιρική φιλία into separate species' from κοινωνική φιλία in the strict sense. Eudemos (loc. cit. p. 387) actually does so.

πολιτικά, 1161 a, 10 sqq. φυλετικά 1160 a, 18.

συμπλοϊκά, 1159 b, 28. 1160 a, 15. καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, e.g. ἡ τῶν συστρατιωτῶν.

- 15 καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τά-
 ξειεν ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνε-2
 ται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς·
 οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα,
 16 τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον
 20 δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ
 τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνψεκίωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ
 τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκείον τῷ
 ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὁδοὺς θριξ' ὀτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐδὲν
 τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἦττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν
 25 γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου
 τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ
 δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν 3
 τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτοὺς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι
 αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πε-
 30 φυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέ-
 ναι· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταῦτοποιεῖ·
 ὅθεν φασὶ ταῦτόν αἷμα καὶ ρίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ
 δὲ ταυτό πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν 4
 καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἡλιξ γὰρ ἡλικα,

τὴν ξενικὴν. 1156 a, 31.

§ 2. μᾶλλον συνψεκίωται κ.τ.λ.,
 i.e. οικειότερον ἔχει, 'feels it more its
 own.'

φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. Mure-
 tus quotes Eurip. frag. incert.—

μήτηρ φιλοτεκνος μᾶλλον ἔστι τοῦ
 πατρός·

ἢ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς οἶδεν ὄνθ', ὁ δ' οἶεται.

Menander Karx. 2—

αὐτὸν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οἶδε τοῦ ποτ' ἐγένετο,
 ἀλλ' ὑπονοοῦμεν πάντες, ἢ πιστεύομεν.

Homer, Od. i, 215—

μήτηρ μὲν τ' ἐμέ φησι τοῦ ἔμμεναι,
 αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε

οὐκ οἶδ'· οὐ γὰρ πῶ τις ἐὼν γόνον αὐτὸς
 ἀνέγνω.

§ 3. τῷ κεχωρίσθαι, i.e. they are
 ἕτεροι in virtue of their separation, just
 as they are οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ αὐτῶν τι εἶναι.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. The following ἐκεῖνα
 shows that this is neuter.

ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα κ.τ.λ., 'their
 identity with their parents identifies
 them with one another.' Cf. Met.
 1018 a, 7 ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἡ ταυτότης
 ἐνότης τίς ἐστιν ἢ πλείονων τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ
 ὅταν χρῆται ὡς πλείονων, οἷον ὅταν λέγῃ
 αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ταῦτόν· ὡς δυεῖ γὰρ χρῆται
 αὐτῷ.

ταῦτόν αἷμα. This idea is expressed
 by the word δραιοις. Cf. Aisch.
 Eum. 89 αὐτὰδελφον αἷμα.

ρίζαν, sc. τὴν αὐτήν. Cf. Eur. Ion
 1576 παῖδες γενόμενοι τέσσαρες ρίζης
 μιᾶς.

καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις, i.e. κεχωρι-
 μένοις. Cf. EE. 1245 a, 35 βούλεται
 ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος.

§ 4. τὸ σύντροφον, 'being brought

καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ 35
 ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων 1162^a
 συνωφείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ'
 οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ' ἄλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω
 5 τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνους,
 καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· 5
 εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασιν τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆ-
 6 ναι αἷτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ
 ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων,
 ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ
 ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς 10
 ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ
 γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοιό-
 στεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες
 ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ
 7 βεβαιωτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγε- 15
 νῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ
 φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
 μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον οἰκία
 πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζώοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν
 ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον 20

up together,' τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν, sc. εἶναι, their 'being of an age.'

ἡλικίαν γὰρ ἡλικία. Cf. EE. 1238 a, 33, Rhet. 1371 b, 15. The proverb is quoted by Plato, Phdr. 240 c ἡλικία γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρεπει τὸν ἡλικία.

ἐκ τούτων, sc. ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν.

§ 6. τῶν ὀθνείων, i.e. τῆς τῶν ὀθνείων.

§ 7. ἀνάλογον, 'in proportion' (to the closeness of their relationship).

τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικόν. Cf. Pol. 1252 a, 26 ἀνάγκη δὲ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνεν ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἔνεκεν, (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι οἷον αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν

ἕτερον).

πρότερον (sc. χρόνῳ) καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον (sc. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως). But in another sense the state is πρότερον καὶ κάλλιον. Cf. Pol. 1253 a, 19. The addition of καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον shows what kind of priority is meant.

κοινότερον τοῖς ζώοις, a sure sign that a thing is φυσικόν, in the sense of ἀναγκαῖον. Cf. Introductory Note.

ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, i.e. ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τεκνοποιία. Cf. Gen. An. 753 a, 7 quoted in the Introductory Note. See also Oecon. 1343 b, 13 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἀλόγως τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον μετέχουσι τῆς φύσεως (surely φρονήσεως), ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τεκνοποιίας μόνον χάριν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ φρονιμωτέροις διήθρῳται μᾶλλον

τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ
 25 καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετὴ, καὶ χαίρουεν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θάπτον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς βιωτέον ἀνδρὶ 8
 30 πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται

1162 a, 29. EE. 1242 a, 19 τὸ δὴ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ ὁμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν δίκαιόν τί ἐστιν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν πρὸς φίλον. τό τε γὰρ δίκαιόν τισι καὶ κοινωνοῖς, καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνός, ὁ μὲν γένους, ὁ δὲ βίου. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῶν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰλλα ποτε συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι [καί] θήλει καὶ ἄρρενι † ἀλλ' αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν † (ἄλλο δὲ δὴ μοναυλικόν?), ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν ἄνθρωπος ζῶν πρὸς οὓς φύσει συγγένεια ἐστίν· καὶ κοινωνία τοῖνυν καὶ δίκαιόν τι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πόλις εἴη· οἰκία δ' ἐστὶ τις φιλία. δεσπότου μὲν οὖν καὶ δούλου ἥπερ καὶ τέχνης καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται οὔτε φιλία οὔτε δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὕγιον οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον· γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία· πατὴρ δὲ καὶ υἱοῦ ἢ αὐτῇ ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαστος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον· ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐταιρικὴ μάλιστα ἢ κατ' ἰσότητα.

οὐ γάρ τι νόθος τῷδ' ἀπεδείχθη·

ἀμφοῖν δὲ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ἐκλήθη

Ζεὺς ἐμὸς ἄρχων.

ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἴσον ζητούντων λέγεται. διὸ ἐν οἰκίᾳ πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαὶ φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας καὶ δικαίου.

(φαίνονται γὰρ μάλλον βοήθειαι γινόμεναι καὶ εὐνοιαὶ καὶ συνεργαίαι ἀλλήλοις), ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ μάλιστα, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι συνεργὰ ἀλλήλοις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἐστί.

διήρηται τὰ ἔργα. Fritzsche quotes

Oecon. 1343 b, 26 οὕτω προωκοῦσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑκατέρου ἢ φύσει, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικός, πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν, κ.τ.λ.

§ 8. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται, sc. τὸ δίκαιον.

τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἑταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

- XIII. Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ 35 καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χεῖροιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσι- 1162^b μον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. 2 γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ 5 τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνη ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἂν ἢ χαρίεις, ἀμύ- 10 νεται εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὐ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοῖται τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγε- 3 ται. οὐ πάνν δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὐ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἔξον μὴ 15 4 συνημερεύειν. ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ'

συμφοιτητήν, 'schoolfellow.' Plato, Euthyd. 272 c οἱ συμφοιτηταί μου, Phdr. 255 a.

XIII. § 1. Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν κ.τ.λ. We come now to certain practical rules about φιλία. We always make a point of drawing practical conclusions from our theories, even if they interrupt the main argument. They serve also, however, to bring out the true nature of Friendship.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, κ.τ.λ., i.e. they may be equally pleasant or useful, or one more pleasant or useful than the other (ἰσάζοντες...ἢ διαφέροντες).

κατ' ἰσότητα closely with ἰσάζειν.

καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς, sc. τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τῷ ἡδεῖ ἢ οἱ τῷ χρήσιμῳ.

τῷ...ἀποδιδόναι sc. δεῖ ἰσάζειν. The reading τῷ is probably a conjecture by the corrector of cod. Par. 1417 (τὸ K^b L^b), but it seems necessary to make a proper antithesis to κατ' ἰσότητα.

§ 2. ἀμύνεται, Spengel quotes Rhet. 1398 a, 24 διὸ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνεσθαι ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα. Cardwell refers to Isokr. 86 d χαριέντως αὐτοὺς ἡμινάμην, Thuc. iv, 63 τὸν εὖ καὶ κακῶς δρῶντα ἐξ ἴσου ἀρετῇ ἀμυνόμεθα.

§ 3. οὐ πάνν δὲ, sc. ἐγκλήματα γίνεται. Ind. s. v. οὐ πάνν.

ὠφελεία γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις αἰεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ
 20 δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πά-
 σχοντες δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, 5
 τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ
 χρήσιμον φιλίας ἢ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται
 οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συν-
 25 ἀλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ 6
 ῥήτοϊς, ἢ μὲν πᾶμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἢ
 δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντι-
 τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῦκ ἀμφίλογον,

1162 b, 21. EE. 1242 b, 22 ἡ δὲ κατ' ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτική. ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐστὶ μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοίως

οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρήας,

καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἡ φιλία· ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε τὸ βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα ὅπως εὖ ποιῇ ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἴσον ᾗ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας. κατ' ἰσότητά δὴ βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρησίμου φιλίας εἶδη δύο, ἡ μὲν νομικὴ ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ. βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι. διὸ εἴρηται

μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ.

ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν <ᾗ> ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, [καὶ] νομικῇ·

§ 5. κατὰ νόμον. The opposition is not quite correctly stated, for a νομικὸν δίκαιον may quite well be unwritten, nor is an ἄγραφον δίκαιον necessarily φύσει δίκαιον. But the expression is natural, for τὰ γεγραμμένα δίκαια ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν (Rhet. 1374 a, 19).

φιλίας. So K^b and Asp. This reading is guaranteed by Eudemos (loc. cit.), otherwise we might be

tempted to adopt the reading of L^b ὠφελείας.

ἠθικῇ. We still speak of a 'moral' as distinct from a 'legal' obligation, though the associations are different.

ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν, sc. φίλων, συναλλάξωσι ... διαλύωνται, 'when they contract and dissolve the friendship.'

§ 6. ἡ μὲν... ἡ δὲ... A further subdivision of ἡ νομικῇ.

ὄν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων
 , ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλά- 30
 ις. ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται
 δῆποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν,
 ὃ δεδοκῶς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλ-
 λὰ καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει
 τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά, 35
 κρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ
 ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. **δυναμένῳ** 1163^a

Ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἐταιρική.
 Πλείστα ἐγκλημα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν.
 γὰρ φιλαί ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν· οἱ δ'
 ἕτερα βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου ἕνεκα,
 δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπικεικῆς, διὸ ὡς πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν.
 μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλείστα ἐγκλήματα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀνέγκλητον, οἱ δ' ἡδεῖς ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται· οἱ δὲ
 μοι οὐκ εὐθὺς διαλύονται, ἀν μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἐταιρικῶς προσ-
 ται). ὅμως δὲ τῆς χρησίμου ἢ νομικῇ ἀνέγκλητος. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν
 διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ ἴσον), ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ
 οὐ· διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὁμιλοῦσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι
 τῶν ἐκουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ὁρθῶς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ
 εἰς δίκαιον εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττουσιν. ἔστι
 ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέρω,
 κατέρος ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύουσιν.

κόν...ἔχει, 'the postponement
 friendly element in it.'

παρ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. Stewart
 Theophrastos *Περὶ συμβολαίων*
 tobæus *Χαρῶνδας καὶ Πλάτων*
χρήμα κελεύουσι διδόναι καὶ
εἰν, ἐὰν δὲ τις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ
κιν, αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς

ὁτιδῆποτε ἄλλο, sc. ὠφελεῖ.
 seems the only verb we can

οὐχ ὁμοίως, 'not so well.'
 does not come out of the
 is on as good terms as he went

in.' The phrase cannot be equivalent
 to *μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν* above; for it
 refers exclusively to *ἠθικὴ φιλία*.

βούλεσθαι ... προαιρεῖσθαι. The
 appetitive element is sound, but the
 intellectual and deliberative is not.

§ 9. **δυναμένῳ** δὴ κ.τ.λ. The
 words *καὶ ἐκόντι* can hardly be
 translated 'willingly (i.e. without
 waiting to be asked)' (Stewart), for
ἐκόν means 'voluntarily' (i.e. without
 being forced). Nor can *ἐκόντι*
ἀνταποδοτέον naturally mean anything
 else than 'one must give back to the
 man who is willing to take it.' I

δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν [καὶ ἐκόντι] (ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον· ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει—οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος—καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥήτοις εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον)· καὶ ὁ ὁμολόγησεν ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ διδούς ἠξίωσεν ἂν. ὥστ' εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη ἢ μή. ἀμφισβήτησιν 10
10 δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ

καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πρῶγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθέν, πόσον, ἢ ποῖον ἦν τῷ πεπονθότι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ὅπερ λέγει Θεόγνις·

σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεά, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τοῖναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, σοὶ μὲν παιδιὰν τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐντεῦθεν δ' εἴρηται τὰ ἐγκλήματα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὡς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας, ὅτι δεομένη ἐποίησεν, ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο, λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὠφέλειαν πόσον ἡδύνατο, ἀλλ' οὐ τί ἦν αὐτῷ· ὁ δὲ τοῖναντίον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅσον αὐτῷ. ὅτε δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῷ μικρὸν ἀπέβη, ὁ δ' ὅσον αὐτῷ μέγα ἐδύνατο, ὅσον εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἀξίον ὠφέλησεν, ὁ μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ὁ δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα

suspect the interpolator meant it so, not seeing the drift of the next clause. Aspasios, as well as K^b, omits the words.

ἄκοντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A long 'digressive parenthesis' (Bywater). We must not assume that our benefactor meant to be a friend to us.

ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα κ.τ.λ. There is an anacolouthon here caused by the parenthesis within a parenthesis οὐ γὰρ...δρῶντος. We expect ἀποδοτέον, but the sentence is resumed by καθάπερ οὖν κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ὁ ὁμολόγησεν ἂν, sc. ἀνταποδοτέον. I have adopted Bywater's conjecture here. We must join closely τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν καὶ ὁ ὁμολόγησεν

ἂν. 'He must repay the equivalent of the benefit received and what he would have agreed to repay if he could' (but for the misunderstanding).

οὐδ'...ἠξίωσεν ἂν. He is entitled to assume that it is not a mere commercial transaction and that the giver is so much his friend that he would not have asked him to pay if he were unable.

ἐπὶ τίνι, 'on what terms.' ὑπομένη, sc. εὐεργετούμενος.

§ 10. ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει, 'there is room for difference of opinion,' and therefore ἐγκλήματα may arise. Ind. s.v. ἔχειν.

πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαν-
τος εὐεργεσία. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαυτά φασι λαβεῖν
παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἢ μικρὰ ἢν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ'
ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέ-
γιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἢ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν 15
11 κινδύνους ἢ τοιαύταις χρεΐαις. ἄρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον
τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος
γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν
ἴσῃν· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἢ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέλη-
ται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· 20
κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ
ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ὅκειν ἢ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς
ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἥθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

περὶ τούτων ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότ' ἦν, ὁ δὲ πῶς
νῦν, ἂν μὴ διεῖπωνται. ἢ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν
καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν. ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον
τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐστί, καὶ δικαιοσύνη φιλική. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι,
διότι καλλίων μὲν ἢ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαϊότερα δὲ ἢ χρησίμη. οἱ δ'
ἄρχονται μὲν ὡς οἱ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν ὄντες· ὅταν δ' ἀντικρυς
ἢ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν. ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ
διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλόν· διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω φιλίαν. ὥστε
φανερὸν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν
προαίρεσιν βλέπτεον εἰ ἴσῃ, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιώτεον θατέρῳ παρὰ
θατέρου· εἰ δ' ὡς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί, ὡς ἂν ἐλυσιτέλει ὁμολογοῦσιν·
ἂν δ' ὁ μὲν φῇ ὧδε ὁ δὲ ἐκείνως, οὐ καλὸν μὲν ἀντιποιῆσαι, δέον τού-
τους καλοὺς λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ θατέρου, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ διεί-
ποντο ὡς ἠθικῶς, δεῖ κρίνειν τίνα, μὴδ' ὑποκρινόμενον μὴδέτερον αὐτῶν
ἐξαπατᾶν. ὥστε δεῖ στέργειν αὐτὸν τὴν τύχην. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἠθικὴ
κατὰ προαίρεσιν, δῆλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθὼν μὴ ἀποδῶῃ δι'
ἀδυναμίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡδύνατο, καλῶς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀνέχεται κατὰ δύνάμιν
λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας. ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἔξει, ἂν μὴ
φήσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.

οὐκ ἦν, sc. λαβεῖν.

§ 11. ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. The regular
formula in a tentative answer.

ἐπαρκεῖ, sc. ὁ εὖ ποίων.

ἢ καὶ πλέον. Fritzsche quotes

Hes. "Erg. 349 Εὖ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρὰ
γείτονος, εὖ δ' ἀποδοῦναι, | αὐτῷ τῷ
μέτρῳ, καὶ λῶϊον, αἰ κε δύνῃαι. This
is the rule of the ἐπίμετρον.

XIV. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις·
 25 ἀξιοὶ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλεόν ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται,
 διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἶται γὰρ ὁ τε βελτίων προσήκειν
 αὐτῷ πλεόν ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλεόν· ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἴσον
 ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ
 30 κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἴονται
 γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλείον λαμβάνουσιν
 οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλείον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ
 δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι
 τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσι· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ
 35 ἢ δυνάστη φίλου εἶναι, μὴδὲν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν;
 1163^b ἔοικε δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος ὁρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλεόν 2
 νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερ-
 ἔχοντι τιμῆς τῷ δ' ἐνδεεὶ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς

1163 a, 24. EE. 1242 b, 2 ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλίας τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρετήν,
 κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, τούτων δὲ ἑκάστης δύο διαφοραὶ (ἡ μὲν
 γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἡ δὲ κατ' ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον
 τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων δῆλον), ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ' ὑπερ-
 οχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων
 ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ
 τοῦ ἐλάττοντος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ, διακείμενος ὥσπερ ἄρχων
 πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ
 καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνιῶν οὕτω συμβαίνει. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ
 ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἴσου μετέχουσιν, ὅτε δὲ λόγῳ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον ἀριθμῷ
 εἰσῆνεγκον ἀργύριον, ἴσον καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ διαλαμβάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ
 ἴσον, ἀνάλογον. ὁ δ' ὑπερεχόμενος τοῦναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον,
 καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὁ
 ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. δεῖ ἄρα τινὲς ἐτέρῃ

XIV. § 1. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ
 κ.τ.λ., i.e. ἐγκαλοῦνται ἀλλήλοις.

ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, and there-
 fore in the Family and the State.

νέμεσθαι, sc. προσήκειν.

οἴονται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The ὑπερέχων
 wishes to regulate the friendship on
 the principles of Distributive Justice,
 while the ὑπερεχόμενος regards it as
 falling under the head of an exchange

of services for honour, and therefore,
 as Eudemos puts it, συζεύγνυσιν τῆς
 διάμετρον. Cf. above 1133 a, 6 n.

§ 2. ἔοικε δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle
 solves the difficulty by applying τὸ
 διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον. We must find
 τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον and apply the
 rule of τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός. Then only
 will 'diagonal conjunction' be fair.

- καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἢ τιμῇ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία
 3 τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαί- 5
 νεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων·
 τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδεται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἢ τιμῇ δὲ
 κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν
 καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει·
 τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἔλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ 10
 τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ
 σφάζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνί-
 σοις ὀμίλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς
 ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.
 4 τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ ἢ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ 15
 γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς
 καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίῃ, εἰς
 δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπικεκῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κὰν δό-
 ξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν·
 ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν 20
 ὑπηρεγμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται,
 ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ. ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδεὶς ποτ'
 ἂν ἀποστήναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρία· χωρὶς
 γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ
 διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, 25
 μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ
 δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἄλυσιτελέες. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων
 ἐπὶ τοσούτον εἰρήσθω.

ἀνισάσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀνάλογον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἢ τιμῇ, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ
 ἄρχοντι φύσει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ ἴσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος
 πρὸς τὴν τιμὴν.

§ 4. τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. In this *φιλα* differs from *δικαιοσύνη*.

ἔστιν, sc. τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

εἰς δύναμιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. for the *ἐνδοξον* Xen. Mem. i, 3, 3 *ἐπαινέτης* ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπους τοῦδε (Hes. *Εργ.* 336) *Κὰδ δύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἰέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν*.

ἀπείπασθαι. Cf. Plato *Laws* 928 e

for the ἀποκήρυξις of a son. Dem. Boiot. § 39 ὁ νόμος τοὺς γονεῖς ποιεῖ κυρίους οὐ μόνον θέσθαι τοῦνομα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν ἐξαλεῖψαι ἐὰν βούλωνται καὶ ἀποκηρύξαι.

τῶν ὑπηρεγμένων, sc. τῷ υἱεὶ παρὰ τοῦ πατρός.

τὴν ἐπικουρίαν, sc. τὴν γηροτροφίαν.

Ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον
 ἰσάζει καὶ σφάζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ
 ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοι-
 35 βῇ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς.
 1164^a ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ 2

1163 b, 32. EE. 1243 b, 15 πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς
 φιλίαις ταῖς μὴ κατ' εὐθυρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥᾶδιον. χαλεπὸν
 γὰρ μετρῆσαι ἐνὶ τῷδε τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθυρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἐρωτικῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ὡς [τὸν] ἡδὺν ἐπὶ τὸ συζῆν, ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνον
 ἐνόστε ὡς χρήσιμον· ὅταν δὲ παύσῃται τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἄλλου γινομένου ἄλλος
 γίνεται, καὶ τότε λογίζονται παντὶ τιнос, καὶ ὡς Πύθων καὶ Παμμένης

I. § 1. Ἐν...ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσι φι-
 λίαις, i.e. ὧν μὴ ταῦτ' εἶδος. The
 reading of L^b ἀνομοειδέσι deserves the
 preference over the ἀνομοειδέσι of K^b
 (cf. Bon. Ind. s.v. ὁμοειδέης); for what
 is meant is friendships in which the
 φιλητὸν of the one party (ἀγαθόν, ἡδύ
 or χρήσιμον) is τῷ εἶδει ἕτερον, not
 merely ἀνόμιον, from that of the
 other. In other words, they are
 friendships in which ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου
 ἀντικατάλλονται οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠ-
 φελείας. They must not be con-
 fused with αἱ κατ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλῖαι.
 Eudemos (loc. cit.) describes friend-
 ships of this kind as μὴ κατ' εὐθυρίαν,
 by which he means apparently friend-
 ships in which the φιλητὰ differ not
 merely by attaining a higher or lower

degree along the same line, but in
 which they are wholly disparate. So
 in Met. 994 a, 2 the αἷτια τῶν ἐντων
 are said to be ἀπειρα neither κατ'
 εὐθυρίαν (as an infinite series) nor
 κατ' εἶδος.

εἴρηται. The reference, if genuine,
 must be to 1132 b, 31 sqq., the account
 of justice ἐν τοῖς ἐκνομίοις συναλλάγ-
 μασιν.

καθάπερ εἴρηται. It has not been
 said, though it has been implied in
 1163 b, 1 sqq.

ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ, sc. κοινωνία, as we
 see from Eudemos loc. cit. The
 point of the illustration is that here
 too the parties are ἀνομοειδέις.

§ 2. ἐνταῦθα, sc. ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ
 κοινωνίᾳ. Cf. 1133 a, 19 sqq.

πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος 5
 3 πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρησιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὴν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ 10
 τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα, διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φι-

διεφέροντο καὶ ὅλως διλάσκαλος καὶ μαθητής (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἐνὶ μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Πρόδικος (Ἡρόδικος Spengel) ὁ ἱατρὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀποδιδόντα μικρὸν τὸν μισθόν, καὶ ὡς ὁ κιθαρωδὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδεῖ, ὁ δ' ὡς χρησίμῳ ὠμίλει· ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι, αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἐκείνον ἔσσαντα εὐφρᾶναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποσχόμενος ἐκείνῳ. ὁμῶς δὲ φανερόν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωριστέον· ἐνὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρητέον καὶ ἐνταῦθ', ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅρῳ ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀνάλογον γὰρ μετρητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία. πῶς γὰρ κοινωνήσῃ γεωργῷ σκνυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα; τοῖς δὲ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν σοφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὁ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον, εἴτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς ἐκάτερον. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἡμισυ ἔδωκεν, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοστὸν μέρος, ὁ δὴλον ὅτι οὗτος ἀδικεῖ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φῇ ὁ μὲν ὡς χρησίμους συνελθεῖν αὐτούς, ὁ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ὡς κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ φιλίαν.

ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ, sc. κοινῶν, where ἡδεῖα ὄψις is exchanged for θεραπεία. Cf. 1157 a, 7 sqq.

ἐνίοτε μὲν κ.τ.λ. 1159 b, 16 sqq.
 εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν. Cf. 1113 a, 19, 22. 1114 a, 15. 1153 b, 13.

§ 3. ταῦτα δὲ μὴ...ὑπάρχει, 'and they have not both these attributes.' So a, 11 ταῦτα ὑπάρχοντα, 'their attributes.' The case supposed is that described above (ληγοῦσης τῆς ὥρας, when the θεραπεία ceases).

αὐτούς, i.e. ἀλλήλους καθ' αὐτούς, cf. above 1156 b, 10 n. Contrast the

good, who δε' αὐτοὺς οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (1156 b, 10). The mss., however, have αὐτούς.

ἡ...τῶν ἡθῶν. Victorius seems clearly right in referring to 1157 a, 10 πολλοὶ δ' αὐ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἡθῶς στρέψωσιν, ὁμοίθεις ὄντες. It is not necessary to suppose with most editors that ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλία is meant. Affection founded on character is καθ' αὐτήν, even if the character is not an ideally good one; for the friend is loved καθ' αὐτόν, not merely for his ὑπάρχοντα.

λίου. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσα μένει, καθάπερ
εἴρηται. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ 4
μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν
15 οὐ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνη, οἷον καὶ τῷ καθαρωδῶ ὁ ἐπαγ-
γελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἄσειεν, τοσοῦτ' ὧ πλείω· εἰς
ἔω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀπο-
δεδοκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἰκανῶς
ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει
20 ὁ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν
γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κακείνου
γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστὶ, 5
τοῦ προἰεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προἰεμένος ἔοικ'
ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν·
25 ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν
ὅσον δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν
τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνόις ἀρέσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." οἱ δὲ 6

καθ' αὐτήν, i.e. in it καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν. This is a striking example of the way in which καθ' αὐτὸν has come to be treated as a simple adjective without regard to its literal meaning.

§ 4. ἐφίεται. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

οἷον καὶ τῷ καθαρωδῶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 401 (where αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδὸν ἐποίησεν means 'adopted the rôle of a friend διὰ τὸ ἡδύ'), and Plutarch, Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης 333 f. Διονύσιος γοῦν ὁ τύραννος, ὡς φασι, καθαρωδοῦ τινὸς εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἀκούων ἐπηγγέλτο δωρεὰν αὐτῷ τάλαντον. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀπαιτοῦντος, Χθές, εἶπεν, εὐφρανόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ παρ' ὃν ἦδες χρόνον, εὐφρανα κάγώ σέ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ὥστε τὸν μισθὸν ὧν ἔτερπες ἀπελάμβανες εὐθὺς ἀντιτερόμενος. Note the loose, conversational way in which Aristotle alludes to the story.

κακείνου γε χάριν, sc. οὐ δεόμενος τυγχάνει. ταῦτα, sc. ἂ ἔχει. Muretus conjectured τὰ αὐτοῦ.

§ 5. τοῦ προλαβόντος, not merely τοῦ πρότερον λαβόντος, as the editors say, but (as often) 'the one who has got the start,' 'the advantage.' He is called ὁ προέχων below 1164 b, 9. This rendering makes the aorist tense (suspected by Bywater) natural and right. The second alternative introduced by ἡ is preferred, as shown by the following clause with γάρ. Cf. 1156 b, 34.

ὅπερ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Prot. 328 b ἐπειδὴν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθη, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδεῖδωκεν δ' ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερὸν ὁμόσας, ὅσον ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

ποιεῖν, imperf. inf. 'used to do.' τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." Hesiod, "Erg. 368—

μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄραις ἔστω,
καὶ τε κασιγνήτῳ γελάσας ἐπὶ μάρτυρα θέσθαι·
πίστευς δ' ἄρα δμως καὶ ἀπιστία ὦλεσσ' ἀνδρας.

προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἴτα μηδὲν ποιούντες ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἢ ὁμολόγησαν. τοῦτο 30 δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθὸν μὴ ποιούντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς προέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι—τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ' 35 ἀρετὴν φιλία—τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαί- 1164^b ρεσιν—αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἢ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ 5 8 ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσον 10 τὴν ἡδονὴν εἴλετ' ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὀνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμε-

Even among friends things should be done on a business footing.

§ 7. τοῦτο, i.e. to have a fixed charge payable in advance.

δι' αὐτούς, 'for the sake of their friends themselves,' not for what they hope to get out of them. εἴρηται, 1162 b, 6 sqq.

κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. It is not a case for 'payment by results.' It is the will (προαίρεσις) rather than the power (δύναμις) that is essential.

καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1164 b, 5.

§ 8. ἐπὶ τινι, 'for some return,' 'on the understanding that a return has to be made.' The context shows that we are still dealing with 'understandings,' not with 'agreements.' So ἐπὶ τινι is not equivalent to ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς.

τὸν προέχοντα, 'the one who has the start.' Cf. the note on τοῦ προλαβόντος 1164 a, 23. The editors appear to think that ὁ προέχων can mean ὁ πρότερον σχών. Even Zell says "is qui prior habet, id est, qui prior accepit."

οὗτος, sc. ὁ προέχων.

ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου κ.τ.λ. The pleasure has to be calculated in terms of τὸ ὠφέλιμον.

ἔξει, sc. ὁ προέμενος. τὴν παρὰ τούτου, sc. τοῦ προέχοντος.

ἐν τοῖς ὀνίοις, 'in the case of things offered for sale.' The seller will take as much as he can get, but the just price is the value of the article to the buyer. Aristotle is still thinking of *χρεία* as the only standard of value. He forgets that there is a Normal Value determined by Cost of Pro-

νον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας 9
μὴ εἶναι, ὥς δέον ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον
15 καθάπερ ἐκοινωνήσεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἶεται δι-
καιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ
γὰρ οἰκεία καὶ ἃ διδῶσιν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια·
ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τὰτ-
20 τωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτον τιμᾶν ὅσον
ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσον πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

II. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ
πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα
μὲν ἱατρῷ πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολε-
25 μίκον· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον,
καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ προετέον,
εἰ μὴ ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται. ἄρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκρι-
βῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥάδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας

1164 b, 22. EE. 1244 a, 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κατ'
ἀρετὴν φίλον σκεπτέον πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τὰ χρήσιμα ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ
βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ ἀντιποιούντι καὶ δυναμένῳ. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόβλημά
ἐστι, πότερον τὸν φίλον ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὖ ποιητέον μᾶλλον. ἂν μὲν
γὰρ <ὁ> φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπὸν, ἂν μὴ τις τὸ μὲν
αὐξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα ποιῶν, ἐπικεικὴ δὲ ἡρέμα·
εἰ δὲ μή, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὁ
δὲ ἔσται, οὐπω δέ, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δ' οὐ, ὁ δὲ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ

duction. If the seller does not get this, he will withdraw his wares from the market, unless indeed they are perishable.

§ 9. ἐνιαχοῦ τε κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1162 b, 29.

τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων. Cf. above 1131 a, 2 sqq. and the notes.

οἶεται. There is no difficulty in the third person singular which Aristotle uses very freely without a definite subject (cf. 1110 a, 14 n.). Here we may supply ὁ νομοθέτης from οἱ νόμοι if we like.

ἀλλ' ὅμως κ.τ.λ. However high the seller's estimate may be, it is the buyer's estimate that is decisive.

δεῖ δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. A reservation in favour of the seller. When the article has been bought its apparent value to the purchaser is lowered, for he is no longer conscious how much he wanted it. Of course, if he wishes to sell it again, its apparent value to him rises again.

II. § 1. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ. These ἀπορίαι form a sort of casuistry of Friendship. For ἔχει cf. Ind. s. v.

ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδη- 30
λον· καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἐταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφεί-
λει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ'
αἰεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσά-
μενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὅστισιν ᾗ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐαλωκότι 35
ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε 1165^a
ἢ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἰρηται,
καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ
δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον·
ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προὔπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, 5
ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἢ ἀντ-

οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον. μὴ γάρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης,
ποιήσας

λόγων δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,
ἔργον δ' ἐκεῖνος ἔργον <ὅς> παρέσχετο.

καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ τῇ μητρί· καίτοι
βελτίων ὁ πατήρ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδ' ἔχει πάσας τὰς
τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινάς· ἴσως οὖν ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἀλλὰ δὲ τῷ
ἀγαθῷ. οἷον οὐκ εἰ σίτον δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ συζῆν τούτῳ δεῖ·
οὐδ' ᾧ τοῖνον τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἃ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος.
ἀλλ' οἱ τοῦτο ποιῶντες τούτῳ πάντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ διδόασιν οὐ δέον,
οὐδενός εἰσιν ἄξιοι.

καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μὲν πῶς εἰσι φιλίας,
ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ κείνῳ ἀγαθὰ
καὶ τῷ εὖ ποιήσαντι καὶ τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει οὗτος ὁ
ὀρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθ'
ἡδονὴν τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν· πάντες δ' οὗτοι οἱ ὅροι κατὰ

§ 4. μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα, sc. δεῖν
λύεσθαι. The point is that, as it is
right to ransom your father rather than
yourself, it will be right to ransom him
rather than the man who has ran-
somed you, and still more if the man
who ransomed you is not himself a

captive but is merely claiming repay-
ment of the money he spent.

§ 5. τὴν προὔπαρχήν, 'the original
benefit.' The word comes from ὑπ-
άρχειν as opposed to ἀμύνεσθαι. Cf.
1124 b, 12 n.

απόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ
 δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομι-
 εῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι
 10 παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον
 τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δό-
 ξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὕπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ 6
 πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὠρισμένον
 τοῖς περὶ ἅ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταῦτ' ἀπὸδοτέον,
 15 οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ
 ἄδελον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἐταίροις 7
 καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα
 ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους
 μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος
 20 καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ'
 οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταῦτό. δόξειε δ' 8
 ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὥς ὀφείλον-
 τας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὢν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς
 ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ

φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δ' οὐδεῖς. διὸ πολλοὶ εἰσι, καὶ
 ἕκαστος μιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὧν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ εἶναι προαίρεσις.
 καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ * * βούλεται τῷ ἔργῳ τῇ
 αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ
 συζῆν οὐ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡδεῖ.

ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἀλλήλους ἔνιοι· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μᾶλλον, ἀλλ'
 οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὸ φιλεῖ κακείνους οἷον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον
 εἴλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἴλετο· χρησιμώτερος γάρ. διὸ
 <οὐ> δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μᾶλλον εἴλετο ἀντὶ ἡττονος. οἱ δ'
 ἐγκαλοῦσιν· ἐκείνον γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι τὸν ἀγαθόν, πρότερον ζητήσαντες
 τὸν ἡδὺν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον.

τὸ ἀξίωμα, 'the claim.'

οἴονται δέ, 'but they think (or rather 'he thinks') it is so.' The number changes, but it is still the good man who does not wish to lend his money. It is quite natural that he should not lend to a man who he thinks (rightly or wrongly) will not

pay back.

§ 6. εἴρηται. Cf. 1104 a, 1 etc.

θύεται, sc. πάντα.

§ 7. κήδη, funerals.

§ 8. τροφῆς, partitive genitive. The allusion is to the Hellenic duty of γηροτροφία.

πασαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ 25
τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν,
9 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ
τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς
τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἐταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν
καὶ ἀπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ 30
πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν αἰεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον
ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ'
10 οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων
ἢ κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ
γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτω διοριστείον. 35

III. Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς
φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ 1165^b
τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχω-
σιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν
ἀπολιπόντων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσεις δ' ἂν τις,
εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ 5
τὸ ἡθος· ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, πλείσται διαφοραὶ
γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὡσι
2 φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖ-
σθαι διὰ τὸ ἡθος, μηδὲν τοιούτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἐαυτὸν
αἰτιῶντ' ἂν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, 10
δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ
νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία.

§ 9. ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει,
'rising and giving them a seat.' Cf.
Plato, Rep. 425 a σιγάς τε τῶν νεωτέρων
παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ὡς πρέπει, καὶ
κατακλίσσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.

καὶ συγκρίνειν κ.τ.λ., 'and com-
pare the claims of each in respect of
closeness, goodness and usefulness.'
I cannot feel convinced of Professor
Bywater's view (Contr. p. 62) that
συγκρίνειν is here used in the sense of
συνδυάζειν (or συνάγειν) and that the
reference is to "combining the persons
and their respective dues." These, I

take it, would be προσήκοντα, not
ὑπάρχοντα.

§ 10. ἡ κρίσις, i.e. ἡ σύγκρισις
according to the usual practice of
repeating a compound by the simple
word (1156 b, 23 n.). Ruelle's σύγ-
κρισις is therefore unnecessary.

III. § 1. ἐν ἀρχῇ, probably 1162 b,
23.

§ 2. ἡ τοῖς...κιβδηλεύουσιν.
Zwinger quotes Theognis, v. 200—
Χρυσοῦ κιβδήλοιο καὶ ἀργύρου ἀνσχετος
ἄτη,

Κύρρε, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν ῥῆδιον ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ.

εάν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ 3
δοκῇ, ἂρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλη-
15 τὸν ἀλλὰ τὰγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ † φιλητέον † πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ
φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρη-
ται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἂρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυ-
τέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;
ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν
20 οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ'
ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ
φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται.
εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένει ὁ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺν 4
διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἄρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται;
25 ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν
ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένει τὴν διά-
νοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι
μῆτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μῆτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπού-
μενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ
30 δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν
τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἂρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς 5
αὐτὸν ἐκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγγένοιε φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ
μνεῖαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις
μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνεῖοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς

εἰ δὲ φίλου νόος ἀνδρὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι
λέληθε

ψυδρὸς ἑών, δόλιον δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ
ἔχει,

τοῦτο θεὸς κιβδηλότατον ποίησε βρο-
τοῖσι,

καὶ γινῶναι πάντων τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότατον.
Camerarius adds Dem. Lept. § 167—
θαυμάζω δ' ἔγωγε εἰ τοῖς μὲν τὸ νόμισμα
διαφθείρουσι θάνατος παρ' ἡμῶν ἐστίν ἢ
ζημία, τοῖς δ' ὅλην τὴν πόλιν κίβδηλον
καὶ ἄπιστον ποιοῦσι λόγον δώσετε.

§ 3. οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον κ.τ.λ. There
is clearly something wrong. Stahr
reads οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν <τὸ> πονηρὸν,
and so Bywater. Stewart supposes
the original text to have been ἢ οὐ

δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ
τὰγαθόν, οὐδὲ δεῖ. φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ
κ.τ.λ., the words οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον
πονηρὸν being due to a dittography of
οὐδὲ δεῖ φιλοπόνηρον.

φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We have
perhaps an echo of this in Theo-
phrastus, Char. 14 (Περὶ φιλοπονηρίας)
καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοπονηρία ἀδελφὴ ἐστὶ
τῆς πονηρίας καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς
παροιμίας τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον
πορεύεσθαι.

ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι, 'capable of
reform.' For ἔχειν cf. Ind. s. v.

§ 4. ἦν. For the imperfect cf.
Ind. s. v. ἦν.

συμβιοῦν. Cf. 1126 a, 31 n.

γενομένους ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, 35
 ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσιν γένηται.

IV. Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλῖαι 1166^a
 ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τι-
 θέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλούμενον καὶ πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ
 ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλούμενον εἶναι καὶ
 ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκ- 5
 να πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἱ δὲ
 τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγούντα

1166 a, 1. EE. 1240 a, 5 πόσα μὲν οὖν εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες
 διαφοραὶ καθ' ὧς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμε-
 νοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν
 αὐτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις
 μάλιστα ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι
 κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ
 τὰ δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦνται, τὰ δ' ὅμοια
 φαίνεται ὄντα. ἔστι γὰρ πῶς κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη ἡ φιλία, ἅπλως δ'
 οὐ. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ διηρημένοις τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν· δι' ἃ μᾶλλον
 οὕτως αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, <ὡς> ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται
 πῶς ἐκὼν ἢ ἄκων, τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς,
 καὶ ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ
 ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὐτόν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ ταῦτα καὶ διηρημένοις· ἢ δὴ

IV. § 1. Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.
 We now come to what is really the
 important part of the discussion of
 φίλια so far as regards the main argu-
 ment. It is φίλια alone, in the sense
 of the higher self-love, that can lead us
 from the practical to the theoretic life.
 Cf. Introductory Note p. 345.

πρὸς τοὺς πέλας (so K^b for vulg.
 πρὸς τοὺς φίλους). Friendship as a
 feeling πρὸς ἕτερον is, in its highest
 form, an externalisation and trans-
 ference to others of the good man's
 relation to himself.

ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν. We must not
 supply φίλικων, for Aristotle does not
 intend to assume yet that there is such

a thing as self-love. That question is
 raised only to be dismissed below
 (a, 33). There is no definite ellipse.
 Eudemos says more clearly ἀπὸ τῆς
 πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑξέως (loc. cit. p. 410).

τιθέασι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Five φιλικὰ are
 enumerated and shown to be charac-
 teristic of self-love, viz. (1) βούλησις
 ἀγαθοῦ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, (2) βούλησις τοῦ
 εἶναι τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, (3) τὸ
 συνδιάγειν (= τὸ συζῆν), (4) τὸ ταῦτ' αἰ-
 ρεῖσθαι (τὸ ὁμογνωμονεῖν), (5) τὸ
 συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαλεῖν.

οἱ προσκεκρουκότες, 'who have
 quarrelled' (perhaps about a trifle)
 and 'never see each other now,' so
 that their friendship is clearly dis-

καὶ συγκαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ
τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δὲ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν
10 ὀρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρ- 2
χει—τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι
(εἶοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστων ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ
ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)—οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν 3
αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν· καὶ βούλεται
15 δὴ ἑαυτῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει—τοῦ

δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα, ἢ δ' οὐ διηρημένα, οὐχ
ὑπάρχει.

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔξεως [ὥς] οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν
διωρισμένοι, καθ' οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ
φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλούμενός τινι τὰγαθὰ ἢ οἷα οἶεται ἀγαθὰ, μὴ δι' αὐτόν,
ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι' ἐκείνου καὶ
μὴ δι' αὐτόν, κἂν εἰ μὴ διανεμῶν τὰγαθὰ, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξει
μάλιστα φιλεῖν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἰρεῖται δι' αὐτὴν τὴν
ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις,
συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μάχεται δὴ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἀλλήλα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς, οἱ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἰοῦνται
φιλεῖσθαι. ἔτι τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι [ἀγαπᾶν
θήσομεν], οἷον οἱ δούλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας, ὅτι χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες,

interested (αὐτοῦ χάριν). Cf. Pol. 1263 a, 18 οἱ πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούοντες ἀλλήλοις.

ὀρίζονται. They are not, of course, scientific ὁρισμοί, but only dialectical ὀρίκα (Top. 102 a, 9 sqq.) τῆς φίλας.

§ 2. τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, i. q. τῷ ἀγαθῷ, and ὁ σπουδαῖος below i. q. ὁ ἀγαθός.

ἢ...ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, 'in so far as they fancy themselves good.' The point is more fully explained below 1166 b, 2. Here the remark is quite parenthetical.

καθάπερ εἴρηται. Cf. 1113 a, 22 sqq.

§ 3. οὗτος γὰρ, sc. ὁ ἐπιεικής (a, 10). The fourth φιλικόν shown to be true of the good man's relation to himself. Cf. 1167 b, 4.

κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν, i.e. there is no variance between his ὀρέξεις, his ἐπιθυμία and θυμός have the same objects as his βούλλαις. It is not true of him that τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται (1099 a, 12); πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφρονεῖ τῷ λόγῳ (1102 b, 28). We must avoid the Paraphrast's error of saying τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ τε λογικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλογον. The λόγον ἔχον has no ὀρεξις.

καὶ βούλεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. The first φιλικόν, viz. βούλλαις ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ ἕνεκα.

καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα. Of course to the good man these are identical with τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὰ, but Aristotle inserts the words lest we should forget that ὀρεξις is οὐκ ἀνευ φαντασίας.

γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν—καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα—τοῦ
 γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ.—καὶ ζῆν
 δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σφῆζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ
 4 φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δ'
 ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἰρεῖται οὐ- 20
 δεῖς πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκείνο τὸ γενόμενον—ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ

ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτούς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες
 ὄρνιθες. βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστα γε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ
 φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, ὅσον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο,
 ὅτι [μὴ] ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν. <τὸ γὰρ
 χαίρειν> μὴ δι' ἑτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνον, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλικόν. ἔτι τὰ
 τοιαῦτα λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότις, καὶ [μὴ] μίαν ψυχὴν
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα.
 καὶ γὰρ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς
 αὐτὸν εὖ ποιεῖ διὰ τι ἕτερον, οὐδὲ χάριτος. οὐ δὲ λέγει ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ εἰς.
 δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι ὁ δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλεῖν.

1166 a, 20. EE. 1240 b, 8 καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ τὸ συζῆν

ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ, 'which each of us is believed to be.' We need not seek far for the author of this *ἐνδοξον*. Plato in Rep. ix. had already represented τὸ φιλόσοφον in the likeness of a man, while *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* are in the image of a lion and a many-headed monster. We need not yet consider whether, or in what sense, Aristotle himself could accept the formula. Cf. 1168 b, 30 sqq. 1178 a, 2 sqq.

καὶ ζῆν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The *second* φιλικόν.

τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ, in the Platonist sense of the word *φρόνησις*. Cf. above 1140 a, 24 n.

§ 4. γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος κ.τ.λ. Stewart is evidently right in trying to explain this sentence by the light of the ἀπορία about βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ raised above (1159 a, 5 sqq.). There we saw that a man will not wish his friend to be a god, here we see that

he will not wish to be a god himself. We are coming closer to the idea of Self.

γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος, 'by becoming another.' The sentence "No one chooses by becoming another that the thing he has become should have all good things" is not logical; but the thought does not lend itself to clear expression. If we bracket ἐκείνο τὸ γενόμενον with Vermehren, the sentence is smoother; but I am inclined to think the confusion of two inconsistent thoughts is intentional.

καὶ νῦν, 'as it is,' so he would be wishing for something which already exists. Cf. Leibniz's "A quoy vous serviroit-il de devenir Roy de la Chine à condition d'oublier ce que vous avez esté? Ne seroit-ce pas la même chose que si Dieu en même temps qu'il vous détruisoit, créoit un Roy dans la Chine?"

θεὸς τὰγαθόν—ἀλλ' ὦν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοῦν
 ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ 5
 βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμέ-
 25 νων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνεῖαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
 ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ
 τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεί τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ·
 πάντοτε γὰρ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ
 ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς
 30 αὐτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπικεκῆ, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὐτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος
 ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ
 φίλοι οἷς ταυθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ 6
 οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν

καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὲ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὴ
 δύνασθαι ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν. οὕτω γὰρ
 ἔχει ὁ εἷς, καὶ ἴσως ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ
 ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτόν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πονηρῷ διαφωνεῖ, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ.
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἐχθρὸν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι· ἢ δ' εἷς καὶ
 ἀδιαίρετος, ὁρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὃ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας
 ἕτερος καὶ ἑμπληκτός. ὥστε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς
 τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅτι γὰρ πῃ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός,

ἀλλ' ὦν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, 'remaining just what he is,' sc. αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν. A will not accept bliss on condition of becoming B. It is nothing to A that B is blessed.

§ 5. συνδιάγειν τε κ.τ.λ. The *third* φιλικόν.

μνεῖαι. I prefer this, the reading of K^b, to the more commonplace μνημαί. The *poeticus color* is quite in place here. Cf. 1165 b, 33.

συναλγεί τε κ.τ.λ. The *fifth* φιλικόν.

ἀμεταμέλητος. Zwinger compares Epicharmos (fr. 280 Kaibel), οὐ μετανοεῖν ἀλλὰ προνοεῖν χρή τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν

σοφόν.

τῷ δὲ...ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. Men's views of the characteristics of φιλία are entirely derived from the good man's relation to himself. His relation to himself is transferred to his relation to his friend; for the friend is "another self," and that is why men regard the points enumerated as φιλικά.

§ 6. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is introduced as an entirely fresh point. We have seen that our view of what friendship is based upon the good man's relation to himself; can we put it the other way and say that the good

ταύτη εἶναι φιλία, ἥ ἐστι δύο ἢ πλείω [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέ- 35
νων] καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦ- 1166 b
7 ται. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν,
καίπερ οὔσι φαύλοις. ἄρ' οὖν ἡ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ
ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτη μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν ;
ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ' 5
8 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύ-
λοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦ-
σιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ
ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλα-
βερὰ ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται 10

ταύτη αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος καὶ ὁρεκτός· φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὁ πονηρὸς
παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς οὐθ' ἅμα λαιδορεῖται ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκράτης,
οὔτε ὁ ὑστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὥσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός, οὔτε ὁ ἐμπροσθεν
τῷ ὑστερον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψεύστης. ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ
διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπονδαῖος. δῆλον γὰρ

man loves himself? This is precisely parallel to the question in Book V. whether a man can wrong himself.

ἡ ἐστι δύο ἢ πλείω. This has been taken in two ways, (1) 'in so far as he is two or more,' (2) 'in so far as two or more of the characteristics mentioned are present.' With regard to (2) I would ask why 'two or more' are mentioned. Surely the good man has them all and the bad man fancies he has. EE. 1240 a, 17 sqq. (loc. cit. p. 409) seems to me decisive in favour of (1). We have there τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, and below a, 20 ἡ δὲ δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχῆ, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα. This is an authoritative explanation. Eudemos also (loc. cit.) refers to the parallel question πότερον ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ. If we follow this hint and turn to 1138 b, 5, we find κατὰ μεταφωρὰν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν

ἐστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν. Here as there we have a reference to the Platonic view. This Aristotle regards as a metaphor, so we may be sure that the argument here is still purely dialectical.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. Bywater (Contr. p. 63) puts a comma before ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων to show that it goes closely with δόξειε δ' ἂν. I do not see how it follows from what has been said, and prefer to believe the words have crept in from the paraphrase. We see from the next sentence that τὰ εἰρημένα most naturally means the φιλικὰ which have been enumerated, and it is therefore likely that they are introduced here to support the interpretation we have rejected.

§ 8. ἐτέρων μὲν κ.τ.λ. Observe that the διαφορά is entirely in the ὁρεκτικόν, not between δρεξις and διάνοια.

- τοῦ πραττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσιν οἱ οἱ 9 μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιημερεύουσιν, ἑαυτούς δὲ φεύγουσιν.
- 15 ἀναμνησκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι καθ' ἑαυτούς ὄντες, μεθ' ἐτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλ-
γούσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ,
- 20 καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δ' ἡδέεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ δια-
σπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἶόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι, 10 ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἦσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ
- 25 οἱ φαῦλοι γέμονουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθη-
ρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῇ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαῖον αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἀποκτινύουσιν αὐτούς· ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός. ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἀπλῶς ὦν ἀγαθός εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι οὐ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ ἃ φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπᾶσαι ἀδύνατον. διὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων <οὐ>, οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ * *, οὐκ ἄρα φίλος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ παῖδιά, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡδὴ ἔχῃ προαίρεσιν· ἡδὴ γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. εἰκοι δ' ἡ φιλία ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ κατὰ συγ-
γένειαν· οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς λῦσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφέρωνται, ὅμως οὗτοι μὲν ἐτι συγγενεῖς, ὁ δὲ ἐτι εἷς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ.

καὶ ... μισοῦνται, 'and who are hated' (the relative cannot be repeated in Greek), καὶ φεύγουσι, 'actually shun.'

φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν, opp. ζῆν βούλεται ἑαυτὸν (1166 a, 17).

§ 9. ἑαυτούς δὲ φεύγουσιν, opp. συνδιάγειν ἑαυτῷ βούλεται κ.τ.λ. (1166 a, 23).

οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν κ.τ.λ. opp. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνῆδεται ἑαυτῷ (ib. 27).

V. Ἡ δ' εὐνοία φιλία μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· 30
 γίνεται γὰρ εὐνοία καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φι-
 λία δ' οὐ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φί-
 λησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει
 2 δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ
 δ' εὐνοία καὶ ἐκ προσπαίον, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστάς 35
 συμβαίνει· εὐνοὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμ- 1167^a
 πράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν, προσπαίως εὐνοὶ
 3 γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὲ ἀρχὴ φιλίας
 εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ
 προησθείς τῇ ιδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οὐδέν 5
 μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρου-
 σίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷον τ' εἶναι μὴ
 εὐνοὺς γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὐνοὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βού-
 λονται γὰρ μόνον τὰγαθὰ οἷς εἰσιν εὐνοὶ, συμπράξαιεν δ'
 ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη 10

1166 b, 30. EE. 1240 b, 38 ποσαχῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν
 λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δηλον ἐκ
 τῶν εἰρημένων· οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμοιότητος καὶ
 εὐνοίας. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων.
 ἔστι δ' ἡ εὐνοία τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἕτερον οὔτε ταυτόν. διη-
 ρημένῃς γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὗτ' ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὗτ' ἐν
 τῇ κατ' ἡδονὴν ἐστίν. εἴτε γὰρ ὅτι χρήσιμον, βούλεται αὐτῷ τὰγαθά,
 οὐ δὲ ἐκείνον ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν βούλοισι' ἂν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ <ἡ φιλία> καὶ

V. § 1. καὶ πρότερον, 1155 b, 32.
 We here begin an examination of
 cognate *ἔξεις* and *δυνάμεις* like that in
 Book VI., 1142 a, 31 sqq.

διάτασιν, *animi intentionem*. The
 word is originally a medical term.
 Cf. Plato, Rep. 407 c κεφαλῆς *τινές*...
διατάσεις, migraines.

ἀκολουθεῖ. Cf. Ind. s. v.

§ 2. περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστάς. Cf.
 Lat. *favor*.

§ 3. ἀρχὴ φιλίας. Cf. EE. (loc.

cit.), which proves that ἀρχή here
 means simply 'beginning.'

τῇ ιδέᾳ...τῷ εἶδει. There is no
 difference of meaning.

οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, 'is not in love for
 all that.'

ἀπόντα ποθῇ, *absentem desiderat*;
 for πόθος (*desiderium*) is always τοῦ
 ἀπόντος, Plato, Krat. 420 a.

μεταφέρων, 'in a metaphor.' Cf.
 Ind. s. v.

τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς
 συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ
 χρησίμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὐνοια ἐπὶ τού-
 τοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν
 15 ἀπονέμει τὴν εὐνοίαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός
 τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ'
 20 εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ
 φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινα χρήσιν. ὅλως δ' ἡ εὐ-
 νοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῇ
 20 καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀγωνιστῶν εἶπομεν.

VI. Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν
 ἂν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὅτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φα-
 25 σιν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ
 τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασιν, ὅταν
 περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτὰ προαι-

ἡ εὐνοια οὐκ αὐτοῦ εὐνοια τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾧ εὐνοεῖ· εἰ
 δὴ ἦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος φιλίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὐνόουν. ὥστε δῆλον
 ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὐνοια ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος
 βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν αὐτῷ βούλεται. ἐστὶ
 γὰρ ἡ εὐνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὖνους, ὁ δ' εὖνους οὐ
 πᾶς φίλος. ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας,
 ἀλλ' οὐ φιλία.

1167 a, 22. EE. 1241 a, 15 δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἱ τε φίλοι
 ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες φίλοι εἶναι. ἐστὶ δ' οὐ περὶ πάντα ἡ
 ὁμόνοια ἡ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα
 εἰς τὸ συζῆν συντείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν (ἐστὶ
 γὰρ τάναντία τὸ κινεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ διαφωνεῖ
 τοῦτο), οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

ἀργὴν. The metaphor is probably
 from fields that lie fallow or mines
 that are unworked. Contrast *ἐνέργεια*.

τὰ δίκαια δρῶν. He is *δίκαιος* rather
 than *εὖνους*, in the proper sense.

VI. § 1. ὁμόνοια, *concordia*, a
 political term.

περὶ ὅτουοῦν. As the writer of
 MM says (1212 a, 15) we do not call
 it ὁμόνοια to agree with Empedokles
 about the elements. As Eudemos put
 it, it is neither κατὰ διάνοιαν nor yet
 κατ' ὄρεξιν solely. Hence its relation to
 προαίρεσις.

2 ρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ
 δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδε-
 χόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν 30
 πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακε-
 δαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν
 δ' ἐκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις,
 στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν
 ὁδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος 35
 καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γί- 1167^b
 νεται οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἢ ὁμό-
 νοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἐστι
 3 καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμόνοια· οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι
 καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες βλάπτουσιν ἀλλήλους. εἰκε δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ φιλία· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πρώτη καὶ
 φύσει σπονδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἔστι τοὺς φαύλους ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ καθ'
 ἣν καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν
 ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχωσιν. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι
 ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὗ ὀρέγονται. ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται ὁ μὴ
 ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται· οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ' οὐ μαχοῦνται. ἔστι δ'
 ἡ ὁμόνοια, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾖ, μὴ
 τοῦ ἐκάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία
 πολιτικὴ.

§ 2. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ κ.τ.λ. There are three things to note in answering the question περὶ ποῖα; (1) it has to do with πρακτά, (2) on a large scale, (3) in which it is possible for the desires of all parties to be satisfied. Cf. Eudemos loc. cit.

ἡ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν. The illustration is to the point, for (1) Pittakos was an *elected* tyrant (Pol. 1285 a, 35), and (2) he resigned against the wishes of the citizens. Accordingly ὁμόνοια prevailed only during the period when he consented to rule (ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν).

οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις. Eteokles and Polyneikes in Euripides. Cf.

"Was mein Bruder Karl will, dass will ich auch."

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, 'in the same person.'

οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς. These are the same as οἱ ἀριστοί.

πολιτικὴ δὴ κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. If it has to do (1) with πρακτά on a large scale and (2) with things as to which the desires of all may be satisfied, it will be political.

καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται. 'Ὁμόνοια is used technically by Thucydides of agreement as to the constitution. So in viii. 93 ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμόνοιας.

5 ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ
 ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων
 γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὐριπος),
 βούλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ
 καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷον τε ὁμονοεῖν 4
 10 πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας
 ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς
 λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλούμενος ταῦτα
 τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοι-
 νὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους
 15 μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια
 ποιεῖν.

VII. Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον
 φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὐ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ
 λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαί-
 20 νεται ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν

1167 b, 17. EE. 1241 a, 34 περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας
 εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· ἀπορεῖται δὲ διὰ τί μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες
 εὐ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὐ τοὺς ποιήσαντας. δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον
 εἶναι τοῦναντίον. τοῦτο δ' ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἂν τις διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ
 αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον συμβαίνειν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀφείλεται, τὸν δ' ἀποδοῦναι

§ 3. ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν, sc. ἐν τοῖς
 ἀγαθοῖς, opp. ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις, without
 the political significance which the
 word has above (b, 1).

ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, 'being of one
 mind.' The phrase ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς
 γνώμης εἶναι, γίνεσθαι, μένειν is
 common in Demosthenes, and can be
 replaced by ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι,
 γίνεσθαι, μένειν in the same sense
 (see Rehdanz Ind. s.v.). There is no
 reference whatever to the proverb ἐπὶ
 τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμεῖν.

ὥσπερ εὐριπος. "Significantur hoc
 nomine omnia maris loca angustiora
 in quibus contrarii sunt fluctuum
 motus," Zell. For the simile cf.

Aischines p. 66. 27 πλείους τραπέ-
 μενος τροπὰς τοῦ Εὐρίπου παρ' ὃ φέει.

§ 4. τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει. Cf. the
 complaints of Demosthenes in the
 Philippics.

—VII. § 1. Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται κ.τ.λ.
 This ἀπορία too serves to bring out
 some important points about φίλια.

παρὰ λόγον, i. q. ἀλογον, opp. κατὰ
 λόγον, εὐλογον.

τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις. Fritzsche
 compares Thuc. ii, 40 βεβαιότεροι δ'
 δράσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι'
 εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σφῆξεν· ὁ δ' ἀντοφεί-
 λων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν ἀλλ'
 ἐς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων.

ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος 25 μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς "ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους," ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῶ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, 2 καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον, καὶ οὐδ' ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 30 σφύζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας κὰν μηδὲν ὥσι 3 χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἂν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθεῖν ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου· 35

δεῖ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυσικόν. ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αἰρετώτερον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὃ δ' εὖ παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἡ περὶ τὰ τέκνα σπουδὴ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ <τὰ> γεννώμενα σφύζειν. καὶ φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες τὰ τέκνα [καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων] ἢ φιλοῦνται· καὶ οὗτοι πάλιν τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς γεννήσαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἀριστον· καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον οἶονται αὐτῶν εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ διορίζουσι, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν μήτηρ.

ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους. Epicharmos fr. 146 Kaibel, where θεωμένους is restored. I do not think the interpretation given by Koraes "as if from a bad seat in the theatre" is adequate. It seems more likely that ἐκ πονηροῦ should be understood on the analogy of ἐκ δεξιᾶς, ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς, ἐξ ἐναντίας, so that the meaning will be 'looking at the thing on the bad side' or, as we say, 'the seamy side' (metaphor from tapestry). Cf. the Latin *in malam partem*.

ἀνθρωπικῶ. Cf. 1111 b, 1 n.

§ 2. φυσικώτερον. Cf. 1147 a, 24 n. In 1155 b, 8, 9 φυσικὰ ἀπορήματα are opposed to ἀνθρωπικά.

οὐδ' ὅμοιον, 'is not even analogous.' Cf. 1105 a, 26. Bywater (Contr. p. 64) reads τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας, a decided improvement.

περὶ ἐκείνους, sc. τοὺς δανείσαντας, 'there is no φιλῆσις in them' (for their debtors).

τοῦ σφύζεσθαι βούλησις κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1155 b, 30.

κομιδῆς. Cf. κομίζεσθαι 1162 b, 32.

1168^a μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπερ-
 αγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεία ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥστερ
 τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὐ⁴
 πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ
 5 τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν
 αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργεῖα—τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ
 πράττειν—ἐνεργεῖα δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ πῶς· στέργει
 δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὁ γὰρ
 ἐστὶ δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ⁵
 10 τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν
 ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι,
 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἦττον ἢ δὴ καὶ φιλητόν.
 ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος⁶

§ 3. περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς. Cf. 1120 b, 13 n.

§ 4. ἐνεργεῖα δὲ ὁ ποιήσας κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the syllogism is that τὸ ἔργον is φιλητόν, and this is reached through the middle term τὸ ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι (τὸν ποιήσαντα). Thus τὸ ἐνεργεῖα is φιλητόν
 τὸ ἔργον is τὸ ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι
 ∴ τὸ ἔργον is φιλητόν.

From this it follows that τὸ ἔργον must be the subject (or predicate) of the sentence which contains the minor premiss, the article being added to both subject and predicate because the terms are convertible (cf. 1097 b, 22 n.). 'The product is (in a sense) its producer in activity.' If we write ἐστὶ for ἐστὶ and translate 'the producer of the product (ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον) is (in a sense) actively,' we could only conclude that he loves production, not that he loves the product, and the word πῶς becomes meaningless. It is clear, then, that here Aristotle is really trying to show that the love of an ἔργον is a form of self-love, and this helps the main argument considerably. Further, the doctrine that the ἐνέργεια of the ποιῶν is embodied in the πάσχον is thorough-

ly Aristotelian, cf. De An. 426 a, 4⁺ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται, and especially Phys. 202 a, 13 sqq. where the whole problem suggested by the fact that ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ is discussed. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 419.

ἐστὶ πῶς. The meaning of this reservation is clear from De An. 424 a, 25 (of the αἰσθητικόν and the αἰσθητόν) ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον (1130 a, 12 n.), compared with 418 a, 3 τὸ αἰσθητικόν δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὅλον τὸ αἰσθητόν ἢ δὴ ἐντελεχείᾳ. We may say, then, that τὸ ποιοῦντι εἶναι is not the same as τὸ ἐργῶ εἶναι, but the producer is potentially the product and the product is the producer actualised. Therefore the producer loves the product; for he loves τὸ εἶναι, and τὸ εἶναι in the primary sense is τὸ εἶναι ἐνεργεῖα.

ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, i.e. τῷ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, 'the object of the act.' Cf. 1117 b, 30 n. The τόπος of τὸ καλόν is now applied.

§ 6. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. We now look at the question from the τόπος of τὸ πολυχρόνιον, which is applied to the πρόβλημα of τῶν αἰρετώτερον in Top. 116 a, 13.

ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι 15 μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἥττον· ἢ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἢ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσῃ ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πράξιν 20 7 ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἢ γέν- 25 νησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

VIII. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε 30 ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον—ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει—ὁ δ' ἐπεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλον ἔνεκα, 2 τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα δια- 35 φωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν 1168^b μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ 5

καὶ ἢ μὲν φιλῆσις κ.τ.λ. For the τόπος cf. De An. 430 a, 18.

§ 7. οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1168 a, 1 and Plato Rep. 330 b.

VIII. § 1. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. We now approach the question of φιλαυτία more directly. It is to this that the whole discussion has been tending.

οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, 'that he does

nothing of himself.' I do not see how the phrase can mean 'he does nothing without an eye to his own interest.' But the self-lover is emphatically the man who does nothing 'unless he has to.' Cf. Dem. Chers. § 5 τὰ γ' ἀφ' ὧν ἔτοιμ' ὑπάρχοντα ὁρῶ, Eur. Tro. 74 ἔτοιμ' ἃ βούλει τὰ π' ἐμοῦ.

§ 2. ἐκείνου ἔνεκα. Cf. 1155 b, 31.

φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ
 πᾶσαι ὁμογενωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ "μία ψυχὴ" καὶ "κοινὰ
 τὰ φίλων" καὶ "ἰσότης φιλότης" καὶ "γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον."
 πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα
 10 γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπο-
 ρεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπασθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων
 τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν 3
 καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ
 λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο
 15 δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι 4
 τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς
 καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέ-
 γονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ
 περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται
 20 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς
 ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία
 γεγέννηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὴ τοῖς
 οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς 5
 ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδη-
 25 λον· εἰ γὰρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζῃ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς
 μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὅποιασὺν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ
 τὰς ἀρετὰς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖτο, οὐδεὶς
 ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος 6
 μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαντος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα
 30 καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ,
 καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώ-

μία ψυχὴ. Eur. Or. 1045 ἔχων...
 ψυχὴν μίαν.

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. 1159 b, 31.

ἰσότης φιλότης. 1157 b, 36.

γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον. Theokr. xvi,
 18 ἀπωτέρω ἢ γόνυ κνήμα.

ποτέροις, 'which set of ἐνδοξα.'
 This is a regular dialectical πρόβλημα.

§ 3. λάβοιμεν, cf. 1123 a, 35 n.
 For the τόπος of τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον, cf. Top. 110 a, 23 sqq. It is

specially applicable to the case of φιλοτοιοῦται. Cf. 1125 b, 14 n.

§ 4. οἱ πολλοί. For the restriction of a word's application by the behaviour of οἱ πολλοί, cf. 1153 b, 33.

§ 6. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'Just as the sovereign is held to be the state in the fullest sense, and in any composite whole the ruling part is taken to be the whole, so the ruling part of a man is the man.'

τατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαντος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὥς τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πε- 35
πραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. 1169^a
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπικεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαντος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσούτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέ- 5
7 γεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν 10
ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαντον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ βλάνφει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν 8 ἐπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἂ δεῖ πράττειν 15
καὶ ἂ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπικεικὴς, ἂ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοὺς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπικεικὴς

τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ. For the construction cf. 1118 b, 23. This is not, of course, Aristotle's own theory. We are dealing with *ἐνδοξα*.

τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος (cf. 1178 a, 2. 7), 'implying that mind is each one of us.' The *ἐγκρατὴς* is *κρείττων τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν*, a phrase which implies that he himself is *νοῦς* and not *ἐπιθυμία*. We are not yet entitled to say that this is Aristotle's own view, but it certainly was Plato's. Here it is only inferred from an *ἐνδοξον*.

τὰ μετὰ λόγου, i.e. τὰ προβεβουλευμένα (1112 a, 16). The intellectual element is essential to *προαίρεσις*.

ἢ μάλιστα. Now that the doctrine *νοὺς ἐστὶν ἕκαστος* is more positively stated, a reservation is added.

κατὰ λόγον...κατὰ πάθος. Cf. 1095 a, 10 n.

καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι closely with τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν. There is no difficulty in saying that the good man κατὰ λόγον ὀρέγεται τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. Some MSS., however, omit ἢ before τοῦ καλοῦ from a desire to avoid this. The meaning will then be 'as much as τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ differs from τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν.' But it is not true that ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν ὀρέγεται τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν, his *ὄρεξις* is surely τοῦ παρόντος ἡδέος.

§ 7. ἀποδέχονται, cf. 1156 b, 28 n.

τοιοῦτον, sc. ἀγαθόν.

§ 8. πᾶς γὰρ νοὺς κ.τ.λ. Ramsauer quotes Rhet. 1362 a, 24 (ἀγαθὰ

πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν
 φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κὰν δέη
 20 ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς
 καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ
 καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιτ'
 ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα, καὶ βιώσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη
 τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς
 25 καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει·
 αἰροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προσοῦντ'
 ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ
 μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὲ μείζον
 ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ 10
 30 αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· κα-
 λὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν· εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπον-
 दाῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται
 δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προῖεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ
 αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς 11
 35 ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον
 1169^b νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαντον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται·
 ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

IX. Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα εἰ δεησέ-
 ται φίλων ἢ μὴ. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακα-
 5 ρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀγαθὰ· αὐτάρ-
 κεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον
 αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἅ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν “ὅταν ὁ

1169 b, 3. EE. 1244 b, 1 σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκείας καὶ
 φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις
 πότερον, εἴ τις εἴη κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ * * φίλος. εἰ
 κατ' ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς αὐταρκέστατος, εἰ ὁ μετ'

δ' ἐστὶ) ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἐκάστῳ ἀποδοίη,
 καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἑκάστου νοῦς (i.e. ὁ
 ἐκάστου νοῦς) ἀποδίδωσιν ἐκάστῳ.

IX. § 1. Αμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ
 κ.τ.λ. This πρόβλημα brings us still
 closer to the question how φιλία is
 related to the Self.

ἕτερον αὐτόν, cf. above 1161 b, 29,
 1166 a, 32.

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων κ.τ.λ. Euripides,
 Orestes, 665—

τοὺς φίλους
 ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρή τοῖς φίλοιςιν ὠφελῶν
 ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

- 2 δαίμων εὖ διδῶ, τί δεῖ φίλων;” ἔοικε δ’ ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ’ ἀπονεύοντα τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον 10 ἔστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ’ εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὥς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν 15
- 3 εὐτυχούντων οὖς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ’ ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ’ ἂν καθ’ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ’ ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ’ ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ’ ὥς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιει- 20 κῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ’ ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν.
- 4 δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπεὶ δὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, 25 ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὃν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι

ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τί ἂν δέοι φίλου; οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὔτε τῶν εὐφρανούντων οὔτε τοῦ συζῆν· αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἱκανὸς συνεῖναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο φανερόν ἐπὶ θεοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδενὸς προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδ’ ἔσται αὐτῷ οὔτε μηθὲν ἰδεσπτότου. ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεήσεται φίλου, ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστα ζῶντι, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάξειν ὅπως ὥσι φίλοι, ἀλλ’ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ συζῆν αἰρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε φανερόν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν ὡς οὐ χρήσεως ἕνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδ’ ὠφελείας, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γὰρ μηθενὸς ἐνδεεὶς ὦμεν, τότε τοὺς συναπολαυσόμενους ζητοῦσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς

§ 3. μονώτην. Cf. above 1097 b, 9. sense ‘by himself,’ ‘alone.’

καθ’ αὐτόν, here in its ordinary

§ 4. οἱ πολλοί. Cf. 1168 b, 17 n.

φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται 5
 ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι
 30 γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαι-
 μονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέρ-
 γεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ
 εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον
 τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ
 35 τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων
 1170^a ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα).
 ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προ-
 αιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. οἴονται τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα.
 5 μυνώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν
 ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἐτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον. ἔσται 6
 οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὃ δεῖ

ποιήσοντας. ἀμείνω δ' ἔχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετ' ἐνδεΐας,
 ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζῆν ἀξίων δεόμεθα φίλων.

περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον, μή ποτε τὸ μὲν τι λέγεται
 καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολήν. δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ
 ζῆν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
 καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ
 συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν
 γνωρίζειν αἰρετώτατον ἐκάστω, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ
 ὀρεξις· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι γινώσιν τινα. εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέμει καὶ
 ποιήσῃ τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ * * (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν
 λανθάνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἐστὶ μὴ
 λανθάνειν), οὐθὲν ἂν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ· τὸ δ'
 ὁμοιον τοῦ ζῆν ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλον. εὐλόγως δὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι
 καὶ γνωρίζειν αἰρετώτερον. δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα συνθεῖναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι
 τε τὸ ζῆν [καὶ] αἰρετόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ

§ 5. ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1098 a, 16.
 ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. Cf. the antithesis
 of χρήσις and κτήσις.

ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1099 a, 21.
 τὸ οἰκεῖον, 'what is his own.' Cf.
 1156 b, 15 καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς

καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστω γὰρ καθ' ἑδονήν
 εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι.

ἄμφω, sc. τὸ σπουδαῖον and τὸ
 οἰκεῖον.

περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἢ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ ¹⁰ 7 τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησις τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεογνίς φησιν. φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἐστὶ καθ' ¹⁵ αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζώοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,

† τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. εἰ οὖν ἐστὶν αἰὲ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ἢ ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἰρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὠρισμένης φύσεως· ὥστε τὸ αὐτοῦ βούλεσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τοιονδὶ βούλεσθαι ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐσμεν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς γίνεται ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, καθὰ πρότερον αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἢ καὶ οὐ, γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)· ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν αἰὲ βούλεται, ὅτι βούλεται αἰὲ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ γνωστόν. τὸ δὴ συζῆν αἰρεῖσθαι δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοποῦμένοις πως εὐήθες (ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθίειν ἢ τοῦ συμπίνειν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον οὔσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ χωρὶς, ἂν ἀφέλῃς τὸν λόγον; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον· ἅμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μαθάνειν τοῖς αὐταρκέσι φίλοις οἷον τε· μαθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ, διδάσκοντος δ' ὁ φίλος, ἢ δ' ὁμοιότης φιλία)· ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γέ, καὶ πάντες ἡδιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθ' ὅσον

§ 7. Θεογνίς, v. 35,

Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεται,
ἦν δὲ κακοῖσι

συμμίσης, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

φυσικώτερον κ.τ.λ. If we consider this πρόβλημα in the light of φυσικαὶ προτάσεις (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.), we are landed once more in the psychology of the Self, and this is in fact the real motive of the inquiry. The argument is intricately stated; but it may, I think, be worked out as a series of syllogisms,

the first of which is supported by two prosyllogisms. If these are disentangled, the repetitions and parentheses can easily be referred to their proper place in the argument.

τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. 413 b, 1 τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην (sc. τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν) ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζώοις, τὸ δὲ ζῶν διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν πρώτως. 414 b, 18 ἐτέροις δὲ (ὑπάρχει) καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις.

ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὲ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν
20 καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὠρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὠρι-
σμένον τῆς τάγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ

ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ δύναται ἀρίστον, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς, τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μουσικῆς, τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας. καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ. διὸ φησι “μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι,” ὥστ' οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τούτου γινομένου. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλίας ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἴσθησιν.

1170 a, 19. EE. 1245 a, 26 ὁ μὲν τοίνυν λόγος ἐκεῖνά φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ὥστε δηλὸν ὅτι παρακρούεται πως ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν. σκεπτέον ἔνθεν τἀληθές. ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησὶν, ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός. διόσπασται δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐφ' ἐνὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν τὸ συγγενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὅμοιος ἕτερος, ἄλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ μόριον ἕτερος ἕτερον. ἀλλ' οὐθέν

εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. For ἀνάγειν see 1113 a, 6. 'The capacity is reduced to (or 'traced up to') the activity' as its ἀρχή. For the ἐνέργεια as the ἀρχή (οὐ ἔνεκα) of the δύναμις cf. Met. 1050 a, 8 sqq., and especially 1051 a, 29 τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὐρίσκεται. As a capacity is always a capacity of some activity, if a capacity is the differentia of a thing, that thing will be the corresponding activity.

τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, 'the primary ἀρχή,' 'that which makes the δύναμις what it is lies in the ἐνέργεια which is its final cause.' When applied to ἀρχαί, τὸ κύριον is practically the same as τὸ πρῶτον (cf. Bonitz on Met. 1015 b, 11). We now have

Prosyllogism A.

The differentia of human life is the capacity of Sensation and Thought.

Every capacity is referred to its activity as primary.

∴ Human life is primarily the activity of Sensation and Thought.

ὠρισμένον γάρ. This gives us the middle term of—

Prosyllogism B.

The determinate is good by nature. Life is determinate.

∴ Life is good by nature.

For the view that the 'determinate' or 'limited' is good, cf. 1106 b, 30. As we shall see later, this means that life is τελειόν τι, that its form is completely realised.

τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. This gives us—

Syllogism I.

Life is Sensation and Thought. (Prosyll. A.)

Life is good by nature and therefore pleasant in itself to the good man. (Prosyll. B.)

∴ Sensation and Thought are good by nature and pleasant in themselves to the good man.

8 τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν
9 τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' 25
αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους·
τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη
ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὀρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει
καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι 30
τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι
αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῦμεν ἂν ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανό-
μεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ
νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό (φύ- 1170^b
σει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ), αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγα-

τε ἦττον βούλεται ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ
φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ <τὸν
φίλον γνωρίζειν τὸ> αὐτόν πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικά μὲν
συνιδέσθαι καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκείνου
ἅμα αἰσθησις αἰεί), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειοτέρας ἡδονάς. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι αἰεὶ
ἡδίων ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις. In the first part of Book X we shall see that such lives do not fulfil the requirements of τὸ ὠρισμένον. They are ἀτελεῖς, 'incomplete.'

§ 9. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has compressed the whole argument into one of his enormous protases, the apodosis of which does not come till b, 8 οὕτω. We can disentangle first
Syllogism II.

Sensation and thought are good and pleasant in themselves to the good.

Self-consciousness is consciousness of Sensation and Thought.

∴ The Self-consciousness of the good is consciousness of something

good and pleasant in itself.

ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὀρᾷ αἰσθάνεται κ.τ.λ.

For this way of expressing what we call 'self-consciousness,' cf. De An. 425 b, 12 ἐπεὶ δ' αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὀρώμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὀφεί
ὅτι ὀρᾷ ἢ ἐτέρῳ. De Somno 455 a, 15
ἔστι δὲ τις καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολου-
θοῦσα πάσαις, ἣ καὶ ὅτι ὀρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει
αἰσθάνεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὀφεί ὀρᾷ
ὅτι ὀρᾷ. This consciousness of sen-
sation as distinct from sensation is
called by Eudemos συναίσθησις. We
are not told here what it is that
αἰσθάνεται ὅτι νοεῖ. We shall see
that it is νοῦς itself in its highest
function, νόησις νόησεως.

θοίς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ—συναισθανό-
 5 μνοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονταί—ὥς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν 10
 ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ
 φίλος ἔστιν· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετόν ἔστιν ἐκάστω,
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἢ
 αἰρετόν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη
 10 αἰσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ
 φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν
 λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων
 τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρε-

πάθος, ὅτε δὲ πρᾶξις, ὅτε δὲ ἕτερόν τι. εἰ δ' αὐτὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ οὕτω
 καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν συνεργεῖν, ἢ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει
 μάλιστα γε. διὸ <δεῖ> συνθερεῖν καὶ συνευχεῖσθαι, οὐ τὰ διὰ
 τροφήν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· αἱ τοιαῦται * * ὁμιλίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
 ἀπολαύσεις. ἀλλ' ἕκαστος οὗ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν τούτῳ
 βούλεται συζῆν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων
 αἰροῦνται μάλιστα.

συναισθανόμενοι... τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ
 ἀγαθοῦ κ.τ.λ. The verb συναισθάνο-
 μαι is very appropriate for the
 consciousness of sensation or thought
 as distinct from either. Just as from
 σύννοιά σοι we get σύννοια ἐμαντῷ, we
 might get συναισθάνομαι ἐμαντῷ from
 συναισθάνομαί σοι to express the mean-
 ing αἰσθάνομαι ἐμαντοῦ αἰσθανομένου ἢ
 νοούντος. Eudemos already has the
 word συναίσθησις in the primary sense,
 and in the secondary it is technically
 used by Alexander.

§ 10. ὥς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κ.τ.λ. This
 has been proved above 1166 a, 1 (note
 how these apparently unconnected dis-
 cussions fit in with one another) and
 gives us the major premiss of
Syllogism III.

The good man is related to his
 friend as to himself.

The good man's consciousness of
 himself is good and pleasant.

∴. The good man's consciousness
 of his friend's self is good and pleasant
 in itself. Q. E. D.

The doctrine is, then, in modern
 phrase, that the possibility of sym-
 pathy depends upon the presence of
 self-consciousness, that is, of a self
 which distinguishes itself from its
 sensations and thoughts and can there-
 fore relate itself to the sensations and
 thoughts of a friend in the same way
 as to our own. It is thus that φίλος
 widens the self.

ἐν τῷ συζῆν. The συναίσθησις τοῦ
 φίλου can be fully realised only in
 intellectual communion. This follows
 from all that has been said, and is
 gradually leading us up to the ideal of
 the θεωρητικὸς βίος.

εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle
 feels the need of a clearer and more
 succinct statement of the argument.

οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῇ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιούτους. 20

XI. Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἳ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἳ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίῳν καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαϊότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον 25 δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διαίγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῇ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειεν τις πότερον 30 ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἢ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὔσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται,

1171 a, 21. EE. 1245 b, 26 καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἀπείναι εὖ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον βουλόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἅμα βούλεσθαι εἶναι φιλικόν. ἐνδεχομένου μὲν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὖ, τοῦτο πάντες αἰροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆ ἴσως ἂν ἢ μήτηρ εἴλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεὶ θητεύειν. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν εἴπειν καὶ ὃν ὁ Λάκων ἔσχωσεν, ἐπεὶ τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους. δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς συμμεθέξεως τῶν χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρω συμβαίνει εὐλόγως. δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μῆθ' εἶναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὥς <μὴ> ἰδεῖν τὸν φίλον· δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὐτοῦ. διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὐτῶν σκοποῦντες καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπουμένου τοῦ φίλου. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κουφότερον εἶναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά.

ἀγαπητόν. Cf. 1094 b, 9.

XI. § 1. Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις κ.τ.λ. This πρόβλημα also bears on the relation of φίλα to the ideal life.

ἀναγκαϊότερον μὲν...κάλλιον δὲ... Cf. 1155 a, 3 n.

§ 2. ὥσπερ βάρους. Victorius

quotes Xen. Mem. ii, 7, 1 Σωκράτης Ἀρίσταρχόν ποτε ὁρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα· Ὁικας, ἔφη, βαρέως φέρειν τι· χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βαρέος μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τί σε ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.

ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε δ' 3
 35 ἡ παρουσία μική τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν
 1171^b τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις
 ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι—παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος
 καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ἡ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἡθος
 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἡδεταὶ καὶ λυπεῖται—τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθά- 4
 5 νεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει
 λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν
 φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ
 ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἄλυνίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπο-
 μένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς
 10 εἶναι θρηνητικός· γυναῖα δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συ-
 στένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας.
 μιμῆσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν 5
 ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν
 ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἡδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς.
 15 διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους
 προθύμως—εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν—εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυ-
 χίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδίδοναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν,
 ὅθεν τὸ “ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.” μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον

ἐπεὶ δ' αἵρετόν τό τ' εἶ καὶ τὸ ἅμα, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μετ'
 ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ αἵρετώτερόν πως ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μείζονος. ἐπεὶ δὲ
 ἄδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἅμα, ἥδη διαφέρονται καὶ οἶονται τὸ
 μετέχειν ἅμα πάντων φιλικόν, [καὶ] ὥσπερ συνδαιπνεῖν ἅμα φασὶν
 ἡδίων ταῦτ' ἔχοντας· οἱ δ' ἂν μέντοι οὐ βούλονται. ἐπεὶ δ' εἰ γέ τις
 ὑπερβολὰς ποιήσει, * * ὁμολογῶσιν ἅμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἢ
 εἶ σφόδρα χωρὶς. * * παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας.
 ὅτε μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπεῖναι οὐδὲ λυπεῖν, ὅταν μὴθιν
 μέλλωσι ποιήσιν πλέον· ὅτε δὲ αὐτοὺς ἡδιστον παρεῖναι. τὸ δὲ τῆς
 ὑπεναντιώσεως ταύτης καὶ μάλ' εὐλογον. διὰ γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο
 συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ ἐν φαύλῃ ὄντα ἔξει τὸν φίλον
 θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τὸ δ' ὁρᾶν τὸν φίλον

§ 4. κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἄλυνίᾳ.
 Tr. 'even if he is not exceptionally
 insensible to pain.'

§ 5. διαγωγὴν. Cf. 1127^b, 34^a.
 τὸ “ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.” We do
 not know where this comes from.

ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν.
 6 ἵεναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας 20
 ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως—φίλον γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα
 τοὺς ἐν χρεῖα καὶ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον
 καὶ ἥδιον—εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως
 —καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεῖα φίλων—πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχο-
 λαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν 25
 δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ
 συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἰρετὴ
 φαίνεται.

XII. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρώσι τὸ ὀρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν
 ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς, 30
 ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου,
 οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετώτατόν ἐστὶ τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία
 γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν
 φίλον· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἐστὶν αἰρετὴ, καὶ περὶ
 τὸν φίλον δὴ· ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, 35
 2 ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ 1172^a
 εἶναι ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φί-
 λων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ
 συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν

ἡδύ, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡδίστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴ
 κάμνοντα, εἰ αὐτός· ὥστε ὁπότερον ἂν τούτων ἢ μᾶλλον ἡδύ, ποιεῖ τὴν
 ῥοπὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι παρῆναι ἢ μὴ. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων
 συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτι-
 μοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδ' εἶναι ἀνάγκαι * * αὐτοῖς
 κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίοτε τοὺς ἐρωμένους συναποκτινύνασι. μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ
 οἰκείου αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ποτὲ εὖ
 ἔπραττε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ ὥτεο αἰεὶ κακῶς πράττειν.

§ 6. *μη ἀξιώσαντας*. For the read-
 ing see Bywater, Contr. p. 66.

XII. § 1. Ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. The
 discussion is concluded by some
 remarks upon τὸ συζῆν which is
 the ἐνέργεια τῆς φιλίας and there-
 fore the ὅρος of all φιλικά. This

is really a summary of the whole
 argument.

περὶ αὐτόν=αὐτοῦ. Cf. Ind. s.v.
 περὶ.

αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς συναίσθησεως (the
 phrase is used in EE. loc. cit. p. 431).
 Aretinus reads αὐτοῖς.

5 ἡ συμφιλοσοφούσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅτι
 περ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμε-
 νοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιούσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν
 ὡς οἶόν τε [συζῆν]. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία 3
 μοχθηρά—κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μο-
 10 χθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις—ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπικτικῶν
 ἐπικτικής, συναυξανόμενη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελ-
 τίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργούντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάτ-
 τονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν “ἐσθλῶν
 μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά.” περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 4
 15 εἰρήσθω· ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

§ 2. ὡς οἶόν τε. I think this read-
 ing (that of K^b) is established by EE.
 1245 a, 20 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον
 καὶ οὐ δύναται ἀρίστου. When οἶόν τε
 became οἶονται, συζῆν would be added
 as the most obvious verb.

§ 3. ἀπομάττονται. 'They take
 the impress of those things in
 one another they are pleased with.'

The verb is properly used of wax
 taking the impress of a seal.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Theognis 35
 'Εσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεται'
 ἦν δὲ κακοῖσιν

συμμίσηται, ἀπολείψαι καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.
 ταῦτα μαθὼν ἀγαθοῖσιν ὁμίλει· καὶ ποτε
 φήσεις

εὖ συμβουλευεῖν τοῖσι φίλοις ἐμέ.

BOOK X.

THE GOOD FOR MAN.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We are now in a position to answer the question with which we started, but first we must clear up a point which we have left unsettled. In our discussion of the view that pleasure was bad we left it quite an open question whether it might not even be the highest good. This view has often been held, and its most recent and authoritative exponent is Eudoxos who substituted Pleasure for the Platonic Form of the Good. The arguments directed against his position by Speusippos and other members of the Academy are altogether inadequate, and we must therefore come to some understanding on the point before we go any further.

What, then, is pleasure? Contrary to the view received in the Academy it is certainly not a motion. All motions are incomplete and pleasure is something complete in any given moment, just like vision. We can use the present and the perfect tense at once of it. There is not less pleasure in any moment of its presence than there is in its whole duration. It is completely present or not at all, and this shows that it is no motion; for every motion is incomplete till it reaches its end and then it ceases to exist as motion altogether. Pleasure then must be an activity or rather the completion of an activity. Pleasure is the completion of the activity of a subject at its best acting upon an object at its best.

§ 2. It is clear, then, that we can hardly distinguish the pleasure of the highest life from the highest life itself, and in this sense it is true that pleasure is the highest good. But this is not hedonism. Just because the pleasure and the activity which it

completes are so closely bound up together that they can only be distinguished by an effort of thought, it follows that pleasures must differ specifically just as the activities do which they complete. There is therefore no sense in saying that pleasure in the abstract is the end. There is no such thing as pleasure in the abstract; but only pleasures that are inseparably bound up with certain activities. We must therefore continue to look for human good in some form of activity, which will of course, as we saw long ago, be essentially pleasant. And we must decline to separate the activity from its pleasure and discuss which of them is really the end of life.

§ 3. What activity, then, is it that constitutes human good? We know that it must be one which is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, and therefore it cannot be the life of action, the life of the man who possesses goodness of character without anything higher. Of the "three lives" with which we started it can clearly be none other than the life of the onlooker, the disinterested spectator. Now there are at first sight two lives which seem to fulfil this character. There is the life of amusement and there is the life of the philosopher, the life of artistic, scientific or religious "contemplation." But though some people may make amusement their end, this is not its proper function. Amusement is properly speaking a form of rest or relaxation and is a means to an end. We rest in order that we may be the better able to act. There remains, then, the "contemplative life," the life of the thinker. And this is in complete accordance with the results we have reached already: for we saw that, if there were more forms of goodness than one, the good life would be an activity in accordance with the highest and most complete of these. We have seen too that the highest and most complete form of goodness is *σοφία*, and from this it follows that human happiness consists in an *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*.

§ 4. Such happiness is possible, however, for man only to a small extent, and is indeed not strictly speaking human but divine. The greater part of man's life belongs to the province of goodness of character. Our study of self-love has shown us, however, how these two are related. Self-love, in the sense of the love of that which is highest in us, is necessary and right, and so we see that the more properly human life which we live for the

most part, our everyday life, must be ordered with a view to making possible so far as may be the life of Thought which is in some sense the life of our true selves. Now we see what is the true "standard of the means" (*ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων*), or, as Eudemos calls it, the *ὁρος τῆς καλοκάγαθίας* (i.e. *τῆς ἡθικῆς ἀρετῆς*). It is the theoretic life which the *φρόνιμος* keeps in view when he determines the mean; for he knows that his own practical wisdom is only ancillary to the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher. Eudemos expresses exactly the same thought in a definitely religious form when he says that the standard which regulates goodness is *τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν*, "to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever."

§ 5. We now know what the good for man is, and we know also how it is to be produced. If we wish to attain to the blessedness of the contemplative life, we must first of all be good in the everyday sense of the word. And we become good by performing good acts. But our aim at present is not merely to secure this blessed life for ourselves even if that were possible. The object of our science is to secure the good for the citizens of a state so far as they are capable of it. How, then, are we to produce in our citizens the character from which good acts arise? Education is of course the only way to produce character, but the education of the family has too little authority to be sufficient. It is true that in the present state of things the state does not discharge this its most important function, and all that the father of a family can do is to become in some sort a domestic lawgiver, but this is clearly only a makeshift. What we have to do is to learn what constitution will really secure the performance of its function by the state, and to train ourselves to be lawgivers who can legislate with this end in view. The details of this constitutional legislation form the subject of the Politics.

Κ

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν. μά-
 20 λιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συμφκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι
 τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς
 τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ
 μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥο-
 πὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα
 25 βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύ-
 γουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, 2
 ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ

I. § 1. ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν.
 This formula of transition, for which
 cf. 1155 a, 3, is repeated at the begin-
 ning of Book X, though Book IX
 ends with the words ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν
 εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς. So far as it
 goes, this fact favours the view that
 these transitions are a trace of editorial
 work.

μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. The
 usual enumeration of more or less
 irrelevant reasons for the discussion.

συμφκειῶσθαι, 'to be most closely
 bound up with.' For the word cf.
 1161 b, 21 and for the thought
 1105 a, 1 ἐτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῶν
 συντέθραπται (sc. ἡ ἡδονή).

διὸ παιδεύουσι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1104 b,
 11 n. This seems to be the earliest
 instance of the metaphorical use of
 οἰακίζοντες (= κυβερνῶντες), though
 οἰαξ for the 'helm of government'
 occurs from Aischylos onwards. The

same idea is expressed in Plato's image
 (Laws 644 d sqq.) of man as a "puppet
 of the gods" (θαῦμα τῶν θεῶν) whose
 movements are controlled by the two
 strings (σμήνυθαι) of pleasure and
 pain pulling opposite ways.

πρός. For μέγα πρόσ cf. 1161 b,
 33.

ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα, cf. 1094 a, 23.
 προαιροῦνται. Strictly speaking
 this is true only of οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, but
 the word is doubtless used in a popular
 sense as equivalent to διώκεισιν.

§ 2. ὑπέρ. Cf. 1096 a, 4 n. Here,
 by a characteristic brachylogy, ἥκιστα
 παρετέον takes the construction of
 λεκτέον which it implies.

ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν, cf. Ind. s.v.
 εἶναι.

οἱ μὲν...οἱ δὲ... The two parties are
 represented in the Ethics by Eudoxos
 and Speusippos.

τάγαθον ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἴομενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τούναντίον
 3 ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν 35 διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τὰληθὲς προσαναίρουσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὀφθαλμοὶ 1172^b ποτ' ἐφίεμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην
 4 οὖσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. εἰ-
 κασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνωδοὶ γὰρ 5 ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλως· τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

II. Εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθον φετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ

διὸ δεῖν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1109 b, 4 sqq.
 § 3. μή ποτε. 'It may be that...' Goodwin MT. § 269. From signifying 'it is to be feared that' μήποτε came to mean 'perhaps.'

περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι κ.τ.λ., i.q. περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν, cf. 1105 b, 16. The ἐν as usual (Ind. s.v.) indicates the ὅλη.

τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, i.e. τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. Met. 1063 b, 2 οὐχ ὁμοία φαίνεται τὰ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις.

ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν, sc. ἀγαθὴν implied in ἐφίεμενον.

II. § 1. Εὐδοξος. Eudoxos of Knidos, mathematician and astronomer, had belonged to the Academy. He was, it would seem, one of the most original of its members, and developed Plato's theories on lines of his own. The scholiast of L^b tells us that he held τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, which amounts

to saying that he identified it with the Form of the Good. Cf. Rep. 509 b ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας προσβέλα... ὑπερέχοντος. In his sketch of Aristotle's life, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff says "The geographer and astronomer Eudoxos is probably the only one of his associates who had a real influence on Aristotle. That he should take notice of his ethical doctrines, which after all are not of any great significance, can hardly be explained apart from some personal relation to him. Now Eudoxos was just the right man to introduce the natural science of the Ionians to Aristotle; and we certainly require some such intermediary when we look at Aristotle's life as a whole" (Ar. und Ath. i, p. 333).

διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. This implies the definition of the Good as οὐδ' ἀντ' ἐφίεται (1094 a, 3).

- 10 πάνθ' ὅραν ἐφίεμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι
 δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον·
 τὸ δὴ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτό φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἀρι-
 στον ὄν—ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ
 τροφήν—τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τὰγα-
 15 θὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν
 μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σῶφρων εἶναι·
 οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως
 ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἦττον δ' ᾤετ' εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ 2
 ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι,
 20 ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦναντίον αἰρετόν· μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετὸν ὃ μὴ
 δι' ἕτερον μὴδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογου-
 μένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα
 ἥδεται, ὡς καθ' αὐτὴν οὖσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. προστιθε-
 μένην τε ὁτφοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ

ἔλλογα. Aristotle himself never uses this word for λόγον ἔχοντα, nor is it found in Attic writers. This makes it probable that Grant is right in his view that this is a quotation from Eudoxos. If so, the definition of τὸ ἀγαθόν at the beginning of the Ethics will be his. Cf. also Top. 116 a, 19.

τὸ ἐπιεικές, i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν.

φέρεσθαι, an unusual word in this connexion, but natural in the mouth of an astronomer.

τὰγαθὸν εἶναι. The argument is thus given by Alexander (Top. p. 6 Wallies) ἂν λάβωμεν ὅτι ὃ πάντα τὰ ζῷα αἰρεῖται ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, τοῦτο μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν τελικώτατον, καὶ συλλογισάμενοι ὅτι ὃ πάντα τὰ ζῷα ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, αἰρεῖται, τοῦτό ἐστι τελικώτατον, εἴτα προσλάβωμεν ὅτι τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν πάντα ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, αἰρεῖται... (ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν) ἐσόμεθα συλλελογισμένοι.

§ 2. ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου. For the τόπος cf. Top. 117 b, 3 ἐτι ἐκ τῶν

φθορῶν καὶ τῶν ἀποβολῶν καὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ τῶν λήψεων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων... οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀποβολὴ ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον φευκτότερον, αὐτὸ αἰρετώτερον.

ὁμοίως δὴ, sc. καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσιν.

μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν κ.τ.λ. For this τόπος cf. Top. 116 a, 29 καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον αἰρετοῦ αἰρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι.

οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν. This certainly sounds like direct quotation.

προστιθεμένην τε κ.τ.λ. This is from the τόπος of πρόσθεσις, for which cf. Top. 115 a, 26 ἐτι δ' ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως. εἰ ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον προστεθὲν ποιῇ ἀγαθόν ἢ λευκόν, μὴ ὅν πρότερον λευκόν ἢ ἀγαθόν, τὸ προστεθὲν ἔσται λευκόν ἢ ἀγαθόν οἷον περ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. ἐτι εἰ πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρχον (sc. ἀγαθόν ἢ λευκόν) προστεθὲν τι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον ὑπῆρχε, καὶ αὐτὸ ἔσται τοιοῦτον. The present case is of course the second. As Aristotle goes on to observe, it only proves that pleasure is a good, not that it is the good.

δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὔξεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ. 25
 3 ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαί-
 νειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ
 αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιοῦτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων
 ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι
 τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρὶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτόν 30
 κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστε-
 θέντος αὐτῷ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ'
 ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ
 4 ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὐ καὶ
 ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστά- 35
 μενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν. ἃ
 γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν 1173^a

§ 3. πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου κ.τ.λ. Top. 117 a, 16 ἐστὶ τὰ πλεῖω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων.

Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ. Phileb. 60 d λεγέτω... εἰ τις ἀνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τινων ἡδονῶν, ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὐτῶν. — Οὐκ ἔστιν... Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλειον καὶ πᾶσιν αἰρετόν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη; That is, the πρόσθεσις of wisdom also makes pleasure better, and therefore neither is *the good*.

τὸ μικτόν. The phrase is Plato's. Phileb. 22 d ἐν τῷ μικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ. 27 d νικῶντα μὲν ἐθεμέν που τὸν μικτόν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

οὐδενὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'There is nothing the addition of which can make *the good* more worth having.' I prefer the αὐτῷ of L^b to the αὐτὸ of K^b. The good does not admit of πρόσθεσις, for all other good things are desired for the sake of it. This is given in the Topics as an ἐνστασις (objection) to the τόπος ἐκ προσθέσεως. Cf. 117 a, 16 ἐνστασις εἰ που ἄτερον θατέρου χάριν· οὐδὲν γὰρ

αἰρετώτερον τὰ ἀμφοῖν τοῦ ἐνός, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ὑγίειας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τῆς ὑγίειας ἐνεκεν αἰρούμεθα.

τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν. Cf. 1096 b, 16 καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θεῖη τις ἂν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναὶ τινες καὶ τιμαί; Even these we desire τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, and therefore εὐδαιμονία + pleasure is not more worth having than εὐδαιμονία alone.

§ 4. τοιοῦτον, sc. οἷον μὴ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι, or, in other words, μὴ συναριθμούμενον (1097 b, 17 n.).

οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν. As Rodier says, this is added to show that Aristotle does not mean to approve of Plato's theory of the good, except in so far as the above argument goes.

ἐνιστάμενοι, An. Pr. 69 a, 37 ἐνστασις δ' ἐστὶ πρότασις προτάσει ἐναντία.

μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν. See Kühner § 394, 6.

ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, sc. ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. There is no sense in saying a thing is not good if it is thought good by all.

- πίστιν οὐ πᾶν πιστότερα ἐρεῖ. ἥ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἣν ἂν τι λεγόμενον, ἥ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἂν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι [φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν] 5 κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ἐστὶ, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδέτερον—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. 10 ἄμφοιν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τὸ μηδέτερον δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται. III. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς 15 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι 2 δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὀρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι

ἥ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. So Bywater for MS. *εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, cf. Contr. p. 66. The emendation had been anticipated by Michelet.

ἔστι τι κ.τ.λ. Thurot deleted ἀγαθόν, which Michael does not seem to have had, and Bywater would delete φυσικὸν too. We cannot speak of a φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν aiming at an οἰκείον ἀγαθόν. For the thought cf. 1153 b, 31. This is the θεῖον τι of 1153 b, 32. Introd. § 25.

§ 5. οὐ γάρ φασιν κ.τ.λ. The argument is that of Speusippos and has been discussed in Book VII (1153 b, 1 sqq. and the notes).

τῷ μηδέτερον. Stewart points out that this, the MS. reading, can be defended by Plato, Rep. 583 e ἥ καὶ δυνατόν τὸ μηδέτερον ὄν ἀμφοτέρω γινεσθαι;

ὄντων κακῶν. For another reading (ὄντων <τῶν> κακῶν) cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 66.

τὸ μηδέτερον δέ. This correction of MS. τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ is due to Professor Butcher. 'That which is

neutral ought to be (ἔδει) neither shunned nor sought or both alike.'

οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται, 'so the antithesis is of this kind.'

III. § 1. οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων κ.τ.λ. From this it appears that the Platonists (Speusippos) regarded all good things as qualities. Aristotle held, on the other hand, that τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἴσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι, 'is predicated in all the categories' (1096 a, 23). 'Activities according to goodness' are κινήσεις, and so therefore is εὐδαιμονία itself. But Speusippos, who defined εὐδαιμονία as ἔξις τελεία, of course regarded it as a ποιότης.

§ 2. τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον. Cf. 1170 a, 20 and the argument of Plato's Philebos 24 e ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἐν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι... 31 a ἡδονὴ δὲ ἀπείρος τε αὐτῇ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἔξωτος γένους. The word ἀόριστος,

- δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν καὶ <πράττειν> κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται ταυτό· δίκαιοι 20 γὰρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ
- 3 λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὧσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. καὶ τί κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὀρισμένη οὕσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη 25 συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
- 4 τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνουσιν 30

however, is never used by Plato in the sense of *ἄπειρος*, and this makes it likely that Aristotle is criticising a contemporary form of the Platonic doctrine. With Xenokrates *ἀόριστος* was the technical term.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι κ.τ.λ. It does not follow from the fact that τὸ ἡδεσθαι admits of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον that ἡ ἡδονή does so too. If it did, we should have to say that goodness also is *ἀόριστος*, for people may be more or less good.

εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, sc. τοῦτο κρίνουσι. We have seen above (1152 b, 13) that Speusippos, in making all pleasure a *γένεσις*, ignored Plato's distinction between 'mixed' and 'unmixed' pleasures. In the same way he here ignores Plato's view that *ἀμετρία* was to be found in the mixed pleasures only, while the pure pleasures possessed *ἐμμετρία*. Cf. Phileb. 52 c οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τὰς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὁρθῶς ἂν λεχθεῖσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τούναντίον, ἐμμετρίαν.

§ 3. καὶ τί κωλύει. A fresh point. The reading *τί γὰρ κωλύει* has inferior authority and does not make the argument clearer.

καθάπερ ὑγίεια. For *ὑγίεια* as a *συμμετρία* cf. Top. 139 b, 21, where *συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν* is quoted as a definition obscure from its ambiguity. The illustration here is taken from Plato, Phileb. 25 e.

ἐν πᾶσιν...ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Masculine. The proportion of health varies in different persons and in the same person at different times.

ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός. Cf. 1170 b, 32 n. There is always some latitude in a *μεσότης*. We cannot distinguish (*κρίνειν*) very minute intervals, and so a note may be flat or sharp and still be the same note. Aristotle is never tired of arguing against the abstract use of the formula of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον.

§ 4. τέλειόν τε κ.τ.λ. This is all from Plato's Philebos. Cf. especially 54 d ἄρ' οὖν ἡδονὴ γε εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὁρθῶς θήσομεν;

πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰκάσι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν. πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκείον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ 1173^b ὀργισθῆναι, ἡδεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδεσθαι. γένεσίς τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; 5 5 δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ οὐ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν 6

οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν, 'not even a motion,' and therefore *a fortiori* not a *γένεσις*, which is a species of *κίνησις*.

οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου. Here *κόσμος* = οὐρανός. Cf. *De Caelo*, 288 a, 13 *περὶ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ ὅτι ὁμαλῆς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀνώμαλος*... λέγω δὲ τοῦτο *περὶ τοῦ πρώτου οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς πρώτης φθορᾶς*. The *κύκλι φθορά* of the *πρώτος οὐρανός* is an absolutely uniform motion. It has no *ἐπίτασις* or *ἀνεσις*, acceleration or retardation. We cannot therefore call it slow or quick in itself (καθ' αὐτήν), for we have no slower or quicker motion of itself with which to compare it. But if we compare it with the derivative motions like that of the planets, we can call it rapid *πρὸς ἄλλο*.

οὐδέτερον, sc. *οὔτε τὸ καθ' αὐτὴν οὔτε τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο*.

ἡσθῆναι. The ingressive aorist expresses the *κίνησις* or *γένεσις* which ends in feeling pleasure, ἡδεσθαι. So we may 'get angry' quickly, but we cannot 'be angry' quickly.

οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, 'not even relatively.'

βαδίζειν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Walking and growing are *εἶδη κινήσεως*, in all of which there is acceleration and retardation, quick and slow. For the *εἶδη κινήσεως* cf. below 1174 a, 30.

μεταβάλλειν... εἰς τὴν ἡδονήν, i.e. ἡσθῆναι.

§ 5. γένεσίς τε κ.τ.λ. If it is not a *κίνησις*, it cannot be a *γένεσις*, but there are some special reasons against this as well.

οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος. Cf. *Phys.* 204 b, 33 *ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐξ οὗ ἐστὶ, καὶ διαλύεται εἰς τοῦτο*. The reason is that *γένεσις* is the process to *ἐνέργεια* of the form contained *δυνάμει* in a thing, and the *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* are strictly correlative. A thing can only become actually what it is potentially. The reverse process (*φθορά*) is determined in the same way. What is the thing of which pleasure is the *γένεσις*, while its *φθορά* is pain?

§ 6. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. This seems to be an attempt to meet the last argument. The form of which pleasure is a *γένεσις* and pain a *φθορά* is τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἔξις. This doctrine the Platonists derived from the *Philebos*. Cf. 42 c *εἰρηται που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἐκείστω διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεις καὶ διακρίσεις καὶ πληρώσεις καὶ κενώσεις καὶ τισιν αἰσῶσι καὶ φθίσει λύπαι τε καὶ ἀλγηδῶνες καὶ ὀδύνη καὶ πάνθ' ὅπῃς τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματ' ἔχει συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα*. We must remember that Plato himself did not explain all pleasure

τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρῳσιν. ταῦτα δὲ
 σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὲ ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλή-
 ρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρῳσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἦδοιτο· τὸ 10
 σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἄρα ἀναπλήρῳσις ἡ ἡδονή,
 ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἦδοιτ' ἂν τις, καὶ τε-
 μνόμενος λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ
 τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδυνῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γάρ γενο-
 7 μένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἦδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' 15
 οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ
 τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς
 ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι
 καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς
 8 γὰρ ἐνδεῖα γεγένηται, οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρῳσις. πρὸς δὲ 20
 τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδυνῶν λέγοι τις ἂν

in this way. Aristotle meets the argument by pointing out that if ἡδονή is ἀναπλήρῳσις, it must be in the body, not in the soul.

τεμνόμενος. Aristotle is probably referring to some passage in which surgical operations (τέμνειν καὶ κτεῖν) were referred to as examples of violent alterations of the normal state. Grant refers to Tim. 65 b, where αἱ καύσεις καὶ τομαὶ τοῦ σώματος are given as examples of things which ἀπαλλοτρι-οῦνται ἀθρόα and therefore cause great pain, while the recovery causes little pleasure because κατὰ μικρὰ μόγις τε εἰς ταῦτόν πάλιν ἐαντοῖς καθίσταται. The opposite class is represented by the pleasures of smell (εὐωδία), the satisfaction of which is ἀθρόα, while the κένωσις is not perceived. There is therefore no reason to conjecture κενούμενος (Spengel), δέόμενος (Zeller) or ἐνδεής γεγόμενος (Bywater).

§ 7. ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1152 b, 36 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσιν ἡδοναί. Plato, however, also explained these as πληρώσεις, though the κένωσις preceding them

was gradual (κατὰ μικρὰ) and imperceptible (ἀναίσθητος), while the κατάστασις to the normal state was ἀθρόα. Cf. the passage quoted in the last note as to εὐωδία. See also Rep. 584 b εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδονάς· αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπη-θέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται πανσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσιν. Phileb. 51 b (ἡδονάς) τὰς περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδεῖας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδέας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.

§ 8. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now turns to the argument given above 1152 b, 20 τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπονδαίας, ὅτι εἰσι καὶ αἰσχροὶ καὶ οὐνεῖδόμενοι.

λέγοι τις ἂν. The first answer is simply the old one that culpable pleasures are not (φύσει) ἡδέα at all. For ὑγιεινά, γλυκέα, πικρά, cf. above 1113 a, 28—29, and for τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσιν, see ib. 26 n.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις
 ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἷητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ
 οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκερά ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ
 25 λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσιν. ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις ἂν, 9
 ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἵρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὅτι οὖν
 φαγόντι. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἔτεροι γὰρ αἱ 10
 ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσchrῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι
 30 τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ
 ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ 11
 δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὦν τοῦ κόλακος οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὸν
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμι-
 λεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ'
 1174^a ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν 12
 παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία
 ὡς οἷον τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων,
 μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλὰ τε σπουδὴν ποιη-
 5 σαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέρει ἡδονήν, οἷον ὀρᾶν,
 μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν
 ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοντ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε 13
 τὰγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἵρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ

§ 9. ἢ οὕτω κ.τ.λ. A second tentative answer. The pleasures are good in themselves, but not from these sources. For λέγοι τις ἂν see Bywater, Contr. p. 67.

§ 10. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν. The third answer. Here this is only shown dialectically; below (1175 a, 21 sqq.) it is discussed φυσικώτερον.

§ 11. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. The point seems to be this. The friend is said πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν, the flatterer πρὸς ἡδονήν. This suggests *prima facie* that ἡδονή is not ἀγαθόν, or, if we insist that the friend after all gives pleasure too, we must say that it is a different species of pleasure. If pleasure were *μοσειδής*, we could

not draw any distinction at all.

§ 12. οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο κ.τ.λ. EE. 1215 b, 22 (p. 20). This again indicates that there is some difference in species. Simply as pleasure, a child's pleasure may be greater than a man's, and yet no one would wish to have it over again. So, again, no one would wish to have the pleasures of shameful conduct, though, if pleasure were *μοσειδής*, they would be just as much worth having as any others.

περὶ πολλὰ τε κ.τ.λ. This is the other side of the argument. We are coming to see that it is the character of the activities, and not the pleasures as such, that decides our choice.

ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ἃ ὄν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἰκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

IV. Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ' ὄντιν οὖν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον 15 γινόμενον τελειώσκει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιοῦτ' ὃ εἰσὶ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γὰρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ 2 εἶδος· διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστὶν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομία, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ 20 οὗ ἐφίεται. ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς

ἡ ἀφ' ὧν, i.e. ἡ τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν. Cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

IV. § 1. Τί... ἡ ποῖόν τι. For this formula cf. 1106 a, 15 n.

ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, almost equivalent to ἀνωθεν in the sense explained 1155 b, 2 n. The phrase means practically φυσικώτερον ἐπισκοποῦσιν.

ἡ μὲν ὄρασις κ.τ.λ. Seeing is taken as the type of an ἐνέργεια which is complete in every instant as opposed to a κίνησις or 'process' which is ἀτελής. Aristotle's favourite way of expressing the completeness of an activity in any instant of it is by saying that the present and the perfect tense can be simultaneously used of it. If I look at a thing for some time, I can say both ὀρῶ and ἐώρακα at any moment; but if I am building a house, I cannot say ὡκοδόμηκα till the process (κίνησις) is finished. Cf. Top. 178 a, 9 ἀρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι; οὐ, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρᾶν γέ τι ἅμα καὶ ἐώρακέναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐνδέχεται. Met. 1048 b, 29 πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχυράσις, μάθησις, βαδίσις, οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ὡκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν, ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται...

ἐώρακε δὲ καὶ ὀρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. 1066 a, 20 ἡ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελής δέ. If we see a thing at all, we see it just as much one moment as the next; there is no process. So even if we feel the same pleasure for a time, it is no more a pleasure in one moment than another; it is complete in every νῦν. The essence of a process (κίνησις) is that it is completed in time; a complete ἐνέργεια is independent of time.

οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. and τὸ τέλειον is οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω (Introd. § 27).

§ 2. ὅλον ἢ οἰκοδομία. I agree with Professor Stewart's suggestion that the ms. reading οἰκοδομική is due to the following καὶ which has disappeared from all mss. but K^b. We do not want the art here, but the process.

ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ κ.τ.λ. 'A process, then, is complete either in the whole of the time it takes or in the instant that it attains its end.' L^b omits ἡ before τούτῳ, but this makes the connexion awkward. Of course, strictly speaking, the process ceases to exist as a process in the same instant as it is completed.

μέρεσι [τοῦ χρόνου] πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὐται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ
 25 ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία—οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον—ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτρωῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ 3
 30 γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἶδη, πτήσεις βάδισις ἄλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ ταυτὸν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κάκεινην·

τοῦ χρόνου. This is awkward, as the sequel shows Aristotle is speaking of the parts of the construction, not of the time. The reading of K^b is καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ, from which Bywater infers that the original reading was καὶ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς. The vulgate reading looks decidedly conjectural.

ῥαβδώσεως, 'fluting.'

τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως, 'the construction of the temple as a whole.' Cf. above τῆς ὅλης (sc. κινήσεως) καὶ ἀλλήλων. With the ποίησις τοῦ ναοῦ the κίνησις becomes τελεία and therefore ceases. If we can say τὸν ναὸν πεποίηκεν, we can no longer say τὸν ναὸν ποιεῖ. But we can still say ὁρᾷ even when we can also say ἐώρακεν.

τὸ προκείμενον, *propositum*, 'the task in hand.' Cf. ὁ προτιθέμεθα.

κρηπίδος, 'the base.'

§ 3. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The case of locomotion is just like that of building. It has its specifically different parts just as building has, and each is incomplete in itself. The process of locomotion is only complete when the body in motion has reached its destination and then the process is over. If you can say βεβάδικεν, you

cannot still say βαδίζει.

ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, Phys. 243 a, 6. There are three species of κίνησις, (1) locomotion or φορὰ (ἡ κατὰ τόπον), (2) qualitative motion (ἀλλοίωσις, alteration), and (3) quantitative (αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, growth and diminution). Here πόθεν ποῖ is substituted for κατὰ τόπον as the emphasis is on the ποῖ, the goal of the locomotion.

καὶ ταύτης διαφοραί. These correspond to the λίθων σύνθεσις, κίονος ῥαβδώσις etc. For the εἶδη τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως cf. Part. An. 639 b, 1 οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται μία τῷ εἶδει (ἡ τῶν ζώων πορεία)· διαφέρει γὰρ πτήσις καὶ νεῦσις καὶ βάδισις καὶ ἔρψις. Mot. An. 698 a, 5 τὰ μὲν γὰρ πτήσκει κινεῖται τὰ δὲ νεύσει τὰ δὲ πορεία τῶν ζώων, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλους τρόπους τοιοῦτους.

οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως κ.τ.λ. Not only are there different εἶδη κινήσεως, but if we take any one εἶδος, e.g. walking, every step is ἕτερον τῷ εἶδει from every other.

ἐν τῷ μέρει, sc. τοῦ σταδίου.

τὴν γραμμὴν. The γραμμὴ in the race-course is 'the scratch.' But the meaning seems to be more general here. You may draw a line across

οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ 1174^b
 οὖσαν, ἐν ἐτέρῳ δ' αὐτῇ ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ
 κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ
 τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ
 4 εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῦ εἰδοποιούν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅφρουν 5
 χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἑτεράι τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλ-
 λήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἢ ἡδονῇ. δόξειε δ' ἂν
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδε-
 σθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ
 ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς. οὐ 10

any part of the race-course, and the crossing of each successive line brings the process of running nearer its completion. The crossing of each line is specifically different; for the differentia of *φορά* is *κατὰ τόπον* (*πόθεν ποῦ*), and the lines differ *κατὰ τόπον*.

ἐν ἄλλοις, i.e. in the Physics.

ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ, 'in any given time.' There can be no difficulty in taking this as equivalent to ἐν ὅφρουν above. The equivalence of *πᾶς* (*ἅπας*) and *ὅστις* is normal, e.g. *ὅτι οὖν φαγόντι* (1173 b, 28) is the same as *παμφάγῳ ὄντι* (cf. 1149 b, 34), and *πᾶν ποιεῖν* is the regular phrase for *ὅτι οὖν ποιεῖν* (1128 a, 29 n.). Cf. also *πάντως = ὁπωσοῦν* (1124 b, 9). I only mention this because some editors wish to read *οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι χρόνῳ*, adopting the interpretation of Michael, for which see next note.

αἱ πολλαί. This must surely mean 'the many motions' into which it may be cut up, *τὰ μέρη*. I do not think we can translate 'most motions,' i.e. all but the *κύκλῳ φορά* of the *πρῶτος οὐρανός*, as Michael supposes. It is true, no doubt, that Aristotle regarded this as complete and ἐν ἀδιαφόρῳ κατ' εἶδος, but it seems irrelevant.

εἴπερ...εἰδοποιούν. If the specific difference of *φορά* is *κατὰ τόπον* (*πόθεν ποῦ*), then each part of it will be in a

specifically different *τόπος*, and from a different *πόθεν* to a different *ποῦ*.

§ 4. ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι κ.τ.λ. Phys. 234 a, 34 ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐθέν πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι. This is demonstrated from the indivisibility of τὸ νῦν. The conclusion is ἀνάγκη ἀρα καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἡρεμεῖν τὸ ἡρεμούν.

ἐν τῷ νῦν, Phys. 220 a, 18 φανερόν ἐστι οὐδὲν μόνον τὸ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου... ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς. 233 b, 33 ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν... ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι.

δῆλον καί. A fresh point. Not only is pleasure not a process, but we cannot even say there is a *κίνησις* or *γένεσις* of pleasure. I think the context requires Ramsauer's *τῆς ἡδονῆς* (the mss. have *τὴν ἡδονήν*). He compares for the phraseology Phys. 246 b, 11 τὰ πρὸς τι οὐτ' αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις, ὅτε αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδὲ ὅλως μεταβολή.

οὐ γὰρ πάντων κ.τ.λ. Met. 1044 b, 21 ἕνα ἀνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐστι, ὅλον αἱ στιγμαί, εἴπερ εἰσί, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἶδη καὶ αἱ μορφαί. Nothing indivisible can strictly speaking be said to come into being or pass away. A process implies that one part of the thing has changed while the rest remains in its original state. Now pleasure, as we have seen, is an indivisible whole, complete at every

γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ
 ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονά-
 δος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς·
 ὅλον γάρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, 5
 15 τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ
 τὴν αἴσθησιν—τοιούτου γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέρ-
 γεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἡ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, μὴθὲν διαφε-
 ρέτω—καθ' ἐκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα
 διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. αὕτη δ' ἂν
 20 τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἐστὶν
 ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τε-
 λειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιό-
 τατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ 6
 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε

moment. It can no more go through a process of becoming than a point. If it is not complete, it is not there at all. In the same way we may say τὸ ξόλον λευκὸν γίγνεται, but we cannot say τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεται. Whiteness is or is not there, it cannot 'become' (Met. 1044 b, 21). What we call the γένεσις of pleasure is not pleasure, but a certain process in us which leads up to it. The pleasure is not there at all till the process is complete. Then it is all there, and no more in one moment than another. Wherever you make a section it is complete.

ταῦτα, sc. κίνησις καὶ γένεσις.

§ 5. αἰσθήσεως δὲ κ.τ.λ. We are now in a position to see the real relation between ἐνέργεια and ἡδονή. The ἡδονή simply is the τελείωσις of the ἐνέργεια, not something wholly different from the ἐνέργεια.

πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν, for αἴσθησις is essentially relative (πρὸς τι).

ἐν ᾧ ἐστι. The δεκτικὸν τῆς αἰσθήσεως is the αἰσθητήριον. It is ultimately the ψυχὴ that ἐνεργεῖ.

§ 6. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ.

We have seen that the activity of the best sensation in relation to the best object is the most perfect and the most complete. But the completeness consisting in the relation between the sensation and its object must be distinguished from the further completeness of the pleasure. To understand this passage, we must bear in mind that τὸ αἰσθητὸν is the efficient and ἡ αἴσθησις the formal cause of the ἐνέργεια. According to Aristotle, sensation consists in a sentient being taking into itself the form without the matter of its object. It must, therefore, itself be that form potentially (De An. 431 b, 21 ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστι πάντα). Hence it is that ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς (1130 a, 12 n.), the ἐνέργεια is one, though it can be analysed into αἰσθησις and αἰσθητὸν. Further it is complete, and the pleasure which supervenes is something different from its efficient or formal cause.

- καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις, σπονδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ 25
 7 ἱατρός [ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν].—καθ' ἐκάστην δ'
 αἰσθησιν ὅτι γίνεταί ἡδονή, δῆλον (φαμέν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ
 ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα). δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἡ
 τε αἰσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ'
 ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονή 30
 8 ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου.—τελειοῖ
 δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἔξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ'
 ὥς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. ἔως
 ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρίνον ἢ
 θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίω γὰρ ὄντων καὶ 1175^a

ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἱατρός,
 sc. τελειοῖ. Health is the formal cause
 and the doctor the efficient cause of
 being healthy. The two are therefore
 illustrations of the difference between
 αἰσθησις and αἰσθητόν, not of the
 difference between these and pleasure.
 The parallelism is exact; for, just as
 it is the form of the object that makes
 actual the potentiality of it in the soul,
 so it is the form of health in the
 doctor's soul that is the efficient cause
 of health in his patient. Cf. Met.
 1070 b, 30 τὸ κινεῖν... ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ
 διανοίας τὸ εἶδος... ὑγίεια γὰρ πῶς ἢ
 ἱατρική, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἢ οἰκοδομική.
 Neither ὑγίεια nor ἱατρός illustrates
 the way in which pleasure completes
 the activity; the illustration of that
 is deferred by the characteristically
 awkward parenthetical recapitulation
 καθ' ἐκάστην... τοῦ πεισομένου. We
 must, I think, bracket ὁμοίως αἰτία
 ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, which confuses
 the argument.

§ 7. καθ' ἐκάστην κ.τ.λ. This
 parenthesis gives the proof of what
 was said 1174 b, 20 sqq.

πρὸς τοιοῦτον, sc. πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον.
 ποιήσοντος... πεισομένου. The αἰσ-
 θητόν τοιεῖ, the αἰσθησις πάσχει.
 The ἐνέργεια may be analysed into
 action and reaction, but it is really
 one and complete. Cf. Phys. 255 a

34 αἰεὶ δ' ὅταν ἅμα τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ
 παθητικὸν ᾧσι, γίνεταί ἐνέργεια τὸ
 δυνατόν.

§ 8. τελειοῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note the
 awkward resumption.

οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἔξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, 'not
 like its immanent formal cause.' The
 ἔξις here must correspond to ὑγίεια,
 and it is parallel to the form which is
 made actual in the soul by αἰσθησις.

ὥς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, 'as a
 superadded completion' or 'perfection.'
 It is not like health, but like
 the bloom of youth, something which
 supervenes upon the activity when the
 action and reaction are both at their
 best. The illustration is now com-
 plete, and the parallelism may be
 exhibited thus—

Formal Cause	ὑγίεια	αἰσθησις.
Efficient Cause	ἱατρός	αἰσθητόν.
Supervenient	ὥρα	ἡδονή.
Perfection		

τὸ κρίνον ἢ θεωροῦν, i.e. τὸ αἰσ-
 θανόμενον ἢ νοοῦν. In An. Post. 99 b,
 35 αἰσθησις is called δύναμις σύμφυτος
 κρετική. Hitherto we have been
 speaking of αἰσθησις, but of course all
 that has been said applies equally to
 νοῦς. We shall see that the ἐνέργεια
 of νοῦς is the highest.

ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ. The agent
 and patient, the action and reaction,
 are similar and similarly related in

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ
καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς 9
συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδύ-
νατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ
τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καὶνὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως
διὰ ταῦτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ
διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ
ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ
10 παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ 10
τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰθεῖται τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες
ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα
καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἅ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς
τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ
15 θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελει-
οῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ, οὐ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ
τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοὶ γὰρ ἐκάστω τὸ ζῆν, αἵρετόν ὄν.
πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν 11
ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεξεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα

vóh̄sis and *ásth̄sis*, so the same result will follow.

§ 9. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Grant quotes Met. 1050 b, 22 διὸ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστροι καὶ ὁλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο δρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἢ κίνησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως· ἢ γὰρ οὐσία ὅλη καὶ δύναμις οὐσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου.

οὐ γίνεται, sc. συνεχῶς, which can easily be supplied from what precedes.

παρακέκληται, 'the mind is stirred up.' Cf. Plato, Rep. 523 a τὰ...οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν. Isokrates regularly uses παρακαλεῖν and προτρέπεσθαι as synonyms.

οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, 'as when people look and do not merely see,' is, I suppose, the meaning.

τοιαύτη, sc. διατεταμένη.

ἀμαυροῦται, 'is dimmed.' At Athens this word was only poetical, but it is frequent in the κοινὴ. It may have been in common use at Stageira.

§ 10. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The fact on which Eudoxos relied, namely that all aim at pleasure, is now explained. It is really life, i.e. activity, they aim at, and the pleasure is its τελείωσις.

καὶ τούτοις, 'and with these faculties' as shown by the examples τῇ ἀκοῇ and τῇ διανοίᾳ. The pleasure each man pursues is not any pleasure, but that which is the natural completion of the activity which is best in his eyes.

§ 11. πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This question has now become almost meaningless. Cf. Introductory Note.

συνεξεῦχθαι. Cf. 1178 a, 16.

φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐδέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ 20
 γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνεργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή. V. ὅθεν
 δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑφ' ἑτέρων
 οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι—οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ
 τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἶον ζῶα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφή καὶ ἄγαλμα
 καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς δια- 25
 2 φερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. δια-
 φέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ
 αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.
 φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνφκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκά-
 στην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνεργειαν ἡ 30
 οἰκεία ἡδονή· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν
 οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἶον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαί-
 ροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
 λων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ 35

χωρισμὸν οὐδέχεσθαι. Cf. 1175 b, 35 διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι. Cf. 1102 a, 30 ἀχώριστα πεφυκῶτα and the note there.

V. § 1. ὅθεν δοκοῦσι κ.τ.λ. We now see what is meant by saying that pleasures differ specifically. Aristotle has to deal with the view that pleasure *qua* pleasure is the same though from different sources, for which cf. Plato, Phileb. 12 d εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὃ Σώκρατες, αὐταὶ πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐτὰ γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι.

τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα κ.τ.λ. As Alexander puts it ('Hθ. προβλ. 120, 4 sqq. Bruns) αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνδιαίρουται ταῖς ἐνεργείαις.

φαίνεται, sc. τελειοῦμενα. Natural products like animals or trees are τέλεια when they have reached their full development of size and structure; the products of art are τέλεια when they have been finished so far as to serve the end for which they are made.

§ 2. αὐταί, 'these in turn,' i.e. the

pleasures of thought and the pleasures of sense differ specifically among themselves as well as from one another. Cf. below 1176 a, 3 καὶ ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνφκειῶσθαι, 'from their adaptation.' Cf. 1161 b, 21. Not only do the pleasures differ specifically τῷ ἐπὶ διαφερούσαις γίνεσθαι ἐνεργείαις, but also in their own nature as being οἰκεῖαι ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἐφ' αἷς γίνονται (Alexander loc. cit.).

συναύξει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1177 b, 21. That the specific difference between pleasures is intrinsic and not due solely to their association with certain ἐνεργείαις, is shown by the fact that the ἐνεργεία is increased by its οἰκεῖα ἡδονή. The latter must, then, have some specific character of its own. All this depends upon Aristotle's theory of growth, cf. Gen. Corr. 322 a, 26 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ προσιόν δυνάμει ποσὴ σάρξ, ταύτῃ μὲν αὐξητικὸν σαρκὸς κ.τ.λ.

συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· τοῖς
 1175^b ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. ἔτι δὲ 3
 μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμπο-
 δίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς
 λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαί-
 5 ροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλη-
 τικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνεργείαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως 4
 δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο
 ἐνεργῇ· ἡ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κὰν πολὺ δια-
 φέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ
 10 τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁτῶν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν
 ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ
 ἀγωνιζόμενοι ᾧσι, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν 5
 οἰκεῖα ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ
 15 βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον ὡς πολὺ
 διεστᾶσιν. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ
 οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι,
 οἷον εἴ τῷ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυνον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι·
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρὰς οὐσης τῆς
 20 ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τούναντίον ἀπὸ
 τῶν οἰκεῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ
 ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρη-
 ται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ,
 πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. διαφορουσὼν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεῖα 6
 25 καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκῶν

§ 3. ἐκ τοῦ...ἐμποδίου...εἶναι. Alexander (loc. cit.) ἔτι εἰ αἱ ἐπ' ἄλλαις ἐνεργείαις ἡδοναὶ ἐμποδίζουσι τὰς ἐπ' ἄλλαις γινόμεναις...εἰεν ἂν ἡδοναὶ ἡδονῶν φθαρτικάι. εἰ δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ ἡδονῶν φθαρτικάι, οὐκ ἂν εἰεν ὁμοειδεῖς, ἔχουσαι γὰρ τοῦτο πρὸς ἀλλήλας ὁ ἔχει τὰναντία πρὸς ἀλλήλας.

§ 4. ἐνεργῇ, 1110 a, 14 n. ἐκκρούει. Cf. 1119 b, 10. 1154 a, 27.

§ 5. πολὺ διεστᾶσιν. They are like

ἐναντία, as Alexander says, and *a fortiori* they must be εἶδει ἕτερα, for ἐναντία are the εἶδη that are furthest apart in any γένος.

καθ' αὐτήν. This brings out the meaning of οἰκεῖαι. The pleasures are not attached to the activities in an accidental way; they are essentially the pleasures of the activity. They therefore differ καθ' αὐτάς, not merely κατὰ συμβεβηκός οἱ ᾧ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεσθαι.

τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσchrῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέ- 30
ξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεργος ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταυτὸν ἐστίν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
7 οὐ μὴν εὐοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἰσθησις—ἄτοπον γάρ—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταυτὸν. 35
ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἀφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοή καὶ ὁσφρησις γεύσεως· 1176^a
ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν
8 διάνοιαν, καὶ ἐκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκάστω ζῷω

§ 6. τῶν ὀρέξεων, 'than the appetitions, from which they arise.' Alexander (loc. cit.) καὶ γὰρ εἰ πλεον ἀφέστηκεν τὸ ἐφιέμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν τινος καὶ μηδέπω ἔχον αὐτὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ, εἴη ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία πλεον ἀφεστῶσα τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς ἐνεργείας, ἐφ' ᾗ ἡ ἡδονή. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐφεσὶς ἐστὶν ἡδονῆς, τῇ δ' ἐνέργειᾳ σύνεστιν ἡδονὴ καὶ παρακολουθεῖ· ὥστ' εἰ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις συνδιαίρουνται αἱ ἡδοναί, πολὺ ἂν μάλλον ταῖς ἐνεργείαις συνδιαίρουντο.

αἱ μὲν γάρ, sc. αἱ ὀρέξεις. Desire is both antecedent in time and different in its nature from the activities. It is the efficient cause (Mot. An. 700 b, 35 ἡ δ' ὀρεῖς καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον κινεῖ), while pleasure is the superadded perfection of the activity itself.

§ 7. διάνοια...αἰσθησις. The typical ἐνέργεια. It is said that this is inconsistent with Book VII where pleasure is defined as ἀνεμπόδιτος ἐνέργεια. But that is purely dialectical. The γένεσις αἰσθητή of Speusippos is there developed dialectically into ἀνεμπόδιτος ἐνέργεια,

and it is not necessary to go further for the purpose of the argument there. Here we have a further step but no inconsistency.

καθαριότητι. This appears to be because sight, hearing and smell are independent of contact, while taste is a form of touch. Cf. De An. 434 b, 14 αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι' ἐτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὁσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή. 435 a, 14 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα...πάντα...τῷ δι' ἐτέρου αἰσθάνεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν αἰσθησιν καὶ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ, ἡ δ' ἀφῆ τῷ αὐτῶν ἄπτεσθαι ἐστίν. Further (ib. 435 b, 17) ἀνευ γὰρ ἀφῆς δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῶον...τὰς δ' ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχει...οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἶναι. In other words, touch (and taste) are ἀναγκαῖα, the rest are καλὰ. We have learnt already that ἀκρασία and ἀκολασία in the proper sense have to do only with ἀφῆ and γεῦσις.

αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. αἱ τῆς διανοίας (Ind. s. v. περί) ἡδοναί.

καὶ ἐκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. Cf. 1175 a, 27 καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων. The pleasures of each class (pleasures of sense and of intellect) differ among themselves. This has already been shown of the

καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέρ-
 5 γειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστω δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα
 γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλει-
 τὸς φησιν ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἡδιον
 γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ εἶδει
 διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι.
 10 διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ 9
 αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ
 καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκῶν
 δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι
 καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ
 15 εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ 10
 δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.
 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου
 μέτρον ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἧ τοιούτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶναι
 ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ
 20 τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἰ τῷ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολ-
 λαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ
 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμο- 11
 λογουμένως αἰσχυρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν
 τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπικεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ
 25 τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον;
 ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους
 αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδο-

pleasures of sense, and it is equally true that the pleasures of *σοφία* are higher than other pleasures of intellect.

§ 8. ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον. Cf. 1097 b, 24 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, sc. ἡδονὴ οἰκεία ἐκάστω. It is the ἔργον which determines what is the οἰκεία ἐνέργεια of each, cf. Pol. 1253 a, 23 πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισταί.

καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν. Fr. 51 Bywater. σύρματα τὸν χόρτον Ἡράκλειτος λέγει Michael.

ἀδιαφόρους, sc. κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. The technical term for things identical in species.

§ 9. διαλλάττουσι, i. q. διαφέρουσι, cf. 1161 a, 5. Among the lower animals we do find that each kind has its own pleasures; among men alone do we see that pleasures specifically different are pursued by different individuals.

ἐπὶ γλυκῶν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1113 a, 280.

§ 10. δοκεῖ δ' κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1113 a, 25 sqq.

μέτρον... ὁ ἀγαθός. Cf. 1166 a, 13.

ναί κυρίως λέγουιτ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

VI. Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ 30 ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προει-
 2 ρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἵπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυ-
 τῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα 35 μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθά- 1176^b
 περ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δηλον
 ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς αἰρετῶν τινα θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρ- 5
 3 κης. καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσιν αἰρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρε-
 τὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον 10 ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονι-
 ζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκίμοιςιν

§ 11. δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, 'in a secondary and even a far lower degree.' Cf. Plato, Phileb. 44 c οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτόν.

VI. § 1. περὶ εὐδαιμονίας. We are at last in a position to explain the real meaning of our ἀρχή, the definition of Happiness.

§ 2. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις. The doctrine of Speusippos dismissed 1098 b, 31 sqq.

καθεύδοντι...φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον. Cf. 1095 b, 31 sqq., 1098 b, 31 sqq. EE. 1216 a, 3.

τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα, e.g. τῷ Πριαμικαῖς τόχαις περιπεσόντι 1101 a, 6. Cf. 1100 a, 8. 1100 b, 28.

ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, 1098 a, 5.

αἱ μὲν...ἀναγκαῖαι, sc. ἐξ ὑποθέ-
 σεως, i.e. those which have some
 ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν (cf. 1094 a,
 3), which are the *conditio sine qua*
non of something higher.

τῶν καθ' αὐτάς...τῶν δι' ἄλλο. Of course there are some things αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά and also δι' ἄλλο (1096 b, 17), but εὐδαιμονία belongs to the class of things which are οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο.

οὐδενός...ἐνδεῆς, i.e. τελεία. Cf. 1097 a, 30 sqq.

§ 3. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to discuss the claims of amusement to be the end of life for the reason given in Book I.

παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις. Cf. 1095 b, 17. 1158 a, 27.

οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται,
 15 ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς, δέονται δὲ τοιού-
 των. / δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν 4
 δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δ' ἴσως σημείον
 οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς,
 ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες
 20 ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοὺς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς κατα-
 φεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ
 γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἰονται
 εἶναι. εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαί-
 νεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν 5
 25 πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ
 τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἰρετω-
 τάτῃ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ 6
 ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
 παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
 30 ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου
 ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
 σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ
 λίαν παιδικόν. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν,
 ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνα-
 35 τούντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος
 1177^a ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ
 εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς,
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν 7
 γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ
 5 μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ
 βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἦδη. ἀπολαύσειέ
 τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ

ἐφίενται, sc. οἱ τύραννοι.

§ 4. τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις, 1095 b,
 21 n.

§ 5. πολλάκις εἴρηται, 1063 a,
 1 sqq., 1113 a, 25 sqq., 1254 a, 36,
 etc.

§ 6. ἡ ἀνάπαυσις. On the theory
 of ἀνάπαυσις ἀνεσις τῆς ψυχῆς) see

above 1127 b, 33. 1150 b, 17.

It will not seem strange to us that
 Aristotle insists so strongly on the
 truth that amusement is not the end
 of life if we bear in mind that θεωρία
 is a form of διαγωγή and is therefore
 liable to be confused with ἀνάπαυσις.
 Cf. Pol. 1337 b, 33.

ἥττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδω μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ 10 πρότερον εἴρηται.

VII. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοὺς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν 15 καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοὺς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ 20 τῶν γνωστών, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοὺς. ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὅτιοῦν. οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν 25 καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδῶ τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται 30

§ 7. εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον. The slave, being an *ἐμψυχον ὄργανον* (1161 b, 4), has no *βίος* of his own. He is the instrument of another's life. Cf. Pol. 1280 a, 32 *δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων... οὐκ ἔστι* (sc. ἡ πόλις) *διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τὸ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν*.

καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται. Cf. 1098 a, 15.

VII. § 1. εἴρηται. Strictly speaking it has not been said, though it is perhaps implied in 1095 b, 14 sqq. where all other lives than the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* are shown to be inadequate while its consideration is reserved

(1096 a, 4). In any case it follows at once from the proof given in Book VI that *σοφία* is the highest form of goodness.

§ 2. τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν. Cf. 1138 b, 7 n.

θεωρεῖν... δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς. The reason is that *θεωρία* is the *ἐνέργεια* of a *δύναμις* which is so high as to be almost an *ἐνέργεια*. The only reason why it is not continuous is that it is still a *δύναμις*, not the *actus purus* of *νόησις*. Met. 1074 b, 28 *εἰ μὴ νόησις ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὐλογον ἐπίπικον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῇ τῆς νόησεως*.

§ 4. κεχορηγημένων, cf. 1101 a, 15.

πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώ-
φρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς
καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος
ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως
1177^b αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶ-5
σθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ
δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ
τὴν πρᾶξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχο-6
5 λούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην
ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς
ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς·
οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ
10 παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος
τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ
φόνοι γίνοντο. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ
παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τι-
μᾶς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, [ἐτέραν
15 οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἐτέραν οὖσαν.
εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ 7
πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἀσχο-
λοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν,

συνεργοὺς ἔχων. Cf. 1170 a, 5. From the beginning Greek science was organised on cooperative principles (Early Greek Philosophy, *Introd. ad fin.*), and the Peripatos itself was so in a high degree. The Greek thinks of scientific inquiry as the give and take of independent minds (*διαλεκτική*). But of course it is possible for the wise man's soul to commune with itself.

§ 5. οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. At the beginning of the Metaphysics it is shown that science arises after everything necessary to life has been secured. Its origin is in Wonder and it serves no end but the satisfaction of our

natural desire to know. Cf. 982 b, 24 δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτῇ ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν ἐτέραν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπός φημεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὧν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτῇ, μόνῃ ἐλευθέρῃ οὔσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκὲν ἔστιν. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις.

§ 6. δοκεῖ τε κ.τ.λ. This is the truth which underlies the perverted view that amusement is the end of life. Εὐδαιμονία is ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή, though it is not mere ἀνάπαυσις ('rest') or ἀνεσις ('relaxation').

§ 7. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis begins at b, 24 ἡ τελεία δὴ.

ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὐσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν 20 οἰκείαν—αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν—καὶ τὸ αὐταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, [τὰ] κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὲ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μήκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστὶ 25 τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτ' καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος 30 θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα, οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον 1178^a 9 πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ

σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν, sc. τῶν ἐν σχολῇ, e.g. τῶν παιδιῶν.

συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Cf. 1175 a, 30.

μήκος βίου τέλειον, 1098 a, 15 n.

§ 8. τοῦ συνθέτου, 'man as a composite being.'

ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν. Cf. Nauck FTG. p. 690 where we have the verse—

ἀνθρώπον ὄντα δεῖ φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπινα.
In Rhet. 1394 b, 24 Aristotle quotes—
θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα
τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν.

So Pindar, Isthm. v, 20 θνατὰ θνατοῖσι
πρέπει, Sophokles, Tereus fr. 515
θνητὰ φρονεῖν χρὴ θνητὴν φύσιν, Antiphanes ap. Stob. Flor. i, 316 εἰ θνητὸς
εἰ, βέλτιστε θνητὰ καὶ φρόνει.

ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν.
Aristotle did not believe in individual
immortality. Νοῦς alone is immortal
and it is not individual. But by

identifying ourselves so far as may be
with it we escape to a certain extent
from mortality. The thought was
originated by Plato in the Phaedo,
and remained in one form or another
to the end. Cf. Tim. 90 b τῷ δὲ
περὶ φιλομάθειαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς
φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότες... πᾶσα ἀνάγκη
που, καθ' ὅσον δ' αὐτὸ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρω-
πίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτου
μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν. Cf. also the
ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν of
Theait. 176 b.

τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. Cf. 1138 b, 7 n.

τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν. Giphanius com-
pares Soph. El. 183 b, 22 μέγιστον
γὰρ ἔσως ἀρχή... ὅσ' γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ
δυνάμει, τοσοῦτ' μικρότατον ὃν τῷ
μεγέθει χαλεπώτατον ἐστὶν ὀφθῆναι.
Of course the expression is figurative.

§ 9. εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο. Cf.
1169 a, 2.

εἴπερ τὸ κύριον. Cf. 1168 b, 31.

τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστω τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

VIII. Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ 10 κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίοις ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ 2 15 τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνφκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ 3 ἥθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρητημένα δ' αὐταὶ καὶ 20 τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον 4 25 δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεῖα καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ

τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον κ.τ.λ. Here we see the real sequence of the whole argument. For *φιλία* in its highest form is the love of the higher self, and it is good, as proved above 1170 a, 13 sqq., for it is just the self-consciousness of the activity of thought (*νόησις νοήσεως*).

VIII. § 1. Δευτέρως δὲ κ.τ.λ. As the *κύριον* in man is *νοῦς*, the best human life will be *κυρίως καὶ πρώτως* ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν (cf. 1157 a, 31 n.). But we must also take the *σύνθετον* into account.

§ 2. ἔνια δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 b,

3 sqq.

§ 3. συνέζευκται. Cf. 1175 a, 19. εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 a, 23 sqq. τὸ ὀρθόν, i.e. the *ὀρθότης* of the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*.

αὐταί, sc. αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί.

περὶ τὸ σύνθετον, i.e. τοῦ συνθέτου, cf. Ind. s.v. *περί*.

διακριβῶσαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Neither is a note on the *Ethics* the proper place to discuss the *χωρισμός* of *νοῦς*.

§ 4. δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. It is true that this section contains repetitions, but that is no reason for suspecting it.

πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέροι—
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ
 δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ
 δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, 30
 προσποιούνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν),
 τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει, εἵπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἡ
 5 οὗτος ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται τε πότερον κυριώτε-
 ρον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν 35
 οὔσης· τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ 1178^b
 τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ
 6 καλλίους, πλείονων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων
 πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι
 πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἡ δ' ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ, 5
 αἰρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσει οὖν τῶν τοιού-
 7 των πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρη-
 τικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς
 γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπεκλήφμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι·
 πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δι- 10
 καίας; ἡ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακατα-
 θήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους**
 ὑπομένοντες τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντες, ὅτι καλόν; ἡ
 τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται
 αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιούτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; 15
 ἡ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας;
 διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνουσιν· ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ
 καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπεκλήφασιν
 αὐτούς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν
 Ἐνδυμῖωνα. τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ 20

ἐξουσίας, sc. τοῦ ἀκολασταίνειν (Koraes).

§ 5. ἀμφισβητεῖται τε κ.τ.λ. EE. 1288 a, 15.

§ 7. ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους; sc. πράξεις. I read ὑπομένοντες with K^b and κινδυνεύοντες. The accusatives of our other authorities seem due to assimila-

tion to ἀνδρείους. Some such words as ἀλλ' ἄτοποι seem to have fallen out before ὑπομένοντες.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν. Met. 1074 b, 17 εἶπε γὰρ μὴθὲν νοεῖ (ὁ νοῦς), τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων.

μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτῃ εὐδαιμονικωτάτῃ. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας,⁸
 25 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῶων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλ-
 30 λον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ⁹
 αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα
 35 ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν.
 1179^a οὐ μὴν οἴητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαι-
 μονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον
 εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πράξις,
 δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν¹⁰
 5 τὰ καλὰ· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἂν τις πράττειν
 κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶ-
 ται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπικεικὴ πράττειν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ
 βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργούντος. καὶ Σόλων¹¹
 10 δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως
 τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὥς
 ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια

§ 8. τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. 1072 b, 14 διαγωγὴ δ' οἷον ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν.

§ 9. εὐημερίας. Cf. 1099 b, 3 n.

§ 10. τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν, sc. μέτρια.

§ 11. καὶ Σόλων δὲ κ.τ.λ. From Herod. i, 30. Cf. especially Τέλλῳ τοῦτο μὲν τῆς πόλεως εὐήκουστος παῖδες ἦσαν καλοὶ τε κάγαθοί, καὶ σφί εἶδε ἅπασιν τέκνα γενόμενα καὶ πάντα

παρμέναντα· τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ βίου εὐήκοντι, ὡς τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν, τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου λαμπροτάτῃ ἐπεγένετο· γενομένης γὰρ Ἀθηναίοισι μάχης πρὸς τοὺς ἄστυ-γεῖτονας ἐν Ἐλευσίνι βοηθήσας καὶ τροπὴν ποιήσας τῶν πολεμίων ἀπέθανε κάλλιστα, καὶ μιν Ἀθηναῖοι δημοσίῃ τε ἔθαψαν αὐτοῦ τῇ περ ἔπεσε καὶ ἐτίμησαν μεγάλως.

- κεκτημένους πράττειν ἂν δεῖ. ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ Ἄναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι 15
- 12 γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκόασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρή ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα 20 καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις
- 13 ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τούτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὖλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ—τούτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς—καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τούτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. 30 τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

IX. Ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος

Ἄναξαγόρας. Cf. EE. 1215 b, 6 (p. 19) and D L. ii, 7 πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα 'Οὐδὲν σοι μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,' 'Εὐφήμει,' ἔφη, 'ἐμοὶ γὰρ καὶ σφόδρα μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,' δείξας τὸν οὐρανόν.

§ 12. συμφωνεῖν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1098 b, 9 sqq. and Introd. § 25. The λόγοι here are the dialectical arguments derived from λογικαὶ προτάσεις, and these are said to be in harmony with τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκούντα, which form ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις. They must further be tested by the facts of life (ἔργα), and if they do not stand this test, they are to be regarded as mere λόγοι.

§ 13. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κ.τ.λ. It

has been objected to this passage (1) that it breaks the connexion of ideas, (2) that it is inconsistent with Aristotle's view of the relation between God and Man. Both objections are true, but neither is a sign of spuriousness. The words δοκεῖ and εὖλογον show that this is merely a new ἐνδοξον.

IX. § 1. Ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. We have now discovered what εὐδαιμονία is, and we have also seen how a man may attain it for himself; but our task is not complete. We have still to ask how the νομοθέτης is to produce it in the state.

τοῖς τύποις. Cf. Introd. § 26.

35 ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἡ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν
 1179^b ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ
 μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ 2
 εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἡ εἴ πως ἄλλως
 ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς 3
 5 τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δι-
 καίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσα-
 σθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμηῆσαι
 τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἡθὸς τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς
 ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς,
 10 τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι·
 οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέ- 4
 χεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροὺς ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας·
 πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν
 αὐταὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ
 15 δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγε-
 στοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; οὐ 5
 γὰρ οἷόν τε ἡ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡθεσι κατειλημ-

τὴν προαίρεσιν. Here προαίρεσις is practically equivalent to πραγματεία or μέθοδος, cf. 1094 a, 2 n.

καθάπερ λέγεται, 1103 b, 26.

§ 2. οὐδὲ...ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι. Cf. 1105 b, 2. 1152 a, 8.

ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι, i.e. to have the *ἐξίς* and produce the *ἐνέργεια*. Cf. 1098 b, 32 n.

§ 3. κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, v. 432—434 *εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτό γ' ἔδωκε θεός, ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον*. The quotation is suggested by Plato, *Meno* 95 e, where, after quoting *ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά* (1172 a, 13), he goes on *οἷσθ' ὅτε ἐν τούτοις ὡς διδασκτοῦ οὐσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει*;—*Φαίνεται γε*.—*Ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς*, “*ei δ'*

ἦν ποιητόν,” φησι, “*καὶ ἐνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα*,” λέγει πως ὅτι “*πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον*.”

νῦν δὲ φαίνονται...ἰσχύειν go together.

προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμηῆσαι, an Isokratean touch.

κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ready to be ‘possessed’ or ‘inspired’ (*κατέχεσθαι*) by goodness. So in Plato’s *Ion* *ῥασσιν* ἐξ Ὁμήρου κατέχεσθαι.

§ 4. αἰδοῖ...φόβῳ. For the opposition cf. 1116 a, 31.

οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. This chiasmic repetition and amplification is exactly in the style of Isokrates.

§ 5. μεταρρυθμίσαι, an Ionic word, also used by Xenophon. The Attic equivalent is *μετασχηματίσαι*.

κατειλημμένα, ‘shut up in,’ ‘locked up in.’ The term is probably a medical one; for in *Probl.* 870 h. 10

μένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι· ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων
 ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπικεκίς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοι-
 6 μιν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει 20
 οἱ δ' ἔθει οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς
 οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς
 ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή
 ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς
 ἡθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ 25
 7 μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 ἀκούσειεν λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος
 ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τε
 8 οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπέκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἥθος
 προϋπάρχειν πῶς οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ 30
 δυσχεραίνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ
 γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν
 καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενό- 35
 9 μενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας 1180^a
 τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν

(Why do we sweat more in summer than winter though the body is drier?) we read that τοῦ χειμῶνος πεπικνωμένων ἐκτὸς τῶν σωμάτων, πολὺν κατελιγμένον τὸ τῆς φύσεως θερμὸν εἰς πνεῦμα οὐ διαλύει τὰ ὑγρά.

ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. So far from λόγοι alone sufficing, "we may think ourselves lucky" if the combination of all the recognised means of attaining goodness is effective.

§ 6. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1099 b, 9 sqq.

τὸ...τῆς φύσεως, cf. 1103 a, 20 n. ἐφ' ἡμῖν. The words show that this is a formal βούλευσις.

δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι...ὥσπερ γῆν. Korae compares Hippokr. (Nόμ. § 2) ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἡμέων ὁκοῖον ἢ χῶρη·

τὰ δὲ δόγματα τῶν διδασκόντων ὁκοῖον τὰ σπέρματα· ἡ δὲ παιδομαθὴ τὸ κατ' ὥρην αὐτὰ πεσεῖν ἐς τὴν ἀρουραν. The doctrine is the same as 1095 b, 4 sqq. where too K^b has ἔθεισιν for ἡθεσιν (L^b).

§ 7. ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν. Cf. 1095 a, 8.

§ 8. δεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ., the Platonic view. Cf. 1104 b, 12 n.

ὑπὸ τοιούτοις...νόμοις, sc. ὀρθοῖς. After τρέφεσθαι and παιδεύεσθαι, ὑπὸ c. dat. is regular. The steps in the deliberative analysis are ἀρετῇ, ἐθισμός, νόμος.

συνήθη γενόμενα. Cf. Rhet. 1369 b, 16 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνθητες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιούσιν.

αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμον,
καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη
5 μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ 10
οἴονται τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν
ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὥς ἐπακουσομένων
τῶν ἐπικεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφνε-
στέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ'
10 ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπικεικῇ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρε-
γόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καὶ φασι
δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται
ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν 11
15 ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἰθ'
οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπικεικῇ ζῆν καὶ μὴτ' ἄκοντα μὴθ'
ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις
κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν· ἡ μὲν οὖν 12
πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον,
20 οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοι-
ούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ
τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι
τοὺς ἐναντιοιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ

αὐτά. Susemihl suggests ἄττα, while Rodier points out that Michael seems to have read ἄλλα.

§ 10. οἴονται τινες. The reference seems to be to Plato's requirement in the Laws 722 d sqq. that all laws should begin with a *prooimion* of a persuasive and protreptic character.

τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους...ἐξορίζειν. Plato, Protag. 325 n δς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενοι καὶ διδασκόμενοι, ὡς ἀνιάτων ὄντων τοῦτον ἐκβάλλειν ἢ ἀποκτείνειν.

Διὸ καὶ φασι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1104 b, 16 n.

§ 11. μὴτ' ἄκοντα μὴθ' ἐκόντα. We must not press this. It is purely phraseological like αἱ τ' ὄντες αἱ τ' ἀπόντες in Soph. Ant. 1109.

βιουμένοις. Aristotle means ζῶσι, but he has slipped into a rare Ionism. This is quite on a different level from the common, though incorrect, βιοῖν, βιώσαι. The study of Isokrates has not effaced the early associations of Stageira (Wilamowitz-Möllendorf Aristoteles und Athen vol. i, p. 331).

§ 12. λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ...νοῦ. Pol. 1287 a, 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεῖον καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπου κελύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίων· ἡ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιούτων, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἀνευ ἀρχέων τοῖς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.

- 13 νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθῆς τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ
 Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει <ῆ> μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν 25
 δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς
 πλείστοις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ
 ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ'
 14 ἀλόχου. κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν
 καὶ ὀρθὴν [καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι]· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων 30
 ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φί-
 λοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, * * ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μᾶλλον
 δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς
 γενόμενος. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νό-
 μων γίνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων· γεγραμ- 35
 μένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν 1180^b
 εἰς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ
 γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
 ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἥθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν
 οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ 5
 τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέρ-
 15 γοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ
 καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς· κα-
 θόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία,
 τινὲ δ' ἴσως οὐ, ὃ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην 10

§ 13. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1337 a, 31 ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἂν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ παιδῆς καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην. Cf. also 1102 a, 10.

ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων. The addition of ἢ is due to Professor Bywater. Aristotle means the Cretans and the Carthaginians. Cf. Pol. 1372 b, 24.

κυκλωπικῶς, Od. ix, 114 (of the Cyclopes)...θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος | παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἄλλῃων ἀλέγουσιν. Elsewhere Aristotle uses this quotation to describe the patriarchal stage of society. Cf. Pol. 1252 b, 20 πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυ-

τάτου...καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ λέγει Ὀμηρος κ.τ.λ.

§ 14. καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι. Professor Bywater's suggestion that these words should come after συμβάλλεσθαι would certainly improve the sentence.

γεγραμμένων...ἀγράφων. This famous antithesis is only mentioned here because the laws of the domestic legislator will as a rule be unwritten.

§ 15. ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς. Cf. 1097 a, 11.

μάχην περιτίθουσιν is a strange phrase. Stahr conjectures μειλίχην for μάχην and Stewart παρατίθουσιν for περιτίθουσιν.

περιτίθῃσιν. ἐξακριβούσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκα-
στον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφό-
ρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖν μὲν <ἀν> ἄριστα καθ'
ἐν καὶ ἱατρὸς καὶ γυμναστῆς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς,
15 τί πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοισδί—τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι λέγονται
τε καὶ εἰσὶν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς 16
ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς
τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἱατροὶ
ἐνιοὶ δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι
20 ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἥττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῶ γε-
νέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν
ἂν, κακείνῳ γνωριστέον ὥς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ
τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστήμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας 17
βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶ πειρα-
25 τέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἂν. ὄντινα γὰρ
οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος,
ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμελεία τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπι- 18
σκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ
30 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μῦριον γὰρ ἐδόκει

ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς. Cf. 1141 b, 22
εἰς δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.
Cf. also Met. 981 a, 10 πᾶσι τοῖς τοι-
οῖσδε κατ' εἶδος ἐν ἀφορισθεῖσι.

§ 16. δι' ἐμπειρίαν. Cf. Met. 981 a,
12 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία
τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὀρώμεν τοὺς
ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον
ἐχόντων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία
τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐστὶ γνώσις, ἡ δὲ
τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ
αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον
εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον ὑγιάζει ὁ
ιατρεὺς, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβη-
κός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτη ἢ τῶν
ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ὧς
συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἐὰν οὖν
ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχη τις τὸν λόγον,
καὶ τὸ μὲν καθόλου γνωρίζῃ, τὸ δ' ἐν
τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις

διαμαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεράπει-
ν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ἀλλ' ὅμως τό-
γ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαλεῖν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς
ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ
σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων
ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὥς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι
μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι·
τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν,
οἱ δ' οὐκ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ τὸ ὅτι μὲν
ἴσασιν, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι
καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.

§ 17. καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα, 'any
given subject submitted for treatment.'

§ 18. μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον. We
have found that νόμος is the means to
become νομοθετικός. The next step
in the βούλευσις is the means of
becoming νομοθετικός.

μῦριον γὰρ ἐδόκει...εἶναι, sc. ἡ
νομοθετική. Cf. 1141 b, 23 sqq.

τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἡ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἱατροὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, 35 πρᾶττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν 1181^a ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πρᾶττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται—καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς—οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότας τοὺς σφε- 5

19 τέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἄν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλονται ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς 10 πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι. ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν 20 τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρῳ ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο 15

ἡ οὐχ ὅμοιον κ.τ.λ. This whole passage is an echo of the well-known complaints of Plato in the *Meno* (91 a—100 c) and *Protagoras* (319 d—320 b) that the statesmen of Athens have not taught any one their art, not even their sons.

ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων. Cf. 1094 a, 10. b, 4.

§ 20. τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ. The history of the Greek word ῥήτωρ and its everyday use at Athens led to this identification, the criticism of which forms the first subject of Plato's *Gorgias*. But, as Spengel saw, Isokrates is more immediately aimed at. Cf. e.g. *Antid.* § 80 νόμους μὲν θεῖναι μυριοὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ἱκανοὶ γεγόνασιν, εἰπεῖν δὲ περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἀξίως τῆς πόλεως

καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν πολλοὶ δυνήθευν. ὦν ἕνεκα τοὺς ἔργον ποιοῦμένους τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους εὗρίσκειν τοσοῦτῳ χρή περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τῶν τοὺς νόμους ποιούντων, ὅσῳ περ εἰσι σπανιώτεροι καὶ χαλεπώτεροι καὶ ψυχῆς φρονιμωτέρας δεόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νῦν.

οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο κ.τ.λ. Here the reference is quite plain. Cf. *Antid.* § 82 ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐνταῦθα προεληλύθαμεν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους ἀναριθμήτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν νόμων ἐπαινεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχαιοτάτους, τῶν δὲ λόγων τοὺς καινοτάτους, οὐκέτι τῆς αὐτῆς διανοίας ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι προαιρουμένοις προῤῥηγον γέγονε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κειμένων, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ζητεῖν δεῖ ἐτέροισι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς

ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας
 τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
 τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὐσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον,
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα
 20 κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἡ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συν-
 ιᾷσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν
 τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσ-
 περ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις εἰόκασιν·
 1181^b πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἡ τοὺς ἀρίστους
 κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμά- 21
 των γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θερα-
 πεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν
 5 ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἔξεις· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἔμπειροις
 ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως
 οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς
 μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοῦναντίον
 καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἶη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ
 10 ἔξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν

παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας πειρα-
 θῆναι συναγαγεῖν, ὃ ῥᾶδιως ὅστις ἂν
 οὖν βουληθεὶς ποιήσῃε κ.τ.λ. 'Aris-
 totle's words are a direct quotation
 from this.

ἔργοις εἰόκασιν. The point is that
 the laws are τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης, not ἡ
 τέχνη. Cf. the criticism of the rhe-
 torical teaching of Gorgias and the rest,
 which consisted in giving their pupils
 speeches to learn by heart. Soph.
 El. 184 a, 2 οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ
 τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμ-
 βανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἐπιστήμην
 φάσκων παραδόνειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν ποιεῖν
 τοὺς πόδας, εἴτα σκντοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ
 διδάσκει, μηδ' ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι
 τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδα-
 πῶν ὑποδημάτων, οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε
 μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν, τέχνην δ' οὐ
 παρέδωκεν.

§ 21. ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων. We
 see from the context that this is an

argument *a fortiori*. Medical books
 are more scientific than collections of
 laws, and yet the doctor must use his
 own judgment.

ἴσως οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. 1360 a,
 30 χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ
 μὴ μόνον ἐπαλεῖν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρι
 ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθόντων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶδέναι, αἱ
 ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἀρμόττουσιν. ὥστε
 δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ
 τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ
 λαβεῖν ἔστιν τοῖς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμοις,
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς τὰς
 τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστο-
 ρίας· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ'
 οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.

ἄνευ ἔξεως. This is the MS.
 reading, and is supposed to mean
 either (1) without the habit produced
 by experience and practice, or (2)
 without knowledge as a *ξῆς ἀπο-*
δεικτικῆς. Neither of which seems

ὑπάρχουσι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα
 22 τάχ' ἂν γένοιντο. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύ-
 νητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον
 βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύνα-
 23 μιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν 15
 οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων
 πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν
 θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σφίζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ
 ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν
 καλῶς αἱ δὲ τοῦναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τού- 20
 των τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη,
 καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη.
 λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

satisfactory. We might read *ἀνευ ἐξετάσεως*. The words are confused in MSS., e.g. in Plato *Apol.* 22 e.

§ 23. *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* The fact that the sketch here given does not agree with the order followed in the *Politics* as we have it, or, as Newman says, with "any conceivable order," seems to me decisive in favour

of its genuineness. Surely an interpolator would have given a more recognisable synopsis. On the whole question, see Newman's *Politics* vol. II, App. A.

ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν. We have at last one of these in the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, of which few will now suspect the Aristotelian origin.

APPENDIX A

De Anima 433 a, 9 sqq.

Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινούμενα, ἡ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα· πολλά γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις οὐ νόησις οἶδε λογισμὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός, διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πάντα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ κινούμενα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτικῇ· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρεκτὸν. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως. ἐν δὲ τι τὸ κινεῖν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἂν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως—ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις—ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται. ἡ δ' ὄρεξις κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις τίς ἐστιν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ αἰεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτὸν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις, φανερόν. τοῖς δὲ διαιρούσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐὰν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις διαίρῳσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, ἀμύπολλα γίνεται, θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, ἐτι ὀρεκτικόν· ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ θυμικόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίαι ᾧσι, γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνῳ αἰσθησιν ἔχουσι—ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκει κελύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἥδη· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἥδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν τὸ μέλλον—εἶδει μὲν ἐν ἂν εἴη τὸ

κινούν τὸ ὁρεκτικόν, ἢ ὁρεκτικόν, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὁρεκτόν—τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι—ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινούντα. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐστὶ τρία, ἐν μὲν τὸ κινούν, δεύτερον δ' ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον· τὸ δὲ κινούν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινούν καὶ κινούμενον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινούν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὁρεκτικόν—κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὁρεγόμενον ἢ ὁρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὁρεξις κίνησις τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια—τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῶον· ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἢ ὁρεξις, ἥδη τοῦτο σωματικόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινούν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτόν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχή· διὸ τὸ μὲν ἡρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει δ' ἀχώριστα· πάντα γὰρ ὥσει καὶ ἔλξει κινεῖται. διὸ δεῖ ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν τι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἢ ὁρεκτικόν τὸ ζῶον, ταύτῃ ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν· ὁρεκτικόν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα μετέχει.

Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν τί τὸ κινούν ἐστιν, οἷς ἀφ' ἑνὸς μόνον ὑπάρχει αἰσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς, ἢ οὐ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. φαίνεται γὰρ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη. φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐνεστὶ μὲν, ἀορίστως δ' ἐνεστίν. ἢ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ὑπάρχει, ἢ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς· πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἥδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μείζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε δύναται ἐν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν. καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικόν οὐκ ἔχει ἢ ὁρεξις· νικᾷ δ' ἐνίστε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν· ὅτε δ' ἐκείνη ταύτην, <ὅτε δ' > ὥσπερ σφαῖρα ἢ ὁρεξις τὴν ὁρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκрасία γένηται· φύσει δὲ αἰεὶ ἢ ἂν ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ· ὥστε τρεῖς φορὰς ἥδη κινεῖσθαι. τὸ δ' ἐπιστημονικόν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ μένει. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἢ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα—ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἢ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοῖνον τοιόνδε, καὶ γὰρ δὲ τοιόσδε—ἥδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἢ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου· ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἡρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἢ δ' οὐ.

APPENDIX B

De motu animalium 701 a, 7 sqq.

Πῶς δὲ νοῶν ὅτε μὲν πράττει, ὅτε δ' οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὅτε δ' οὐ κινεῖται; ἔοικε παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων διανο-
 ουμένους καὶ συλλογιζομένους. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος—ὅταν γὰρ
 τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ συνέθηκεν—ἐνταῦθα
 δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται ἢ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ
 ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δ' ὅτι
 οὐδενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, εὐθὺς ἡρεμεῖ· καὶ ταῦτα
 ἄμφω πράττει, ἂν μὴ τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ. ποιητέον μοι ἀγαθόν, οἰκία
 ἀγαθόν, ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθὺς. σκεπάσματος δέομαι, ἱμάτιον δὲ σκέπασμα,
 ἱματίου δέομαι. οὐ δέομαι ποιητέον, ἱματίου δέομαι, ἱμάτιον ποιητέον.
 καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἱμάτιον ποιητέον, πρᾶξις ἐστίν. πράττει δ' ἀπ'
 ἀρχῆς. εἰ ἱμάτιον ἔσται, ἀνάγκη τόδε πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τόδε, τόδε· καὶ τοῦτο
 πράττει εὐθὺς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ
 προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διὰ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ
 τοῦ δυνατοῦ. ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν
 τὴν δῆλην οὐδ' ἢ διάνοια ἐφιστᾶσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν
 ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ
 λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν. ὅταν γὰρ ἐνεργήσῃ ἢ τῇ
 αἰσθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ τῷ νῷ, οὐ ὁρέγεται εἶθι
 ποιεῖ· ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἢ τῆς ὁρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια.
 ποτέον μοι, ἢ ἐπιθυμία λέγει, τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἢ αἰσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία
 ἢ ὁ νοῦς, εὐθὺς πίνει. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῷα
 ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὁρέξεως οὕσης, ταύτης δι'
 γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως.

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TO THE INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

NOTE.—*I have not thought it necessary to give an Index to the Text, as those of Grant, Susemihl, and Bywater are amply sufficient. The references are to the pages of this volume.*

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
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